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This thesis undertakes to explore the specific ways in which the emergence of new-science
epistemological, linguistic, and ethical ideals influenced and transformed how seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century writers conceived of lyric experience, bringing about a metamorphosis
of the lyric from a minor to a major genre.
The Preamble establishes the polemical and critical bases for this study, drawing attention to
the ways in which eighteenth-century criticism devalues the contribution of the lyric in
eighteenth-century culture and society. It shows how the lyric was the most popular poetic
form throughout the century, and it provides evidence of a changing view of its expressive
abilities from the early to the later decades. The Preamble concludes with the thesis that the
lyric's change in generic valuation occurs because it shared many of the epistemological
assumptions which conditioned or modified most thought and feeling throughout the century,
that lyric experience evolved as part of a cultural circumambience in which, through both
ideological and rhetorical precepts, experimental science was exerting an hegemonic force
on every aspect of day-to-day experience. The lyric genre was that form which most readily
expressed the new experience and appreciation of nature brought about by the experimental
science.
Chapter One assesses why the modern critical tradition has conceived the image of the
eighteenth-century lyric as it has done for about two hundred years. This review yields
theoretical and historical fruits for the arguments of later chapters. Chapter Two, focusing on
Bacon's The Advancement of Learning, the work of Wilkins, Sprat, Locke, and others,
iii
examines those particular components of the new science which directly influenced the
metamorphosis of the lyric genre-the rejection of authority, the development of
epistemological principles, and adherence to a linguistic, rhetorical, and ethical code. Chapter
Three shows how the steady advance of experimental science in the seventeenth century
began to alter attitudes and perceptions of the lyric's expressive potential, entailing a
discussion of how the new science altered literary values and standards which were derived
from classicism. Chapter Four explores critical views of the genre (and of specific types) in
the eighteenth century, focusing in particular on the value of poetic description, on
conceptualisations of the genre's specific poetic features, on careful assessments of the
rules of composition, and on other such matters. The Chapter Five provides a final parallel
between lyric and scientific perceptions of the way in which nature leads to ecstatic
experiences which are imaged spatially, and concludes with some remarks about the
implications of the thesis.
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The History of Thought
Often the things which have seemed true to me
when I began to think about them, seemed false
when I tried to place them on paper.
Rene Descartes
Discourse on the Method
vii
Preamble
A letter signed simply "J. A." in The Gentleman's Magazine for September 1786 makes
the following request: "Permit me, under favour of your Magazine, to make this public
testimony of the pleasure I have received in reading Mrs. Smith's Elegiac Sonnets."1
What? Pleasure from reading Charlotte Smith's Elegiac Sonnets? Apparently so, and
four editions in two years suggests that many of J. A.'s contemporaries likewise believed
that Smith's poems--her lyric poems-would yield them a high quantum of pleasure.
Coleridge provides another and obviously more intriguing instance of a positive response
to lyric poems written in the eighteenth century. In 1789 he read William Lisle Bowles's
Fourteen Sonnets, an event which he later recognised as personally apocalyptic.
Bowles's poems unfolded "a style of poetry, so tender, and yet so manly, so natural and
real, and yet so dignified, and harmonious" that they awakened what he terms "feelings of
the heart"; this awakening in turn allowed his "natural faculties ... to expand, and [his]
original tendencies to develope themselves: [his] fancy, and the love of nature, and the
sense of beauty in forms and sounds."2 For a time these poems even quenched
Coleridge's thirst for metaphysical speculation, and he proudly confesses that he
"laboured to make proselytes, not only of [his] companions, but of all with whom [he]
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conversed, of whatever rank, and in whatever place."3 Indeed, not content simply to
espouse Bowles's poetical merits, this zeal motivated him to transcribe some forty copies
for friends! Coleridge was perhaps Bowles's most ardent fan, but besides the forty extra
hand-written copies in circulation the Sonnets managed at least three eighteenth-century
editions, while an expanded nineteenth-century volume of Bowles's poetry reached ten.4
Neither Coleridge's nor J. A.'s remarks can be discounted as isolated cases of
eighteenth-century readers confessing their eccentric fondness for lyric poetry: an
anthology devoted exclusively to eighteenth-century praise of contemporary lyrics would
comprise a sizeable tome. John Aikin's Essays on Song-Writing (1772), for instance,
rejects the common view "that the moderns fall short of the antients more particularly in
this species of poetry than in any other." An objective, informed comparison would, he
believes, resolve that "the English names of Dryden, Gray, Akenside, Mason, Collins,
Warton, are not inferior in real poetical elevation to the most renowned Grecian or Roman
which antiquity can produce."5 In An Inquiry Into Some Passages in Dr. Johnson's
Lives of the Poets (1783), Robert Potter declares that no English poet before Collins
actually achieved true lyric excellence, a feat made possible because Collins's "mind was
impressed with a tender melancholy, but without any mixture of that sullen gloom which
deadens its powers; it led him to the softest sympathy, that most refined feeling of the
human heart; his faculties were vigorous, and his genius truly sublime."6 As writers began
more and more to assert the positive virtues of contemporary English poetry as a whole,
Collins's lyric poetry became a focus of praise. John Gilbert Cooper, for instance, praises
Collins's "Ode to Evening" because it "is animated by proper Allegorical Personages, and
coloured highly by incidental Expression, [and] warms the breast with a sympathetic Glow
of retired Thoughtfulness"; he adds in a footnote that Collins's "neglected Genius will
hereafter be both an Honour and a Disgrace to our Nation."7 The Gentleman's Magazine
for October 1785 described Collins's Odes as "truly pathetic," while two years later, in his
superbly belligerent Letters on Literature, John Pinkerton (published under the
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pseudonym of Robert Heron) contends that he would hardly care if all of Waller's and
Cowley's lyric poetry were "thrown in the fire," but he praises the "tender melancholy"
which infuses Collins's verse, while Gray he designates "the first and greatest of modern
lyric writers; nay, I will venture to say, of all lyric Writers."8 When Aikin notes that "The
graver and sublimer strains of the Lyric muse are exemplified in the modern ode, a
species of composition which admits of the boldest flights of poetical enthusiasm, and the
wildest creations of the imagination," he is voicing a prevalent view about the intrinsic
excellence of lyric poetry.9
Yet seen through the wide angle lens of history (and without blinkers as to
eighteenth-century reading prejudices) such positive responses to lyric forms should not
strike the reader as odd. The lyric, after all, occupies a rather large tract of the English
poetic tradition, its roots stretching deep into pre-Renaissance culture (both literate and
non-literate). In his Defence of Poesie (1595), Philip Sidney designated the lyric as
virtually the only indigenous British kind: "Other sort of poetry, almost have we none, but
that lyrical kind of songs and sonnets."10 Norman Maclean confirms Sidney's point, finding
that "Unlike most literary species, the lyric had had a sustained English tradition and
flourished before the Revival of Learning."11 The work of poets like Donne, Carew,
Lovelace, Waller, Cowley, Herrick, and a host of others underlines the importance of lyric
forms before the eighteenth century. Indeed, the character of Eugenius in Dryden's An
Essay of Dramatick Poesie (1668) remarks that, while the ancients could still claim the
bays from the moderns in the dramatic arts, "we more surpass them in all the other; for in
the Epique or Lyrique way it will be hard for them to show us one such amongst them as
we have many now living, or who lately were." Eugenius, it deserves noting, does not
deem the modern lyric a major genre, while those assembled at this fictional debate "were
thus far of Eugenius his opinion, that the sweetness of English Verse was never
understood or practis'd by our Fathers."12 Although John Norris, for one, did not hesitate
to voice the opinion, in 1687, that "The Pindaric way ... is the highest and most
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magnificent kind of writing in Verse," such enthusiasm as his was rare, and rarely echoed
in the early decades of the eighteenth century.13 For example, Prior could observe that,
like a squirrel running on a wheel, those "merry Blades, / that frisk it under Pindus'
Shades," trying their luck with "noble Songs, and lofty Odes," did not produce many good
poems but were "Brought back, how fast soe'er they go: / Always aspiring; always low."14
Still, the evidence points to the obvious conclusion that it would be stretching credulity to
insist that all Augustan or neo-classical readers differed so radically in sensibility from
their predecessors that they found lyrics repugnant: Prior, after all, penned his share of
lyrics.15
Indeed, the actual volume of lyrics published during the eighteenth century
testifies to the genre's continued popularity with the poetry-reading public throughout the
century. In 1706, for example, Congreve's Preface to A Pindarique Ode, Humbly Offer'd
to the Queen noted that "There is nothing more frequent among us, than a sort of Poems
intituled Pindarique Odes."16 When Prior likewise wanted to boast about Marlborough's
military successes, he penned "An Ode, Humbly Inscrib'd to the Queen. On the Glorious
Success of Her Majesty's Arms" (1706), promising that "if the Reader will be good enough
to Pardon me this Excursion, I will neither trouble him with Poem or Preface any more, 'till
my Lord Duke ofMarlborough gets another Victory greater than those of Blenheim and
Ramilies."17 Of course, the political turbulence of the early century provided many fruitful
occasions for writers of panegyric; besides nationalistic Pindarics, readers also gave a
ready reception to Horatian, Anacreontic, and even Sapphic odes.18 A survey of titles in
David Foxon's English Verse 1701-1750 or of the poetical pieces in the various
magazines throughout the century confirms Congreve's impression that the British muse
was inspiring large numbers of lyric poems: for instance, of the approximately ninety
poems (excluding prologues and epilogues) printed in the Town and Country Magazine
for 1770, about fifty were lyric types, and a similar ratio occurs in other magazines.19 In
other words, when the urge to write came upon an eighteenth-century versifier, and it
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often did, the mood usually transformed into a lyric poem of some kind. Thomas Gray, in a
letter to William Mason, remarks that Mason makes "no more of writing an Ode, and
throwing it in the fire, than of buckling and unbuckling [his] shoe."20 Such numbers,
however, hardly influence modern critical perceptions or judgments of the cultural
centrality of the eighteenth-century lyric. Although Oswald Doughty argued in 1924 that
"The common belief that few lyrics were written between 1700-1800 is entirely mistaken.
During those years so many lyrical (or would-be lyrical) poems were written as at any time
probably before," and although H. J. C. Grierson noted in 1928 that "Songs and odes
were produced in abundance," and even though some fifty years later Donald Davie
stressed that "so far from eighteenth-century lyrics being hard to find, there is an
embarrassment of riches," most critics (and readers) accept Pat Rogers's assertion that
the lyric genre went "its quiet, agreeable and mostly undistinguished way."21 Indeed,
William Hutchings has remarked that the eighteenth-century lyric remains "a subject so
little discussed that a surprising number of people still think there wasn't any."22
The reader may now suspect that with these few evidential crumbs he will be
asked to swallow the preposterous notion that contrary to firmly-established opinion the
eighteenth-century was a lyrical age, and not that prosaical age during which, even for
Coleridge, "the matter and diction seemed . . . characterized not so much by poetic
thoughts, as by thoughts translated into the language of poetry."23 No, certainly not: such
an exercise, besides its trivial critical utility, would provide no insight into the lyric
experiences of Coleridge, J. A., or any of the other writers cited. These experiences
suggest that during the eighteenth century the lyric no longer remained what Joshua
Poole in 1657 designated it, "A second species of Poesie" which "may be made use of on
any occasion. To this head are referred Madrigals, Sonnets, Hymnes, Ballets, Odes,
whereof some are amorous, some rural, some military, some jovial, made for drollery, and
drinking-, in a word, what suits best with the Poets humour," a categorization reiterated by
Edward Bysshe in 1725.24 Instead, the changing estimate of the lyric genre's expressive
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potential reveals a gradual metamorphosis of a third-level poetic genre into a major one,
one from which both writers and readers expected to realise the strongest poetical
affects.
Such a metamorphosis does not, however, warrant the conclusion that changes in
writerly and readerly expectations and appreciation of the lyric ensued as a consequence
of an improvement in the quality of lyric poetry, that eighteenth-century lyrics show a
measurable, tangible degree of aesthetic or stylistic advance over previous lyrics. While
such a project might prove enlightening, providing that it was possible to establish
workable principles of analysis and assessment, the task of assessing poetic quality-of
comparing good or bad poetry-lies outside the boundaries of this thesis. The lyric's "rise"
to major genre status during the eighteenth century does not, moreover, mean that it
displaced epic and drama from Helicon's pinnacle, or that readers no longer regarded
other poetic forms—satire, for instance-as vital registers of specific patterns of
experience, or that other forms-the novel, to be particular-did not enjoy expanding
readerships.25 It means rather that at an important level of experience, where sensations,
thoughts, and words collide, the lyric genre somehow came closest to satisfying the
complex expressive demands made on poetry by, in particular, mid- and late-eighteenth-
century readers. Indeed, as Maclean points out, however little we may think of the period
as lyrical, many commentators of the age saw their special contributions to lyric
expression as one of their major literary achievements.26 Thus to explore and to theorize
the evolution of eighteenth-century perceptions and perspectives about the lyric genre-
that is, to try to understand what brought about this change in taste-constitutes the
primary aim and function of this work.
The concept of taste, of course, ignites a complex range of reactions, particularly
when the term is capitalised and used in conjunction with the adjectives good or bad,
serving as a battle ground for competing ideologies and cultural positions; as Raymond
Williams notes, the concept only begins to lose its connection as a physical sense
towards the latter part of the eighteenth century when it takes on a sense of taste as a
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form of discrimination, with Wordsworth later effectively severing it from the body and
giving it prominence as an intellectual and moral act.271 invoked the word "taste" not to
designate a superficial alteration in aesthetic or generic fashions nor to insinuate a class-
defined division in cultural goods but to suggest that the gradual transformation in the
lyric's generic status occurred almost at a physical state of apprehension, almost as if
writers and readers found in lyrics a model of how they looked at the world (to use a
notoriously suspect phrasing). In other words, the lyric's "rise" in poetical status argues
strongly that in fundamental, profound, and enigmatic ways it shared many of the
epistemological and expressive assumptions which conditioned or modified most thought
and feeling throughout the century. Bluntly, eighteenth-century lyric experience evolved as
part of a cultural circumambience in which, through both its ideological and rhetorical
precepts, experimental science effectively exerted an hegemonic force on every aspect of
day-to-day experience, including literary experience. As John Christie and Sally
Shuttleworth argue, the Enlightenment's "cultural moment. . . was one of particular and
major significance, for it marked the public ascendence of science to a position of cultural
authority in the West, advancing science as the privileged form of cognition and action
while recruiting its powers to aid the emerging campaign for ideological liberalism and
political reformism."28 In this particular cultural matrix, I will argue, the lyric genre provided
that literary form which most integrally expressed the new experience and appreciation of
nature brought about by the experimental scientists.29 The stress in the previous sentence
on the term experimental draws attention to the speciality and specificity of this new
sense of science: not just science as any generalized acquisition of knowledge but, as
Johnson distinguishes it in his Dictionary, a type of knowledge categorised by "Certainty
grounded on demonstration." Certainty in this sense was derived either from the
operations of reason working from the data of personal observation and experience, or
from hypotheses rigorously tested according to the principles of scientific experiments:
sense experiences-the information supplied to the mind through physical sensations-
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constituted the primary ingredients of this category of knowledge.30 Of course, eighteenth-
century commentators often employed synonymous terms such as natural and empirical
philosophy or just science, and often without seeing a need to make terminological
distinctions about their particular sense of science. Unless otherwise stipulated, the term
science in the following work means modern experimental science.
My view that the "rise" of modern experimental science effectively determined the
"rise" of the lyric genre may doubtless do some violence to the post-Romantic perception
of the lyric's emotional and spiritual "function." Even so, the task set here impels us to
defamiliarise ourselves with that specific notion of the lyric and to initiate an appraisal of
the genre in terms which do justice to eighteenth-century meditations on the relationships
between nature, knowing, and our storehouse of language: literature. As Ludmilla
Jordanova reminds us, "Science and literature are united in their shared location within
cultural history."31 Ironically, before the romantic era this shared relationship was probably
conceptually sharper and emotionally stronger in the eighteenth century, that is, was
experienced with less alienation and greater conviction about the value of their intellectual
affiliations, than after it. Prior to the romantic revolution the literary genres were conceived
as a means (and hence a medium) for expressing our rootedness in nature and process.
Umberto Eco astutely remarks that integration of this type provides the basis for identity,
for any statement of "I":
From the very beginning of time, the ability to extend one's corporeality (and
therefore to alter one's own natural dimensions) has been the very condition of
homo faber. To consider such a situation as a degradation of human nature
implies that nature and man are not one and the same thing. It implies an inability
to accept the idea that nature exists in relation to man, is defined, extended, and
modified in and by man; just as man is one particular expression of nature, an
active, modifying expression who distinguishes himself from his environment
precisely because of his capacity to act upon it and to define it—a capacity that
gives him the right to say "I."32
Thus, my divergence from most modern assumptions about the place of the lyric genre in
eighteenth-century culture occurs precisely because I want to account for its popularity
and significance in that culture, something to which most modern critics pay scant regard.
Moreover, this analytical and synthetic task seems to me necessary for at least two basic
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reasons: firstly, it should open up another dimension in our understanding of the
complexity and diversity of eighteenth-century thought and feeling; and, secondly, it may
prove beneficial in instigating new critical thinking about genre and culture in the
eighteenth century.
However, before I set about justifying my claims that a reevaluation of the lyric
occurs in the eighteenth century because significant features of its poetic experience
cohered with the epistemological and linguistic ideals of experimental science, it seems
essential to give readers an explanation of not only how but why modern eighteenth-
century scholarship has generally and persistently minimized the lyric's contribution to
eighteenth-century taste, to eighteenth-century imagination. Chapter One will therefore
assess how the modern critical tradition has perceived the status of the lyric genre in the
period, and why it has conceived this view of the eighteenth-century lyric for about two
hundred years. This review of the critical tradition will establish the need for the
theoretical and critical arguments of later chapters, particularly for Chapter Two. In
Chapter Two, I will examine those particular components in the development of the new
science which directly influenced the metamorphosis of the lyric genre—its rejection of
authority, its epistemological ideals, and its linguistic and rhetorical code. Chapter Three
will show how the steady advance of experimental science in the seventeenth century
began to alter attitudes and perceptions of the lyric's expressive potential. Chapter Four
will explore critical views of the genre (or of specific types) in the eighteenth century,
particularly in regards to the role of description in poetry, problems of harmony and
structure, and the growing sense of the genre's poetic virtues.
As noted earlier, readers should not expect this work to attempt any judgments
about the poetic qualities of eighteenth-century lyrics or to "explain" the rise of the lyric
mode through an analysis of individual lyric poems or even of poets. Instead, the focus
will fall largely on critical commentaries, essays, prefaces, remarks and observations in
magazines, essays discovered in the transactions of literary and other societies, and so
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forth in order to show that the type and range of thinking which led to the lyric's improved
status as a genre owes its specific intellectual flavour to the growing influence of the new
science. Consequently, much of my discussion and my evidence draws largely upon little
known or unknown writers at the expense, it might seem, of the more famous eighteenth-
century thinkers who made offhand or more in-depth observations about many of the
topics raised in this thesis. This selection of sources may therefore appear somewhat
whimsical, but my reasons for examining lesser-known writers remain integral to the
intellectual and critical conceptions of the work. Firstly, these writers provide a valuable
historical register of changing cultural sensibilities: undoubtedly often influenced by the
work of greater minds, often working with and from the ideas of more respected thinkers,
they nevertheless show independence and often originality as they work through literary
and other cultural matters. This independence and originality occurs, as we will see later,
because more often than not they seem to approach literary and critical issues from the
perspective of the new scientist, relying upon personal observations and "testing" to
determine the validity of assertions about literature. Secondly, in their particular focus on
the lyric genre, they encompass important and widely-ranging debates about such topics
as the writing experience, the substance of poetry, the grounds of harmony, the role and
value of description in poetry, the nature of the generic experience, the poet's relation to
the past and to tradition, and so forth. In short, in their contribution to debate these minor
writers played a significant role in the "rise" of the lyric genre, a literary phenomenon
which offers a unique window onto that location where literature and science meet. Their
obscurity, then, actually provides a means of charting new paths of understanding and
appreciation of the dynamics of eighteenth-century culture, the continued need for which
will be outlined in further detail in the next chapter.
Finally, it will become clear that much-though certainly not all—of the evidence
about the lyric's potential for expressing the greatest poetical thoughts and feelings tends
to derive from debates about the nature of the ode, and often about the Pindaric. Partly,
of course, this apparent focus on the ode stems from the available evidence-and the
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availability of the evidence-but there are good grounds for arguing that eighteenth-
century writers were apt to assume that specific features of one kind could readily be
applied to another kind; this easy conflation of generic features is compatible with the
eighteenth-century sense of the lyric's genealogy. Particularly with this genre, which was
almost always defined as the most ancient of all forms, a sense that all of its kinds
developed from a specific root experience and gave rise to a typical, formulaic expression
means that writers shared a good many of the same ideas about what constituted the
basic lyric. The following observations provide a typical assessment: "Songs are a Part of
Lyric Poetry, for Ode indeed signifies a Song"] "The Verse of the Lyric Poetry in the
beginning, was only of one kind, but for the sake of Pleasure, and the Music to which they
were sung, they so vary'd the Numbers and Feet, that their sorts are now almost
innumerable."33 As Poole and Bysshe confirmed for us earlier, the lyric genre included a
wide range of poetic forms.
Chapter One - The Critical Background
Section 1.
The Preamble drew attention to the fact that critics have noted, occasionally, that a vast
number of lyrics were produced in the eighteenth century-odes, sonnets, songs, hymns,
elegies, ballads-but most critics for the better part of this century have seen little of
importance or value in the lyric genre as a means for understanding the dynamics of
eighteenth-century culture. I am by no means the first reader to discover this history of
neglect, as will become clear later in this chapter, nor I suspect will I be the last to wonder
why it occurred. The dismissive posture assumed by the generality of critics towards
eighteenth-century lyric poetry derives its authority, of course, from intangible intellectual
processes subsumed within the historical evolution of the eighteenth-century critical
tradition-most of the stages of which must remain outside the orbit of the following
discussion—and in no sense do I wish to point an accusatory finger at critics contributing
to this tradition nor to pose as a single voice crying in the wilderness. No eighteenth-
century scholar can accomplish much in the field without recognising a profound debt to a
critical tradition which has, against fairly powerful odds, continued to present and
represent our period's citizens and writers, their ideas and emotions; a great deal of
criticism throughout this century has worked hard and successfully to revise perceptions
of the intrinsic and lasting importance of the period's literature, and that work goes on.
Some commentators, moreover, have taken note of the lyric and attempted to assess its
general place in the hierarchy of eighteenth-century poetry. Interested generally in taking
stock of its comparative or local poetic value, often seen as an indicator of nascent
romanticism, individual poems or writers have received positive judgments, and a sense
that the lyric genre may have played a greater role in poetic tastes than usually
considered is occasionally voiced. More about that later, however. For now, it must be
stressed that my intentions in this chapter are not to review the entire history of
eighteenth-century criticism or to chart the success of revisionaries but to show how
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certain basic perceptions-commonplaces-about the quality and nature of the poetry of
this period have remained seemingly intractable to scholarly attempts to dispel them with
both evidence and polemic. These commonplaces lie in the way of obtaining an
appreciation of the lyric genre's growing reputation in a culture in which experimental
science was likewise growing in influence and respect.
As a preliminary to exploring the lyric's transformation from a minor to a major
♦
genre in relationship to the development of eighteenth-century experimental science, this
chapter will attempt to offer an explanation--a narrative, as it were-of how and why the
eighteenth-century lyric has remained a largely undiscovered country from which few have
returned with reports of marvellous phenomena: only by seeing the ways in which critical
perceptions of the eighteenth-century have been formed can we hope to change or modify
those perceptions. At the obvious danger of misrepresenting and over-simplifying the
dynamic interplay of forces which converge in literary history and critical discourses, I will
focus closely on the development of three separate, though ultimately related critical
commonplaces, on evaluative, constitutive critical norms whose synergic influence
continue to delimit effectively reader expectations as regards eighteenth-century lyric
poetry (if not eighteenth-century poetry in general). The commonplace assumption that
eighteenth-century poetry exudes prose virtues will, in respect of both chronology and
critical influence, be addressed first; this will lay the foundation for a reassessment of the
general view that the period when the lyric most clearly achieves major genre status--the
mid- and late-eighteenth century-constitutes an immense poetic desert, a period of
mainly banal sentiments and second-rate writing. Usually, critics perceive this period as a
degenerate phase of Augustanism or as a difficult birthing stage of Romanticism. Only
after an analysis of this critical background will it be sensible to discuss the few modern
approaches to the eighteenth-century lyric which abut on my specific concerns.
Before plunging straight in, however, it might not come amiss to make a few
observations about the formation and function (ideal and practical) of literary
commonplaces with a view to understanding better both the positive and negative
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consequences which flow from their application. Clearly, although they provide powerful
interpretive and evaluative tools, as theoretical substructures critical commonplaces never
operate in benign or salutary ways: critics formulate them not only to facilitate
interpretation but in order to regulate and govern reader responses. In part, then, the
intelligible way to resolve the critical impasse with regard to the eighteenth-century lyric is
to delve into and discover some of the historical and theoretical conditions which sealed
its critical fortune in the first place. The energy spent defining how commonplaces operate
in critical analysis will, therefore, not be wasted since it will reveal those obstacles which
block the general reader's view of the period and make it difficult to appreciate the role of
the lyric genre in eighteenth-century culture; this, in turn, will provide additional
justification for my method of tackling this issue.
The commonplaces of literary history and of criticism serve a hermeneutic function
much like the scientific paradigms which Thomas Kuhn defines and analyses so
suggestively in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As Kuhn sees it, in a science's
earliest stage random observation and gathering of fact produces competing schools of
thought; eventually, one school establishes an interpretive model whose explanatory
power triumphs over all others. This model becomes the accepted paradigm for exploring
and explaining causes and effects within a more or less defined phenomenal field.
Without paradigms, "progressive" scientific inquiry would rarely, if ever, occur: "In the
absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could
possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally
relevant."1 Kuhn therefore defines paradigms as "universally recognized scientific
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of
practitioners" (SSR, p. viii). So far so good but, despite these obvious benefits, scientific
paradigms can actually constrain and limit research: if, on the one hand, "a paradigm is a
criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be
assumed to have solutions," on the other hand Kuhn notes that "To a great extent these
are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its
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members to undertake" {SSR, p. 37). Since a high percentage of scientific research only
aims at establishing "a new and more rigid definition of the field" (SSR, p. 19), at proving
the validity of the paradigm, researchers only study phenomena that seem likely to fit the
paradigm while "those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all" (SSR, p. 24). In
other words, within the paradigm itself lie the seeds of intellectual complacency and
dogmatism.
What holds true in the realm of scientific discourse largely holds true for the
development of critical paradigms. They serve, for instance, the same intellectual needs
as scientific paradigms, gratifying a basic human compulsion to bring order to any field of
disparate, inchoate data. As Geoffrey Hartman explains it: "We begin with a lack or
excess; with a confusion in thought or language; we brood over that chaos to purify it, or
to produce order. Theory-making is part of that brooding and ordering."2 The
commonplaces of literary history indicate regular victories of order over chaos, rewarding
the efforts of critics with valuable polemical and pedagogical tools; obviously, the reader
benefits, too. Yet critical paradigms, like scientific paradigms, limit the field of
investigation by determining those issues which need resolution; and by encouraging
constant confirmation of the dominant paradigm, critics build up an authoritative (and
imposing) literature which all subsequent research in the field must attempt to address.
However, at a fundamental level of application scientific and critical paradigms
operate differently, endure differently: we do not read the "book" of nature like those of
culture. Unlike the scientist, whose experimental methodology (and level of technological
sophistication) constrains what he can do and therefore say about his phenomenal field,
literary critics may investigate their subject area in whatever fashion they desire,
constructing and applying models and theories of their own design, while their utterances
about that field may indulge intellectual fancies of an all-too-human nature. Inasmuch as
the cultural field permits unprovable theories to become acceptable paradigms, personal
prejudice, intellectual training, and cultural cecity invariably play a significant part in the
production (and promulgation) of literary paradigms.3 Hence, new evidence or a new
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approach will not necessarily invalidate an older paradigm's influence over critical
discourse: the temperature of polemic may simply go up. In short, critical paradigms can
maintain a powerful influence over reader responses for long periods; they can actually
resist change, go "underground" as Donald Davie aptly styles it, often resurfacing in a new
guise, masked by a different terminology.4 This feature of critical paradigms-their
tenacious hold over critical responses-holds the key to understanding the peculiar
evolution of attitudes towards eighteenth-century lyric poetry. We need, therefore, to
examine the historical roots of these attitudes, roots firmly embedded in nineteenth-
century views of Augustan literature.
Even a cursory glance at modern literary history discloses the pervading influence
of nineteenth-century critical paradigms on modern assessments of the eighteenth-
century "personality." Indeed, the power of those paradigms to condition and control
critical and lay perceptions erected serious impediments in the way of those critics
wanting to attain a fairer estimate of eighteenth-century literature. David Nichol Smith long
ago lamented that "To a greater extent than most of us realize, we are, in matters of
literary taste, the pupils of the nineteenth century. We may think that we have escaped
from it, but oftener than we seem to know we are only repeating what it told us."5 Geoffrey
Tillotson likewise acknowledged that most readers almost invariably "approach
eighteenth-century poetry by way of nineteenth-century poetry," evaluating the earlier
poetry in terms of the critical, aesthetic, or "life" values espoused in the later.6 F. W.
Bateson surveys the nineteenth-century critical tradition in a rather more irritable mood
than either Nichol Smith or Tillotson, denominating it a "debased Romanticism" which
"stood for nothing better in the last analysis than self-centred emotional indulgences by
the individual reader."7 Many other critics, as we shall see later, have struggled with equal
energy to replace this stubborn perception; the evidence would seem to justify Davie's
suspicion that more often than not critical attitudes rarely go into cowed retreat but simply
go "underground." Indeed, while Donald J. Greene in 1965 "wonders how the legend grew
up that the eighteenth century was impersonal, objective, dispassionate. No age ever
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abounded more in self-conscious, self-dramatizing writers. If the Romantics loved to
contemplate their own images, they had ample precedent for doing so," Paul Whiteley
reminds us in a 1994 review of new criticism of the eighteenth century that "Old habits die
hard, especially in literary history and criticism, and the eighteenth century still labours in
the popular mind under such labels as the 'Age of Reason' or the 'Augustan Age'. That it
is hard to escape the pressure of such labelling when thinking of the literature of the
period can be shown in the general image of the period as one of extreme logic and
correctness."8 Ideas about the period which can remain so stuck in general
consciousness deserve a closer look.
Many nineteenth-century critics defined the basic temper of eighteenth-century
thought and character in one word: prose. This innocuous term invoked a matrix of
beliefs, values, and qualities which supposedly inhered in eighteenth-century writing, and
nineteenth-century critics rejected these as inimical to great poetry, if not to life itself: the
slavish worship of reason, a sublunary imagination, a cold, insensitive heart, a witty but
superficial grasp of "truth," and other such negatively-charged descriptive phrases. Given
the plainly unfavourable connotations of the word, nineteenth-century critics usually
(though not always) expressed little sympathy for the intellectual or literary tastes of their
predecessors. For example: whereas Glanville, a character in Charlotte Lennox's The
Female Quixote (1752), finds "inimitable beauties" in Johnson's writings, Austin Dobson
suggests in his foreword to Eighteenth Century Essays (1889) that most of the "grave
and portentous production" of the eighteenth-century essayists "has become to us a little
lengthy-a little wearisome."9 His anthology therefore contains only those pieces
possessing "eternal" worth--"sketches of character and manners, and those chiefly of the
humorous kind."10 Of Johnson's many essays only Idlers 28 and 29 suit Dobson's
purposes.
Wordsworth and Coleridge slighted eighteenth-century diction, of course, while
Francis Jeffrey exulted that "the wits of Queen Anne's time have been gradually brought
down from the supremacy which they had enjoyed, without competition, for the best part
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of a century."11 In fact, when Jeffrey adumbrates the primary traits of the Augustan
"temper," he lays down the principal tenets of the prose paradigm: "of that generation of
authors," he concludes, "it may be said that, as poets, they had no force or greatness of
fancy-no pathos, and no enthusiasm;-and, as philosophers, no comprehensiveness,
depth or originality. They are sagacious, no doubt, neat, clear, and reasonable; but for the
most part cold, timid, and superficial" (p. 3). Poets trained in such debilitating habits of
mind "never meddle with the great scenes of nature, or the great passions of man . . .
Their inspiration, accordingly, is little more than a sprightly sort of good sense; and they
have scarcely any invention but what is subservient to the purposes of derision and satire"
(p. 3). When he goes on to explain their fall from poetical grace as the ineluctable
outcome of a cultural era which demanded "no glow of feeling-no blaze of imagination-
no flashes of genius" (p. 3), a modern reader conditioned to these images of the
Augustan "personality" will knowingly nod in affirmation.12
Just after mid-century, Matthew Arnold expounded his famous arguments about
the status of eighteenth-century literature. Yet he simply reworks Jeffrey's arguments, his
reading staying within the boundaries of Jeffrey's paradigm: for Arnold, the Augustans did
not produce great poetry because "after the Restoration the time had come when our
nation felt the imperious need of a fit prose."13 An age gripped by such an "imperious
need" must suffer the consequences, one of which appears to be the decay of that part of
the human frame which spawns great poetry, making it impossible that
a fit prose should establish itself amongst us without some touch of frost to the
imaginative life of the soul. The needful qualities for a fit prose are regularity,
uniformity, precision, balance. The men of letters, whose destiny it may be to bring
their nation to the attainment of a fit prose, must of necessity, whether they work
in prose or in verse, give a predominating, an almost exclusive attention to the
qualities of regularity, uniformity, precision, balance. But an almost exclusive
attention to these qualities involves some repression and silencing of poetry.
(■CPW, pp. 179-180)
Arnold then advises that of all these early prose toilers "We are to regard Dryden as the
puissant and glorious founder, Pope as the splendid high priest, of our age of prose and
reason, of our excellent and indispensable eighteenth century" (CPW, p. 180). Jeffrey's
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evaluation of the eighteenth-century temper stands behind Arnold's assertion that
"Though they may write in verse, though they may in a certain sense be masters of the art
of versification, Dryden and Pope are not classics of our poetry, they are classics of our
prose" (CPW, p. 181).
Jeffrey's and Arnold's categorisation of the poetry of the period does not mean,
obviously, that nineteenth-century readers therefore ignored that of the eighteenth: no,
they continued to read it and buy it, editions of Pope, Swift, Thomson, Somerville, Gray,
Collins, Goldsmith, Cowper, Burns, and others appearing regularly. Moreover, they
expressed admiration for much of this poetry, including lyric poetry by Collins and Gray in
particular. Arnold, for example, maintained a high regard for Gray, though a much-
qualified regard.14 Yet as Nichol Smith and others tell us, the nineteenth century found it
difficult to see the poetry of their grandfathers as truly inspired, as poetry of the highest
merit. A few examples should suffice. George Gilfillan, the indefatigable nineteenth-
century editor, classes Pope among "the equable, highly polished writers ... in whom
there are neither great swellings nor great sinkings."15 William Hazlitt similarly discusses
Dryden's and Pope's prosiness, while Stopford A. Brooke, writing in 1920, argues that
eighteenth-century writers could not, because of their metaphysical outlook, write poetry
of inspiration.16 Arthur Pollard, after quoting Arnold's observations about Pope and Dryden
and Gray, makes the typical point that "we today would find it hard to accept... his
judgment and his order of priorities," but we nevertheless "can understand" his reasons
for making them because "the gold did not flow abundantly and the silver was much more
in evidence in the eighteenth century.17 In short, the notion that the eighteenth century
produced great prose but not divinely-inspired poetry had infiltrated attitudes to such a
degree that it could only be countered with difficulty, and the problem for critics wanting to
defend eighteenth-century poetry was how to educate readers to appreciate its poetry for
qualities which deserved praise and did not at the same time appear to fly in the face of
accepted perceptions. Critics somehow needed to comes to terms with the prose
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paradigm, and the ways in which it invariably influenced perceptions of the eighteenth-
century lyric.
T. S. Eliot does not read eighteenth-century poetry in the same spirit as Jeffrey
and Arnold. Eliot's reading--a defence of eighteenth-century poetry-argues that Pope,
Johnson, and Goldsmith deserve a place in the poetical tradition because their poetry
exhibits "the qualities which good verse shares with good prose." Eliot's argument rests
on his view that in all ages good verse and good prose share the same expressive and
linguistic virtues, and that "the virtues of good prose is the first and minimum requirement
of good poetry." The poetry of a Goldsmith or a Johnson, according to this schema, merits
a respectable degree of praise "partly because it has the virtues of good prose."18 A just
estimate, perhaps, and Eliot rightly notes that a good many second-rate eighteenth-
century poets managed to produce moments of good verse but fell into a secondary
category because they failed to achieve an idiom or style of their own: they remained too
wedded to the style of Pope. However, we should note the terms on which approbation of
this poetry is negotiated. It rests upon the old paradigm but reinvents it to establish a
"new" paradigm for appreciating the eighteenth-century style. This kind of stylistic
appreciation similarly informs Maynard Mack's view of Pope: "Pope writes a poetry with
striking prose affinities. It has the Augustan virtues of perspicuity and ease which,
whatever their status in poetry, are among the distinguishing attributes of prose
discourse."19 Most readers familiar with criticism dealing with the eighteenth century will
easily recall many similar statements, testifying to the truth that the nineteenth-century
view of the eighteenth as an age of prose passed into modern critical consciousness.
Even when it suffered blows from small gangs of revisionist opposition, it was able to
survive these attacks, going "underground" and then resurfacing to be extolled in post-
1900 statements as one of the period's greatest literary virtues, as Eliot's and Mack's
"positive" remarks emphatically show. Yet knowing that the prose paradigm survived and
still influences critical attitudes to eighteenth-century poetry throws but a dim light on the
relationship between its survival and modern assumptions about the eighteenth-century
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lyric; to illuminate that relationship, the paradigm's survival and role in critical thinking
needs to be situated within a larger process of development.
Many modern critics, inheritors of a tradition which for the most part evaluated
eighteenth-century poetry in terms which in a romantic and post-romantic were inherently
negative, approached their subject in a defensive state of mind, a point worth
remembering in any hindsight judgments about shortcomings in the historical evolution of
eighteenth-century studies.20 Jeffrey, after all, believed that all the Augustan poets "[had]
been eclipsed by those of [his] own" time, an eclipse occasioned by an irrevocable
change in taste, in that faculty "most sure to advance and improve with time and
experience" (p. 2). For Jeffrey, the inevitable "improvement" in taste doomed the
Augustans to obscurity, and he (and others anxious not to appear unsophisticated), felt
duty-bound to assist the process. Indeed, Byron's satiric repudiation of Romantic
reactions to eighteenth-century poetry stands out for its eccentricity; his defence of writers
like Dryden and Pope in poems such as English Bards and Scotch Reviewers and Don
Juan could not stand against improvements in taste. Although the poetry retained a broad
base of readership, as noted earlier, the prose paradigm flourished. As James Sutherland
has noted, anyone who wished to promote the merits of eighteenth-century poetry first
had to overcome a welter of "pre-established codes of decision" handed down from the
past and which thoroughly "obstructed] the modern reader's enjoyment of eighteenth-
century poetry."21
Insofar as defenders of eighteenth-century poetry could not simply ignore or
discount these codes or paradigms-after all, they had been schooled in them-they would
need to make strategic critical and intellectual compromises: the type of defence to
mount, for instance, the selection of which (if successful) would affect the future (and
future courses) of eighteenth-century studies. Since nineteenth-century critics built the
prose paradigm largely on their perception of the personalities of Dryden, Pope, Swift, and
Johnson, that is, on those writers most familiar to them, modern critics naturally made
these writers cause celebres, stating the merits of their case on precisely those prosy
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qualities which their predecessors disparaged. Rather than attempt a full-scale rebuttal, it
was simpler (and politically expedient) to subsume or adapt the paradigm without taking
issue with its overall interpretive justness. When, for instance, Alan D. McKillop tried to
coax modern readers into an appreciation of the enduring values of eighteenth-century
literature, he relies on the prose characterisation: "To an age like ours," he says,
"remembering, experiencing, and anticipating one national crisis after another, the
eighteenth century may seem at first an age of trivialities," yet with further study "we may
come to feel that people who could work so quietly and urbanely had high and exacting
standards from which we still have something to learn."22 Nichol Smith made similar
assurances that eighteenth-century poets do reward study because many of them "are
masters in the final art of self-expression, and give us what we cannot find elsewhere."23
The initial vindication of eighteenth-century poetry thus meant defending the major
Augustan writers as exemplars of the prose paradigm, and the immense scholarly
commitment afforded the "major writer" approach attests to its methodological value; it
would be misleading (and churlish) to suggest that, given its institutional aims, a high level
of success was not achieved.24
Yet writing literary history according to this model exacted its intellectual price;
most obviously, it encouraged a rather limited picture of the concerns, styles, and tastes
of eighteenth-century writers and readers, while making questionable assertions about the
degree of influence which individual writers exerted on their culture. An early example, W.
J. Courthope's A History of English Poetry, highlights the model's shortcomings. He
sees his task quite clearly:
my design from the first has been, not to furnish an exhaustive list of the English
poets as individuals, but rather to describe the general movements of English
Poetry, as an Art illustrating the evolution of national taste. The poets whose
works are here considered are treated as having contributed something
characteristic towards these movements; but I have not thought it necessary to
dwell on the lives and writings of versifiers such as Ambrose Philips, Beattie,
Aaron Hill, and others, whose names appear in collections like those of Anderson
and Chalmers; their poetry having too little distinctive character for my purpose.25
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True, no one would seriously want to consider Philips, Beattie, or Hill major writers, but
this should not obscure the fact that they earned reputation enough in their time,
contributing something to "their" national taste-Philips even merited an entry in Johnson's
Lives of the Poets.
Courthope's cavalier rejection of those writers who do not fit the paradigm should
not, however, be dismissed as simply anachronistic or atypical. McKillop, while warning
that "no ready-made formula" will adequately explain the dynamics of Enlightenment
culture, reassuringly suggests that Europe's Enlightenment "has at least the appearance
of being relatively simple and unified," and even if contradictions exist "a plan must be
had, if the course of study is to be more than a collection of disconnected impressions
and facts." Despite the many "isms" strewn throughout eighteenth-century studies, he
begs the reader, as far as possible, "to see them not separately, but together."26 Franklin
L. Ford makes similar claims to respect Enlightenment diversity but then declares that his
"ultimate purpose is to try to get beyond the mere notation of variety to a useful
redefinition of the movement as a whole, a redefinition broad enough to accommodate
internal diversity, yet explicit enough to cut away elements which ought not to be, though
they often are, included."27 The "ought" says it all.
I would not foolishly insinuate that every eighteenth-century critic has dogmatically
adhered to a simplistic, moribund view of cultural relationships, or that much work on the
period has not taken as its starting point a determination to rehabilitate the reputations of
figures and to reorient critical perspectives about the period. Many admirable exceptions
do exist.28 Long ago Nichol Smith advised readers that "We should do well to forget [all
the popular eighteenth-century paradigms] when we consider the poetry of the eighteenth
century."29 Carey Mcintosh, for example, drew attention to the fact that
The Age of Johnson is also the Age of Rousseau; both men spoke for their times;
and although they had in common many of the ideas and attitudes endemic to
Western Europe of the period, they disagree at so many points so unmistakably
that it is convenient to organize a review of scholarship on the second half of the
eighteenth century with both of them in mind . . . Perhaps the case with which this
division between sense and sensibility can be made is itself a distinguishing
characteristic of the age; and yet, having made it, there remains a large number of
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writings with one foot in either camp, works that are nevertheless harmoniously
single in tone and temperament.30
Mcintosh's sense of the intellectual diversity of the period-and of its resistance to easy
categorisation-finds confirmation in the work of many other critics. Eric Rothstein, for
instance, works to dispel "the pervasive myth of the cloven century," that is, to show that
a proper appreciation of the century involves a rejection of the many "isms" which lay
strewn throughout literary history.31 Doody, after reminding us of the problematical
definitions and history of attitudes about eighteenth-century poetry (which she found still
entrenched in 1985), wants "to restore the sense of excitement that can come from a
reading of Augustan poetry."32 Not so long ago James Sambrook noted that "it seems at
times almost as if every path of thought communicates with every other"; rather than
clear-cut lines of intellectual demarcation, says Sambrook, the investigator finds that
"astronomy provides aids to navigation and proofs of the existence of God, current
political and economic thought influences the interpretation of ancient Roman history, the
empirical and mathematical methods of science are applied to aesthetics and moral
philosophy; such instances, large and small, could be multiplied almost indefinitely."33
Yet the growing wealth of revisionist work does not guarantee that older
paradigms, particularly the prose paradigm, or methodologies will fall into complete
disuse. J. Paul Hunter welcomes what he sees as an exciting renaissance in eighteenth-
century studies working to efface the view of the period as "an irrelevance," but he can
still, in 1990, worry about the potential damage which could be inflicted on new
approaches and views of the period by scholarship which remains rooted in narrow critical
paradigms.34 Hunter notes that "Not all is sweetness and light here-bees and spiders and
mirrors and lamps still battle unceremoniously for turf, and scholars with single interests
often seem to write past each other rather than putting their observations together."35 Of
course, revisionist critics often have expressed unease at the long-term effects of the
prose paradigm and the major model approach on general impressions of eighteenth-
century poetry, though I am probably alone in extending that worry to the eighteenth-
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century lyric. A number of critics have found that, ironically, the heady application of the
prose paradigm/major model approach bred a species of historical coueism detrimental to
the long-term health of eighteenth-century studies. Claude Rawson, for one, condemns
the scholarly tendency "to suppose that because some thinkers held certain views, all
their contemporaries must also be assumed to take these views for granted, and that
these views must necessarily be reflected, with an uncompromising directness, in every
aspect of their art."36 O. H. K. Spate states the issue even more bluntly when he notes
how easily critics accept the image of Augustan poets "as mainly a choir of singing birds
nesting in the pleasant gardens of Twickenham and Stowe, with an ugly off-stage chatter
of London gutter-sparrows in Grub-Street, and a few migrants between the two, such as
Gay and Matthew Green."37 Rawson, moreover, berates critics who assume a
"dangerously over-simplified conception of the history of ideas," blithely personifying
abstractions like historical periods or literary movements and then proceeding as if these
"have thoughts and beliefs in the same way as individual beings have, and apparently that
these thoughts and beliefs impose themselves with a somewhat surprising consistency,
coherence, and universality of assent on individual writers of varied and complicated
character."38 A novice in eighteenth-century studies hardly notices the rather odd way that
critics speak about the century, accepting that its literature neatly falls into an Age of Pope
and an Age of Johnson, that any utterance by a major figure constitutes the only
acceptable standards by which to judge contemporary (or even later) writers, as if his
opinions, ideas, and prejudices alone created the culture in which he lived and wrote.39
Surely it borders on the fustian to claim, as A. R. Humphreys did, that "Of that civilization
Johnson is the strongest representative; to express it was his instinctive and his
deliberate aim."40 The evidence seems to suggest, then, that rather than contest critical
paradigms many scholars generally preferred to integrate the "major-model" methodology
with the prose paradigm's basic tenets.
A. D. Harvey, working along similar lines to Rawson's, reveals another disquieting
feature of the way that critical paradigms develop. He notes the strange authority over
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taste which critics typically and confidently ascribe to those few writers they most admire
but who achieved little popularity in their own lifetimes: writers like Wordsworth, Keats,
Shelley, and Blake, he says, "have come to be regarded as epitomising the period which
neglected and misunderstood them." To promulgate the view that such writers stood at
the forefront of taste, as the arbiters of contemporary aesthetic values, simply ignores the
"basic fact about any culture . . . that the contributors to a cultural environment are to be
numbered in scores and hundreds, not in ones and twos."41 Perhaps the irreverent
suggestion by the anonymous author of Ranelagh (1777) that "Critics, like children and
fox-hunters, have a natural antipathy to new acquaintance" contains a large grain of
truth.42 In any case, confessions like Coleridge's that he held a poet like Bowles in the
highest esteem should be sufficient evidence of the enigmatic role of taste in the
evolution of poetry, and that the line of influence between major and minor writers runs in
two directions.
Generally, then, the prose paradigm/major model approach promoted a critical
ethos which seemed unsympathetic to the full range of eighteenth-century literary
production. As Bertrand Bronson noted irritably, the "official" version stressed "positive"
virtues like repose, elegance, and civilized taste, and students learned "precisely where
[the eighteenth century] stood, and what it stood for. It was fixed in its appointed place,
and there it would always be when we cared to look again. We understood its values, and
they bored us."43 Lonsdale concurs, attributing a general apathy towards eighteenth-
century poetry to the restricted focus of paradigm-governed research: "With some
honourable exceptions," modern scholars have "in fact returned again and again to the
same familiar material," with the rueful consequence that "The general reader seems to
know all too well what to expect from the age of Good Taste and Common Sense."44
Lonsdale, of course, has done much to dispel this anodyne view of eighteenth-century
poetry, particularly in his two splendid anthologies, The New Oxford Book of Eighteenth-
Century Verse and Eighteenth-Century Women Poets, both compiled "to question
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some of the deeply ingrained preconceptions about what it was possible to feel, think, and
write in the eighteenth century."45
Of course part of the problem, as Bronson testifies, lies in an "official" version
which stresses those qualities of writing and thought which the revisionists are trying to
counter. Much evidence has already been cited on this front, but it seems worth repeating
that the general lay reader or student often take their first bite of the period from
handbooks and guides to literature such as The Oxford Companion to English
Literature and The Harper Handbook to Literature. The entry in The Oxford
Companion, for instance, tells us that the eighteenth century was "an age of prose rather
than poetry, of lucidity, simplicity, and grace, rational and witty rather than humorous, and
somewhat lacking in intensity."46 Similar pronouncements turn up in Dennis Davison's
depiction of the period in his introduction to Penguin Book of Eighteenth-Century
English Verse, where he explains that, in the period after faction and violence had torn
the country apart,
Characteristically, the verse of this new era was deliberately social in content,
urbane and conventional in style. The cultivation of neo-classical balance and
correctness, of decorum in the choice of vocabulary or genres, and the adoption of
the values of a polite, urban society, are significant features of a culture which
had, of course, its own contradictions, but which did manifest an overt uniformity.47
Not surprisingly, given the general dissemination of such views into the general reading
culture, the editors of an anthology of eighteenth-century poetry published in 1994 still find
the reputation of eighteenth-century poetry problematic, noting that it belongs to
a period which today is neither popular nor fashionable. Like every period it has its
bands of industrious scholars working away at their books and articles, and
fighting their concerns in academic debate, but otherwise the poetry is largely
unread. Today's 'common reader' (a phrase coined by one of our writers) is
perhaps the graduate of English literature. But since many English degrees offer a
selective coverage of literary history, even that graduate may have only the
slightest acquaintance with the work of Dryden, Pope and Johnson. Certainly, he
or she will know a good deal more of Donne from the previous century or of Keats
from the next.48
Yet while the editors provide a sound argument for trying to read the poetry without falling
into old patterns of evaluation, they nonetheless want to retain old perceptions, though
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hopefully in a new way: we should still see the century as the age of reason because
"there is some truth in it.'"49 It might seem, therefore, that W. H. Auden's pithy couplet-
"For many a don while looking down his nose / Calls Pope and Dryden classics of our
prose"~captured a pervasive sentiment underlying the modern institutionalised view of
eighteenth-century poetry: if the period seemed rather dull and predictable, at least one
could speak with some certainty about its literary values.50
If the too-fervent commitment to the prose paradigm resulted in the general reader
displaying a dismaying apathy about even the best eighteenth-century poetry, it hardly
seems surprising that there were various other repercussions. Most obviously, persistent
attention to specific key writers inevitably minimized the contributions of other eighteenth-
century writers; less obviously, consistent discounting of the value of mid- and late-
eighteenth century poetry obscured signs of the lyric's steady rise in literary status. Davie
lamented, with good reason, that "there is still a very general assumption that the clocks
of literary history stopped, if not in 1700, then at the death of Pope in 1744; and that they
began to tick again only in 1798, when Wordsworth and Coleridge published their Lyrical
Ballads,"51 Charles Ryskamp observes: "The date 1798 is probably the one first stamped
on the mind of the student of English literature, and if he goes very far in his studies he
almost surely learns that few moments of literary history have been so frequently
described or so thoroughly worried as the year which gave birth to Lyrical Ballads."52
More recently, Hutchings concluded that most readers, professional and otherwise, still
assume that the century "produced only a small amount of worthwhile poetry, the rest
being tedious, dispensable lumber."53 Although many recent scholars have worked hard to
dispel this dismal state of affairs-studies on Collins, Cowper, Cowley, Smart, Thomson,
Young, and Goldsmith appear at regular intervals, and less-known writers receive
occasional attention-and attempts are now well underway to try and alter readerly
perceptions and expectations of mid- and late-eighteenth century writers and writings, the
task will likely prove as difficult as it did with efforts to shift the prose paradigm.54 Since
the same problems inherent in paradigm construction dog attitudes to the eighteenth-
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century lyric, a brief review of mid- and late-eighteenth century paradigms and other
issues now seems in order.
Again, Jeffrey's impressions of the period merit citation because, just as he
pronounced fundamental verdicts on the Augustan writers, he sets the tone for the
standard evaluative paradigm found in many later commentators:
The age which succeeded [that of Pope], too, was not the age of courage or
adventure. There never was, on the whole, a quieter time than the reigns of the
first Georges, and the greater part of that which ensued . . . They went on,
accordingly, minding their old business, and reading their old books, with great
patience and stupidity: And certainly there never was so remarkable a dearth of
original talent--so long an interruption of native genius-as during about 60 years in
the middle of the last century. The dramatic art was dead 50 years before--and
poetry seemed verging to a similar extinction. The few sparks that appeared,
however, showed that the old fire was burnt out, and that the altar must hereafter
be heaped with fuel of another quality, (p. 7)
The spirit of these remarks surface in Arnold's estimate of Gray's poetical achievements.
Arnold in fact considered Gray "our poetical classic of that literature and age," largely
because he approved of Gray's love of Greek and Latin poetry; however, Gray failed to
achieve the selfsame "independent criticism of life" as did the ancients, and what he did
manage, their "point of view for regarding life . . . their poetic manner," says Arnold, was
"not self-sprung in him, he caught them of others." Although Gray occasionally rose to
something like an ancient's height, he did not possess the "power" or "volume" of those
early writers who came "in times more favourable" (CPW, p. 181).
Eighty-six years later after Jeffrey, J. H. Millar's The Mid-Eighteenth Century
simply reiterates Jeffrey's views. Millar assures his reader that "It is common ground with
all modern critics, that the intrinsic value of the poetry produced during our period is
singularly small." Indeed, because "The reasoning faculty, in the narrower sense, is in the
ascendent," no one should expect the period after mid century to be "prolific of what are
usually termed works of imagination-prose fiction always excepted." Echoing Arnold, he
asserts that the "great achievement was the bringing to maturity of prose fiction," and like
Jeffrey and Arnold before him, he trots out the poetry without a flame metaphor, adding
that while eighteenth-century poetry lacks imagination it makes do with a lively "play of
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intelligence" and a "bountiful supply of sheer cleverness."55 Since Arnold had determined
that the "substance and matter of the best poetry acquire their special character from
possessing, in an eminent degree, truth and seriousness" (CPW, p. 171), lively and clever
eighteenth-century poetry would seem to preclude it from the upper echelons of the poetic
hierarchy.
Similarly, when Eliot turns his evaluative eye upon mid-century poetry, he knows
what he will find there: "The eighteenth century in English verse is not, after Pope, Swift,
Prior, and Gay, an age of courtly verse. It seems more like an age of retired country
clergymen and schoolmasters. It is cursed with a Pastoral convention."56 Admittedly,
Davie's introduction to The Late Augustans (first published in 1958) offers a balanced,
sympathetic view, pointing out that numerous conclusions about the period were stated
ipse dixit, notably, the level of emotion "allowed" in Augustan poetry.57 Davie won few
converts, however. Modern editors of scholarly anthologies, for instance, seem compelled
to assure readers that most of this poetry does not merit serious attention. McKillop
defines it as largely "silly, affected, and trivial," while Richard Quintana and Alvin Whitley
(who deserve praise for their attempt to dispel various prejudices about mid- and late-
eighteenth century poetry) confess that "It seems scarcely necessary to point out that the
poetry of these years is not the greatest in the language."58 The few critics who do cast a
longer glance at this poetry usually reiterate the anthologizers' testimony: Wallace
Jackson puts forward the typical view that, while mid-century poets often managed
"competent performances," the poetry as a whole "[is] uniquely limited and only
occasionally first-rate" and "of major poems or poets there are few."59 In short, those few
paradigms actually formulated to illuminate mid- and late-eighteenth century poetry
invariably have started from the premise that the fundamental critical issue concerns the
poor quality of the poetry. Regardless of the stated intentions of the critic, most
explications revert to a peevish carking about the quality of the verse, never straying far
from the security of Jeffrey's evaluative paradigm.60
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The most popular paradigm for explaining the inferiority of post-Augustan poetry
conceives poetic decline as the inevitable legacy of a period of great artistic creativity:
cultural energies wore down, poetic enervation signalling a period of transition. Eliot, who
admired eighteenth-century poetry for its prose virtues, considered the tumble in the
quality of poetry after Pope as part of the inevitable movement of literary and linguistic
forces. While the entire century, he says, "was, like any other age, an age of transition,"
he found the poetry after Pope "intolerably poetic," by which he meant that "instead of
working out the proper form for its matter, when it has any, and informing verse with prose
virtues, it merely applies the magniloquence of Milton or the neatness of Pope to matter
which it is wholly unprepared for." This amounted to a sort of radical malfunction in the
use of language: the ability to master both style and feeling degenerated because "after
Pope there was no one who thought and felt nearly enough like Pope to be able to use his
language quite successfully; but a good many second-rate writers tried to write something
like it."61 Quintana and Whitley likewise apologise for the inadequacies of the verse with
the statement that "Like all other eras [the mid- and late-eighteenth century] was of
course transitional."62
Basically, the age-as-transition paradigm relies on the impossible-to-be-proved
assumption that inferior poetry naturally follows a sustained expenditure of a nation's
creative energy. This sounds as if the creative herd simply ran itself into the ground, the
breeding stock of culture so depleted of "verse reserves" that its progeny suffered a
thorough debilitation of poetic nerve. Young dispensed with this argument in his
Conjectures On Original Composition (1759): "Reasons there are why talents may not
appear, none why they may not exist, as much in one period as another."63 An essay in
the Trifler likewise argues that "True genius never fails to force its way into the world. It
will always be admired, it will always be revered."64 In fact, the same essay makes a
strong argument to suggest that the present suffered not from its past but from itself, a
not inaccurate observation. After all, much of the diversity which so characterizes the
period owes its existence to explosion of writing, much of it led by the demand for
Chapter One, p. 39
contributions to popular media. For example, The Gentleman's Magazine for 1784 says
to its readers:
The Poetical department of our Magazine, though professedly a collection of
fugitive pieces, has lately been so plentifully supplied with original compositions of
real merit, that very little room has been left for selection. As Poetry is the feast
provided for our fair readers, we would wish it chiefly to consist of delicacies; and
therefore earnestly request the assistance of rising genius to contribute to their
entertainment.65
Remarking that love of fame may provide a wonderful engine of progress, the Trifler
essay adds that "its disadvantages have not been altogether inconsiderable" since the
desire motivated many of the poorly qualified to attempt literary careers: "Every illiterate
puppy, who can scarcely scribble his own name, thinks himself bound, with or without a
patron, to communicate his stanzas to the publick; and the pedantic schoolboy, just out of
his Cordery, sends forth some nonsensical translation to the press." With a certain acuity
of insight, the Trifler observes that "To increase the republic of letters without adding to
its stability is a useless and dangerous experiment."66 This attack on lesser talents runs
throughout the century and in all likelihood worried more writers and critics than any
burden of the past.
Still, the argument has struck many critics as fundamentally sound, and a number
of notable theories concerning poetic inheritance and the failure of mid- and late-
eighteenth century poetry owe their credibility to this paradigm. Walter Jackson Bate's
The Burden of the Past and the English Poet, for instance, has proved an influential
rendering of the age-as-transition paradigm. Bate contends that poetry (or culture)
declines because no poet can shoulder the combined emotional, psychological, and
intellectual weight of past greatness. The poet feels "increasingly powerless to attain (or is
in some way being forbidden to attain) the scope and power of the earlier poetry that he
so deeply admires."67 Bate illustrates his thesis with a comment from Johnson's Rambler
86:
The burthen of government is increased upon princes by the virtues of their
immediate predecessors. It is, indeed, always dangerous to be placed in a state of
unavoidable comparison with excellence, and the danger is still greater when that
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excellence is consecrated by death ... He that succeeds a celebrated writer, has
the same difficulties to encounter.68
Although writers in every age feel this burden, the famous battle of the Ancients and the
Moderns would seem to provide clear evidence that eighteenth-century writers felt the
weight of the past increase dramatically. Unfortunately for the moderns, with rare
exceptions the battle confirms their failure to reach the heights commanded by the
ancients.69
As the century wears on, this sense that famous precursors necessarily produced
better art seemingly becomes more pervasive. Young, for example, laments that great
writers of the past "engross, prejudice, and intimidate. They engross our attention, and so
prevent a due inspection of ourselves; they prejudice our judgement in favour of their
abilities, and so lessen our own; and they intimidate us with the splendour of their renown,
and thus under diffidence bury our strength."70 Young here is of course asking that
readers and critics judge contemporary writers by criteria appropriate to their talents and
productions. Frank Sayers, writing in 1805, adds further weight to this generally
pessimistic feeling about the opportunities for writerly success, noting that "In that highly
advanced state to which literature is at present arrived, few productions can be expected
which may allure by the novelty of their matter, or fascinate by the brilliancy of their
execution." Sayers in fact extends this analysis to include almost all types of writing; he
contends that "Not only the most attractive and prominent, but many even of the humbler
themes of imagination and science, have been seized by the vigilance of genius, and
moulded into forms with a skill, a fancy, and an elegance which can hardly be equalled."71
How, then, to counter this force. Young sees that writers could only reverse the "great
inferiority" of contemporary poetry by producing original works, yet in practice the grail of
originality simply intensified the poet's sense of futility: his inferiority occurs precisely
because he lacks the imaginative strength to turn the old into the new and the vital.72
Mired in history and subdued by tradition, mid- and late-eighteenth century poets could
not achieve the solution arrived at by the Romantics, what Bate calls "an active debate or
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dialogue within the human psyche of the past with the present," that is, "a creative use of
the past." Incapable of translating tradition into vital art, these poets made their poetry into
a lament for "the artist's relation to his own art," a lament which the Romantics
transformed into great poetry.73
Harold Bloom stakes out similar theoretical territory, although he allows the
inherited burden an element of dynamic potentiality. For Bloom, a poet earns his identity
as a poet only after he enters into a deeply emotional and dynamic relationship with a
father poet, and just as in the Freudian account of father/son relations, that of precursor
and successor involves anxiety and conflict: "Initial love for the precursor's poetry is
transformed rapidly enough into a revisionary strife, without which individuation is not
possible."74 Hence, unless a poet possesses "the persistence to wrestle with [his] strong
precursors, even to the death," he will always lack an individual identity, will be unable to
"clear imaginative space" for himself, the amount of space which he wins indicating the
degree to which he has conquered the influence of his poetic father.75 Yet for all the
theory's syncretic neatness, Bloom acknowledges that it does not actually answer the
question of how great poetry gets written: for one thing, overcoming a poetic father-figure
may solve the problem of originality, but that alone will not make a poet "necessarily
better."76 Ultimately, only by writing better poetry will the latecomer end the struggle.
Whatever the theoretical merits of such "burden" and "anxiety" paradigms, in
practice they prove both unconvincing and critically reductive. A case in point. Paul
Sherwin, a student of Bloom's, applied the theory in a study of Collins, plotting Collins's
failure to displace his poetic father, Milton. Unable to reach Milton's poetic standards,
Collins dejectedly turns to radical experimentation (that is, to originality), sowing a few
seeds which later flowered in the Romantics; oppressed by failure, he went mad and died
prematurely. Locked into a reductive psychological approach, Sherwin takes scant notice
of evidence about Collins's life which suggests a more plausible explanation for Collins's
poetic "failure"—if what Collins did achieve could be deemed failure. Part of Collins's
despair (and madness) supposedly resulted from the lack of positive response to his
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poetry. In fact his first major poem, the Persian Eclogues (1742), found a sizable and
supportive audience in the same year that Young and Pope both published major
poems.77 True, the initial response to the Descriptive and Allegorical Odes (1746)
depressed Collins, but how could these poems reveal his despair even before he knew
how the public would receive them? Perhaps Collins's madness stemmed from some
other source. Johnson, who knew Collins well, hints that Collins enjoyed wine, women,
and song, which suggests that his mental and physical infirmities resulted from his
lifestyle: he probably suffered the recurring effects of venereal disease. In any case, as
Richard Wendorf argues, any method of psychological profiling which relies upon hints
from Collins's poetry alone "are surely subject to serious qualifications."78
Collins's "case," moreover, highlights a further weakness in the anxiety of
influence paradigm: who, amongst a field of many, to designate as the poetic forefather.
The textual and critical notes to Lonsdale's edition to Collins's poems make it clear that
Collins drew upon a wide variety of sources: borrowings from Pope, Thomson, Spenser,
Shakespeare, ancient Greek poetry, and Horace occur as frequently as ones from Milton,
as do ones from lesser writers--the Wartons, Akenside, Tickell, Prior, John Davies, and
others.79 Collins, in fact, admired Thomson probably more than he did any other writer.
Thus, while the reformulations of the age-as-transition paradigm undertaken by both Bate
and Bloom raise important considerations about the psychological dynamics of the
creative act, the burden of the past forms only one component of a complex matrix of
elements which might conceivably coalesce in any one particular poet's "personality," the
importance of any one element would be difficult, if not impossible, to measure.80
The transitional status allotted mid- and late-eighteenth century writings spawned
other, equally unsatisfying critical commonplaces, doubtless in part because the influence
of the popular paradigms already discussed remained in force. As Nichol Smith
complained long ago, once critics left the calm, well-mapped seas of Augustan literature
they floundered in a search for either "classic" or "romantic" tendencies, determined to
categorize the poetry as the consequence of "a period of decadence" (that is, decline and
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transition) or "a period of preparation" (that is, reaction and transition).81 Bronson relates
that as a student he learned that the only point in reading eighteenth-century poetry "was
to see how the human spirit struggled out of [its Augustan] straitjacket into new life ... we
knew that its tenets had reached their probably ultimate exemplification in the work of
Pope, and that what followed in its track was only feebler and more arid imitation, while
the buds of fresh romantic promise were beginning here and there to peep out timidly."82
Lending some credence to Branson's complaint, A. Bosker offers a fairly typical summary
of how and why poetry developed as it did during the century:
The literature of the Age of Johnson reflects the conflict between the two main
factors in artistic creation, unimpassioned reason on the one side, emotion and
imagination on the other. Reason had been the dominating force ever since the
middle of the seventeenth century and under its powerful sway emotional and
imaginative elements had been repressed, the old spontaneity of the Elizabethans
had fled the domain of art, and the artistic expression of deep personal feelings
had come to be looked upon with distrust. But the old romantic spirit, which had
never become extinct, began to reassert itself and gradually restored the essential
elements of poetic art to their proper places, so that the last decades of the
eighteenth century saw the dawn of a new era, free from the restraints of common
sense.83
The psychological paradigm (operating as a kind of historical determinism) behind this
argument does not, of course, bear scrutiny, while as an account of how poets see the
purpose of their work it lacks common-sense. Northrop Frye, for one, found the whole
"pre-romantic" argument inherently illogical: "Not only did the 'pre-romantics' not know that
the Romantic movement was going to succeed them," he observes, "but there has
probably never been a case on record of a poet's having regarded a later poet's work as
the fulfilment of his own."84 At least seeing these poets either as reacting against
classicism, Frye's position, or as actively if inadequately promoting Augustan poetic
values, Branson's view, commits no sin against chronology.85 In any case, this rage to
interpret the poetry after Pope according to the demands of a pre-Romantic paradigm
moved Sutherland to complain that in evaluating the period critics had "too often reserved
their praise for what is least characteristic of it. Their eyes have been fixed continually on
the horizon; and any faint glimmerings of pre-romanticism have been extolled at the
expense of the more characteristic and central achievements of the century."86
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Sutherland's remark appears just: closer examination of contemporary evidence
which seems so supportive of the burden of the past theory often reveals a less
pessimistic view of the cultural climate of the time. Dryden's The Secular Masque. From
The Pilgrim (1700) offers a case in point. While it appears to lament the passing of the
age, the final lines look forward with hope not resignation: "T/'s well an old age is out, /
And time to begin a new."87 Goldsmith's An Inquiry into the Present State of Polite
Learning (1759), which sets out "to distinguish the decay, naturally consequent on an age
grown old in literature," would seem a likely work in which to discover a lament for the
passing of a golden age of English literature. Goldsmith, however, vents no such regret:
although he can imagine a distant age "when taste is so far depraved" that no work will
merit serious attention, he contests that "such a period bears no resemblance to the
present."88 In The Monthly Miscellany for February 1774, an essay entitled "An Essay on
the State of Literature in Great Britain" remarks that "About the time of William the
Conqueror, all Europe was sunk in the abyss of ignorance. The learning of the ancients
was forgotten, and ferocious barbarism had consigned the arts to oblivion." Now,
however, "the minds of the English seem to have undergone a total revolution" as
evidence of almost daily improvements in all the fields of knowledge attest, the essay
concluding that "The imitative arts are now making hasty strides towards perfection."89
Although the essay in the Trifler noted earlier took a dim view of "the genius of that
unhappy, restless herd of authors, who never soar beyond the madrigals of a Grub-street
garret," the essayist still feels that "the present state of the literary republic is not in so
weak and tottering a condition as to require assistance from the vain, superficial, the
mercenary."90 Sayers, who appeared to take a markedly pessimistic view of the prospects
for contemporary writers, puts on a brave face, advising that even if the past did produce
great works the writers of the present age were not therefore "condemned to a mere
indolent enjoyment of the delight and instruction which is already prepared for us; an
examination of our literary possessions will still afford us ample occasion for the exercise
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of our talents," adding that "if we cannot be as splendidly, we may at least be as usefully
employed as many of our more eminent predecessors."91 Stronger evidence for the
declining age thesis appears in George Berkeley's poem, "On The Prospect Of Planting
Arts And Learning In America" (wr. 1726; pub. 1752). He sees Europe (and Britain in
particular) as a place which "breeds in her decay," her cultural, intellectual, and social
achievements "already past." The Muses, "disgusted at an age and clime" which could
foster such decay, move on to America and "another golden age."92 Berkeley, of course,
saw the new paradise first-hand and returned to Britain.93
Despite the well-founded complaints of critics like Sutherland and Frye that the
pre-romantic paradigm did a disservice to mid- and late-eighteenth century achievements,
and despite the evidence provided by writers in the period, the urge to make the paradigm
work remains strong. For instance, the title of Marshall Brown's recent study,
Preromanticism, indicates where his sympathies lie: full of promise and generally fine
work—particularly his readings of Collins and Gray, the study does not deviate greatly from
attitudes traced in this chapter. After noting that he "concur[s] with many critics who have
attacked or renounced the term in its old form," he asserts that he does not accept
alternative terms.94 Instead, he wants to continue using the tag preromanticism for the
"very reason" that it suggests the age's teleological urge: he says that most of all mid- and
late-eighteenth-century writers "wanted change," wanted to escape or transcend the flux
of their age which, as an "age of sensibility was inevitably an age of dissatisfaction." His
book will answer the question that earlier positivist criticism could not adequately raise-
"what hindered the greatest authors of the period from writing?"95 Still, in its emphasis on
developing an historical criticism which wants to account for generic changes as essential
to understanding the relationship of writing to culture, Brown's work deserves high praise.
His focus on philosophical and aesthetic developments, however, does not engage with
the new science. In short, though a rich and suggestive exploration, it takes a rather
different tack from mine.
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Another particularly unfortunate repercussion of the age-as-transition paradigm
can be seen in a general and insidious "visualizing" of the lives and writings of mid- and
late-eighteenth century poets. W. K. Wimsatt, for example, pictures the age as "a
relatively weak or dim inner period, a poetic valley of a shadow ... a time full of
somewhat fatigued and straining traditions, transitions, retrospective creations."96 His
sketch, not surprisingly, clings to generalization, vague imagery, and dime-store
psychologizing. D. J. Enright spins out the logic of the paradigm rather thinly: "Between
the self-assured work of the Augustans and the energetic and diverse movements of the
Romantic Revival," he explains, "came a period of half-hearted, characterless writing,
when the poets, looking backwards and forwards at the same time, drifted on a slow
current of change which they could neither govern nor understand."97 Jackson follows a
similar course, declaring that Collins and Gray never achieved greatness because they
laboured under "a mid-century poetic of such drastic limitations that it offered to the poet
no specifically contemporary act of mind and no imitative models other than the
extrapolated sublimities of past poets. It was not a fertile field."98 Such remarks hardly
border on sense: after all, how does a poet look both forwards and backwards at the
same time, and what could Jackson possibly mean by a "mid-century poetic" which failed
to offer a "specifically contemporary act of mind" to a poet?
Nonetheless, Donald Wesling would agree with both Enright and Jackson. In his
eyes, the entire interval between Pope and Wordsworth constitutes "a bad time for
poetry," the vile "late Augustan time of associationism." For Wesling, poetry written
according to associationist principles struggles to represent the world as "an infinitude of
things, ranged side by side," but it fails because the linguistic strategies available to the
poet could not contend with reality: "Language, in appropriating this plenitude, gestured
"here," then "there"; or "if," then "then"; or language remarked "then it was that" and "now
it is this." Sensations, words, image words, dominated all the mind's procedures of
exposition, for the major mode of perceiving the world was that of conjunction, addition,
polarity, and analogy."99 Yet this casual personification of language to describe mid- and
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late-eighteenth century poetic practice seems to me a more dishonest rhetorical device
than that style of associationist composition which Wesling deplores: the world, after all,
is "an infinitude of things," and the mind does employ "Sensations, words, image words,"
and so forth to try and represent to itself and to others its experience of the world.100 In
light of such appraisals as these, Benjamin Boyce's confession that "even the scholars
who today devote themselves to studying these poems acknowledge some difficulty in
justifying them" hardly comes as a shock.101 Norman Maclean, a scholar whose work on
the eighteenth-century lyric deserves much praise, happily confirms Boyce's remark,
confessing that "I am one of those who have attempted to throw some ray of historical
understanding upon the personified lyrics of the eighteenth century ... I still do not like
them."102
The weight of negative commentary painted an image of Britain after mid century
as a land inhabited solely by "the small fry of scribblers" who "wriggle[dj through the mud
in shoals," too self-pitying and myopic to see the real world going on about them.103 To be
sure, many writers wrote, as David Mallet happily confessed, from "humble but happy
retirement," but the reader need not conclude that such writers necessarily or willingly
avoided the "potentially disturbing immediacy of the real world."104 The blame for this
perception lies with modern criticism, not with eighteenth-century writers, since critics
commonly portrayed these poets as either too rooted in the dullness of their culture to rise
to the heights of the powerful emotional poetry which the Romantics produced, or as
lightweight versifiers who merely floated on the winds of changing aesthetic fashions,
halfway to rebellion but ultimately too content with the norms of Augustan expression
really to break away. Lonsdale argues that "Commentators still generalise freely about
large areas of experience which, it is claimed, eighteenth-century poets ignored" when, in
reality, eighteenth-century poetry accommodated many styles, schools, and subjects,
varied experience providing the impetus behind numerous experiments.105 Poems which
tell a more realistic story about the concerns of eighteenth-century writers do exist: Robert
Tatersal's "The Bricklayer's Lament" (1734) describes the vagaries of seasonal labour;
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Edward Rushton's "Human Debasement. A Fragment" (1793) denounces slavery, while
Joseph Mather extols Paine's virtues in "God Save Great Thomas Paine" (71792);
Thomas Holcroft portrays a grim but sympathetic picture in "The Dying Prostitute, An
Elegy" (1785), and Mary Leapor's "An Essay On Woman" (1751) details a woman's place
in society; "Between An Unemployed Artist and His Wife" (Anonymous, 1775) discusses
the prospect of the workhouse facing a married couple. The preface to Thomas Day's The
Dying Negro (1773) explains that "Whatever reception this little piece may meet with from
others, the Author can never regret that portion of time as lost, which he has employed in
paying this small tribute of humanity to the misery of a fellow-creature."106 Although radical
literary experimentation was, therefore, occurring well before the 1790's, critics
conditioned by the dominant paradigms persistently ignored, misrepresented, or
undervalued these mid-century experiments.107 While the critical situation is changing
under new theoretical pressures and political concerns, for much of this century Norman
Callan's observation about criticism of the period summed up the essential problem: "Of
no other age has the poetry been so little read for its own sake, or so much for the sake of
comparison with others."108
Section 2.
At this point a reader might well be wondering why, given the lyric genre's continuing
popularity and rising reputation during the eighteenth century, modern critics did not
foreground lyric accomplishments in the period to rebut the charge of prosiness and in the
process establish a more productive paradigm for reading mid- and late-eighteenth
century poetry. Hindsight of course makes everyone wise, but the historical drift of
eighteenth-century studies, governed so to speak by its own peculiar logic, militated
against any such development. Although critics would often praise specific poems or point
to Gray and Collins as able practitioners of lyric writing, particularly as they both seemed
to fit the emerging temper of romanticism, the rise of the eighteenth-century lyric to the
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status of a major genre escaped the notice of most critics and readers because it did not
fit into the specific paradigms formulated to defend, explain, and promote the best poetry
of the century: the issue of generic transformation as a register of cultural experience
rarely contributed to debates about the "failure" of post-Popean writing or to those studies
bent on spotting the train of Romanticism.109 Insofar as critics showed an awareness of
the lyric's presence in the cultural field, they generally couched their remarks about it in
terms of the evaluative norms of the prose paradigms or its various derivatives. Doughty,
for instance, found that many eighteenth-century lyrics were "not without skill and charm,"
but also that he was "glad also to discover how little injustice the romantics did to the
period which immediately preceded their own." The problem why no lyric of this period
reached romantic sublimity, he feels, lay in the repression of feeling caused by the strict
application of reason, a devotion to wit, and a social function ascribed to all poetry.110
Grierson, who appeared to take issue with the "commonplace of criticism that the
eighteenth century was not a period which produced great poetry, was not lyrical in
temperament," nonetheless concluded that the peculiar quality of the lyric—the "note of
ecstasy, the piercing note of joy or sorrow"--was missing.111 Although Davie queries the
modern conviction that "whatever the virtues of [eighteenth-century] poetry ... it is
assumed that they cannot be lyrical virtues," he resorts to a lyric definition so restrictive
that it effectively eliminates all but eighteenth-century hymns from his discussion.112 In
what sounds almost a refrain, A. R. Humphreys voices the basic impression that "The
eighteenth century lowers the lyric to the level of prose sense."113 Harvey notes that "The
characteristics of the lyric-subjectivity and intensity-to which might be added
comparative brevity and simplicity—were not at all the most prominent characteristics of
Augustan verse."114 David W. Lindsay finds that "the most interesting developments
between 1744 and 1759 were in lyrical poetry," but in spite of his recognition of these
developments his explanation for these developments relies upon established
paradigms.115 The introductory notes to a recent anthology, after telling us that "The
period ... is principally a period of the long poem, and particularly of the long meditative
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poem and the long satiric poem, in which virtues are praised and vices excoriated," goes
on to explain that "even the lyrics of the period, at least those belonging to its largest body
of lyrics, are not such as would immediately appeal to modern readers. The Christian
hymns of the eighteenth century are probably as strange to many of us as its strange
genres."116 McKillop, it would seem, summed up the basic standpoint quite nicely: "an age
which subordinated the individual to impersonal norms did not express itself in short
intense poems of personal feeling"; verse written under such an emotionally restrictive
regime "tends to be trivial and conventional, or at best neat and pensive."117 In brief,
eighteenth-century poets simply could not write "true" lyrics.
Such remarks serve notice that, in addition to the normative view about the prosy
temper of eighteenth-century poets, modern critics conceive of the nature of lyric poetry in
a rather specific way; an unspoken, if ambiguous assumption about the essential fabric of
"real" poetry often lies behind critical remarks about eighteenth-century poetry, and
especially about the eighteenth-century lyric.118 For the modern, lyric poetry is, as Hegel
concisely defines it, "the expression of subjectivity," that is, it conveys profound,
spontaneous, and inspired emotional experiences which for many critics constitutes the
essence of great poetry.119 Catherine Walsh Peltz long ago made a good attempt to argue
that the Restoration and early eighteenth-century lyric, if impersonal and working largely
with conventional matters (mainly love affairs), attained a certain style and manner of
expressiveness, and she finds that critics overlooked these poems because "we view the
neo-classical age as essentially unlyric."120 To her credit, she does not pretend that neo¬
classical lyrics intend spontaneous effusions of self but shows that poets writing at the
time worked with an altogether different conception of the lyric. Martha Collins, on the
other hand, ascribes the lack of a true lyric spirit in Collins's poetry to the degree to which
he shared the temper of his age, "an age in which . . . criticism was more important than
lyricism."121 Mark Jeffreys, disputing Prospero Saiz's and other deconstructionists'
categorization of the lyric genre as a "reactionary genre" which privileges logocentrism
and the authority of the self, points out that such an assertion "depend[s] on a late-
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Romantic conception of the lyric and lyric subjectivity." He argues that "only in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was [the lyric] mythologized as the purest and oldest of
poetic genres and thus transformed into a nostalgic ideological marker."122 Obviously,
such a conception will make certain demands, raise certain expectations, about what type
of subject matter the form ought to treat and how it ought to treat it: this "lyric as
expression of subjectivity" paradigm, which usually occurs in tandem with other
preromantic paradigms, adds to the difficulty of appreciating the work of mid- and late-
eighteenth century poets on their terms.
Since preromantic readings explore mid- and late-eighteenth century writings
primarily to establish the spiritual excellence of Romantic poetry, the approach already
presupposes that Romantic sensibilities provide the norm for lyric experience: by looking
at the lyric backwards, so to speak, from Romantic successes to eighteenth-century half-
successes, the true lyric spirit becomes manifest. Prophetic Strain, by Anne Williams,
pursues this method. Working from Romantic models (read Wordsworthian), she defines
a lyric thus: "when the author induces the reader to know, from within, the virtual
experience of a more or less particularized consciousness. When this aim constitutes the
pre-dominant organizing principle of a poem, we say that is a lyric."123 According to
Howard Weinbrot, Williams errs in defining those forces at work in the eighteenth century
which created this lyric impulse: for Williams, '"II Penseroso', Protestant emphasis on the
value of the senses as aids to personal response and meditation, and the particular
example of Job all encouraged the personal vision and prophetic strain that found its
ultimate success in Wordsworth."124 Certainly Williams is correct that Milton's "II
Penseroso" went through a period of immense popularity, though whether this actually led
to Wordsworth remains a moot point, or if it did then the line of descent needs some
careful reappraisal. Shenstone observes, in 1755, that "I cannot help remarking that
Milton's II Penseroso has drove half our Poets crazy; it has, however, produced some
admirable Odes to Fancy, amongst which, that of Warton I think deserves the
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Preference; and after his Merrick's, Penshurst, and the Ode on Solitude are of the
same Tribe, and are good. The Pleasures ofMelancholy, and Mariott's Ode to Fancy, of
the same Tribe, are indifferent."125 In any case, Williams's account seems both too
particular and too vague to Weinbrot, and he considers this argument for the motivation of
lyrics as "imprecise" and thus "fails." Williams shows little understanding of the aesthetic
or historical situation of the lyric, along with a limited awareness of lyric precursors-
Pindar, Horace, and Virgil, for example-and little awareness of recent work on lyric
theory.126 More favourably, Hutchings notes that Williams's study says "not so much about
lyric poetry in the eighteenth century ... as about how the lyric took over the major thrust
of poetry through a process of 'generic appropriation'." However, like Weinbrot, he sees
similar problems, noting that her definition of the lyric apparently "encompasses all" poetic
acts such that "any poem can be a lyric."127
The critical treatment of Collins's personality and poetry provides a good
illustration of the way in which the various Romantic paradigms determine estimates of a
poet's work. On the one hand, Collins receives attention from modern critics largely
because his poetry appears to concern itself with specifically "modern" issues: poetry
about poetry, the poetic act, anxiety about creation, and so forth, encouraging readers to
engage Collins's poetry as important documents on the way towards a Romantic poetics.
On the other hand, Collins's concern with the writing of poetry invariably dooms him to
failure in modern eyes: he fails because the modern perspective takes it as axiomatic that
it already knows what he was saying in his poetry and why he was saying it: for example,
Brown's reading of Collins's "Ode to Evening," however suggestive, suffers from a
heavily-influenced Kantian romanticism, reading the poem as if Collins was trying to
achieve, but not finally succeeding in, a Kantian form of transcendence beyond the
empirical. For Brown, the "Ode to Evening" employs "deficient modes of time. Impure and
unstable movement obscures the purified inner sense that the poem allows us finally to
glimpse."128 This type of observation fits Umberto Eco's argument that post-Romantic
criticism often fails to appreciate the aims of pre-Romantic art precisely because the pre-
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Romantic artist or writer does not articulate the basic concerns of Romantic poetics,
Romantic aesthetics. Those concerns, he says, revolve around the problems of art and
artistic production or, as Bate put it, "the artist's relation to his own art." Modern critics,
who generally share the same aesthetic concerns, tend to evaluate a work in terms of its
declaration or its statement of poetics. This means, says Eco, that the criteria for failure is
the reverse for that of success: "the success of the work will have to do solely with
whether or not the artist has been able to express the problem of poetics he wanted to
resolve."'*29 Collins, who did not live long enough nor sanely enough, never clearly
formulated (or at least never expressed) his poetics in a satisfactory way for modern
tastes, and therefore he can be classified as a failed poet.
For those critics who accepted the period as a transitional phase, the apparent
increase in lyrics simply provided further evidence of the radical separation of neo-classic
and romantic sensibilities. In The Mirror and the Lamp, M. H. Abrams articulates the
rationale for this approach: the contrast between neo-classic and Romantic art lies in a
shift in understanding (and valuing) of how the mind works. Instead of holding up a mirror
to nature, that is, pursuing a mimetic theory of art, poets began to appreciate the mind's
active role in creating its reality: the mind was seen as a lamp and poetry the immediate
expression of inner life. Throughout the latter decades of the eighteenth century, as
romanticism slowly ripens, aesthetic and literary theory begins to emphasise more and
more the expressive and emotional value of poetry, eschewing principles of order,
decorum, and right reason for those of ecstasy, vision, and poetic creativity. The lyric, it is
then assumed, offered poets the freedom which the new expressive ideal required.130
Jackson argues that as poets began to react against their Augustan precursors they were
"abetted by such contemporary fashions as the traditions of ut picture poesis, by the
sublime, and by the growing interest in cultural and aesthetic primitivism." Such a climate
of taste required spontaneous poetic effusions and so, invoking a rather strange notion of
"demand-led" poetry, he asserts that to meet the need for "an immediately affective art"
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the poets put their collective heads together and agreed that "fundamentally the lyric was
the literary form most able to meet this requirement."131 The results, as far as Jackson is
concerned, were not overly positive.
However, if the reader can manage to disregard all the negative publicity, can
forget the charge that "The poets were too sane," it becomes evident that rather than a
literary desert the decades after Pope constitute "an extraordinarily interesting period of
English literature."132 Indeed, the admitted competence of these poets suggests the
unfairness of most critical estimates. Wimsatt, for instance, finds the poetry "shot through
. . . with many interesting flashes" which he interprets, typically, as part of an ongoing
rebellion-"hard-won, even unconscious, freedoms"~but flashes which underline the fact
that the roots of this poetry lie deep in the poetic tradition: "One motif intrinsic to the
poetry of the whole century may be observed in peculiar concentration here--the method,
the bondage, and the main freedom of all English neo-classic and pre-romantic
poetry--the principle of imitation or free-running parallel." Such imitation included all the
ancient models, as well as "the whole British tradition and notably of the English poets
who had already best imitated or parallelled the ancients-Spenser and Milton especially
and, though he was still very near, Pope."133 The notes to Lonsdale's edition of The
Poems of Gray, Collins, and Goldsmith, and those to James Sambrook's edition of
Thomson's The Seasons drive home the validity of Wimsatt's argument, while Boyce,
who admits that the odes of Gray, Collins, and the Wartons "seem to have lost most of
their charm" for modern readers, finds mid-century odes "a very mixed breed" which a
reader unacquainted with their complex cultural sensibility cannot fully appreciate.
Besides requiring a good knowledge of "the odes of Pindar and Horace, with their allusive,
highly decorated manner," the reader should possess a familiarity with "Milton's shorter
poems, the tradition of literary pictorialism seemingly affected by late Renaissance
painting, allegorical and mythological tendencies seemingly strengthened by baroque
canvases and ceiling paintings, and something of sentimental melancholy."134 In other
words, paradigms which attempt to explain, define, or interpret the attitudes and
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temperament of this period resist easy formulation. Indeed, critics remain divided about a
name for the decades which follow Pope, in part perhaps because they have not, as
Sutherland noted, "written about eighteenth-century poetry with their eyes fixed steadily on
the object, or even with any apparent eagerness to study it."135
It would be senseless to challenge the premise that eighteenth-century poets
gradually began to articulate expressive ideals, that this involved a new appreciation of
"primitivist" or oraculist poetry, or that poets valued the lyric because it offered modes of
expression closer to that of pure poetry.136 Clearly, and as my own evidence presented in
Chapter Four confirms, they did. I would nevertheless reject the leading assumptions
about the nature of the lyric genre which limit and condition such interpretations: these
devalue and misrepresent eighteenth-century perceptions and expectations of the lyric
qua poetry, and they falsify the intellectual forces and norms which governed how the
concept of the poetic "character" evolved in the eighteenth century. As I argued in the
Preamble, the growing appreciation of the lyric genre's expressive capacity, registered in
a wealth of critical reflections and statements of praise by a large number of minor
figures, calls attention to a comprehensive evolution in the way that writers and readers,
makers and consumers of culture, conceived of the lyric genre. Critically, we must accept
that this culture did not conceive of the lyric in terms of Romantic poetics. And, further, as
a matter of changing taste, modern views about the eighteenth-century lyric have shown
little concern to appreciate the metamorphosis in the genre's reputation in terms of an
eighteenth-century context in which the transformational power of experimental science
played a dominant role in thinking about the arts and sciences: witness, for instance, the
explosion of literary criticism and aesthetic philosophy during the century. In any case, we
might at least approach with some scepticism the chorus of negative judgments
concerning the importance of mid- and late-eighteenth century poetry for an
understanding of the evolution of eighteenth-century culture based on estimates of the
quality of the poetry. For the most part, the nay-saying simply conceals how few critics
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have even bothered to investigate the cultural dynamics peculiar to mid- and late-
eighteenth century poetry.137 To begin rectifying that requires some attempt to
contextualise the special status of the eighteenth-century lyric; to do that we must
reappraise the origins and the evolution of experimental science in England and, in
particular, examine a set of behavioural "ideals" which underpinned the hegemonic growth
of the new science and laid down the conditions for the rise of the eighteenth-century lyric
to major genre status. Further, we must depart from the usual method of evaluating the
effect or influence of science upon literature. More about that in the next chapter.
Chapter Two - Experimental Science, Authority, Language
Section 1. Science as Hegemony
Samuel Johnson's striking his foot hard against a rock to refute George Berkeley's theory
that "the objects of human knowledge . . . are either ideas actually imprinted on the
senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the
mind" impresses most readers as a typically humorous instance of Johnsonian reaction.1
Yet in smiling at Johnson's behaviour the significance of the act as a philosophical
objection can be easily misprized: it strikingly dramatised his conviction that any theories
about causes and effects must pass the test of experience. The foot hitting the rock and
the immediate knowledge garnered therefrom-that the idea of pain was not prior to the
sense experience-served Johnson as a ready test of the credibility of Berkeley's theory,
what Boswell referred to as "a stout exemplification of the first truths of Pere Bouffier, or
the original principles of Read and Beattie; without admitting which, we can no more
argue in metaphysicks, than we can argue in mathematics without axioms."2 Rather than
simply assent to Berkeley's hypothesis (and he likely sympathised with Berkeley's
theological aims), and rather than elaborate a precise syllogistic rebuttal, Johnson based
his judgment on personal experience; in fact, he habitually tested conjectures about
natural processes by running experiments. Boswell describes several of Johnson's
"experiments": he shaved the hair about his nipples in order to measure its rate of growth;
he carried out chemical experiments of dubious merit; and he conducted experiments with
plants. Johnson, moreover, retained a keen interest in medical issues and in mechanical
inventions throughout his life.3 In short, his "scientism" formed a vital component of his
"worldview," which itself governed his response to Berkeley's hypothesis.4
Presumably, Berkeley's intellect matured within a similar cultural framework as did
Johnson's. Certainly, as his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision indicates, he
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considered himself an experimental scientist of sorts.5 That work displays a thorough
grounding in the methodology of experimental science, while the analytical procedure
which he adopts in his Principles of Human Knowledge derives from Locke, the arch-
empiricist and the usual foil for Berkeley's anti-empiricist polemic. Whether Berkeley won
or lost his argument with Locke does not greatly matter here; what does is that he cloaks
his hypotheses in the raiment of the new science, exploiting its epistemological and
methodological authority to legitimise the claims made in favour of his "worldview."
Doubtless he suspected that few of his contemporary readers would sympathise with a
theory of knowledge which utilised a methodology with less authority than that of the
experimental method.6 Thus, although Johnson and Berkeley held differing convictions
about the metaphysical purpose of the experimental method of inquiry, both cases attest
to the pervasive influence of that method in the intellectual and cultural life of the
eighteenth century; that Johnson used Berkeley's definition of science in his Dictionary
doubly emphasizes the complicated way in which experimental and empirical ideals
worked their way into general consciousness.
The area of dispute between Johnson and Berkeley, of course, indicates not only
that the cultural role but that perceptions of the meaning of the new science were by no
means straight-forward or taken for granted. On the contrary, as Margaret J. Osier
argues, at least two epistemological traditions competed during the eighteenth century:
one, which we might designate a form of optimistic realism, held that mechanical laws
actually explained reality; the other tradition, taking its cue from Locke, tended towards
scepticism, particularly in matters concerning metaphysics, theology, and questions about
faith and identity.7 Yet the persistence of these two differing traditions does not negate my
main point because, despite antagonisms about its implications and significance, both
sides retained a healthy respect for the methodology and the other ideals of the new
science, as well as a high degree of interest in it as an intellectual discipline. I will take up
these issue in more detail later. For now we might adduce Richard B. Schwartz's roll call
of notable eighteenth-century literary writers in order to underline my point that writers of
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all sorts maintained an interest in some form of experimental science.8 Moreover, as
various studies show, as a mental discipline it contributed to developments in language
and literature in general, and to the genesis of the novel in particular. In The Rise of the
Novel, for example, Ian Watt postulates that during the era following the publication of
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, a general acceptance of the new
scientific view of how the individual related to his environment paved the way for the
novel's innovative exploration of personal and social identity. The novelist exploited the
ramifications of Lockean psychology, developments in narrative and character formation
appearing "analogous to the rejection of universals and the emphasis on particulars which
characterizes philosophic realism."9 In other words, under the influence of certain tenets
of experimental science and Lockean psychology, writers transformed the Romance,
Epic, and Travel genres into a literary form wholly in keeping with the scientific
assumptions of the time. Eve Tavor, for instance, shows that the "sceptical tradition
represented by Locke, Mandeville, Hume and to some extent Shaftesbury, determines the
incipient novel's range of concerns and, more important, its distinctive formal features."10
The lyric also underwent generic metamorphosis within this same cultural framework, and
it therefore seems appropriate, indeed necessary, to isolate the core methodological and
linguistic features of the new science in order to gain an appreciation of how and why they
could transform perceptions and estimates of the literary value of the lyric genre.
The student of literature who wants to extract information and insight from the
history of science must, however, surmount several obstacles to both method and
analysis. Not only does the history of science cover an immense field of study sub-divided
into diverse specialisms but its practitioners for a long time applied methods of analysis
and evaluation designed to achieve specific historical aims. In a way (and this is not
meant to sound disparaging), most studies in the history of science followed an almost
one-dimensional path, usually explaining how certain scientific ideas came into being,
how applied, adapted, refined, improved; how certain ideas appear, flourish, disappear-
they study the development of scientific paradigms, what Michel Foucault sees as the
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description of "the processes and products of the scientific consciousness."11 Beyond
these fairly limited and historically uncomplicated aims they generally, as G. S. Rousseau
and Roy Porter remind us, felt little need to trespass: "history of science, with honourable
exceptions, essentially celebrated the biography of humble genius and the triumphal
progress of discoveries along the royal road of truth. The history of science was the
spaniel of science itself. This approach had real merits, not least in spotlighting the
tremendous power of science as an engine of investigation." This situation has all
changed now because of new methods and attitudes, new critical and political
perspectives, new concerns about the role of science in modern life, and "all these have
compelled profound rethinking. Certainties have given way to questions. The history of
science is no longer a scientist's hymn to science: it has become part of history itself."12 In
other words, history of science now plays an important role in determining issues of
cultural and historical meaning. As Margaret J. Osier and Paul Lawrence Farber assert,
"The scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is central to
understanding modern culture and the modern world. Pivotal in the development of the
concepts of nature and of human nature that dominate contemporary life, this intellectual
upheaval was deeply enmeshed in the religious, philosophical, and political currents of the
time."13 Indeed, much history of science now takes it as axiomatic that science must
undergo the same interrogation of its historical context as other cultural practices, and as
we will see later the intention of my work, though formulated well before I came into
contact with these new theories of science and culture, falls in line with this new thinking
(though less concerned here to debate problems concerning theories of history of science
or to map alterations in its contemporary status).
In any case, I must differentiate my approach to science and poetry from that
which has generally held in literary history, if only to provide a rationale for the type and
scope of analysis which I intend to undertake. In the first place, until quite recently the
literary historian's task always aimed at a somewhat more questionable end compared to
that of the older history of science. Obviously, the literary historian must always conduct a
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further, complicating manoeuvre, and this holds true even with the changes occurring in
history of science: the critic must theorize and then apply historical information to a literary
text or even to an entire corpus of texts in hopes of showing a relationship between
literature and science. Thus, insofar as he pursues rather different ends than do
historians of science, these ends invariably regulate the critic's interpretative task.14 Faced
with such an assignment, the literary student's instinct is to rehearse the evolution of the
new science from its earliest stages up to some point in the eighteenth century, locating
and examining seminal moments and texts which help throw light on particular literary
issues orwriterly aims: for example, the formation of the Royal Society, the Ancients
versus Moderns dispute, Newton's Principia, Thomson's imagery. This type of analysis
guarantees a wealth of information fascinating in its own right, and it allows the critic to
validate his efforts by showing where poets imported new scientific conceptions of nature
or the universe into their poetry, or how new mechanical inventions-the microscope, for
instance-generated interesting new poetic images, or how new scientific discoveries
affected the poet's psychological outlook. Marjorie Hope Nicolson's Science and
Imagination, for example, promises to "follow the development of the telescope and
microscope as they appear in literature, watching new figures of speech, new literary
themes, new cosmic epics, most of all the transformation of poetic and religious
imagination by ideas which, once grasped, man has never been able to forget."15
Similarly, William Powell Jones's The Rhetoric of Science, a fine study in many ways,
ferrets out a welter of images which owe their genesis to scientific writings.16
No one would seriously dispute the necessity of such work or the valuable
contribution which it makes to eighteenth-century scholarship. Our appreciation of the
complexity of Johnson's thought, for instance, owes much to the efforts of a critic like
Richard Schwartz to trace out how Johnson's attitude to science informed and
complicated his thinking. Even so, the undoubted value of such scholarship disguises its
limitations as an interpretive strategy since, as Kester Svendson notes, "There is no
settled methodology for studying the impact of science on structure or form of poetry and
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prose."17 On the one hand, the guiding rationale for much of the literary historian's
research into science seems (in many cases) to amount to little more than an exercise in
influence-peddling. A scientific text, say, Newton's Opticks, undergoes extensive
examination and explication; then a cornucopia of citation plucked from literary texts
follows which either "proves" how little a writer understood those ideas or "proves" a
writer's affiliation to scientific ideas. An instance of the first approach is voiced by Carson
S. Duncan, who condemns seventeenth-century poets for remaining locked into
cosmological conceptions (particularly astrological ones) belonging to the older science
and for using poetic images derived from classical sources. Presumably, as the new
science replaces the old cosmology, the poet should expunge all thoughts of the old from
his mind and writing. This seems a hard, even senseless demand: even Locke could
speak as if the old astrological superstitions still had some communicatory value: "For I
cannot but think it an odd persecution of my stars, that I who meddle with no affairs but
my own, that seek nothing but retirement and books to pass the remainder of my time in
an air that favours my health cannot be permitted it."18 Nicolson's Newton Demands the
Muse provides a case-book example of the phylogenetic approach. Her work establishes
beyond doubt the widespread influence of Newton's Opticks and Principia on poetic
imagery throughout the eighteenth century (and especially on Blake's imagery). Yet the
wealth of citation rarely gives rise to deeper reflection about the relationship of science to
poetry, Nicolson preferring evaluative to analytic criticism; consequently, when she
remarks that Thomson "admired the surpassing intellectual attainments of Newton," that
azure "was a color in which Thomson found special pleasure ... a happy color," or that
he "played delightedly with the spectrum," she effectively depreciates his engagement
with Newton's theories.19 Similarly, G. C. Macaulay and Douglas Grant, both admirers and
on the whole helpful critics of Thomson, do not offer much more than Nicolson in the way
of insight into Thomson's use of Newton's theories.20 In the end, this type of critical
treatment means that Thomson's (or any other writer's for that matter) poetry simply
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disappears as a distinct imaginative entity, re-appearing as a curious hybrid of Newton's
Opticks and Principia.
On the other hand, the unavoidable and extensive decussation of scientific and
poetic texts begets interpretive familiarity: literary students learn how scientific discoveries
affected every thinker and writer during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, how it
affected cosmological and religious beliefs, how it "decentred" man's traditional place in
the cosmos (and thus decentred his consciousness), how it reduced man to an atomic bit
of a large mechanistic construct, and how imagination, spirit, and poetry suffered under its
influence.21 A typical sense that scientific discoveries decentred man's place in the
universe underlies Thomas Docherty's John Donne, Undone. He argues that "What was
fundamentally new in the work of Copernicus . . . was the fact of his decentring the earth
itself; and subsequently, the impact of De Revolutionibus was felt primarily as a threat to
the credibility of humanity's special relation to God and the world," while Gary F. Waller
similarly notes a "longing for a stable center" occurring everywhere in the poetry of the
latter sixteenth century; however, he links this yearning to the rise of the Protestant view
of personal identity conflating with the conventions of Petrarchan love poetry (in which the
unrequited lover experiences a fall into confusion and psychic disarray), and in a more
general recognition of the mutability of human life (a common theme of classical and
humanist literature).22 Louis T. Milic looks at the way in which time and space were used
in everyday speech, noting that general usage of these two metaphors shows that these
two fundamental elements of reality "helped to explain certain beliefs and especially that
they supported the possibility of an all-powerful God. The unsatisfactory implications of a
mechanical universe were not clear to the general in the time of Pope or Swift."23 The
hypothesis that some sort of psychic crisis and insecurity developed as a consequence of
the discoveries of early science, and particularly of early astronomy, suffers therefore from
a number of weaknesses. Indeed, many of those observers closer to the action, as it
were, did not always consider astronomical discoveries in the way pictured by modern
critics. For example, Joseph Moxon writes that the immense size of the universe simply
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proves God's power: "if you weigh well with your selfe this little parcel of fruit
Astronomical; as concerning the bigness and distance of the Stars, &c, and the Huge
massiness of the Starry Heaven, you will find your Consciences moved with the Kingly
Prophet to sing the confession of Gods Glory."24 Similarly, but ninety years later, an essay
called "Observations on the UNIVERSE, and the different Systems of which it is
composed," in The Royal Magazine for January 1760, explains that its frontispiece
"presents a small sketch of the universe, according to the discoveries of the moderns,
wherein every fixed star is supposed to be a real sun, with planets revolving round it, like
that fountain of life and heat, placed by Omnipotence in the center of our system." It goes
on to say, and the argument bears quoting in full, that our mind,
while it is contemplating the works of its Maker, is lost in astonishment. If we
consider the universe in no other light than as it appears to the eye of a spectator
placed on the surface of our earth, it is really astonishing, even in this confined,
this imperfect view. How beautiful does the apparent arch of heaven appear, when
the sun is sunk beneath the horizon, and the fleecy clouds are wafted beyond the
limits of our sight! How magnificently is it adorned with gems of the most brilliant
lustre, whose rays penetrate the sable mantle of the night, and throw a faint and
trembling light over the dusky landscape! What are all the decorations of human
art, when compared to these glowing lamps that adorn the ample circuit of the
skies!
The author then supplies a statistical barrage to emphasise the Earth's insignificance in
the universal scheme, noting that "if the grandeur of this system alone cannot be fully
comprehended, how will the human mind be able to form a proper idea of the universe,
where this system is but a point; and, were it annihilated, could not be missed by an eye
capable of taking in the whole circle of creation." This information does not, however, lead
to a debilitating psychological defragmentation but to an assertion of mankind's moral
duties: "Absorbed in the inchanting idea of riches, we forget that we are only sojourners
here, and that we must shortly leave our possessions to others. We view the works of
Omnipotence with a frigid indifference, and are too often more charmed with the paultry
decorations of a theatre, than with the majestic, the refulgent scenes of creation."25 The
author here clearly invokes the spirit of Psalm 8 and, in short, scientific discoveries could
just as easily root faith more deeply as tear it out.
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Thus, in conjunction with a general complacency that a restatement of scientific
ideas in poetic dress offers the only significant level at which science might influence
poetry, a simple dislike of science clouds thinking about the complicated (and
complicating) intertextuality of poetic and scientific writings, a point which Rousseau and
Porter both wish to emphasize and part of the blame for which they place on history of
science itself. They argue that "the eighteenth century is a problem" because even
historians of science "have tended to regard it as a tiresome trough to be negotiated
between the peaks of the seventeenth and those of the nineteenth century; or as a
mystery, a twilight zone in which all is on the verge of yielding. This judgement may seem
paradoxical. For even by the most conventional 'internal' standards of evaluation, the
eighteenth century was one of noted achievement." Interestingly, and appropriate given
the history of criticism traced in Chapter One, they note that the neglect of the period
belongs to a myth which "is part, of course, of the Romantic and counter-French-
Revolutionary reaction against all facets of the eighteenth-century world: its religion, its art
and poetry, its history-writing," and they add that "So potent does the myth remain that
many fields of Enlightenment ideas and culture-perhaps especially gauging the pitch of
its religion-suffer from scholarly neglect at least as seriously as its science" (p. 3).26 Of
course, students will encounter a huge range of studies which attempt to put the
relationship between science and literature into a positive and integrated framework, as
Schwartz's study on Johnson suggests, but literary history and criticism for a long period
of time tended to focus on and emphasize satiric and negative views, and in the process
giving the impression that science promoted anti-human, anti-literary values.27 Douglas
Bush, for instance, explains that "the romantic faith in nature, man, imagination, myth, and
beauty was a genuine rebirth of the human spirit which still has meaning for us,"
especially the "revolt against mechanistic rationalism," while B. Ifor Evans contends that
experimental science wreaked a "great cleavage in human thought," leaving modern man
"frightened, anxious, incompetent." In typically romantic terms, he believes that the only
alternative lies in the poet who "assert[sj a life of the imagination," who develops his
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"prophetic or visionary power." He instances Blake and Keats as exemplary poets "who
regarded science as the enemy."28 C. J. Home tells us that 1660 marks a turning point in
which we witness writing decidedly "more modern in style and spirit than much that was
written only a few years earlier. This modernity, as also a depression of the poetic
imagination that went with it, is to be explained in part by the remarkable advance of
science in the seventeenth century and the dominance of the scientific attitude throughout
the eighteenth."29 Even a fairly helpful work like Basil Willey's The Eighteenth-Century
Background transmits an anti-science bias. Although the spirit of scientific investigation
helped to dispel "the fogs and glooms of history," replacing the "ignorance and barbarism
of the Gothic centuries" with a more hopeful "common daylight," it produced a "prosaic"
world whose "steady and serene" beams would soon make all "dark with excessive
light."30A typical example of the Romantic bias can be found in Bush's Science and
English Poetry. While promising a sensitive analysis of the role of science in the post-
Renaissance era, Bush actually charts a course designed to appeal to post-Romantic
prejudices. In the initial stages of his argument he declares that, because the post-
Medieval world underwent complex changes as a result of science, readers must become
aware of its "effects upon the life and spirit of man in general and poets in particular." Of
these manifold effects, the literary critic should mark "the changes in the technique and
texture as well as the content of poetry that have been wrought by the great changes in
the poet's outer and inner world."31 Unfortunately, he never actually enlarges upon the
changes in "technique and texture," at least not in the eighteenth-century poetry which he
discusses. He sees, instead, "the further development of science, of anti-Christian
rationalism and evangelical Christianity, and of poetry . . . dividing a community of
relatively homogenous culture into groups embracing diverse and opposed kinds of
knowledge and belief."32 Modern science (unlike previous forms of science) wreaks havoc
on the homogeneous, harmonious cultural consciousness and eighteenth-century writers
therefore get short shrift from Bush, who indicts them for their "acceptance" of science; he
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goes on to praise the romantic "revolt of the feeling heart and the senses and the
imagination against mere reason and its abstract picture of the world and man."33
Such observations about science and poetry moved Rousseau to conclude that,
like "so many other humanistic scholars," most literary critics "share an ingrained
resistance to science and the history of science." In Rousseau's eyes, such resistance
encourages unwelcome, even pernicious, habits of mind: too often literary critics
"intentionally diminish the role science played in the history of human culture, and take
less account of it in their scholarship than is historically accurate or ideologically
healthy."34 This type of unhealthy scholarship slips easily into the critical paradigms
already detailed, pronouncements about the relationship of science and literature leaning
heavily upon established opinions. The scientific or rationalist "temper" of the period, for
instance, merges (and even helps to explain) the period's disposition to prose, while
critics imbued with the anti-scientific biases of post-romantic paradigms happily distort the
eighteenth-century accommodation of emotional and rational life. Richard F. Jones, for
example, remarks that "The spirit of utility, which derived its strength from the new
science, and which recommended the latter to the Puritans, demanded that language be
considered only as a means to an end, and upon its subordination to the useful study of
nature."35 As Rousseau points out, most post-romantics find it inconceivable that a
religious, spiritual, or aesthetic conception of life could subsist with an interest or training
in science:
Ever since the Romantic thinkers rebelled against both mechanism and
empiricism, religion and science construed as separate domains have been much
further apart than they were in the eighteenth century, and it is almost impossible
for most contemporary intellectual historians, as well as literary historians, to
imagine that religion and science could still have been wedded as recently as the
eighteenth century.36
A quick glance at Isaac Watts's writing career supports Rousseau's point. While Watts
could write a poem like "The Hurry of the Spirits, in a Fever and Nervous Disorders," a
piece which uses the type of decentring imagery often cited by critics of romantic tastes
as indicative of the eighteenth-century mania for mechanism or of signs of nascent
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romanticism ("The engine rules the man"; "little restless atoms rise and reign / Tyrants in
sovereign uproar"), he could also write a best-selling course on logic (heavily indebted to
Locke) and a poem praising Locke's achievements ("To John Locke, Esq. Retir'd from
Business")37 Ironically, instead of objectively engaging the human elements which
motivate all cultural expression, critics of a romantic hue too often prefer an abstract and
ultimately automated response to the dynamics of cultural evolution.
Or perhaps, as Gabriel Josipovici contends, the modern reader naturally resists
the scientific temper of the eighteenth century because he sympathises more with (or
yearns for) a Medieval and early Renaissance worldview than with later ones.38 Even so,
such "sympathy" hardly licenses the type of scholarly prejudices which, according to
Rousseau, informs most critical pronouncements about the supposed worldview of the
eighteenth century. He scathingly concludes that "Most 'world-picture' or 'background'
books omit science altogether; and those that include it cursorily focus on one or two
main tendencies."39 The irony of such background studies lies in the fact, says Rousseau,
"that scientific thought and the 'paradigms' [that is, the books] that are its results are
largely responsible for creating the worldview of a given age" and that, regardless of the
type or level of science current in any age, it will share certain features in common with
the literary worldview of the time, and he goes on to note that in the development of
literary analysis a critic needs to be aware that "there is a great deal more in common
between, for example, Sophoclean narrative and the philosophy of ancient Greece vis-a-
vis the nature of man, than there is in common between this narrative and philosophy and
the narrative of other ages."40 Nostalgia for a golden age prior to the emergence of
modern science does not change the fact that when science itself changes it necessarily
transforms the worldview of a culture, which in turn alters both literary expectations and
the boundaries of the imagination, reshaping the literary genres and the literary
worldview.41 Seen in this light, we can agree with John Christie and Sally Shuttleworth's
argument that "Our culture and criticism tends to pair literature and science as opposites.
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Thus any attempt to study literature and science as a field of positive relations will be an
effort to work against dominant cultural and scholarly conventions, to cross barriers, and
hence to transgress."42
The preceding remarks make it clear that traditional methods of analysing and
marking the intertextuality of poetry and science cannot, because of the basic
presuppositions and prejudices which govern such analyses, illuminate how eighteenth-
century lyric experience and critical attitudes to the lyric altered in light of the shaping
force of experimental science on the worldview of the time. In short, as a means of
exploring the lyric's transformation from minor to major genre it will do no good to focus
on the immediately visible and tangible results of the new science, that is, on such
achievements as its new discoveries into planetary motion, the flow of the blood, the
microscopic world, or on its mechanical and technological innovations. It would, of course,
be wrong to underestimate the importance of discoveries and innovations in winning
acceptance and respect for the new science, or of the power of such marvels to spark a
writer's interest. None of these, however, actually initiates the new-science's
transformative force in both collective and individual thinking processes, but they signal
the consequences of that new thinking process. To appreciate how the new science could
shape and inform lyric experience, how it could help reveal and lead to a revaluation of
the "verities" of the lyric genre, we must first transgress, or to use a less loaded term, we
must reassess (and reaccess) the nature and force of the epistemological, expressive,
and ethical ideals which lay behind the thought and practice known as the experimental
method. After all, during the initial stages of its development the proponents of the new
science drew inspiration and motivation for their activities from these ideals: they were
more concerned with contemporary needs than with future achievements about which
they could know nothing whatsoever.
In broad terms, the new science provoked a radical reorientation of the concept of
intellectual identity, liberating the individual from the fetters of tradition and authority: it
freed the intellect to interact with and respond to nature, giving primacy and credibility to
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knowledge or theories based on the personal observation of phenomena. The united
powers of mind and body were given a unified role in the pursuit of knowledge and truth.
At the same time, the new science demanded a high level of self-discipline, set limits to
what any one individual might know, and put responsibility for the "truth-value" of the
mind's discoveries and formulations on the individual. The new science, in other words,
formulated an ethos of research into phenomena which required the adoption of a strict
methodology that, besides promising certain practical and limited achievements,
promoted intellectual humility and social duty. Equally important, the early scientists
elaborated and expounded a linguistic or communicative ideal which put special
constraints on both the aim and the style of scientific language usage.
Loosely schematized and defined in the abstract terms outlined above, any
attempt to apply a theory of the influence of new-science epistemological, linguistic, and
ethical ideals to the evolution of critical esteem and valuation of the lyric genre must
appear a questionable project, and at least as unlikely to make any greater inroads into
understanding the relationship of science to poetry as those approaches criticised earlier.
In all likelihood, the range and depth and type of influence on the evolution of literary and
critical issues which I attribute to the new science cannot be proved absolutely. Indeed,
the methodology employed to argue my case-analysis of textual materials drawn from
different disciplines which were for different aims and audiences; searching for and
collating linguistic and other resemblances in the formulations of critical issues and
problem solving in scientific texts, texts about science, and literary texts (relying often on
analogical and comparative methods of analysis not on objective facts); the attempt to
chart critical estimates of, and attitudes to, the lyric genre in parallel with an ever-
increasing growth in acceptance of the values of empirical science-structures a
concentrated focus on specific elements in the materials drawn upon for evidence. It
means, therefore, that other evidence and theories about cultural change either must be
ignored or insufficiently explored. Social, religious, political, and other forces at work
undoubtedly affected perceptions of the value and function of lyric poetry (I will make
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reference to these on occasion), but the argument as constituted does not lay any claim
as a final word on lyric poetry, or that lyric poetry improved or degenerated in a cultural
climate in which the new science was an important force. Like the epistemological
principles which underwrote experimental science itself, the best that can be hoped for in
an interpretive task of this nature are a degree of probability and credibility, not proof of
any absolute cause. My claims, though argued with conviction, go only so far as to
suggest that new-science ideals initiated and governed many lines of thought and
judgment during the same long period of time in which critical estimates of the lyric's
expressive potential underwent a radical transformation; that this revaluation of the lyric
genre occurs largely during the mid- and late-eighteenth century; and that, whatever other
forces were at work on lyric experience, when we come to consider the evolution of
critical estimates of the lyric genre we remember to include reflection on the instrumental
power of new-science ideals on thought processes. In remaining alert to the role of
science in the cultural context of the lyric genre's evolution, we add a vital perspective to
our appreciation of its history and to the myriad ways in which science and literature
transgress each other's boundaries, if boundaries there be.43
To initiate the process of "re-seeing" how new-science ideals could be diffused
throughout the same culture which they shared with the lyric genre, I want to theorize their
dynamic functionality in terms of the intellectual conflicts, interpenetrations, and
conflations which always occur as part of the evolving drama of cultural practices. In other
words, from its inception the new science was always more than just a new methodology,
more than just a new way of measuring and weighing natural phenomena. As an
epistemological and methodological (that is, as a thinking) practice it evolved, first, from a
loose amalgam of ideals into a coordinated ideological construct, and then, over a
significant period of time, it passed beyond the stage of ideology into what Raymond
Williams calls "hegemony."441 would wish to make the distinction between science as
ideology or as hegemony because, as Williams points out, the concept of ideology by
itself cannot account for the actual intellectual movements, conflicts, and transformations
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which occur in a culture overtime. In the first place, whereas the concept of culture posits
culture "as a 'whole social process', in which men define and shape their whole lives," that
of ideology abstracts and formalises a particular system of meanings and values into "the
expression or projection of a particular class interest" (ML, p. 108). The abstraction of a
system of ideas as a single class or world-view, however, must either exclude or ignore
the "relatively mixed, confused, incomplete, or inarticulate consciousness of actual men"
(ML, p. 109) who, subject to time, undergo varying degrees of cultural assimilation and
actualization.45 The concept of culture will always, therefore, subvert the concept of
ideology; but, at the same time, the concept of culture as that by which "men define and
shape their whole lives" likewise simply states an abstraction because "In any actual
society there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this
process" (ML, p. 108). Neither concept adequately captures the process of historical
actualization (or, for that matter, of the experience of alienation), nor do they grant the
dynamic reciprocity of scientific, literary, and critical paradigms in the play of
consciousness, paradigms which emerge as a consequence of heterogeneous historico-
intellectual processes: all three operate across and through social and ideological
structures.
The concept of hegemony, on the other hand, does. Since it includes both culture
and ideology within it, hegemony encapsulates the entire spectrum of lived, historical
actuality, encompassing any and all paradigms:
It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our
senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our
world. It is a lived system of meanings and values-constitutive and constituting-
which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It
thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in society. (ML, p. 110)
As a "lived" process, moreover, hegemony goes beyond the concepts of both culture and
ideology in two unique ways: first, says Williams, "It is not, except analytically, a system or
a structure. ... In practice, that is, hegemony can never be singular"; second, because it
crosses ideological borders "it does not just passively exist as a form of dominance. It has
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continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually
resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own" (ML, p. 112). Hence,
an evolving hegemony will typically not only come into conflict with already developed,
specific elements of ideology and culture, but it will clash with the larger components of
other emerging and declining hegemonies. As Williams says, a hegemony "is never either
total or exclusive. At any time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics or
culture exist as significant elements in the society" (ML, p. 113).46 Given Williams's
breakdown of hegemonic "structure" and activity, I would suggest that most "conflicts"
take place at the paradigm level: well-established paradigms function, so to speak, like
"regional" hegemonies. When a series of paradigms coalesce and move beyond the stage
of ideology to become hegemonic, they operate in a multidimensional way throughout the
culture, existing and persisting along with other ideologies and evolving hegemonies. Only
as an hegemony could the new science become an integral force in cultural life, affecting
and influencing thinkers and writers of varying temperament and conviction; only as an
hegemony could it inexorably reorganize and reshape modes of apprehension and
standards of expression. In short, any writer thrown into this culture would in important
ways be subjected to the hegemonic force of the new science; it would influence his
identity, his concept of vocation, his attitude to knowledge, his use of language, his choice
of genre.
Section 2. Making the Break
Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning (1605) offers a natural starting point for
a discussion of science and the lyric genre in the eighteenth century for two reasons.
Firstly, most eighteenth-century British observers regarded Bacon as the founding father
of the new science. As the author of "An Essay on the State of Literature in Great
Britain" testifies, the Renaissance in Britain began with Bacon: "About this time the great
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chancellor Bacon enlightened the world by his writings ... He pointed out at a distance
the road to true philosophy, and recommended experiments and observations as the only
assistants to discover the secrets of nature."47 Peter Williams, in his Letters Concerning
Education: Addressed to a Gentleman entering at the University (1785), makes a
similar point, explaining that when "my Lord Verulam introduced the method of Inquiry by
means of Experiment," he "removed the prejudices of former times, and placed
Philosophy on a new and more extensive basis."48 Although Bacon considered his treatise
"not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning
their instruments," his attack on scholastic philosophy and medieval science forms a
leitmotif in eighteenth-century appraisals of his achievements.49 For the eighteenth-
century observer, Bacon's spirited defence of learning provided the irrefutable rationale
for the experimental method of philosophical investigation.
Secondly, it was Bacon who first articulated the various intellectual and practical
ideals which comprise the bone and muscle of seventeenth-century science, providing it
with a powerful and comprehensive body of theoretical principles.50 Indeed, the structural
integrity of The Advancement of Learning seems well-designed as a founding text. He
develops his theory of science by mobilizing his defence around a number of different
issues, entwining arguments one into another: nature as the source of all human
knowledge merges with Bacon's belief in the primacy of the senses and personal
experience for verifying knowledge; the dynamics of the master/disciple relationship links
with his reevaluation of the thinker's duty to the past, to tradition and to authority. These
arguments, moreover, revolve around his specific assault on the abuse of rhetoric and the
peculiar institutional structure and function of scholastic debate. In that sense, modern
experimental science owes its formulation to a conflict over the role of experience and the
purpose of language in the pursuit and presentation of knowledge, and the hegemonic
force of these in the evolving epistemological "matrix" of the modern age merit attention
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for obvious reasons: when science impinges on poetry, it does so at the level of thought
and language.
As The Advancement of Learning makes clear, Bacon entertained no illusions
about the status of Renaissance humanism: anxiety about its fragility permeates his text.51
He recognised that the Renaissance ideal of intellectual freedom grew out of religious and
theological power struggles, and that for the most part the combatants fought each other
with and over rhetoric.52 He describes the origins and early evolution of Renaissance
rhetoric in succinct fashion:
Martin Luther, conducted (no doubt) by an higher providence, but in discourse of
reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against the bishop of Rome
and the degenerate traditions of the church, and finding his own solitude, being no
ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity,
and to call former times to his succours to make a party against the present time:
so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and humanity, which had long time
slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This by consequence
did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages original,
wherein those authors did write, for the better understanding of those authors, and
the better advantage of pressing and applying their words. And thereof grew again
a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of
writing. (AL, p. 25)
Insofar as the battle against "the degenerate traditions of the church" mattered to Bacon,
it did so because it commenced a process of freeing individual thought and expression;
as a humanist moral philosopher he could not help but applaud the rediscovery of ancient
texts and the exposure to different rhetorical modes and styles which this entailed. Yet he
could not applaud all the purposes to which the new rhetorical tools were put.
At first, noticeably different rhetorical styles distinguished the opponents. The
humanist rhetorical style emphasised matter and clear diction, while the arguments of the
schoolmen "were altogether in a different style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame
new terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit of speech, without
regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and . . . lawfulness of the phrase or word" (AL, p.
25). It would be wrong to suppose, however, that early humanist argument did not contain
its ratio of emotion. Initially, says Bacon, the new oratory "was much furthered and
precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but
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seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen," and since each side needed
adherents, the rhetorical element intensified: "the great labour then was with the people . .
. for the winning and persuading of them there grew of necessity in chief price and
request eloquence and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access into the
capacity of the vulgar sort" (AL, p. 25). In such a competitive milieu, eloquence itself
became a primary aim of debate; rather than try to clarify an issue with sound argument
and sensible illustration "men began to hunt more after words than matter; more after the
choiceness of the phrase, and the round and clean composition of the sentence, and the
sweet falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and
figures" (AL, p. 26). Soon both sides adopted rhetorical styles which did not rely "so much
upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, as upon
particular confutations and solutions of every scruple, cavillation, and objection" (AL, p.
28). To the uninitiated or the disinterested observer this type of argumentation would
appear to be nothing more than "monstrous altercations and barking questions" (AL, p.
29), a poor recommendation for the value of learning.
In short, the schoolmen triumphed, and instead of legitimising intellectual freedom
and extending the horizons of thought, the "commonwealth" of learning became a closed
society in which servile imitation and superficial learning steadily devalued "worth of
subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or depth of judgement," until learning
"grew ... to be utterly despised as barbarous" (AL, p. 26). Bacon viewed this as the
complete negation of the purpose of learning, which was to "taketh away the wildness and
barbarism and fierceness of men's minds" (AL, pp. 54-55). Still, that such a promising
intellectual movement could be checked so easily taught him an important psychological
lesson: elocution hinders "the deep progress into philosophy" because "it is too early
satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of further search, before we
come to a just period" (AL, p. 27). In light of the historical evidence, Bacon concludes that
before all else thinkers needed a set of guidelines which would restrain and regulate their
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seemingly natural instinct towards rhetorical excess, some guide which would help them
avoid that fall into the "first distemper of learning" (AL, p. 26). They needed, in short, a
linguistic or communicative ideal, an ideal based upon observation of the way the mind
actually seemed to function rather than upon rhetorical principles derived from
compositions whose specific aims dictated their structural organisation.
In keeping with his distaste for overcomplicated hypotheses, Bacon advances a
conventional view of how the mind works: "God hath framed the mind of man as a mirror
or glass, capable of the image of the universal world, and joyful to receive the impression
thereof (AL, p. 7).53 Bacon admits, however, that sense impressions do not always reveal
nature's truths immediately, and he therefore argues that "by comparison, by help of
instrument, and by producing and urging such things as are too subtile for the sense to
some effect comprehensible by the sense, and other like assistance," the mind can
decipher and "read" its environment "sufficient to certify and report truth" (AL, pp. 121-
122). Of course, if the mind functioned in such a simple, straightforward way, arguments
would never occur because everyone would agree: Bacon recognised this facet of his
argument and used it to advantage.
First, he qualified his mind-as-glass metaphor, explaining that man's mind "is far
from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect
according to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of
superstition and imposture," and until the "beams of things" are "delivered and reduced"
(AL, p. 127), that is, until sense-impressions are assigned either a mental image or an
expressive form, chaos or silence reigns. If the mind functions primarily and initially as a
reflector of the external material world, it follows therefore that "words are but the images
of matter" (AL, p. 26); arguments will always arise because they "consist of propositions,
and propositions of words, and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular
notions of things" (AL, p. 121). Truth and understanding lay behind words, in the
experience itself, and it was the philosopher's task to communicate that truth in as clear
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and precise wording as possible: successful communication indicated that real learning
had preceded the words.54
Accordingly, to combat the urge to logomachy every thinker should bend his mind
to "work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God," and while he
might be "limited thereby" at least in so doing he would "worketh according to the stuff
(AL, p. 28). Bacon concludes that an habitual neglect of "sensible and material things"
(AL, p. 9) will inevitably corrupt the bond between mind and matter to such a degree that
the mind will become an "unequal mirror" capable of communicating only "deceiving and
deformed images" (AL, p. 29). To prefer words before matter indicated, therefore, not only
a basic misunderstanding of the function and purpose of words but an intellectual
propensity bordering on the pathological: "except they have life of reason and invention, to
fall in love with them is as to fall in love with a picture" (AL, p. 26). With the sad history of
Renaissance rhetoric in view, he determines that matter before words must constitute the
primary linguistic ideal of science, a simple enough formula in itself but in practice
requiring complicated behavioural and mental disciplines.
Significantly, the demand that thinkers put matter before words did not mean that
Bacon wanted all figurative or metaphorical language eliminated from scientific or
philosophical discourse. Students of literature all too easily misconstrue Bacon's attack on
excessive rhetorical language as simply the misguided notions of a thinker too rooted in
concrete reality to understand the potential for figurative language to move the mind, too
rational to admire beautiful words. As Charles Whitney shows, Bacon draws heavily on
myth and allegory to think through and express his philosophical ideas.55 In fact, Bacon
insists that poets, as an intellectual species, can legitimately exploit all the resources of
language in the pursuit of their special goals; of poetry as a form of learning he "can
report no deficience," and "to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing of
affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to
the philosophers' work" (AL, pp. 82-83); he also argues for the necessity of imagination in
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all thought, especially higher forms of thought (AL, pp. 116-121). Thus, concerned that
thinkers "clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible and
plausible elocution" (AL, p. 26), he counsels that "words ... are not to be despised,
specially with the advantage of passion and affection" (AL, p. 183). Rene Descartes
makes a similar point about the value of beautiful language to thought in his Discourse
on the Method, noting that he "deemed Eloquence to have a power and beauty beyond
compare; that Poesy has most ravishing delicacy and sweetness."56 The arts of language
(grammar, logic, rhetoric, the medieval trivium) retain a vital role in scientific discourse
and, if anything, the thinker should master rhetoric as a means of controlling his urge to
linguistic excess, but Bacon insists that in no instance should the presentation of a
scientific argument depend upon a rhetorical appeal to the passions, on the "delicacies
and affectations" (AL, p. 27) of a complex trope, on a cleverly constructed syllogism; a
scientific point, clearly presented or disposed, should meet with impartial agreement,
instilling intellectual harmony, not "barking questions." Ultimately, unless "the more severe
and laborious sort of inquirers into truth" resolutely pursued the ideal that "substance of
matter is better than beauty of words" (AL, p. 27) nothing would differentiate the truth-
value of their ideas from those of the rhetoricians who would, as history starkly showed,
remain victors of the field.57
Bacon appreciated that to realise his linguistic ideal would involve more than the
simple implementation of another mechanical art of rhetoric: it would require a revolution
in life-style, a transformation in which the ideal would form a reflex of thought, becoming
habit, custom, second-nature. In other words, he grasped that success would depend
upon a lived process of study not dissimilar to the comprehensiveness and intensity of
scholastic training. Yet that style of existence would need to be the obverse of the
monastic regime, which took thinkers blessed with "sharp and strong wits," allowed them
an "abundance of leisure" but confined them to a "small variety of reading," with obvious
results:
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their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator)
as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and
knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter
and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which
are extant in their books. (AL, p. 27)
While Bacon accepts that initially the schoolmen produced solid and valuable knowledge,
he laments the experiential barrenness of their scholarship which precluded the wider
application of their work. Aloof from the crucible of experience their arguments soon
became hopelessly tautological, Bacon regarding it as axiomatic that even sound
knowledge would putrefy and dissolve into a number of "subtle, idle, unwholesome, and . .
. vermiculate questions" (AL, p. 27) in a closed system. Left alone and with few
opportunities to explore alternative sources of data the mind will simply "work upon itself,
as the spider worketh his web," work which "is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs
of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work but of no substance or profit"
(AL, p. 28).58
In opposition to the restricted life-style which ended in the spider-argumentation of
the schoolmen, Bacon posits the ideal of the active life. Outside the cloister every thinker
could approach nature as an infinite field free "for the contemplation of God's creatures
and works," an endless space in which "nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's
inquiry and invention" (AL, p. 7). This view that a cloistered environment did not nurture
original thinking or an expansive attitude towards life forms, we might note in passing, an
important aspect of eighteenth-century thinking about what constituted a beneficial
education. A letter to The Gentleman's Magazine (1786) signed Clio states:
It is universally confessed that learning is an invaluable acquisition, but that a
continual intercourse with books, without the possession of a distinct knowledge of
mankind, is at best but an incomplete endowment. It is not the life of a college
makes a wise man, where abstruse researches are made into the depths of
philosophy, and where remote reflections and observations on the manners of
humanity are so rarely encouraged; where, if any knowledge of the world is
acquired, it is gained . . . through the spectacle of books-it is made through a mist
of obscurity.59
An essay entitled The Defects of Modern Education, in The Universal Magazine of
Knowledge and Pleasure (Vol. L, June, 1772), passes a similar judgment, noting that
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"We owe not to universities the few philosophers, who have enlightened us since the
revival of letters," and that figures such as Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke,
Leibnitz, Shaftesbury, and Maupertius "were formed in the midst of the world, of business,
of camps. If those great men had subjected themselves to scholastic instructions, their
genius would have been stinted by the contagious mediocrity of their preceptors."60 Of
course, when Bacon articulated his axiom of freedom it squarely attacked the
schoolmen's privileged control of the curriculum, and like Adam the new scientist
envisaged by Bacon could be charged with "the aspiring to overmuch knowledge [which]
was the original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man" (AL, p. 6).61
Certainly that type of presumption could be charged against a figure like Giovanni Pico
Delia Mirandola, whose oration, De dignitate hominis, or "Of the Dignity of Man" (delivered
in 1494), championed man's free-will and intellectual striving, defining man as neither
beast nor angel but free to make himself either. God, he declared, created man with
the seeds of all good and the germs of every form of life. Whatever seeds each
man cultivates, those seeds will grow to maturity and bear him their own fruit. If
they be vegetative, he will be like a plant. If sensual, he will become brutish. If
rational, he will issue as a heavenly being. If intellectual, he will be an angel and
the son of God. And if, happy in the lot of no created thing, he withdraws into the
center of his own unity, his spirit made one with God in the solitary darkness of
God who is set above all things, he shall surpass them all.62
Galileo walks a similar tightrope in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World
Systems, but he does not, as Craig points out, give man the same mental powers as
God.63
However, Bacon's definition of the mind as a mirror of material reality once again
rescues his argument: knowledge of divinity or immateriality lay outside of the mind's
capacities because God, the first cause, "worketh nothing in nature but by second
causes" (AL, p. 9), and the only intimation of the first cause allowed to man derived from
his understanding of the second causes, "which are next unto the senses" (AL, p. 9). By
studying nature man could attain some degree of knowledge about its laws and
phenomena, but with "regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken
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knowledge" (AL, p. 9), and he adds that "if any man shall think by view and inquiry into
these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself
the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy" (AL, pp. 8-9).
Milton would make a similar point in Paradise Lost, arguing through the persona of the
Angel Michael, he advises that "objects divine / Must needs impair and weary human
sense."64 To crush out the thinker's urge to indulge such vanities-which had so bedevilled
the progress of science in the past-Bacon insists that studying the second causes
(nature) cannot prepare the mind for divine revelation, and to pursue such a desire strikes
him as inimical to true philosophy.65
Armed with this schema of how the mind functioned, Bacon throws the charge of
intellectual hubris back, claiming that in its pursuit of certain "truths" scholastic learning
abused the mind's logical and rational functions. By training the mind to produce clever
syllogisms and by constructing elaborate systems of thought which "proved" the existence
of God or the justness of his laws, the schoolmen deluded themselves into believing that
mind unaided could actually reveal God's divine attributes. Such presumption inculcated
"too great a reverence, and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man," a
conceit which tempted the schoolmen to withdraw "too much from the contemplation of
nature, and the observations of experience" (AL, p. 34), to withdraw like Pico into "the
solitary darkness of God." Thus encouraged by their intellectually narrow training "to leave
the oracle of God's works" (AL, p. 29), scholastic philosophy perpetrated "the greatest
error of all . . . the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge" (AL, p.
36) for the first, making the phenomena fit the logically derived system rather than trying
to comprehend the actual system in which God placed man.
Bacon's attack on scholastic hubris dovetails, of course, with a growing demand in
the seventeenth and the eighteenth century for religious humility and a belief in the
benefits of employing the intellect on practical tasks, another testament perhaps to the
Chapter Two, p. 83
hegemonic force of new science ideals. Two examples must suffice. In Book VII of
Paradise Lost the Angel Michael checks Adam's desire to know
what cause
Mov'd the Creator in his holy Rest
Through all Eternity so late to build
In Chaos
with the statement that he will
answer [his] desire
Of knowledge within bounds; beyond abstain
To ask, nor let thine own inventions hope
Things not reveal'd, which th'invisible King,
Only Omniscient, hath supprest in Night.66
And in his prayer of August 12, 1784, titled "Against Iniquities and Perplexing Thoughts,"
Johnson writes:
And while it shall please thee to continue me in this world where much is to be
done and little to be known, teach me by thy Holy Spirit to withdraw my Mind from
unprofitable and dangerous enquiries, from difficulties vainly curious, and doubts
impossible to be solved. Let me rejoice in the light which thou hast imparted, let
me serve thee with active zeal, and humble confidence, and wait with patient
expectation for the time in which the soul which Thou receivest, shall be satisfied
with knowledge.67
Bacon's strategy for encouraging such attitudes to intellectual humility employed his usual
method of arguing from an everyday appreciation of reality. Since God equipped man with
the necessary tools to make sense of his environment, the way to attain this goal required
the thinker to admit that human (or as he termed it humane) knowledge relied upon the
physical senses. Sense impressions provided the raw material, as it were, which the mind
transformed into ideas and words. However insufficient, they formed the bedrock upon
which all greater knowledge rested. Thinkers, says Bacon, "ought not to attempt to draw
down or to submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and
advance our reason to the divine truth" (AL, pp. 86-87). As long as the mind cleaved to
the things of this world, beginning with simple and intelligible truths, and building step by
step an understanding of nature's workings, it would not lose itself in metaphysical
speculations about the divine attributes or other such abstruse conundrums. As Milton's
Michael will tell Adam, the secret of human striving lies in man's recognition that he can
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"by small / Accomplish ] great things," which knowledge the Angel calls "the sum / Of
wisdom." Significantly, after this "revelation" which must serve mankind until doomsday,
the Angel tells Adam to "descend now . . . from this top / Of Speculation."68 In any case,
insofar as the senses limited the attainment of knowledge it was impossible to "search too
far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works,
divinity or philosophy" (AL, p. 9).69 Indeed, as he goes about his careful and controlled
study of nature the "serious inquirer" will learn all he needs about "the omnipotency and
wisdom of the maker, but not his image" (AL, p. 86). A consistent and continuous appeal
to the evidence provided by the senses would thereby reduce the potential for error and
would, furthermore, reveal the paradox that "they be not the highest instances that give
the securest information ... it cometh often to pass, that mean and small things discover
great, better than great can discover small" (AL, p. 70). History proved, moreover, that
learning degenerated into folly and spider-argumentation whenever philosophers forgot
that "in nature, the more you remove yourself from particulars, the greater peril of error do
you incur" (AL, p. 206). Thus, Bacon will pursue a humbler path, determined to rely upon
his natural if limited senses and his personal experiences for guidance and direction,
determined to avoid the "root of all error," that is, "too untimely a departure and too remote
a recess from particulars" (AL, p. 92). In simple terms, this rejects the scholastic desire
to, like Socrates, "call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth" (AL, p.
36).
Remaining humble in the face of nature, however, did not mean prostration to the
works of other writers or to the achievements and intellectual monuments of the past.
Bacon rejects any urge to maintain the intellectual status quo, arguing that in order for
learning to advance the philosopher must attain a proper regard for both past and present
knowledge, which in practice would require a reformulation of the relationship between
master and disciple. If the recovery of ancient authors initially extended the light of
learning, that light was dimming because the moderns accorded the ancient authors
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"overmuch credit. . . making them dictators, that their words should stand, and not
consuls to give advice; the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the
principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or advancement" (AL, p.
31). Importantly, this particular argument found many adherents throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: it became an ideological rallying cry. Bacon's
complaint, for example, echoes well down into the eighteenth century, The Adventurer
No. 63 noting that
The number of original writers, of writers who discover any traces of original
thought, or veins of new expression, is found to be extremely small, in every
branch of literature. Few possess ability or courage to think for themselves, to
trust to their own powers, to rely on their own stock; and, therefore, the generality
creeps tamely and cautiously in the track of their predecessors.70
Interestingly, Blake coins a proverb in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell which nicely
encapsulates Bacon's frustration with intellectual timidity: "The eagle never lost so much
time as when he submitted to learn of the crow."71 For Bacon, then, a writer's value rested
solely on the progress which he made in revealing nature's workings, this progress laying
the foundation for future exploration: "Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men should
make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well
taken, then to make progression" (AL, pp. 32-33). An author deserved all honours due,
but this respect should not hinder the progress of thought in the present, or as Bacon
phrases it, that "time, which is the author of authors, be not deprived of his due, which is,
further and further to discover truth"; in other words, disciples "do owe unto masters only
a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgement till they be fully instructed,
and not an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity" (AL, p. 32). The disciple who
accepts all that his master says "without due and mature suspension of judgement,"
suppressing misgivings or questions in an "impatience of doubt" (AL, p. 35), usually ends
in a state of intellectual uncertainty or falls into one of dogmatic blindness, neither of
which are desirable results. Following Cicero, he reiterates that "the sinews of wisdom are
slowness of belief and distrust" (AL, p. 181). Instead of rote learning and imitation, Bacon
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wants the master/ disciple relationship to involve a process of "copious suggestions of all
doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to
turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined
and tried," a process which "taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency" (AL, p. 55)
from both master and disciple.
The conflict inherent in the master/disciple relationship allows Bacon to refine
further his ideal of learning. Although his epistemological perspective tacitly assumes that
the pursuit of knowledge aids the development of consciousness and the unfolding of
personal identity, he insists that a social purpose should underwrite all intellectual
endeavour. In opposition to scholastic teaching, which directed (and regulated) its pupils
along a path toward personal revelation, he makes it the new scientist's duty to pursue
knowledge which will benefit all mankind: "the more constant and devote kind of
professors of any science ought to propound to themselves to make some additions to
their science" {AL, p. 35). Of course, a philosopher would need to mix at large in society
in order to establish what kind of knowledge would most benefit mankind, what
achievements of the past could or should be improved upon, and how to present any new
knowledge so that it might receive a sympathetic hearing.
To illustrate how the philosopher could make better use of the achievements of
the past, Bacon contrasts the usual procedure followed in the mechanical arts. In the
more abstract sciences and arts the ideas of an original or influential writer are treated
like holy writ, most of the energies of later thinkers engaged in exegesis or exhortation,
with little attempt to prove the validity or applicability of the ideas. Yet how, for instance,
could "knowledge derived from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination . . .
rise higher than the knowledge of Aristotle" {AL, p. 32)? It cannot, of course, nor would it
so long as scholastic metaphysical thought paid scant attention to practical or "vulgar"
proofs.72 Bacon finds a general "rejection of experiment familiar and vulgar" among
scholastic philosophers for whom "it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to
descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical, except they be such as may
Chapter Two, p. 87
be thought secrets, rarities, and special subtilities" (AL, p. 70).73 He contrasts this with the
attitude which prevails in the mechanical arts where, even if a new invention or
mechanical process at first appears clumsy or crude, with experience and experiment
subsequent users introduce modifications which make the invention more efficient or
"perfect":
For many operations have been invented, sometime by a casual incidence and
occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment: and of those which have been
found by an intentional experiment, some have been found out by varying or
extending the same experiment, some by transferring and compounding divers
experiments one into the other, which kind of invention an empiric may manage.
Again by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to follow many
indications and designations of new particulars, if men in their speculation will
keep one eye upon use and practice. (AL, p. 97)
Thus Bacon finds that studying the mechanical arts, besides helping to break habits of
mind inculcated by scholastic modes of thought, "is of all other the most radical and
fundamental towards natural philosophy; such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in
the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall be operative to
the endowment and benefit of man's life" (AL, p. 71 ).74
Building upon his analysis of the methods practised in the mechanical arts Bacon
isolates three important lessons. First and most obvious, that all human productions,
whether mechanical or mental, should undergo the test of experiment. The process of
experiment would establish the real value or worth of an idea or theory of knowledge, and
it would indicate what aspects or features needed further refinement or, if wrong or not
testable, letting go. Second, that not every experiment will yield immediate benefits but
may require some other experiment to "complete" it. Progress, inasmuch as small
particles of knowledge often laid the ground for much greater results, therefore needed to
be measured in relative terms. Finally, that in the quest for really useful and enduring
knowledge, the greatest progress could only be made through cooperative and communal
efforts, not through individual and competitive means.
Hence, at the same time as the ethical command that the pursuit of knowledge
should produce tangible benefits modifies scientific activity, it also fits the whole of
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Bacon's new science into a larger metaphysical structure. Indeed, throughout his analysis
of the need for a new science he maintained that it could only be valuable in terms of a
larger project of thought. Bacon accepts that "physic carrieth man in narrow and
restrained ways, subject to many accidents of impediments, imitating the ordinary flexous
course of nature," and while "physical causes give light to new invention in simili materia"
(.AL, p. 93), ultimately science must justify itself as part of the greater purpose of
metaphysics. Thus, as Mary Hesse points out, Bacon's varied comments about the
purpose of experimental science should "put us on guard against a frequent
misinterpretation of Bacon as a mere fact-collector"; instead, we ought to see that Bacon
wished to develop a new science which could "correct on the one hand the excessive
rationalism of the ancient philosophers, who leaped straight from particulars to ill-founded
general axioms and then reasoned only by the syllogism, and on the other hand it was to
correct the unregulated empiricism of the alchemists and natural magicians, who wasted
their time in unfruitful experimenting."75 At the core of Bacon's philosophy lies the
conviction that in his researches into nature the philosopher must be guided by the fact
that
it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual
experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the
complaint of vita brevis, ars tonga\ which is performed by uniting the notions and
conceptions of sciences. For knowledges are as pyramides, whereof history is the
basis. So of natural philosophy, the basis is natural history: the stage next the
basis is physic; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As for the vertical
point, opus quod operator Deus a principio usque ad finem, the summary law of
nature, we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be
the true stages of knowledge. (AL, pp. 92-93)
In other words, only metaphysics can sanction scientific inquiry and free it from the
constraints of institutionalized power because the true spirit of metaphysics "doth
enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and
effects" (AL, p. 93).76 For Bacon, then, the whole purpose of scientific inquiry stems from
his belief that "men must know, that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God
and angels to be lookers on" (AL, p. 149). Accordingly, the philosopher, thinker, orator,
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politician, should not assault mankind with "barking questions" or burden it with "vain
matters" but strive to obtain that knowledge which will promote social and civil good.77
This element of Bacon's programme, not surprisingly, infiltrated eighteenth-century
attitudes about the relationships between knowledge and its social functions, and
particularly in regard to the truth aims of writing.
Section 3. After Bacon: The Advance to Hegemony
The ideas expounded by Bacon in The Advancement of Learning did not fall, as Hume
complained about those of his A Treatise on Human Nature, "dead-born from the press,"
but found their way into the mainstream of cultural debate and began to alter thinking
patterns (and thus individual worldviews) relatively quickly.78 However, and
understandably, Bacon's ideas did not march along parallel lines into intellectual
consciousness. As Ernan McMullin emphasizes, the change from a metaphysical
episteme which worked from a priori principles to that of a theory of science which could
deliver a more systematic knowledge of nature through an a posteriori methodology was a
curious and by no means straightforward one, in large part because the older traditions of
thought continued to infiltrate and condition both epistemology and the nature of scientific
research. In the seventeenth century, he says, no one "had a single, consistent, well-
worked-out view of the nature of scientific knowledge, which is hardly to be wondered
at."79 Thus, while Bacon envisaged the new science as an integral, unified activity, the
fulfilment of his ideals could be achieved only in and through a social process involving
conflict and assimilation. Certain elements of his programme appealed more readily than
others, and they did so for reasons peculiar to the evolving cultural gestalt of
seventeenth-century British life: the collision of historical events with, as it were, evolving
intellectual themes activated the ideological symbiosis of the new science and
seventeenth-century culture, which in turn transformed science into an hegemonic force.
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For an understanding of the relationship between science and poetry this impact cannot
be underestimated, although in the discussion which follows an occasional sideways
glance at these historical and cultural changes must suffice. I intend to direct attention to
those "themes" of the narrative of science which relate most directly, and plausibly, to the
metamorphosis of the lyric genre.
The revolt against authority (signalled throughout the seventeenth century by the
trumpeting of the individual's right to determine the plausibility and credibility of all claims
to truth) marks the first stage in the appropriation of the ideology of experimental science.
John Wilkins's early work The Discovery of a World in the Moone (1638), a work which
relies at various moments on "the learned . . .the judicious Verulam," asserts the
necessity for greater intellectual freedom both in the reading of the ancients and in the
study of nature or matters of fact.80 The paralysis of contemporary science stems, he
says, from imitative and uncritical study of the canonical authors, or rather, of one author:
Aristotle. While Wilkins accepts that "the world is much beholden to Aristotle for all its
sciences," he opposes the practice of submitting new discoveries or new ideas about
natural processes to Aristotelian paradigms: "tis not Aristotle, but truth that should be the
rule of our opinions."81 A dogmatic reliance on an ancient author not only arrested
curiosity about the ways in which nature functioned, it nurtured an intellectual breeding-
ground for superstitious and fabulous explanations of natural phenomena. This state of
affairs leads, he sees, to a vicious logic: "here's the misery of it, wee first tie our selves
unto Ahstotles Principles, and then conclude, that nothing could contradict them but a
miracle."82 Worse, the recourse to miraculous and fabulous explanations, besides
confounding common-sense and bewitching the mind, degraded the reputation of science
and turned men of learning into popular targets of satire.83
Wilkins therefore marshals practical arguments why the moderns should study
those ancient authors not included in the canon. Insofar as gaps must have occurred in
the transfer and transmission of knowledge during the ancient and medieval eras, it
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follows that "77s a false conceit, for us to thinke, that amongst the ancient variety and
search of opinions, the best hath still prevailed." Furthermore, of those works which did
survive the ravages of time and circumstance many will "have for a long time lien
neglected' in libraries (as many still do), and Wilkins assures his readers that these
writings contain "many truths well worthy ofyour paines and observations."84 By
inference, any philosopher worthy of the name would value these alternative explanations
of natural phenomena and hope to exploit whatever potentialities they might possess.
Two years later, in A Discourse Concerning a New Planet Tending to prove,
That 'tis probable our Earth is one of the Planets, Wilkins perseveres in his revolt
against ancient authority, declaring that thinkers no longer needed to be "so
superstitiously devoted to Antiquitie, as to take up every thing for Canonicall, which drops
from the pen of a Father, or was approved by the consent of the Antients."85 The same
point will be echoed over and over in the period, John Norris feeling that a main
encumbrance to thinking was the "over-fond and superstitious deference to Authority,
especially that of Antiquity. There is nothing that cramps the Parts, and fetters the
Understandings of men like this strait-lac'd humour. Men are resolv'd never to outshoot
their forefathers mark; but write one after another and so the dance goes round in a circle;
and the world is never the wiser for being older. Take an instance of this in the School¬
men."86 Wilkins, however, supplements his rejection of ancient authority with a clarification
of the proper approach to questions of knowledge; equating deductive logic with devotion
and deference to ancient ideas and canonical authors, he rejects both. "In the
examination of Philosophical points," he says, "it were a preposterous course to begin at
the testimony and opinion of others, and then afterwards to descend unto the reasons
that may bee drawne from the Nature and Essence of the things themselves."87 This
deductive method of explaining nature's workings, which goes by the name of "inartificiall
Arguments (as the Logicians cal them)," never produces "any cleere and convincing
evidence" about matters of fact or about the relationships between things.
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Wilkins then performs the obvious, though nevertheless vital, reversal, making the
state of intellectual freedom indivisible from the practice of inductive analysis:
It behooves every one in the search of Truth, alwaies to preserve a Philosophicall
liberty: not to be so inslaved to the opinion of any man, as to thinke what ever he
sayes to be infallible. We must labour to find out what things are in themselves by
our owne experience, and a through examination of their natures, nor what
another sayes of them. And if in such an impartiall enquiry, we chance to light
upon a new way, and that which is besides the common rode, this is neither our
fault, or our unhappinesse.88
Hence, whenever a free-thinker tackles an issue which involves matters of fact he will, as
a matter of principle, set aside all questions regarding final causes; after first establishing
"those that are of more necessary dependence," he will slowly progress to a more
comprehensive understanding of the phenomena. Only much later, once he can adduce
clear and convincing evidence, should he venture upon "inartificiall Arguments," and even
then only "rather to confirme, than resolve the ludgement."89
Wilkins's early writings present, as it were, a paradigmatic illustration of the
unsystematic process through which Bacon's ideas merged into the orbit of intellectual
debate. Like Wilkins, other thinkers, religious dissenters, philosophers, and writers
throughout the seventeenth century seized on the principle that every individual
possessed an inalienable right (as well as a duty) to judge the truth-value of all
statements and hypotheses concerning the natural world. For instance, around the same
time that Wilkins rejects the whole programme of deductive reasoning, Thomas Browne
abandons the conventional orthodoxy of Religio Medici (published 1635-36) to champion
Bacon's attack on scholasticism in his Vulgar Errors (1645).90 In many cases, references
to Aristotle signal changing attitudes and the steady advance of Bacon's programme.
During the seventeenth (and eighteenth) century, Aristotle's name functions
synecdochically which, when invoked, signified everything that the new science opposed,
and all that it promoted. He symbolised the ancient thinker who merited respect but
whose treatment by the schoolmen and divines testified to the need for intellectual
freedom. For example, in A Proposition for the Advancement ofExperimental
Philosophy (1661), Cowley articulates the normative view: "Not that I would disparage
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the admirable Wit, and worthy labours ofmany of the Ancients, much less of Aristotle, the
most eminent among them\ but it were madness to imagine that the Cisterns ofmen
should afford us as much, and as the wholesome Waters, as the Fountains of Nature." He
then observes that"Many Persons of admirable abilities (if they had been wisely managed
and profitably employed) have spent their whole time and diligence in commenting upon
Aristotles Philosophy, who could never go beyond him, because their design was only to
follow, not grasp, or lay hold on, or so much as touch Nature." Instead of attaining a real
knowledge of nature, their adherence to Aristotle's notions meant that "they catcht only at
the shadow of her in their own Brains," and Cowley therefore concludes "as a certain
Foundation, that we must not content our selves with that Inheritance of Knowledge which
is left us by the labour and bounty of ourAncestors, but seek to improve those very
grounds,"91 Similarly, Simon Patrick observes that "the Theater of nature is much enlarg'd
since Aristotles time," and he then asks: "Must we now after all these and many more
discoveries about natural bodies, confine our selves to what we find in Aristotle who never
dream'd of any such things?"92 Locke, in rejecting the notion of innate ideas, relies upon
the same principle of personal authority:
Not that I want a due respect to other Mens Opinions; but after all, the greatest
reverence is due to Truth; and, I hope, it will not be thought arrogance to say,
That, perhaps, we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and
contemplative Knowledge, if we sought it in the Fountain, in the consideration of
Things themselves; and made use rather of our own Thoughts, than other Mens to
find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, as to
know by other Mens Understandings. So much as we our selves consider and
comprehend of Truth and Reason, so much we possess of real and true
Knowledge. The floating of other Mens Opinions in our brains makes us not one
jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was Science,
is in us but Opiniatrety, whilst we give up our Assent only to reverend names, and
do not, as they did, employ our own Reason to understand those Truths, which
gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing Man, but no body ever
thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the Opinions
of another. And if the taking up of another's Principles, without examining them,
made not him a Philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the
Sciences, every one has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he
believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds.93
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Locke here actually uses Aristotle as an exemplar of the appropriate stance to take to
authority and to the pursuit of knowledge. What seems clear from these examples is the
importance of establishing a sense of individual distance from tradition, and that this
constituted a fundamental intellectual strategy for those thinkers who found the new
science appealing.
Famously, Hobbes bases his philosophy upon the lessons of everyday human
experience, encompassing personal and social responses and feelings about events
which occur to us: "Science is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one
fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do
something else when we will, or the like another time."94 In the Port-Royal generated
Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking, a similar attitude, though a different aim, prevails. The
authors start from the premise that
Nothing is more desirable than Good Sense and Justness of Thought in
discerning Truth from Falshood. Every other Quality of the Mind is of limited
Advantage; but Exactness of Reason is of universal Use, and serviceable in all the
Parts and Offices of Life. It is not in the Sciences only that it is difficult to
distinguish between Truth and Error, but it is the same in most of the Subjects
upon which we discourse, and in the Affairs wherein we are concerned. We
almost every where meet with two Tracks, the one leading to Truth, the other to
Falshood, and it is Reason must make the Choice which to follow. Those who
chuse Right, are those who are endued with a Justness of Thought; those who
chuse Wrong, are those who have a Falseness of Thought; and this is the first
and most essential Difference between the Qualities of Mens Understandings.95
Of course, in order to make such fine distinctions the philosopher must embark upon a
training in logic, defined by the authors as "the Art of rightly directing our Reason in the
Knowledge of Things, in order to instruct both ourselves and others in the same."96 Like
Bacon's new scientist, the logician must direct his efforts towards the greater social good.
Significantly, because the logician endorses only those propositions and theories
which pass reason's scrutiny, he submits to no single authority. Like Wilkins, the Port-
Royal authors decry the privilege accorded Aristotle's works; while admitting that "'Tis
hard Measure to condemn all Aristotle's Opinions in general, (as has been formerly
done)," they retort that "it is as hard to force Men to subscribe blindly to every thing he
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says, and to make him the Standard of the Truth of Philosophical Opinions. . . . Men
cannot long endure such Tyranny." Although dogmatism may rule men's minds for long
periods, "by degrees they will recover the Possession of their natural and reasonable
Freedom, which consists in approving what we think true, and rejecting what we think
false."97 The Port-Royal authors take care, however, to delimit the proper sphere in which
free reason operates: "Reason does not refuse to submit to Authority in those Sciences
which, treating of Things that are above Reason, must follow another Light, which can
only be Divine Authority. But in Humane Sciences, which profess the Support of Reason
only, no body can bear to be forced to submit to Authority, contrary to Reason."98 Hence,
by definition reason cannot function at its best without complete freedom in secular
affairs, a view which merges easily with the aim and practice of experimental science.
This conviction that every one must be free to pursue their thoughts without fear of
authority probably encouraged a tendency during the seventeenth century in which, as T.
A. Birrell notes, almost every facet of intellectual concern-philosophy, religion, logic,
rhetoric, and so forth~"seems to fall together in a loose but inevitable synthesis."99
Simon Patrick's A BriefAccount of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, Together
with some reflections upon the New Philosophy (1662) provides a fitting
exemplification of this synthesising urge.100 For Patrick, the equation is a simple one: God
granted man reason so that each individual could exercise it to secure personal faith:
For Reason is that faculty whereby a man must judge of everything, nor can a man
believe any thing except he have some reason for it, whether that reason be a
deduction from the light of nature, and those principles which are the candle of the
Lord, set up in the soul of every man that hath not wit fully extinguished it; nor a
branch of Divine revelation in the oracles of holy scriptures; or the general
interpretation of genuine antiquity, or the proposal of our own Church consenteous
thereto, or lastly the result of some or all of these: for he that will rightly make use
of his Reason, must take all that is reasonable into consideration.101
Thus, by refusing to adopt the teaching or doctrines of any particular church, school, or
sect, preferring instead to determine the truth of scripture through the use of their own
reason, the Latitudinarians were simply displaying a right regard for the function of
reason. Patrick intimates that this attitude towards tradition and authority formed the
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essential spirit of the modern thinker: the Latitude-Men do not "hold any other Doctrine
than the Church, since they derive it from the same fountains, not from the Spinoze schol-
men, or Dutch systematics, neither from Rome nor Geneva, the Council of Trent, nor
Synod of Dort, but from the Sacred writings of the Apostles and Evangelists," and when
they interpret the scriptures, "they carefully attend to the sense of the ancient Church, by
which they conceive the modern ought to be guided" (BA, p. 9). Echoing Bacon, Patrick
then sketches out a familiar history of learning, satirising with gusto the excesses of
scholastic practices and religious conflicts which made the Latitudinarian attitude
necessary during a time when faith in the Church and in God "have been almost exploded
in these latter degenerate ages of the world" (BA, p. 19). Fortunately, he detects "an
infinite desire of knowledge broken forth in the world" (BA, p. 23) which aimed primarily at
restoring religious belief.
This reforming desire, however, was not occurring in the churches or schools but in
"different persons upon different accounts" (BA, p. 10), and it becomes clear that
experimental scientists form a large percentage of those "different persons." Their
analytical procedures supported reason in its quest for truth, and the early successes of
many experiments struck Patrick as sufficient evidence of the promise of the new science.
Accordingly, he opposes those who believe that "all innovations are dangerous," that
"Philosophy and Divinity are so inter-woven by the School-men, that it cannot be safe to
separate them," countering such an apology for the status quo with the argument that
"new Philosophy will bring in new Divinity, and freedom in the one will make men desire a
liberty in the other" (BA, p. 22). In any case, since the evidence from both reason and
scripture attested to "an eternal consanguinity between all veritys," it followed that
"nothing is true in Divinity, which is false in Philosophy, or on the contrary" (BA, p. 11).102
It seemed unlikely to Patrick, therefore, that new discoveries in nature could rattle real
faith: "True Philosophy can never hurt sound Divinity" (BA, p. 24). In practice, then, "it
must be the Office of Philosophy to find out the process of the Divine Art [that is, how
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nature functions] in the great automaton of the world," and to make such discoveries
would require the true philosopher to eschew the seductions of a systemizing or syllogistic
form of philosophy and instead to apply the inductive method, "by observing how one part
moves another, and how these motions are varied by the several magnitudes, figures,
positions of each part, from the first springs or plummets ... to the hand that points out
the visible and last effects" (BA, p. 19).
To dispel doubts that greater intellectual freedom and new discoveries about nature
would produce negative consequences, Patrick employs a geographical analogy.103 If, he
says, mariners had been "forbid the reading of any more Geography than is found in
Strabo or Mela" (BA, p. 22), that is, in ancient authorities, they would never have
discovered the new world: modern mariners sailing forth in contradiction to ancient belief
relied instead on what reason and experience taught them. Does anyone, Patrick
wonders, therefore think that "it be unlawful to use the advantages of such noble
achievement" (BA, p. 22). He knows the answer, of course, and so demands to know why
"Philosophy alone [must] be bound up stil in its infant swadling bands" (BA, p. 22). Since
the history of the times proves that it will not "be possible otherwise to free Religion from
scorn and contempt, if her Priests be not as well skilled in nature as the people" (BA, p.
24), Patrick concludes that the schools and churches should, rather than fighting against
the aims of the new science, become actively involved in promoting its ideals. Many
churchmen, of course, did just that.
As suggested earlier, the repudiation of ancient and medieval intellectual authority
could not in itself provoke the wholesale adoption of the experimental method. A
successful cultural appropriation of new ideas does not depend upon their intrinsic merits
alone but upon complex and sometimes unlikely extrinsic factors. Indeed, it would not be
an exaggeration to say that without the political and religious ferment which dominated
early seventeenth-century life, Bacon's ideas might never have received a serious
hearing.104 As Thomas Sprat explains in The History of the Royal-Society of London
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(1667), "It was . . . some space after the end of the Civil Wars at Oxford, in Dr. Wilkins his
Lodgings, in Wadham College, which was then the place of Resort for Vertuous, and
Learned Men, that the first meetings were made, which laid the foundation of all this that
follow'd."105 The meetings attracted men who wanted "onely the satisfaction of breathing a
freer air, and of conversing in quiet one with another, without being ingag'd in the
passions, and madness of that dismal Age" (HRS, p. 53). In the quiet of Wilkins's rooms
these men deliberately fashioned their behaviour in marked counterpoint to scholastic
debate: no "monstrous altercations or barking questions." Yet these early recruits to the
new science did not possess a clearly articulated set of rules or procedures for
experimental practice, proceeding "rather by action, then discourse; cheifly attending
some particular Trials, in Chymistry, or Mechanicks: they had no Rules nor Method fix'd:
their intention was more, to communicate to each other, their discoveries, which they
could make in so narrow a compass, than an united, constant, or regular inquisition"
(HRS, p. 56). In other words, by the middle of the seventeenth century the new science to
a large extent still so to speak remained hidden within the closet: while a small band
admired its intellectual ideals, few executed its methodology in a disciplined way, while
the greater public remained largely unaware of this science which promised to bestow
great benefits upon it.
Sprat thus undertakes the History in order to codify the ideals and methods of the
new science as a distinct intellectual unity. Behind his confidence about its advantages for
human life, however, the work exudes as much anxiety about the fate of experimental
philosophy as The Advancement of Learning did about the future of learning in general.
Sprat voices his apprehensions (and obviously those of other members of the Society)
when he states that, confronted by the many "Detractors of so noble an Institution" and in
light of "their Objections and Cavils," it became necessary "to write . . . not altogether in
the way of a plain History, but sometimes of an Apology," adding that his book takes "a
liberty" because it offers, besides history, "a Defence and Recommendation of
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Experimental Knowledge in General,"106 The History, he promises, will "set on foot, a new
way of improvement of Arts, as Great and as Beneficial (to say no more) as any the
wittiest or the happiest Age has ever invented" (HRS, p. 3), thereby proving to the
detractors the error of their ways.
Sprat begins by refuting a charge levelled against the new scientists which echoed
Bacon's dislike of scholastic learning. Sceptics and other antagonists had pointed out
that, despite claims about the superiority and the immediately practical social value of
their method, the experimenters produced little useful knowledge. Sprat does not sidestep
this charge but deflects it in two ways. Firstly, he reminds the sceptics that, before they
ridiculed the new science on the basis of its as yet small successes, they ought to recall
the shameful state at which scholastic learning had arrived. In doing so they would see
"how farre more importantly a good Method of thinking, and a right course of
apprehending things, does contribute towards the attaining of perfection in true
knowledge, then the strongest, and most vigorous wit in the World" (HRS, p. 15).
Secondly, he recurs to the historical context in which these first meetings of the Royal
Society occurred: an extended period of religious and civil strife had militated against
concerted and joint experimental efforts, both of which he later stipulates as essential
conditions for a successful scientific experiment. In any case, if the results of these
meetings seemed inconclusive, they still performed a vital function: "by this means there
was a race of yong Men provided, against the next Age, whose minds receiving . . . their
first Impressions of sober and generous knowledge, were invincibly arm'd against all the
enchantments of Enthusiasm" (HRS, p. 53). Sprat recognised the importance of these
meetings as preliminary stages in the development of a full-fledged ideology of science:
since the main ideologies which conditioned behaviour in the past had provoked so much
discord and bloodshed, fanaticism and ignorance, it was time to formulate clearer
intellectual ideals which could cultivate more socially cooperative behaviour.107 Cowley's A
Proposition for the Advancement of Experimental Philosophy (1661) lays down
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similar rules of behaviour for the professors in his ideal college of experimental science:
"they shall all keep an inviolable and exemplary friendship with one another, and that the
Assembly shall lay a considerable pecuniary mulct upon any one who shall be proved to
have entered so far into a quarrel as to give uncivil Language to his Brother-Professor,
and that perseverance in any enmity shall be punish'd by the Governours with
expulsion."108
Understandably, then, the Society's early activities were of "necessity . . . about
Preparatory Affairs," though Sprat observes that its members "have not wholly neglected
their principal End\ but have had Success, in the tryal of many remarkable things" (HRS,
p. 3). In addition, the men who attended these meetings-Wilkins, Wallis, Boyle, Wren,
Ward, and others-actively disseminated their ideas and the results of their experiments,
as Sprat notes, in the culture at large: "Nor were the good effects of this conversation
onely confin'd to Oxford: But they have made themselves known in their printed Works,
both in our own, and in the learned Language: which have much conduc'd to the Fame of
our Nation abroad, and to the spreading of profitable Light, at home" (HRS, p. 54). Later,
after 1658, as the original members dispersed to pursue their respective careers, they
met at least twice a week at Gresham College; membership increased, and the meetings
took on a more formal structure. Importantly, many of the members were influential in the
administration of civil, religious, and governmental affairs, while the Royal Charter
awarded by Charles II in 1662, of course, accorded the new Society a prestige which
doubtless many hitherto noncommittal observers could not resist. The overall influence of
the monarch on the development and acceptance of the new science, however, would be
difficult to judge.109
The main stumbling-block to wider acceptance, Sprat finds, was that contemporary
judgments about the value of the new experimental philosophy were either paradoxical or
morally reductive. On the one hand, "some over-zealous Divines do reprobate Natural
Philosophy, as a carnal knowledge, and a too much minding worldly things," while "the
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men of the World, and business on the other side, esteem it meerly as an idle matter of
Fancy, and as that which disables us, from taking right measures in humane affairs"
(HRS, p. 27). If true these charges were damning, but inasmuch as they were
contradictory and levelled from extreme positions Sprat counters that these charges
simply proved that the Society was "guilty of neither of these faults" (HRS, p. 27); still, the
sources of these paradoxical views force Sprat to admit tacitly the need for a clearer,
more substantial statement of the aims and methods of the experimental philosophy, not
only to convince the detractors of their misjudgment but to remind the practitioners
themselves of their duties as experimental philosophers.
To this end, Sprat insists upon a fundamental rule of all scientific activity: "The true
Philosophy must be first of all begun, on a scrupulous, and severe examination of
particulars: from them, there may be some general Rules, with great caution drawn"
(HRS, p. 31). Establishing plausible causes for certain observable effects, restraining the
urge to speculate wildly upon initial findings, a determination to explain and convince by
means of experiment and demonstration--these form strict rules of conduct for the natural
philosopher. Building upon a careful examination of particulars, of the "observable"
relations of cause and effect, the experimental philosopher slowly forms a better
understanding of how nature works, with each new advance in understanding laying the
ground for further experiment: he "must advance those Principles, to the finding out of
new effects, through all the varieties of Matter: and so both the courses must proceed
orderly together; from experimenting, to Demonstrating, and from demonstrating, to
Experimenting again" (HRS, p. 31). Equally important, consistent application of the
method verifies for the experimenter the basic truth that no "one Man, by wonderful
sagacity, or extraordinary chance, shall light upon the True Principles of Natural
Philosophy" (HRS, p. 31).
Sprat pursues the logical conclusion to this assumption about the limitations of
human intellectual powers, using the argument to root science in a framework of moral
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behaviour. Experimental philosophers must "make all their Labours unite for the service of
man-kind" (HRS, p. 76); they must "meddle no otherwise with Divine things, than onely as
the Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness of the Creator, is display'd in the admirable order,
and workman-ship of the Creatures" (HRS, p. 82).110 They should only seek that
knowledge which "might be brought within their own Touch and Sight" (HRS, p. 83),
accepting the reports and observations of others only with the greatest caution; every
sober inquirer therefore ought to consult and compare his observations and experimental
results with others. Since the contentious debates of the scholastic philosophers proved
how "cautious ought men to be, in pronouncing even upon Matters of Fact" (HRS, p. 73),
all knowledge needed to survive the test of experiment, and this, says Sprat, constitutes a
"Fundamental Law" (HRS, p. 83) for all members of the Society. Other members
reiterated this law over and over again. John Wilkins bases his theological understanding
on "that Physical Certainty which doth depend upon the Evidence of sense, which is the
first and highest kind of Evidence, of which humane nature is capable," while Robert
Boyle insists on a scrupulous confirmation of experimental results:
For though unwillingly, yet I must for the truth sake, and the reader's, warne him not
to be forward to believe chymical experiments when they are set down only by way
of prescriptions, and not of relations; that is, unless he that delivers them mentions
his doing it upon his own particular knowledge, or upon the relation of some credible
person, avowing it upon his experience. For I am troubled, I must complain, that
even eminent writers, both physitians and philosophers, whom I can easily name, if
it be required, have of late suffered themselves to be so far imposed upon, as to
publish and build upon chymical experiments, which questionless they have never
tried; for if they had, they would, as well as I, have found them not to be true.111
Thus the ideal of the experimental attitude, with its contingent views about the function of
knowledge and its social function, builds into itself a thorough-going ethical principle, as
well as the criteria for judgment and progress. Cowley, for instance, stipulates that every
professor in his academy must investigate natural phenomena wherever they find
themselves: each would "take a solemn Oath never to write any thing to the Colledge, but
what after very diligent Examination, they shall fully believe to be true, and to confess and
recant it as soon as they find themselves in Errour."112
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In rounding off his defence of experimental science, Sprat makes two related
qualifications about experimental practice. Firstly, he maintains that as long as the
experimenter dutifully observed the correct method, even those experiments which ended
in error or with inconclusive results were valuable: "the tracing of a false Cause, doth very
often so much conduce; that, in the progress, the right has been discover'd by it" (HRS, p.
108). This sense that in the pursuit of knowledge errors invariably occurred was obviously
important. Boyle, for example, makes a similar point in The Sceptical Chymist..
I blush not to acknowledge that I much less scruple to confess that I doubt when I
do so, than to profess that I know what I do not: and I should have much stronger
expectations that I dare yet entertain, to see philosophy solidly established, if men
would more carefully distinguish those things that they know from those that they
ignore or do but think, and then explicate clearly the things they conceive they
understand, acknowledge ingenuously what it is they ignore, and profess so
candidly their doubts, that the industry of intelligent persons might be set on work to
make further enquiries, and the easiness of less discerning men might not be
imposed on.113
Hence, unlike someone who "has fix'd on his Cause, before he has experimented" (HRS,
p. 108)--the scholastic philosopher, perhaps-a naturalist who conducted disciplined
experiments which honestly tried to discover the truth about some object, motion, effect
deserved praise regardless of the results. Indeed, since the experimenter should have
"never affirm'd any thing, concerning the cause, till the trial was past: whereas, to do it
before, is a most venomous thing in the making of Sciences" (HRS, p. 108), many
experiments will end in a failure to validate the hypothesis, but far from casting aspersions
on the intellectual capacities of the thinker, this process will actually help to bring about "a
full comprehension of the object in all its appearances" (HRS, p. 85); which, in turn, will
lead to greater understanding and certainty, though still falling short of complete
knowledge.
Secondly, Sprat recognised that such a mental discipline seemed ill-designed to
avoid either the dogmatism or the sterility which infected medieval and early Renaissance
science. Accordingly, he differentiates the method or"Art of Experimenting" (HRS, p. 89)
itself from the way the mind should respond or react to the influence of phenomena. The
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art of experimenting, he declares, should neither "prescribe" nor "circumscribe" the
thoughts or ideas of the experimenter: "The true Experimenting has this one thing
inseparable from it, never to be a fix'd and settled Art, and never to be limited by constant
Rules" (HRS, p. 89). The raw data should be examined, measured, weighed, and tested
in a rigorous and methodological way, but the experimenter should not bring to his search
any expectations or presuppositions about the how or the why of some particular natural
process or phenomenon. Hence, rather than mount an experiment to prove how some
event occurs because of the effect of one or other of the four primary elements, he must
allow the phenomena to direct the course of enquiry, altering and formulating his ideas
according to the information or facts discoverable from the objects at hand.
Conflating the experimental methodology and the ideal of free thought in this way
clearly enhanced the new-science's hegemonic potency: together they offered a desirable
paradigm for all social and intellectual behaviour.114 For example, Sprat deems such a
state of intellectual readiness essential for the operation "of Invention," and he also likens
it to "that which is call'd Decence in humane life; which, though it be that, by which all our
Actions are to be fashion'd ... yet it is never wholly to be reduc'd to standing Precepts',
and may almost as easily be obtain'd, as defin'd" (HRS, p. 90). By analogy, then, rules of
behaviour and rules of expression or composition must naturally alter with the discovery of
new laws or operations at work in nature: rules cannot prescribe but only guide, especially
as even the short history of experimental science had shown that the discovery of new
causes, new laws of nature, ruled out any fixed canon of rules. These principles of the
method appealed to many observers. William Wotton, for example, undertook a series of
reflections upon learning and asserts the tremendous value of the Royal Society's
intellectual policies:
The New Philosophers, as they are commonly called, avoid making general
Conclusions, till they have collected a great Number of Experiments or
Observations upon the Thing in hand; and, as new Light comes in, old Hypotheses
fall without any Noise or Stir. So that the Inferences that are now a-days made from
any Enquiries into Natural Things, though perhaps they be set down in general
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Terms, yet are (as it were by Consent) received with this tacit Reserve, As far as
the Experiments or Observations already made, will warrant."5
Clearly, Wotton feels that if this new and potentially powerful method could be instituted
as a general discipline, it would offer a new model of intellectual behaviour. Cowley goes
so far as to argue that because normal educational practices generally meant that
children wasted "six or seven years in the learning of words only, and that too very
imperfectly," his college would make certain that children were "initiated in Things as well
as Words," which would require an educational method "for the infusing Knowledge and
Language at the same time into them; and that this may be their Apprenticeship in Natural
Philosophy."116
No one, however, would appreciate the great value of the experimental method if
scholastic rhetorical practices continued to seduce the new scientist, that is, if he failed to
deliver his results in a clear and concise language. Yet just as many of his
contemporaries in the learned and everyday worlds misprized both the need for and the
value of a proper method, Sprat finds the new scientists indicted on the charge that their
linguistic ideal remained the same as that of the scholastics: "in this . . . the Experimental
Philosophy has met with very hard usage: For it has commonly in Mens Censures,
undergone the imputation of those very faults, which it indeavors to correct in the Verbat'
(HRS, p. 26). Following Bacon, Sprat affirms that a form of linguistic purity remained the
primary aim of the new science; besides conducting experiments themselves, of "all other
businesses, that have come under their care; there is one thing more, about which the
Society has been most sollicitous; and that is, the manner of their Discourse" (HRS, p.
111). Typically, he condemns "the luxury and redundance of speech" which "indeed may
be justly condemn'd for filling mens thoughts, with imaginary Ideas of conceptions, that
are no way answerable to the practical ends of Life" (HRS, p. 26). While this disease
infects all the sciences, Sprat warns the Society's members that "unless they had been
very watchful to keep in due temper, the whole spirit and vigour of their Design, had been
eaten out" (HRS, p. 111). After listing the damage inflicted upon knowledge by the abuse
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of figurative language and tropes, he puts linguistic excesses down to unsound
methodology. Consistent attention to the experimental method "is the surest guide,
against such Notional wandrings: opens our eyes to perceive all the realities of things:
and cleers the brain, not onely from darkness, but false, or useless Light" (HRS, p. 26).
Eloquence, it would appear, could offer the scientist little of any lasting value-contrary to
Bacon, Sprat seems to feel that science must do without the charms of rhetoric.
Yet the ornaments of language originally served a useful purpose, says Sprat, and
he freely admits that they were "an admirable Instrument in the hands of Wise Men,"
particularly when (and Sprat here makes a typical qualification) "they were onely employ'd
to describe Goodness, Honesty, Obedience-, in larger, fairer, and more moving Images: to
represent Truth, cloth'd with Bodies" {HRS, p. 112). Conceding that eloquence and
rhetoric had played an historically valid role in teaching both science and morality, Sprat
still seems to conceive of rhetoric as limited to its conventional use as a means of
adornment. However, he goes on to make an important and radical modification to the
drift of his thought, stating that rhetoric's real task was "to bring Knowledg back to our
very senses, from whence it was at first deriv'd to our understandings" {HRS, p. 112). In
this formulation he effectively reverses the honoured dictum that poetry leads to a form of
divine madness; instead, it actually helps to reintegrate the mind and the senses into their
original unity, which leads to a greater awareness of consciousness and truth.117
Moreover, Sprat sees that the poetic resources of language, particularly such devices as
personification, simile, and metaphor, give language its vital power to explain, persuade,
and communicate, the purpose of all discourse. The degeneration of language (and
shortly thereafter that of learning) occurs, therefore, because speakers, writers, poets
misuse the resources of language, deviating from its basic aims and functions. Hobbes
similarly attributes faulty reasoning and "absurd conclusion" to the misuse of language,
and he provides seven different causes of this misuse, the first of which he considers
"want of method" and the sixth "to the use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical
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figures, instead of proper words." Yet Hobbes, in common with other seventeenth-century
thinkers like Sprat, accepts that common speech legitimately makes use of figures of
speech but that "in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be
admitted."118
Given that the tendency towards linguistic excess persists even after Bacon's
analysis of this disease of learning, Sprat notes that all members of the Royal Society
agreed to practice a linguistic discipline consistent with both their view of how the human
mind functioned and their ideal of experimental practice. The members
have . . . been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only Remedy, that can be
found for this extravagance ... a constant Resolution, to reject all the
amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style: to return back to the primitive
purity, and shortness, when men deliver'd so many things, almost in an equal
number of words. They have exacted from all their members, a close, naked,
natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native easiness:
bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring
the language of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before that, of Wits, and
Scholars. (HRS, p. 113)
This statement of linguistic practice articulated a concise alternative to scholastic rhetoric,
and it appealed not only to those disaffected thinkers who related the social disjunctions
of the earlier part of the century to the excesses of scholasticism but to others, too.
Dryden, for example, notes that "The great art of poets is either the adorning and
beautifying of truth or the inventing pleasing, and probable fictions."119 In this aspect of
their writing some latitude or poetic licence could be deemed acceptable, but poetic
licence and extravagant language were hardly sufficient qualities to make a great poet.
Dryden contends that "to be a compleat and excellent Poet" required a high degree of
learning "in severall Sciences" as well as "experience in all sorts of humours and manners
of men." Equally important, the poet "should have a reasonable Philosophical!, and in
some measure MathematicalI head." The reason why a poet must acquire a proficiency in
these areas of learning lies in the special nature of his work and in the tools of his trade:
words. While the means by which a poet attains his ends-fiction, feigning, and emotion-
he must still use words that tell true, that can be verified (because imitations or
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representations of "truth"), and that will move the auditor. Accordingly, Dryden accepts
that while "Poetry should not be reduced to the strictnesse of Mathematicks ... it ought to
be so far MathematicalI, as to have likeness, and Proportion."120 This clear, mathematical
style, then, could attain an appealing degree of dignity and eloquence, and it could
therefore be held up as a standard of writing and of personal behaviour, as Boyle clearly
felt. He explains that he chose to write his The Sceptical Chymist in
a style more fashionable than that of mere scholars is wont to be . . . that to keep a
due decorum in the discourses it was fit that in a book written by a gentleman, and
wherein only gentlemen are introduced as speakers, the language should be more
smooth and the expressions more civil than is usual in the more scholastic way of
writing. And indeed, I am not sorry to have this opportunity of giving an example
how to manage even disputes with civility; whence perhaps some readers will be
assisted to discern a difference betwixt bluntness of speech and strength of reason,
and find that a man may be a champion for truth without being an enemy to civility;
and may confute an opinion without railing at them that hold it.121
Here Boyle nicely encapsulates the new attitude of the scientists to knowledge, their
prose style itself expressing their ethical and social ideals.
Sprat's call for scientific standards in thinking and writing soon reverberated
throughout the latter decades of the seventeenth century and down through the
eighteenth, an ideal of spoken and written practice which diffused itself into all the other
arts, an essential element in the hegemonic power of the new science. For example, in
three separate works-Wilkins's An Essay Towards a Philosophical Grammar, Real
Character, and a Philosophical Language (1668), Locke's chapters on language in An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), and Defoe's An Essay Upon
Projects (1697)--each writer promotes the linguistic creed as articulated by Bacon and
then codified in Sprat's History. Each in his own fashion rescripts the logic of the
linguistic code, justifying and reinforcing it as an integral supplement to experimental
practice. As we saw with Bacon, a word was the image of a thing, a mental
representation of some aspect of sense experience, acting as a medium between external
and internal impressions: its function was to communicate the idea generated in the mind
by the sense-image. The word itself and its particular sound, however, was an arbitrary
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invention whose meaning was sanctioned through a combination of personal experience
and social conventions; and since God created all men with the same capacities for
apprehending the world, and reason sufficient to draw intelligent conclusions for survival
in their environment, confusions and disagreements signalled that a breakdown between
sense experience and word had occurred; or, if debate degenerated into conflicts about
the arbitrary meanings of words, that the disputants no longer grasped the arbitrary
relationship which cohered between thing and word. Consistent and serious application of
the experimental method would realign that relationship.
Wilkins bases his Essay (read to the Royal Society) on the principle that, "As men
do generally agree in the same Principle of Reason, so do they likewise agree in the same
Internal Notion or Apprehension of Things," by which he means that everyone's senses
report the same thing: "That conceit which men have in their minds concerning a Horse or
Tree, is the notion or mental Image of that Beast, of such a nature, shape and use."122
Thus every perceiver's ideas of a horse always agreed because their senses had always
conveyed, and always would convey, the same or similar images, irrespective of the
various articulate sounds assigned to those images; for proof of this point, Wilkins notes
that "The Names given to these in several Languages, are arbitrary sounds or words, as
Nations of men have agreed upon, either casually or designedly, to express their Mental
notions of them" (ETRC, p. 20). Connaturality of sense experience, however, does not
transfer straight over into words whose meanings remain fixed for all time, in part
because men acquire words "by way of Imitation," and in part because words "in a long
tract of time, have, upon several emergencies, admitted various and casual alterations"
(ETRC, p. 19) in pronunciation and meaning. In short, language inevitably becomes
infected with "manifold defects and imperfections" (ETRC, p. 19).123 Although grammar
and the rules of language do provide some corrective to linguistic decay, they do so only
partly because grammatical rules are "of much later invention then Languages
themselves, being adapted to what was already in being, rather then the Rule making it
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so" (ETRC, p. 19); in itself, then, grammar cannot protect the meanings of words from
altering or becoming confused, ambiguous, unclear.
Wilkins thus speculates that, overtime, men failed to appreciate the damage
inflicted upon language by the multiplication of both words and equivocal meanings. In the
natural maturation of culture "the native simplicity" of unadorned speech loses value,
while verbose, abstruse, and inexact elocution soon masquerades as sophisticated
intellectual attainment, with society rewarding those "who are skilled in these Canting
forms of speech, though in nothing else" (ETRC, p. 18). Moreover, the arbitrary equation
of sounds to words allows words to function "like other things of fashion," which is to say,
they "are changeable, every generation producing new ones; witness the present Age,
especially the late times, wherein this grand imposture of Phrases hath almost eaten out
solid Knowledge in all professions" (ETRC, p. 18). While Wilkins accepts that language
evolves in this way according to the exigencies of human nature and the mechanics of
language acquisition, he insists that science, whose object is general, solid nature, cannot
follow fashion. As he puts it, "though the varieties of Phrases in Language may seem to
contribute to the elegance and ornament of Speech; yet, like other affected ornaments,
they . . . contribute to the disguising of it with false appearances" (ETRC, p. 18). In this
respect, science can do without synonyms, which "make Language tedious, and are
generally superfluities, since the end and use of Speech is for humane utility and mutual
converse" (ETRC, p. 18). In a truly philosophical or scientific language, every word "ought
in strictness to have but one proper sense and acceptation, to prevent equivolcalness"
(ETRC, p. 318). If nothing else was accomplished by a philosophical grammar and
character, at least the necessity to state ideas unequivocally would force philosophers to
think more carefully about words.
In any case, since it was the proper task of the various branches of philosophy to
reduce "all things and notions unto such a frame, as may express their natural order,
dependence, and relations" (ETRC, p. 1), it followed that "a regular enumeration and
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description of all those things and notions, to which marks or names ought to be
assigned" (ETRC, p. 1) would prove of utmost value to science. Consequently, a great
deal of scientific work must inevitably focus upon enumerating, defining, and describing
the species and classes of flora and fauna. This work of classification would go some way
to help determine "their primary significations" (ETRC, p. 22). Once these had been
agreed upon, occasions for conflict and argument would be reduced, not only in natural
science but in other fields as well; practitioners in all fields could utilise the linguistic ideal
of the new science to "improve" their own performances; as well, opportunities for
argument and discord would be reduced.
Indeed, Wilkins confesses that he accepted the task of trying to formulate a
philosophical language precisely because it offered an opportunity to improve social
concord, first by "facilitating mutual Commerce, amongst the several Nations of the world,
and the improving of all Natural knowledge," and in addition it would "likewise very much
conduce to the spreading of the knowledge of Religion" (ETRC, sig. B). A philosophical
language would further the cause of religion because it would "contribute much to the
clearing of some of ourModern differences in Religion, by unmasking many wild errors,
that shelter themselves under the disguise of affected phrases" (ETRC, sig. B). Part of
Wilkins's confidence in the validity of this programme derives from the general sense in
the period that the study of nature would lead to a greater understanding of the mind's
various functions. Typically, nature was conceived as the visible sign of God's creative
power, offering humankind a "book" in which to read His magnificence and take lessens
for our humility. As the anonymous author of Theologia Ruris sive Schola et Scala
Naturae: Or, The Book of Nature, Leading Us, by Certain Degrees, to the Knowledge
and Worship of the God of Nature (1686) argued, "God calleth thee into this richly
furnisht Palace of his, not to be a judge but a witness of his munificence"; the true
suppliant looked upon nature as "Man's School, and God's Temple," as "a large Book" in
which we "daily read new Lessons to thy Mind, Lessons of Calmness, Contentedness,
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and Confidence."124 Religious terms and concepts, like those used in other fields, would
first be "Philosophically unfolded, and rendered according to the genuine and natural
importance of Words," a process which would not only strengthen the grounds of belief
since the study of nature-God's book-formed its cornerstone, but it would prove
invaluable for revealing the roots of "inconsistencies and contradictions. And several of
those pretended, mysterious, profound notions, expressed in great swelling words,
whereby some men set up for reputation, being this way examined, will appear to be,
either nonsense, or very flat and jejeune" (ETRC, sig. B).125 Dryden puts forward a similar
plea in his Religio Laid or, A Layman's Faith (1682):
If still our Reason runs another way,
That private Reason 'tis more Just to curb,
Than by Disputes the publick Peace disturb.
For points obscure are of small use to learn:
But Common quiet is Mankind's concern.126
It would be wrong to assume, however, that Wilkins felt that his philosophical language
could somehow fix for ever the meaning of words, or that scientific knowledge could be
communicated effectively without making use of the poetic resources imbedded in the
everyday use of language. New advances in scientific understanding would coin new
words and terms, and the meanings of older terms might require re-definition. Thus, he
wants his philosophical language to incorporate a "way to change and vary the sense of
any word, as may with all, leave it free from ambiguity" (ETRC, p. 318), and he suggests
that tropes, metaphors, personification and other figures of speech are capable of
communicating ideas in concise and exact terms. Accordingly, figures of speech "may be
well enough retained in a Philosophical Language" (ETRC, p. 324), as long as the user
paid close attention to the ideas and relationships united within the figure itself. Such
careful usage would "much promote the copiousness and elegancy" (ETRC, p. 318) of
scientific discourse.
The verdicts which Locke passed on such issues as philosophical authority, the
relationship between experience and knowledge, and the natural limitations of the human
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capacity to know provide further (and pivotal) evidence of the steady advance of scientific
hegemony: to give the Essay Concerning Human Understanding its due would,
unfortunately, require lengthy digressions into arguments already well explored. Yet the
Essay cannot be by-passed unnoticed, especially as Locke consistently justifies and
reinforces the ideals of the new science, and my treatment intends only to focus upon
those aspects of his work which help underscore the develops traced in earlier
arguments. His attitude towards the search for knowledge, for instance, parallels those of
his predecessors:
he who has raised himself above the Alms-Basket, and not content to live lazily on
scraps of begg'd Opinions, sets his own Thoughts on work, to find and follow Truth,
will (whatever his lights on) not miss the Hunter's Satisfaction; every moment of his
Pursuit, will reward his Pains with some Delight; and he will have Reason to think
his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great Acquisition.127
Moreover, his explanation for taking up the writing of the Essay shares the
experimentalists' view of the reach of human mental abilities. He explains that
If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers
thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate;
and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of
Man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to
stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet
Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the
reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an
Affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves
and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not suited;
and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or
whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we
can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties
to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to
content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State. (ECHU, pp. 44-45)
Here Locke's declaration that he wants to teach others to restrain their intellectual pride
belongs to a by now familiar intellectual ancestry. Yet while Locke proposed "to enquire
into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge ... to consider the
discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to
do with," and to do so in an "Historical, plain Method" {ECHU, pp. 43-44 ), the Essay
served another equally urgent objective: namely, to establish "the natural Advantages and
Defects of Language; and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the
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inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of Words, without which, it is
impossible to discourse with any clearness, or order, concerning Knowledge" (ECHU, p.
404).128 Like Bacon, Wilkins, and Sprat before him, Locke expected the serious thinker to
"use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precise determined Idea, which he resolves to
make it the sign of' (ECHU, p. 13); consequently he feels compelled to denounce, even
as late as the 1690s, the persistent use of "Vague and insignificant Forms of Speech"
(ECHU, p. 10) and rhetorical excess as the great enemies of scientific discourse. As Hans
Aarsleff remarks, Locke's Essay "was, as it were, intended as a manual in the
epistemology of the Royal Society, whose aim was the promotion of natural
knowledge."129
Before recommending "remedies" with which to combat the misapplication of words,
however, Locke first examined how the epistemological structure of the word as a sign
made communication possible, and in light of this investigation he theorised about how its
mental processing contributed to a psychological disposition to word abuse. His
observations both advance and qualify the new-science view of language explored thus
far. Moreover, his analysis of how the basic mechanics of word acquisition induced a
psychological proclivity for word abuse further justified the call for a "plain" style in
scientific discourses but did not, significantly, put the same strictures on "common"
speech. Equally critical, his deliberations on the word/idea structure further emphasised
and enhanced the view already noted amongst seventeenth-century scientists, that a
"poetic" as opposed to a rhetorical use of language was legitimate and even desireable.
Although more extensive and subtle than his predecessors, Locke's views about
language cover roughly the same ground. For instance, he considered language a special
tool granted man by God to serve the twin aims of communication and social cohesion.
For Locke, the function of language derives from a simple logic: "God having designed
Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity
to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language,
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which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society" (ECHU, p. 402).
Locke's appeal to this notion that God gave man the capacity for speech for the
foundation of social order was, of course, a commonplace of linguistic theory right through
to the nineteenth century (and beyond); undoubtedly, this view owes its strength and
cogency to the power of Christian hegemony. Hobbes, for instance, subscribed to it, as
does Tamworth Reresby, writing in the early years of the eighteenth century: after
dismissing theories about gradual language acquisition which rely on classical philosophy,
Reresby declares that "Christians need not go far in Quest of the Original of Languages,
being very well assur'd, that God created Man with all the Perfections that appertain to his
Nature. That as he was made for Society, and as Speech is its primary and necessary
Tye, so must he of Course have been provided with that Faculty from the first Moment of
his Creation." Indeed, he takes it as axiomatic "that Man no sooner enjoy'd an Existence,
but he enjoy'd Thought; that he no sooner conceiv'd any Notion, than he desir'd to
communicate it." Fired by this desire to communicate his impressions and notions were
"follow'd by certain Traces in his Imagination, proper to invest them with Body; and by
certain Dispositions in the Organs of Voice proper to form expressive Sounds. So that all
his Thoughts, in the whole Course of his Life, were invested with all the Images and all
necessary Expressions, to render them as clear, conspicuous, and intelligible to others as
they were to himself; and all this was done by the Direction of God."130
Locke, then, followed a tradition which relied upon divine authority for the purpose
of speech, but he agreed with Bacon, Sprat, and Wilkins that at a primitive stage of
language development words acquired meaning only because all the ideas which they
expressed "originally come either from sensible Objects without, or what we feel within
our selves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits" (ECHU, p. 404); and that, even
at sophisticated levels of use all words "which are made use of to stand for Actions and
Notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious
sensible Ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations" (ECHU, p. 403).131 Like so
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many other scientifically-minded thinkers of his time, Locke considered sense perceptions
the bedrock of all higher forms of mental activity, but he also saw them as the key to the
dynamic nature of knowledge. He asks where the mind comes
by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it,
with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and
Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our
Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation
employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of
our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our
Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of
Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
(,ECHU, p. 104)
Locke likewise concurred that speech succeeded only because men shared the same or
similar sense-experiences and therefore the same or similar ideas. Clearly, to reform the
scientific use of language, to gain control over the meaning of words, some standard of
reference was necessary. The experimental scientists made sense-experience that
standard, and in this way they forced opponents to prove the basis upon which their ideas
rested.
Despite his adherence to the popular theological/anthropological paradigm for
explaining the origins of language, Locke questions whether the ability to utter "articulate
Sounds, which we call Words" (ECHU, p. 402) denotes a special feature of the human
use of sounds-parrots and other birds, after all, make distinct sounds. Nor did the
paradigm satisfactorily explain how words acquired their separate, intelligible
significations. Without invoking a theological doctrine, and without leaving the orbit of
experience and simple inference, he nonetheless solves this problem in a novel and
compelling way. Locke, of course, figured the mind untouched by experience as a "white
Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas" (ECHU, p. 104). Working with this image
of the mind he argued that, whereas birds and other animals simply made noises, man
alone possessed the capacity to "use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions;
and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might
be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to
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another" (ECHU, p. 402). Men used articulate sounds, as it were, to "write" their
impressions or experiences of things upon this blank sheet, enabling them "to record their
own Thoughts for the Assistance of their own Memory," and in turn "to bring out their
Ideas, and lay them before the view of others" (ECHU, p. 405). So far, so good: this
account helps clarify how sounds could somehow be used to capture the manifold nature
of human experiences.
It does not, however, resolve how words can communicate ideas, meanings, nor
illuminate how men could abuse a faculty intended by God to facilitate their social good.
Even if the evidence strongly supported the assumption that words conveyed ideas
because men shared the same or similar sense-experiences, Locke recognised that prior
to an idea's articulation a man's ideas must originally take form "within his own Breast,
invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to appear" (ECHU, p.
405). Locke does not question whether or not these "silent" ideas represent clearly and
distinctly to a man's consciousness his outward and inward sensible experiences; as long
as these meanings remain mute, incommunicable except in the most incomplete or
rudimentary fashions-gestures, grunts, shrieks-the issue remains undebatable. The
question of clear and determinate meaning can arise only after the fact of communication,
and this obviously happens only when two (or more) speakers agree that a particular
sound or sequence of sounds will refer to or signify an idea in their respective minds of a
particular thing or experience. The key to successful communication therefore relies upon
"a voluntary Imposition, whereby such a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an
Idea" (ECHU, p. 405); over the course of time "common use, by a tacit Consent,
appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages, which so far limits the
signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the same Idea, he does not
speak properly" (ECHU, p. 408). The sound (or sounds) appropriated to mark the idea of a
horse, for example, may differ in disparate parts of the world-horse, pferd, cheval-bui the
idea of a horse in the mind of all these speakers remains the same. Otherwise, the idea of
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a horse would not translate: ideas get translated, not sounds. People obviously enter into
conversations with others because each believes that the other "cannot be supposed
wholly ignorant of the Ideas, which are annexed to Words by common Use, in a Language
familiar to him" (ECHU, p. 522). In this way the invisible or hidden ideas become known to
others.132
Yet arbitrarily agreed meaning still fails to reconcile the fact that a fortuitous
procedure for marking sounds upon the mind cannot in itself guarantee to report ideas
accurately or "meaningfully." After all, the perceptual and epistemological process by
which everyone turns sounds into words means that "every Man has so inviolable a
Liberty, to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to
make others have the same Ideas in their Minds, that he has, when they use the same
Words, that he does" (ECHU, p. 408).133 Of course, social necessity should stimulate
each speaker to obtain a degree of correlation between his ideas and words and those of
others, but in the final analysis the process only rarely manages to bring word meanings
"within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary Conversation" (ECHU, p. 522).
Thus, the potential for confusion and misunderstanding would appear to be an in¬
built feature of the word/idea structure, and to complicate matters further Locke uncovers
other factors inherent in the mechanical acquisition of language which make the abuse of
words inevitable. The procedure induces, so to speak, a psychological "complex" or
predilection in the mind of the speaker to misuse words. In particular, since language
learning starts "from our Cradles" and involves the constant repetition and imitation of
sounds, "we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily
on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories" (ECHU, p. 407). Every child
therefore learns a great many words before it actually experiences the ideas to which (in
customary usage) they refer; this process continues into maturity, the appropriation of
more sophisticated words occurring without the speaker ever experiencing the ideas
which furnish the meanings or ever bothering to "examine, or settle their Significations
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perfectly" (ECHU, p. 407). Eventually, every speaker throughout a society presupposes
that a word means the same thing or idea for every user; and, as few understand the
simple distinct meaning of a word, and fewer the complex determined meaning, learning
and language degenerate, with a concomitant rise in communication failures, disputes
and conflicts.134
The unfelt, unreflective use of certain sounds to signify certain ideas propagates
other psychological repercussions: lacking the experiential meaning of a word, most
speakers usually become confused about the relationship between words (sounds) and
things. As Locke puts it, "Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own
Imaginations, but of Things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their Words to
stand for the reality of Things" (ECHU, p. 407). The failure to acknowledge the arbitrary
connection between sound and thing invites a reverence for word over matter—men "do
set their Thoughts more on Words than Things" (ECHU, p. 408)~which ultimately
alienates the speaker from his language and degrades the real experience of things, the
precise state of affairs which so worried the new scientists. In part the confusion of word
and thing occurs because the "Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and
perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it
at a distance, and make it its own Object" (ECHU, p. 43). Since the mind functions without
ado, a speaker may on the surface appear to use language efficiently, effectively, even
meaningfully, but at a deeper level his lack of "reality-testing" or experiential validation of a
word's signification has beguiled his mind with second-hand ideas: "there comes by
constant use, to be such a Connexion between certain Sounds, and the Ideas they stand
for, that the Names heard, almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects
themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senses" (ECHU, p.
407). The way in which the human mind processes words, Locke discovers, interferes
with and conspires against a clear understanding of immediate experience. And worse,
the illusion of certainty created by the use of language nullifies appeals to experience or
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common-sense: these can only serve to reinforce the solipsistic delusions of the
speaker.135
Given that most speakers "arrive" as it were unconsciously at a state of certainty
regarding the meaning of words, using them as if they knew their significations, Locke
wonders "whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed more to the
improvement or hindrance of Knowledge amongst Mankind" (ECHU, p. 510). The reply to
that, taking into account the outcome so far of Locke's "Historical, plain method," would
suggest that no remedy could overturn the combined forces of nature and custom. Yet not
everyone succumbs entirely to the desensitising process of language attainment. Society
always throws up those who do not accept as gospel the commonly received definitions of
things, substances, and the like, those "who search after Knowledge, and philosophical
verity" {ECHU, p. 521). Although the combined power of nature and custom make this a
formidable task, one in which the searcher would appear to be left largely to his own
resources, Locke urges such thinkers to "go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature
and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as [they] can,
[their] Ideas of their distinct Species" {ECHU, pp. 520-521). Fortunately, in order to verify
the precise signification of words the seeker can follow a standard path: "natural History is
to be enquired into" {ECHU, p. 521). The appeal to study natural history follows logically
from Locke's epistemological schema, which posits that "the only sure way of making
known the signification of the name of any simple Idea, is by presenting to his Senses
that Subject, which may produce it in his Mind, and make him actually have the Idea, that
Word stands for" {ECHU, p. 515). However much a speaker may confuse things and
words, he can never "corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge, which are in Things
themselves" {ECHU, p. 510). Like his precursors, Locke sends the philosopher back to
the things themselves.136
Locke, of course, recognised the impossibility of an in-depth examination of every
thing, every experience, every word. Although firmly convinced of the value of the dictum
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that "A Man should take care to use no word without a signification, no Name without an
Idea for which he makes it stand" (ECHU, p. 512), he appreciated that the level of
discipline which this required went beyond human capacity. Indeed, to demand such
application from men went against nature and could only prove counter-productive.137
Locke therefore accepts as necessary a certain quantum of second-hand knowledge in
scientific discourse, provided it was obtained "from such as are used to that sort of
Things, and are experienced in them" (ECHU, p. 521). Ideally, he thinks, scientific learning
would greatly benefit if
Men, versed in physical Enquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural
Bodies, would set down those simple Ideas, wherein they observe the Individuals of
each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion,
which comes from several Persons, applying the same Name to a Collection of a
smaller, or greater number of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been
more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any sort of
Things, which come under one denomination.138 (ECHU, p. 521-522)
If nothing else, this type of encyclopaedic resource could provide a standard (an authority)
for helping settle debates which had foundered upon the meaning of a term.
Attaining a clear understanding or idea of a word's true signification solved, of
course, only one part of the problem of word abuse as it pertained to the sciences. A
scientist who communicated his ideas to an audience faced the task of trying to convince
them about the accuracy of his observations and the justness of his conclusions. In other
words, the arts of language-rhetoric and eloquence-complicated matters still farther,
easily leading the scientist down the slippery slope. Locke counsels that "Right reasoning
is founded on something else than the predicaments and predictables, and does not
consist in talking in mode and figure itself."139 Before they addressed an audience
(whether in person or print) thinkers who took their vocation seriously "should think
themselves obliged to study, how they might deliver themselves without Obscurity,
Doubtfulness, or Equivocation" (ECHU, p. 509), especially in those scientific discourses
intended for instruction and information.140 Therefore says Locke, following in the path of
the early experimentalists who regarded rhetorical excess as an obstruction to and a
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deviation from solid learning, if "we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow,
that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative
application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong
Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect
cheat" (ECHU, p. 508).141 The scientist preparing to communicate his findings need only
follow a basic law: restrict himself to words and terms which, "if they be simple must be
clear and distinct; if complex must be determinate, i.e. the precise Collection of simple
Ideas settled in the Mind, with that Sound annexed to it, as the sign of that precise
determined Collection, and no other" (ECHU, p. 512-513). He might then avail himself of
rhetoric to attain the necessary "Order and Clearness" for the particular discussion in
which he troubled himself.
It should be made clear, however, that despite Locke's attack on rhetoric and
eloquence he was not inherently suspicious of words perse but considered them
admirably adapted to perform their primary function. Indeed, he accepted that "Vulgar
Notions suit vulgar Discourses: and both, though confused enough, yet serve pretty well
the Market, and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have Words
wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and
Disputants too, if they had a Mind to understand, and to be clearly understood" (ECHU, p.
514). While he condemns the "learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or
unintelligible Terms, introduced into the Sciences" (ECHU, p. 10) as a waste of energy,
his analysis of the word/idea structure shows how at every level of articulation speech
necessarily functions "poetically." After analysing how man's unique use of sounds allows
him to record his experiences and impressions of things, Locke adds that "It is not enough
for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made the signs of Ideas, unless those
signs can be so made use of, as to comprehend several particular Things" (ECHU, p.
402). In many instances, of course, a single word may adequately signify a single thing,
but in many others the mind must first separate, analyse, and evaluate a whole series of
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particular experiences and then, leaving some out, abstract and re-combine those
remaining into a general idea; and, finally, it must use a sound to "mark a multitude of
particular existences" (ECHU, p. 402). The word "tree," for instance, encompasses the
ideas of leaf, trunk, branch, bark, root, and so forth: a speaker does not need to repeat
each separate word to express the general term tree. Indeed, he does not even need to
"experience" all its separate parts or all the separate species of trees in order to
comprehend the meaning of the word tree as a genera. If the mind did not possess an
ability to abstract and distribute meaning in this way, the multiplication of sounds would
quickly overtax the memory's capacity and thereby subvert the ends of speech.
Thus, while alterations in sound do signal and help convey various meanings, they
do not generate the difference in meaning. It is only the mind's unique ability to ascribe
different ideas or even various ideas to a word that makes sound an effective medium of
communication. Compression, allusion, equation, making a part stand for a whole or a
whole for a part, combining ideas into one word-Locke's analysis of the word/idea
structure implies that these fundamentally "poetic" resources of words make discourse
possible. Poetic devices and figures of speech, although more complex as structures and
more complex to use, belong to the same process. Locke, in fact, made allowance for the
non-scientific use of words. After all, experience and observation of human social activity
impressed upon him that,
Since Wit and Fancy finds easier entertainment in the World, than dry Truth and
real Knowledge, figurative Speeches, and allusion in Language, will hardly be
admitted, as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in Discourses, where we seek
rather Pleasure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments
as are borrowed from them, can scarce pass for Faults. (ECHU, p. 508)
Throughout the Essay he accepts that in general the type of linguistic strictness required
in the sciences did not extend to other spheres of discourse. For instance, he would
consider it mere vanity for anyone to believe that he could "attempt the perfect Reforming
the Languages of the world, no not so much as that of his own Country, without rendring
himself ridiculous. To require that Men should use their words constantly in the same
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sense, and for none but determined and uniform Ideas, would be to think, that all Men
should have the same Notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and
distinct Ideas of (ECHU, p. 509). Similarly, Hobbes defines one of the special uses of
speech as an ability "to please, and delight ourselves and others, by playing with our
words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently."142 Common, everyday usage allowed a great
deal of leeway and inexactness in the use of words, and word-play even provided a large
measure of pleasure; indeed, Locke wrote to Edward Clarke to make certain that his child
be taught "to speak handsomely and well on any occasion . . . there being nothing more
becoming a gentleman, nor more useful in all the occurrences of life, than to be able to
speak well, and to the purpose."143 Even so, Locke expected serious writers-those who
intended to instruct and inform, as well as to delight—to use words of which they have
attained "clear and distinct Ideas." In this he was not alone.
In An Essay Upon Projects (1697), Defoe puts forward a plan for a society or
academy dedicated to the advancement of the English language, similar in many ways to
the French Academy, but likely to prove more successful and valuable because English,
he boasts, is "capable of a much greater Perfection."144 Like the Royal Society, he wants
his academy royally chartered, and its sole purpose
to encourage Polite Learning, to polish and refine the English Tongue, and advance
the so much neglected Faculty of Correct Language, to establish Purity and
Propriety of Style, and to purge it from all the Irregular Additions that Ignorance and
Affectation have introduc'd; and all those Innovations in Speech, If I may call them
such, which some Dogmatic Writers have the confidence to foster upon their Native
Language, as if their Authority were sufficient to make their own Fancy legitimate.
(.EUP, p. 233)
Defoe's ideal of speech parallels the "close, naked, natural way of speaking" defined by
Sprat as the aim of scientific discourse, but whereas Sprat offered a voluntary code Defoe
expects the members of his society to make it their business "to Correct and Censure the
Exorbitance of Writers, especially of Translators" (EUP, p. 236). As well, they would
adjudicate upon the use of new words, irregular usages, and so forth. Like Locke, Defoe
accepted that in general "Custom is allow'd to be our best Authority for Words," yet the
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members of his society would not invariably accept the dictates of custom as the final
standard. Whenever a dispute arose about the actual signification of a word, "Reason
must be the Judge of Sense in Language, and Custom can never prevail over it" (EUP, p.
243), and given Defoe's stated ideal of speech it is easy to imagine how reason would go
about setting a standard of measurement.
Who, though, would comprise the body of this society? Other than stating that it
would be "composed of none but Persons of the first Figure in Learning" (EUP, p. 232),
Defoe does not actually nominate anyone. Instead, he excludes certain types: on the one
hand, "very few, whose Business or Trade was Learning" because "great Scholars, meer
Learned Men, and Graduates in the last Degree of Study" for the most part vocalise a
form of English "far from Polite, full of Stiffness and Affectation, hard Words, and long
Coupling of Syllables and Sentences, which sound harsh" (EUP, p. 234). Clearly not
suitable candidates, and besides these Defoe would prohibit, for understandable reasons,
the "Clergyman, Physician, or Lawyer" (EUP, p. 234). On the other hand, he praises
merchants and traders, manufacturers and businessmen for their plain-speaking and for
their straightforward techniques for solving problems, considering their exposure to
worldly affairs a better training in language and thought than that of "meer" scholars.
Presumably, he would draw members of his society from their ranks; after all, it would
make sense to chose those who habitually spoke in a plain way rather than those who,
like Sprat's scientists, needed to learn how to do so.
From the foregoing illustrations, this much seems clear: as the turn of the century
approached, the miscellaneous ideals and perspectives espoused by the experimental
scientists had obtained a degree of hegemonic force. Writers in unrelated fields of interest
were beginning to view questions of style, pursue critical, religious, or historical issues,
and evaluate the failures and achievements of their culture in terms set by scientific
discourse. John Norris's essay, Of the Advantages of Thinking (1687), takes it as
axiomatic that thinking aimed at "the perfection of our Rational part. . . that is, to be able
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to frame clear and distinct conceptions, to form right Judgments, and to draw true
consequences from one thing to another." Echoing Locke, he says that thinking goes
astray whenever the mind remains satisfied with "the wrong perceptions of things. When
the simple Ideas of our minds are confus'd, our Judgments can never proceed without
errour," and this occurs through "the natural inability of our faculties" and a "want of
Attention and close application of mind. We don't dwell enough upon the object; but
speculate it transiently and in hast; and then, no wonder that we conceive it by halves."145
A critic of intellectually conservative sentiments like Thomas Rymer, for example,
complains in An Essay, Concerning Critical and Curious Learning (1698) about the
many "superficial Wits and pretended Virtuosi' who take "wonderful Pains about little
insignificant things, as in tracing the rise and progress of Words," a practice "fit only for
Pedants and School-masters to amuse their boys withall," who have overrun the
commonwealth of learning.146 He finds it disturbing that so many apparently well-educated
men in responsible positions could propound unfounded and specious hypotheses "which
the wiser part of Mankind have concluded above their Knowledge, and which they
themselves must confess to be nothing better than Learned Amusements" (ECCL, pp. 7-
8). Initially, Rymer's blanket criticisms convey the impression that he considers all curious
speculation as nothing more than frivolous research, but when he remarks that such
trifling inquiries "are wholly Forreign to the acquisition of solid and real Knowledge"
(ECCL, p. 9), he discloses the source of his displeasure.
Rymer admits that only some types of learning merit wholesale condemnation, that
other types of "Curious and Critical Observations are very commendable," and in a
crowded field "that of Experimental Philosophy is the most noble, beneficial, and
satisfactory" (ECCL, pp. 9-10).147 Experimental philosophy, unlike other speculative
practices, cleaved to the testimony of experience, which taught "that [Humane Reason] is
bounded and limited in many respects, even in those things that are more immediately
within its compass" (ECCL, p. 7). Moreover, its application of strict mental discipline to a
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testable subject matter reduced the possibilities of error and self-delusion: "For the Mind
is not there seduced with abstracted Arguments and Chymerical Notions; but is
determined by Demonstrations and Matter of Fact. It is the great Instrument by which
such admirable Effects in Nature have been discovered" (ECCL, p. 10). Rymer deems the
study of natural philosophy "desirable and entertaining in it self to an inquisitive Genius"
(ECCL, p. 10) and applauds the determination of its practitioners to apply themselves for
the benefit of all humankind.148
Up to this point Rymer has more or less followed a path already well trod, and as a
critic and not a scientist his remarks might seem to amount to little more than a polite bow
in the direction of the new science. After all, the modernity of the new science, with its
emphasis on particulars, would likely strike Rymer's conservative tendencies as innately
wrong. However, he actually develops critical concepts and perspectives which both pivot
around and build upon the ideals of the new science, not only furnishing further evidence
of the hegemony of the new science but generating some interesting and suggestive
critical results. In particular, in order to oppose the sort of etymologically-grounded critical
speculation which he considered trite and dilettantish, Rymer advances and maps out an
interesting theoretical account of how the faculty of invention functioned.149
The opinion that a critical rule puts "a Restraint upon a Writers Invention, and does
more harm than good in Composition" (ECCL, p. 29) triggers Rymer's deliberations. In the
first place, whenever a writer observes and adopts the critical rules he does no more than
display "a strict attendance to the Rules of Nature and Reason"; hence, so far from doing
the imaginative or inspirational process harm, the critical rules "never impede or clog an
Author's Fancy; but rather produce and enlarge it" (ECCL, p. 31). In order to justify this
claim, Rymer invokes the epistemological theories of the new science, accepting that "It is
the Condition and Circumstances of Humane Nature, under its present Depression, to
acquire Science by Steps and Gradations"; we cannot acquire knowledge through
revelation because the "Conveyances to our Understanding, are too gross to be
consistent with an immediate Intuition, which is the Happiness and Prerogative of Spiritual
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Intelligences only" and because our mind "takes Impressions from External Objects; and
these Impressions make her reflect upon the Nature of the thing, from whence she
receives them, leading us through a long Chain and Series of Thoughts before we can
arrive at any Conclusions" (ECCL, pp. 35-36). To transform impressions into conclusions,
the mind of man must incorporate two primary and related faculties: reason and memory,
the former he defines as "an Active Principle," the latter "more perceptive and passive"
(ECCL, p. 34). In designating memory as passive he echoes Hobbes's view of memory as
that sense impression which "is fading, old, and past" and which, when it encompasses
many records of this "decaying sense ... is called experience,"150
Since all human knowledge or "Conclusions" as Rymer calls them, result from the
interaction of reason and memory, to produce "Clearness and Perfection" (ECCL, p. 36)
of thought from these chains of remembered impressions entails a consolidated effort of
synthesis from contingent faculties. At first glance, this appears a rather haphazard
procedure, almost as if knowledge occurred through some fortuitous conflation of reason
and memory, but Rymer explains that both memory and reason "are mightily heightened
and improved by Exercise. But if they are neglected and unimployed, they will shrink and
contract themselves, and be unable to answer their proper Functions" (ECCL, pp. 33-34).
Memory, more so even than reason, benefits from constant activity; otherwise it "could
neither retain nor return those Idea's and Images recommended to it, unless it were often
proved and examined. It would have but a very Dark and Unfaithful Conception of Things"
(ECCL, p. 34). The most obvious form of exercise for both reason and memory involves
the use of words, of turning sense impressions into sounds and images, and these into
ideas and concepts, and so forth. In this way, Rymer shows how the faculty of invention
plays a principal role in putting words into communicable forms.
Rymer maintains that thoughts only achieve a state of clearness when they take
form as words. Unarticulated ideas which lay in the mind as "Private Thoughts and
Internal Reflections" remain "always a little dark and cloudy" (ECCL, pp. 36-37).
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Unexercised, the memory fades, and with it, as Hobbes said, so to does the force of the
experience; but if the mind uses the image marked upon it as a word, that image
"becomes more clear and determinate . . . and is, as it were, a second time submitted to
the Censure of the Mind" (ECCL, p. 37). Thus, putting ideas into the shape of words will
"instruct and inform the very Mind that produces them, by putting it still upon a more
intense Application" (ECCL, p. 36). The process of invention forms more complicated and
compelling images out of individual ideas, and it presents to reason a more unified picture
of reality; after invention completes its business, reason may then pass judgment upon
the truth-value of the new signification. In this way the mind checks that pernicious
tendency in every one to "flatter [them] selves with false Beauties and Appearances"
(ECCL, p. 37). Rymer concludes that "the Judgment could never determine aright of that
huddled perplexed Chaos of Knowledge, or rather Ignorance, we should have within us"
(ECCL, p. 35) unless the faculty of invention first worked upon that chaos.
While invention plays an obvious role in the generation of all speech, Rymer
contends that only the act of writing pushes invention to its limit. Writing brings all the
mind's higher operations into play because the use of invention exercises both memory
and reason: memory, of course, because it renders material for the invention; reason,
because it judges the final output. Studying the works of other writers--an extensive and
dynamic history of how they employed their invention-supplies the individual writer with
both an invaluable guide and a infinite source of inspiration. All texts leave a record of
their author's invention, and the best writings exemplify how to put the poetic devices of
language to best use: hence Rymer's claim that critical rules drawn from "Nature and
Reason" cannot hinder the Fancy.151 Poetry, in particular, offers "the knowledge of
Figurative Ornaments; with that fertility of Imagination, and that Beauty of Conception,
which is the Mother of Eloquence, and of all that is graceful in Speaking. So that Invention
in any kind will turn to some Advantage or other" (ECCL, pp. 40-41). Hence, Rymer finds
in the epistemological schema of the new science an intellectually satisfying and
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comprehensive theory which assists his conceptualisation of invention, locating its role as
integral to the mind's proper functioning; and which, if exercised consistently would yield
"Pleasure or Profit, and still the Mind must be improved" (ECCL, p. 41).
The full title of Thomas Baker's Reflections Upon Learning, Wherein is shewn the
INSUFFICIENCY thereof, in its several Particulars: In order to evince the USEFULNESS
and NECESSITY of REVELATION (1700) trumpets his antagonism to the whole drift of
modern learning, which includes at first glance the aims of the new science. His prefatory
remarks object to an intellectual climate which actively expounds the axiom that "nothing
will pass with ourMen of Wit and Sense, but what is agreeable with the nicest Reason,
and every Man's Reason is his own Understanding,"152 After announcing that he "always
had a mean Opinion of two things, Human Understanding and Human Will; The
Weakness of the latter is a confessed thing; we all of us feel it, and most Men complain of
it, but I have scarce yet met with any, that would own the Weakness of his
Understanding" (RUL, p. 1), he concludes that in the "mighty Controversie betwixt the Old
and New Philosophers . . . neither side has reason to boast" (RUL, p. 2). Reproving the
solipsistic humour of the times and its mutual rage for making "Discoveries of New Worlds
of Learning" and "accurate Enquiries" (RUL, p. 6), Baker regards the modern pride in
intellectual achievement as misplaced, in part because the old philosophy offered more
certainty than the new. Baker states:
since Aristotle's Philosophy has been exploded in the Schools, under whom we had
more Peace, and possibly almost as much Truth as we have had since, we have
not been able to fix any where, but have been wavering from one Opinion to
another. The Platonick Philosophy was first introduced with the Greek Learning, and
wonderfully obtain'd for some time, among the Men of Polite Letters; but however
Divine it might seem at first, and for that reason was entertain'd more favourably, it
was found upon a short tryal to lead to Heresie, and so went off again under a
cloud.153 (RUL, p. 4)
Other attempts to replace the old philosophy with new systems proved equally
unsuccessful, and so far from enjoying a state of certainty about nature "we are yet much
in the Dark, that many of our Discoveries are purely imaginary, and that the State of
Learning is so far from Perfection, much more from being the Subject of Ostentation, That
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it ought to teach us Modesty, and keep us Humble" (RUL, p. 6). In striking that note of
intellectual humility, however, Baker echoes sentiments firmly embedded in the ethos of
the new science; in fact, as his polemic progresses he more and more weaves the ideals
of experimental practice into the fabric of his Reflections.
Baker notes, for example, that "Words at the best are no very certain signs of
things; they are liable to Ambiguity, and under that Ambiguity are often subject to very
different Meanings" (RUL, p. 7). Heeding Locke's view that custom largely governs the
meaning of words, he accepts that this serves well enough in the common run of affairs,
but like Locke he advises that "in Matters of Science, it is much otherwise; these are nice
things; the strict Meaning is to be observ'd in them; nor can we mistake a Word without
losing the Notion" (RUL, p. 8). Reiterating the views of the new scientists, Baker makes
the familiar distinction that because "in reality there is no internal worth" in words:
speakers must first "attend to the things" (RUL, p. 9) in order to learn a word's proper
signification. For Baker, like so many other seventeenth-century observers, the proper
route to real, solid knowledge, the only type of knowledge worthy to "deliver" (RUL, p. 9)
to an audience, runs through the rocky field of language.
Baker, not surprisingly, agrees that writers should use simple and plain language in
all discourse, and he evaluates the place of rhetoric in learned discourse in much the
same terms as the new scientists. While granting that the rhetorical arts showed how to
use language "elegantly, by adding Beauty to that Language, that before was naked and
Grammatically true" (RUL, p. 37), he nonetheless recurs to history to illustrate the
destructive consequences of excessive rhetoric. In the past (both ancient and modern)
rhetoric's improper application "had occasion'd Tumults and concussions of State,"
ancient Rome providing an excellent instance of how, once "Demagogues begun to
harangue the People, there was no more Peace in that State, nothing but continual Broils
and intestine Commotions" (RUL, p. 39). Indeed, whatever positive benefits which they
offered the writer, in practice the arts of rhetoric proved that "our common Eloquence is
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usually a Cheat upon the Understanding, it deceives us with Appearances, instead of
Things" (RUL, p. 48), and men of real learning would wisely avoid relying upon rhetorical
tactics to force through their views.
As Baker moves on to tackle other issues, it becomes clear that he has adopted as
his critical standard many of the methods and ideals integral to the new science. At one
point in his survey of the history of learning, for instance, he examines Descartes's
philosophical treatment of motion and rejects it outright because "We have been taught to
distinguish betwixt Hypotheses and Theories, the latter of which are shrew'd things, as
being built upon Observations in Nature, whereas Hypotheses may be only Chimera's"
(RUL, p. 96). Descartes's philosophy smacks of a desire to explain and master nature
without bothering to test the validity of his theories. Although Baker doubts that he will
ever see a theory which bears up under the rigours of testing-the rigours of observation
and demonstration strike him as too time-consuming and complicated-he compares
Descartes's approach to that adopted by the Royal Society and notes admiringly that
"however successful they may have been . . . The Genuine Members of that Society have
other thoughts of things, being far from any hopes of mastering Nature, or of ever making
such progress, as not to leave Work enough for other Men to do" (RUL, pp. 98-99).154
Baker also notes that, "When i speak of Observations and Experiments, i would not be
thought to under-value a Society, which has been erected to that purpose, and whose
Endeavours have been so successful that way already" (RUL, p. 99). Thus, from an
attitude which initially condemned the rage for experiment, Baker ends with praise for the
achievements of the Royal Society.
Chapter Three - Science and Lyric in the Seventeenth Century
The advance of experimental science in Britain during the seventeenth century did not
vault the lyric to major genre status at one bound. All hegemonies, Raymond Williams
observes, die hard, if ever, since all constitutive transformations in the general worldview
of a culture require a lengthy process of debate, qualification, reiteration, and
consolidation. Williams maintains that significant elements from superseded, weakening,
or concurrent hegemonies always remain active and affective, tempering the intellectual
dynamics of a culture:
their active presence is decisive, not only because they have to be included in any
historical (as distinct from epochal) analysis, but as forms which have had
significant effect on the hegemonic process itself. That is to say, alternative political
and cultural emphases, and the many forms of opposition and struggle, are
important not only in themselves but as indicative features of what the hegemonic
process has in practice had to work to control.1
In a textual culture, then, hegemonic survival and modification would constitute core
features of its "evolutionary" movement. Slowly nudged on by Bacon's exhortations to
replace scholastic methods with a more hands-on and fruitful approach to gathering and
assessing knowledge, abetted both by political events and by an accumulating record of
success, the new science probably "arrived" as an hegemonic force about the 1690s. It
would therefore be a senseless pretence to argue that the ideals which emerged from
Bacon's experimental programme immediately revolutionised perceptions of the lyric's
standing in the generic hierarchy, especially as the rise of the lyric involved a complicated
interleaving of different hegemonies: not only did the English lyric enjoy a popular
reputation prior to the appearance of the new science but it was undergoing a process of
modification as a direct consequence of the impact of the growing hegemony of classical
literary values on British writing.
Yet just when, how, and with what degree of intensity the new-science ideals
sketched out in the previous chapter influenced lyric developments in the seventeenth
century must remain a point in question; clearly, too, we cannot ascribe the ethos of the
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new science to sixteenth-century poets, though in their critical judgments about the genre
and the poet's vocation they may in fact already be contributing to debates in ways which
will form part of the temper of later hegemonic conflict and conflation. Gary F. Waller
rightly notes, for example, that "classicism was to become the hegemonic period style" in
writings throughout the seventeenth century, and he sees this as "more than a literary
phenomenon since its hegemony was incorporated into a peculiarly repressive cultural
apparatus, the effects of which were felt in every field of human production from economic
organization to educational practices." He concludes, moreover, that such a repressive
hegemony could not nurture lyric expression and, in addition to the new view of language
promoted by the Royal Society, argues that the lyric was pushed "underground,"
presumably not to return again until the Romantic revival.2 Obviously, Waller ignores the
wealth of lyric poetry written during the seventeenth century, as well as observations like
those of Dryden in An Essay of Dramatick Poesie. I would argue, in opposition to Waller,
that the theories about the linguistic sign developed by the new scientists, much of which
relied upon Christian notions of language, and their concern for accurate descriptions and
precise language, part of which derives from their preferred classical rhetorical models,
actually nurture the lyric genre's place in the poetical hierarchy. From an historic
perspective, the collision of classicism, Christianity, and new science proved vital for the
lyric's rise to major genre status for three reasons: it intensified the appeal of certain
facets of the native species; it broadened the subject-matter and "purpose" of the lyric as
a whole; and it initiated a thorough revaluation of the poet's vocation and cultural identity.
Ironically, it was partly the exploitation of ancient rhetoric in scholastic and religious
debates (the excessive use of which Bacon attacked as fundamentally anti-learning and
anti-expressive) that wrought decisive changes to the way in which the lyric genre was
perceived and appreciated, changes which aided and facilitated its metamorphosis into a
major genre in the eighteenth century under scientific hegemony. In the next development
of my argument, then, I want to explore briefly the lyric tradition before Bacon launched
the new science, which will lead into a discussion of the lyric's "progress" in the
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seventeenth century. Importantly, my argument will try to show that poets and critics of
the late sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century normally follow the high
classical line on most issues, as we might expect, but when writers from the mid to late
seventeenth century actually set about trying to explain or theorize about the nuts and
bolts of poetry-how it functions, how the poet organizes his language, how it affects
readers-they qualify classical ideals through a thinking and evaluative process which
suggests the growing influence of new-science ideals, invariably working out classical
matter in light of the principles, the attitudes, and the language of the new science.3
Richard Dutton observes that during Sidney's "retirement" at Wilton, after 1579, he
regularly met with Edward Dyer, Fulke Greville, and Spenser to discuss "such matters as
the reform of English poetry, the use of classical metre in English verse, the possibility of
integrating poetry and music, and the moral significance of literature-which must always
have been a central issue since the moral influence of literature was the chief accepted
justification for its existence."4 Sidney's complaint (cited in the introductory preamble to
Chapter One) that his native tradition boasted no indigenous poetic species except for a
"lyrical kind of songs and sonnets" testifies on the one hand to its general popularity, but
on the other to its general critical neglect-we might speculate that reform of the lyric often
topped the agenda of informal discussion at Wilton. As Germaine Warkentin points out,
even if Sidney apparently viewed English lyrics with some disdain, "he clearly read them
very attentively," and she goes on to show just how much he learned from them.5
Although it would be an impossible task to account entirely for the lyric's critical neglect,
several reasons suggest themselves. Firstly, the "local" lyric encompassed a diversity of
subject matter: love, sex, wooing, adultery, ageing, death, the changing seasons, nature's
bounty and scarcity, the joys of drink, and so forth. It crossed into both oral and literate
cultures and appealed to all classes. Although many lyrics prior to the sixteenth century
feature a broadly didactic aim, as did most literature, in practice it was a species
dedicated to the temporal, the trite, the truistic, the transmissible-many lyrics, of course,
were composed as musical pieces or else later adapted to music.6 The lyric was taken to
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task because it resolutely refused to conform to a strict didactic aim, often being labelled
as a tavern genre. Secondly, and wholly in keeping with the unpretentious treatment of its
subject matter and its reliance upon ballad-like formulas, early lyric writers shared and
exploited a huge fund of conventional phrases, attitudes, themes, devices, and rhythms:
these were more than adequate to meet the lyric's expressive aims. Finally, there would
arise few occasions and less need to remark critically upon the genre's features during
the fairly stable hegemonic conditions which inhered throughout most of Europe for
several centuries. Of course, the formulaic and conventional quality which marks so much
pre-seventeenth-century poetry did not necessarily make it less "expressive" or
appealing.7 In short, the long course of time and settled experiential patterns firmly
encoded the characteristic features of the native genre: simplicity of material, thought and
emotion; a plain though by no means unemotive diction; and a narrative which was a
reflex of immediate, personal responses to events and things.8
Although lyric imports from the continent (the Petrarchan sonnet, for instance)
encouraged a degree of experiment, these did not noticeably affect the lyric's subject-
matter or, for that matter, alter general perceptions of the poet's identity or cultural
vocation. If anything, these imports initially reinforced the secondary stature of the
vernacular lyric. Indeed, Robert Southwell felt moved to censure those native-born poets
who, "by abusing their talent, and making the follies and faynings of love the customarie
subject of their base endevours, have so discredited this facultie, that a poet, a lover, and
a Iyer, are by many reckoned but three words of one signification."9 Throughout the latter
decades of the sixteenth century, however, as British writers increasingly voiced
admiration for the verbal and moral qualities displayed in classical literary models,
increasingly turned to these models for inspiration and critical direction, and increasingly
applied to poetry the formal principles of composition found in classical rhetoric, they
attempted to reorient the common estimate of the poet's cultural standing.10 Comparison
of the generic features of their most popular poetic species with those found in classical
kinds stimulated a reassessment of both its generic "function" and its expressive potential.
Chapter Three, p. 137
The Preface to John Hawkins's translation of The Odes of Horace (1631), for example,
emphasizes both the lyric genre's expressive and didactic features. Besides valuing
Horace's Odes because in them he finds "Morality touched, and Vertue brightened," he
notes that Horace's poetry displays "clearnesse of Spirit, and accuratenesse of
Judgment,"11 As part of a general transformation of cultural values, then, the native lyric
became a focus for new critical thinking and a locus in quo for poetical experiment.
Indeed, as Norman Maclean notes, "possibly more of English criticism of the Renaissance
is devoted to the lyric than to any other species, the drama alone excepted."12 Waller goes
further, and in his discussion of the force of ideology in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries (a discussion which, like mine, obviously owes important debts to Williams's
analyses) Waller sees the lyric's role in cultural evolution as similar to mine: "the lyric no
less than the epic occupies a place within the age's ideological struggles."13 The first
attempts to "improve" the vernacular lyric, the first shots in the ideological struggles,
occurred at the immediate levels of diction and syntax, and greater changes followed.
Critics usually attribute the initial merger of classical literary values with the native
lyric to Surrey. Working with the compositional principles which underpinned Latinate
rhetorical "elegance," he forged a more rhythmically regular and syntactically balanced
line, while smoothing out the metrical patterns and introducing greater variety and
diversity into the conventional speech-patterns of the English lyric.14 His experiments
appeared in Tottel's Miscellany (1557), and their impact was felt immediately. Following
Surrey's example, other writers set about to promote the union of classical and native
lyrics: Barnabe Googe, for example, whose Eglogs, Epytaphes, and Sonettes (1563)
Frank B. Fieler considers a principal work in the refinement of the latter sixteenth-century
lyric. Googe, besides learning from Surrey, also draws upon Wyatt and Grimald, both of
whom Tottel also published. From Wyatt, a serious student of both the native and the
Italian lyric traditions, Googe learned "the values of controlled, sparse, precise diction,"
while from Grimald he "derived a preference for the longer lyric measures . . . and the
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Humanist oriented practice of using classical rhetorical theory to order his poems."15 His
best lyrics display "a merging of the native lyric tradition with the schema of classical
rhetoric, emphasizing inventio and dispositio: a poetry of logical statement, whose
emotion is consciously restrained and controlled."16 Thus Googe, while retaining the
simple materials of the vernacular poem but making them fit a more ordered structure,
produced lyrics which Fieler contends "lead directly to the great plain style lyrics of the
seventeenth century."17 Googe's intuition about the centrality of inventio and dispositio on
the responses generated by the poem becomes a pivotal ingredient in later theorizing
about composition as a whole; and, as we have seen already, when writers turn their
attention upon invention and arrangement, they do so, as it were, with the lens of
experimental science. In short, by following specific rhetorical precepts, British poets of
the latter sixteenth century refined and heightened features which already distinguished
the native lyric: simplicity and plainness.
As well as prompting formal experimentation, the example of classical literature
instigated a thorough revaluation of the type of subject matter which poetry ought to
illuminate, vibrations from which still actuate ruminations on the poet's identity and
vocation. In The Defence of Poesy, a keynote text in terms of its enunciation of classical
literary values, Sidney recurs time and again to the respect accorded poets during the
great classical eras. That Sidney takes up his defence when he does seems significant
and a brief examination of its matter thus seems in order.18 In the first place, as S. K.
Heninger, Jr. argues, Sidney's Defence works to adjust to changing ontological views of
man's place in the cosmos brought about by changes occurring in cosmology, theology,
and psychology. Importantly, the spirit of empiricism, which for most of the sixteenth
century came down to a new belief in the forms of nature as constituent of essential
reality, was shaking the old Christian/Platonic concept of eternal forms, and Sidney
consciously develops a view of the poet which places him side by side with the new
empiricists.19 Strategically, he begins by reminding his readers that insofar as "the authors
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of most of our sciences were the Romans, and before them the Greeks," that is, since we
respect and follow their opinions in so many other facets of intellectual life, it made sense
to "a little stand upon their authorities" in this matter.20 Since an etymological analysis of
the Greek and Latin meanings of the word "poet" helps to establish the poet's credentials
as a prophet and a maker, a figure of near-divine proportions, he puts forward a
programme which will raise the status of the English poet to a similar level.21
Sidney's interpretation of the pedagogical structure of classical learning verifies,
moreover, the central educational function allotted poetry in the ancient sciences, and the
reasons for continuing that practice remained just as valid. Philosophy (natural or moral)
and history, for example, tackled subjects both dry and hard and therefore generally
reached small audiences: although the knowledge gained from these studies was vital for
everyone, it held little appeal for those outside these sciences. The poet, by means of
invention and the medium of fiction, however, re-combined and re-presented this dry and
difficult matter and transformed it into "sweetly uttered knowledge" (SW, p. 10). Unlike the
philosopher, historian, or theologian, the poet
beginneth not with obscure definitions, which must blur the margent with
interpretations, and load the memory with doubtfulness; but he cometh to you with
words set in delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well
enchanting skill of music; and with a tale forsooth he cometh . . . with a tale which
holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney corner. (Sl/V, p. 120)
As evidence for the validity of this claim Sidney argues that during the early era of Grecian
history no philosopher would dare "appear to the world but under the mask of poets. So
Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides sang their natural philosophy in verse; so did
Pythagoras and Phocylides their moral counsels"; and even later, when Greek philosophy
reached more sophisticated levels of thought, "the skin as it were and beauty" of the
Platonic anti-poetry philosophy "depended most of Poetry" (SW, pp. 103-104).22 In other
words, ancient history proved that unless the philosopher or the historian had received "a
great passport of Poetry" he could not hope to enter "into the gates of popular
judgements" (SUV, p. 104), and Sidney accordingly boasts that in the kingdom of the
sciences "our poet [is] the monarch" (SW, p. 119).
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As Sidney sees it, man shuns that knowledge which might prove most beneficial to
him because he would prefer to shirk the hard mental discipline which its attainment
appeared to demand of him; hence, the means employed to educate him must be such
that it actually made him willing to pursue the ends of education. In other words, the poet
faced a twofold task: "to teach and delight" (SW, p. 108). The difficulty of this labour could
not be underestimated or overvalued because, not only must the poet "delight to move
men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight they would fly as from a
stranger," but he must also "teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are
moved" (Sl/V, p. 109). Of course, this argument became both conventional and popular.
Joseph Moxon, for instance, appeals to its spirit in his A Tutor to Astronomy and
Geography (1670). Noting that the ancient poets saw astronomy as a "commodity
singular in the life of man," but that it "was almost of all men utterly neglected," they
"began to set forth that Art under Fictions; that thereby, such as could not be perswaded
by commodity, might by the pleasure be induced to take a view of these matters." This, he
submits, explains why the ancient poets gave names and narratives to the constellations:
"to make Men fall in love with Astronomy."23
To fulfil this tall order, Sidney needed to persuade his audience that there was
nothing essentially deceitful in the poet's use of language. His task dictated that he adopt
specific strategies and techniques for communicating knowledge which differed from
those of more specialized thinkers. While they laboured with hard terms to express their
abstract ideas, logical propositions, or moral doctrines, the poet communicated the
substantial idea, event, or emotion by mastering the "art of imitation," an art which Sidney
describes as "a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth (to speak metaphorically, a
speaking picture)" (SW, p. 108). So, instead of explaining why the vice of avarice is ugly
or how God's will was ultimately good, the poet reorders all the salient knowledge and
figures it forth in a fable, myth, or image which disclosed the essential points. Such agility
and plasticity of mind earned the poet his unique cultural status. Significantly, as Heninger
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points out, while Sidney claims to owe Plato most obeisance, he turns here to Aristotle
and his theory of poetry as mimesis to situate the poet at the centre of his culture, and
thereby effecting a compromise between the neoplatonic image of the poet and the
demands of the emerging empirical ideal.24
In defending the poet on the grounds that he possessed a special genius for
recasting knowledge (whether of nature or of divinity) into more useful and palatable
forms of expression, Sidney clearly hoped to situate the poet at the fulcrum of learning,
especially moral learning.25 While he tempts men to study nature and the sciences in a
way that "giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice any man to enter into it,"
the poet at the same time "doth intend the winning of the mind from wickedness to virtue"
(Sl/V, pp. 119-120). This axiom of poetic identity permeates virtually every later apology
and defence of poetry.26 Jonson, complaining in his Epistle to Volpone Or, The Fox
(1607) that he lived during "an age wherein poetry and the professors of it hear... ill on
all sides" (admittedly, with some cause), characterises the poet as "the interpreter and
arbiter of nature, a teacher of things divine no less than human, a master in manners."
After reminding his readers of past services rendered unto humankind by the poetic art,
Jonson thunders that "it were an act of the greatest injustice either to let the learned
suffer or so divine a skill (which indeed should not be attempted with unclean hands) to
fall under the least contempt."27 In a similar mood Giles Fletcher's preface to Christs
Victorie, and Triumph in Heaven, and Earth, over, and after death (1610), a defence
of the poet, draws attention to the many poetic passages in the Greek, Hebrew, and Latin
philosophers, ancient writings thereby proving that poets were the first teachers and
civilizers of mankind.28
This steady if uncoordinated campaign to raise poetry's reputation as a vehicle for
learning both natural and moral, and to elevate the poet's cultural status, steadily gained
ground throughout the seventeenth century. Although this movement clearly originated in
humanist readings of classical literature and subsequently drew upon this literature for
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intellectual justification, the development of classical ideals in the form of cultural
hegemony does not fully account for the various qualifications and modifications which
register in thinking about poetry in general and the lyric in particular during the
seventeenth century. It does not seem mere coincidence, though it might be the case,
that a desire to make the poet more socially responsible and valuable--to establish, that
is, the intellectual and practical benefits which flowed from the poet's art-finds expression
and becomes and a focus for critical debate during that period in which the proponents of
the new science demanded that intellectual activity ought to serve the temporal needs of
a suffering mankind. In other words, insofar as the process to redeem the poet occurs
roughly at the same time as experimental science begins to emerge, and as this process
continues throughout the same period that the influence of science on the culture
intensifies, it seems feasible that the intellectual temper of the new science would sooner
or later come to bear upon the as yet newly-derived classical conception of the poet's
identity and vocation. As we will see in Chapter Four, many eighteenth-century critics take
it as axiomatic that a poetry of truth can only survive if the poet adopts the principles and
practices of the experimental scientist. The new science, then, in various ways
significantly modifies estimates of the scope and purpose of the poet's activities.
Dryden, for instance, admits as much in his An Essay of Dramatick Poesie. As
Dryden's characters sit ruminating on the differences between ancients and moderns, the
character Crites wonders if "almost a new Nature has been reveal'd to us," particularly
since "more errours of the School have been detected, more useful Experiments in
Philosophy have been made, more Noble Secrets in Opticks, Medicine, Anatomy,
Astronomy, discover'd, than in all those credulous and doting Ages from Aristotle to us."
Crites draws, moreover, the obvious lesson, that "so true it is that nothing spreads more
fast than Science, when rightly and generally cultivated."29 Eugenius then picks up Crites'
point, using it to propound a doctrine of artistic freedom, and raising the by now routine
arguments about the negative effects of authority and imitation on the health of culture. By
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analogy with the revolution in natural philosophy, he concludes that it would be best if
creative writers did not follow too closely ancient authority "but those of Nature ... for if
Natural Causes be more known now then in the time of Aristotle, because more studied, it
follows that Poesie and other Arts may with the same pains arrive neerer to perfection."30
Similarly, near the end of the seventeenth century the writer of "An Apology for
Poetry, in an Essay directed to Walter Moil Esq" declares that
In an Age when e'ery ignorant Scribler sets up for a Man of Authority; and as many
as can tell their Syllables on their Fingers, without Genius, without Learning, or any
Excuse for Writing, arrogate the Glorious Name of Poets, and, by their Scandalous
Pretensions to it, bring the Pride of Conquerors, and the Envy of Philosophers, into
an unjust and shameful Neglect; 'Tis the Duty of an humble and zealous Admirer of
those God-like Few, whom Art, Nature, and Heav'n have evidently exalted to that
supream Dignity, to make an Apology for them.31
After lamenting the lack of enlightened patrons but not the shortage of those who, "tho'
they value themselves as Men of Sense as well as Fortune, their Dogs and their Bottle
are more their Care, than the Darlings of Heav'n the Poets," the essay repeats the same
justifications for the poet as Sidney's Defence.32 The essay, for example, argues that "If
we regard the Antiquity of Its origine, the Nobleness of its Subject, or the Beauty of its
Aim, or Design (which three Things are the Test of the Excellence of Arts and Sciences,
in reference to each other) we shall easily find Poesie most ancient in its Rise, most
honourable in the Subjects and Matters it adorns, and most transcendently excellent in its
Usefulness and End," and it goes on to confirm poetry's reputation and utility in terms
heavily indebted to Sidney:
And justly too did the Ancients tearm Poetry, a more excellent Philosophy; for if the
Excellence of a thing depend on its more or less aptness to obtain the End 'tis
designed for, the Prerogative is justly given to Poetry: The End of Philosophy is to
form in the Mind Ideas's, and habits of Virtue, and they are fixt there better by
Pleasure than Pain, because the Mind is naturally averse to Pain, and propense to
Pleasure. But the stiff, and difficult Method of those who are Simply Philosophers,
perplexes us too much with Metaphysical Notions, Logical Distinctions, and a long
train of Arguments, which gives the Mind a fatigue to gain the Knowledge it aims at;
whereas the Poetic Philosopher proposes a fairer, more adequate, compendious
and comprehensive Instruction, which the Mind is so far from labouring to Unriddle,
and Understand, that it at first sight perceives it, is in Love with its Beauty, and
greedily takes the charming Impressions it gives, whilst convey'd into it by
Melodious Numbers, bewitching Expression, Mighty Thoughts, and Illustrious
Examples.33
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Yet the essay does not simply parrot Sidney but goes beyond a conventional defence and
develops a primary distinction between philosophic and poetic thinking, asserting the
vitality and the necessity of the latter. In this essay we can see, moreover, how new-
science ideals influenced critical thinking about the nature of the writing process.
Philosophers, the essay notes, esteem two types of study, the contemplative and
the practical. They favour the former because "Contemplation is pleasant for and in its
self, and therefore more Noble"; the practical philosopher, though less noble, merits a
status just below that of the contemplative: throughout the history of philosophy most
thinkers either chose one or the other path, depending on their respective natures.34
Obviously, this schema of intellectual preferences ranked the poet's achievements
somewhere below these two types of thinking. In The Republic, of course, Socrates
censured the poet's mental attainments, finding the poet satisfied with the mere
appearances of things and uninterested in attaining anything but a superficial knowledge
of nature, mechanical operations, or morality, and producing nothing of any practical
value. The writer of the "Apology" refutes this claim and bases his arguments,
significantly, upon his observations of both the writing process and the final product.
He argues that a poet could never compose a great poem which displayed any
degree of "elaborateness and perfection, unless he first dispose his Speculations, and
before consider, and weigh the Materials, and the peculiar Artifice that must be us'd in
setting them off to their best advantage, and in the true Light, and Colours." The stage of
dispositio, then, demands a full understanding of the things, events, and emotions to be
represented, and this could only occur if the poet first entered into a period of deep
contemplation. After contemplating his materials, the poet turns to the difficult phase of
inventio, that is, when he "contrives, invents, and puts his Thoughts in Metre." This the
essayist considers an active, practical element of the poet's vocation since he does not
simply sit back and contemplate but actively writes and produces a valuable product, a
"fairer, more adequate, compendious and comprehensive Instruction."35 Understood from
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the perspectives of experience, observation, and result, the creative process appears to
involve a complex interweaving between disposition and invention, which means that
unlike the two types of philosopher the poet is "compos'd of Speculation and Action."36
Propter hoc, he rates higher than either in the intellectual hierarchy.
The essayist's desire to accentuate the poet's active engagement with his materials
reveals, I would suggest, a conflation of the poet's identity (and presumably his practice)
with that of the experimental scientist's. Indeed, in emphasising the poet's special aptitude
for communicating knowledge--his use of signs, words, language-the writer describes an
approach to words in terms which parallels the ideal of scientific language. Building upon
his earlier verdict that"Contemplation and Thinking is peculiarly the Poet's business," he
explains that a poet trains his mind not to run "away by halves, with imperfect
Appearances that please the Imagination." Plainly, he wants to differentiate an
imaginative flight of fancy which derives from careful observation, discrimination, and
insight from one based upon extravagant and disconnected fantasy. Accordingly, instead
of allowing the imagination to wander freely and aimlessly, to be "taken with all that
glitters," the essayist explains that great poets "dive into the Nature of Things, and fix the
Judgment to decide the Truth, or falsity of what is Charming, and Beautiful, and what
seems so, at a sudden view." This procedure allows the poet to "come to a justness and
trueness of Thought," nor will he avoid this exacting task inasmuch as "on this Depends
all the Beauties of Thought," and from these "proceed Justness, Proportion, and
Harmony" in language.37 Like the experimental scientist, the poet must undertake a
rigorous mental training, testing his ideas and visions against nature. Yet the essayist
does not go so far as to suggest that the poet needs to undergo the same training, nor
does he demand of the poet that he speak only of real and substantial things: he only
hints at the similarities between their aims. He does not, moreover, advise the poet on the
type of genre which he might employ to express these beautiful thoughts.
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It did not escape Sidney's attention that in addition to using poetry to convey their
natural philosophy and other hard truths of science, ancient poets chose lyric forms
through which to celebrate great events and noble achievements, and in particular to
praise their heroes and their gods. He remarks that among the ancients it was the lyric
poet "who with his tuned lyre and well-accorded voice, giveth praise, the reward of virtue,
to virtuous acts; who gives moral precepts and natural problems" (SW, p. 124); the
extensive variation in subjects, styles, and moods of Pindar's odes persuaded Sidney that
of all the poetic genres the lyric "is that kind most capable and most fit to awake the
thoughts from the sleep of idleness, to embrace honourable enterprises" (Sl/V, p. 125).
More urgently, because Pindar used his odes as a vehicle for religious sentiments-he
often "raiseth up his voice to the height of the heavens, in singing the lauds of the
immortal God" (SW, p. 124), his example offered a means by which to increase the
reputation of the lyric mode. Emulating the classical lyricists, Sidney urges his fellow-
poets to sing "the praises of the immortal beauty, the immortal goodness of that God who
giveth us hands to write and wits to conceive" (Sl/V, p. 143), and in making their verse
attend to "higher" matters they might thereby raise the status of both poetry and
themselves. Perhaps in accentuating the lyric's historical fitness as a means for
awakening thought and moral piety, Sidney had in mind Socrates' statement that poetry
could return to his republic "if she can make her defence in lyric or other metre."38
Besides justifying the sacred function of poetry itself, the pious character of many
ancient lyrics provided ammunition for a protracted attack on the native tradition.
Southwell, for instance, connected the amorous subject-matter of many vernacular lyrics
to the general disrepute of poetry, and he lays the blame squarely on his native tradition:
But the devill, as he affecteth deitie and seeketh to have all the complements of
divine honour applyed to his service, so hath he among the rest possessed also
most Poets with his idle fansies. For in lieu of solemne and devout matter, to which
in duty they owe their abilities, they now busie themselves in expressing such
passions as onely serve for testimonies to how unworthy affections they have
wedded their wills.39
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The abuse of poetry by the corrupted, however, should not for serious minds determine
their judgment of its real cultural value. The recovery of ancient texts certified its divine
and lawful pedigree which, whether pagan or Christian, illumined for Southwell its proper
function: "not onely among the heathen, whose gods were chiefely canonized by their
poets, and their paynim divinitie oracled, in verse, but even in the Olde and Newe
Testament, it hath beene used by men of greatest pietie, in matters of most devotion."40
Southwell even finds it necessary to add that "Christ Himselfe, by making a hymne the
conclusion of His Last Supper, and the prologue to the first pageant of His Passion, gave
His Spouse a methode to imitate, as in the office of the Church it appeareth; and to all
men a patterne, to know the true use of this measured and footed stile."41 Allowing due
reverence to poetry's original function as a medium for expressing religious devotion,
Southwell says that the excesses of human vanity and ignorance cannot "counterpoyse
the authoritie of God, Who delivering many parts of Scripture in verse . . . warranteth the
art to be good, and the use allowable."42 Southwell, echoing Sidney, declares that poets
should, instead of writing lyrics which treated of vulgar topics, follow the example set "by
His Apostle willing us to exercise our devotion in hymnes and spiritual sonnets."43 The
language or diction of devotion should not, as Sidney put it, appear as "honey-flowing
matron eloquence apparelled, or rather disguised, in a courtesan-like painted affectation,"
gaudily decked out "with figures and flowers" (SW, p. 143), but in simple, plain, unaffected
words, in fact, in much the same fashion as that diction already coded into the native
genre.
Clearly, we can see here that at least two hegemonic influences-classicism and
Christianity-are coming into play when late-sixteenth and early seventeenth-century
writers evaluated the lyric genre's potential as a medium for producing and encouraging
certain emotional and mental effects. Yet it would be difficult, if not impossible to
determine how the new science actually influenced thinking about the lyric genre
because, obviously, at this point in history its main ideals remained unsystematized,
unstructured, unarticulated; it would, moreover, prove even more problematical to argue
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that the new science influenced a poet's decision to work in the lyric genre. Indeed, in
light of both Williams's concept of hegemony and the history of the lyric traced thus far,
any speculation about the relationships between a writer to new-science theories or to
scientific discoveries and to the lyric genre can only be made with utmost caution. My
earlier analysis of a work written late in the seventeenth century--"Ar7 Apology for Poetry,
in an Essay directed to Walter Moil"~suggests that such speculation can be stated with a
degree of confidence, and later I will try to indicate through careful analyses and
comparisons of language, conceptualisation, and problem-solving how to understand and
appreciate the complex pressures exerted by the new science on critical thinking and
ideas about the lyric. Even then, this comparative methodology, relying as it does on
resemblances, analogies, and repeated patterns of thought will not for every reader
actually prove that the epistemological, linguistic, and ethical ideals of the new science lie
behind alterations in lyric tastes and valuations.
That said, for now just a few words more about the dangers inherent in undertaking
any interpretation of the relation of scientific discoveries to writing poetry, particularly lyric
poetry. It is, for example, difficult to credit Thomas Docherty's assessment of the
Copernican revolution on Donne's personality, or his argument that Donne chose the lyric
to counter his "decentred" personality. Docherty declares that in general Copernicus's
effect on sixteenth-century philosophy
was the fact of his decentring the earth itself; and subsequently, the impact of De
Revolutionibus was felt primarily as a threat to the credibility of humanity's special
relation to God and the world. In a geocentric, anthropocentric world-model, it is
easy to lend belief to the notion that the universe is made by God, for the delight of
humanity or for the exercise of human ingenuity appreciated by God. . . . The
Copernican propositions disturb this complacency in their implications of a number
of possible worlds or 'centres' in the universe.44
As we saw with Wilkins's positive response to the possibility of endless planets and other
worlds, blanket judgments about the negative psychological repercussions of scientific
discoveries on a whole culture often ignore alternative evidence. Moreover, the old
Christian hegemony was still powerful, active, while the function and status of the lyric
Chapter Three, p. 149
itself was altering under the hegemonic ascendency of classical literary values. Docherty
argues that Donne chooses the lyric genre in a reaction to the brute facts of the new
universe, but this assumes that Donne and Donne's culture conceived of the lyric genre's
function in the same way as post-romantics do (a weakness, we should recall, which Eco
considers implicit in most post-romantic criticism). As so often with interpretations which
give more space to modern theoretical explications than to examinations of contemporary
evidence, the theory fails to convince.
We can return now to examine other issues and developments which surface
throughout the seventeenth century in arguments extolling poetry's antiquity and sacred
function. "The Preface to the Reader" (probably written by Joseph Beaumont) of Richard
Crashaw's Steps to the Temple (1646) observes that examples from the Psalms, the
Gospels and all the other religious songs of the Bible attest the urgency to rescue lyric
poetry from "those under-headed Poets, Retainers to seven shares and a halfe; Madrigall
fellowes, whose onely businesse in verse, is to rime a poore six-penny soule, a Subburb
sinner into hell."45 Partly, of course, it could be seen that this particular stress on the lyric's
value as a suitable mode for expressing religious feelings derives from the rejection of
institutionalised religious teaching as the only means of finding faith. This doctrine of
personal freedom, while rooted in Protestant movements, clearly gains strength from the
growth of new-science ideals. Daniel Featly exhibits this spirit in his foreword to Phineas
Fletcher's The Purple Island, Or The Isle of Man: Together With Piscatorie Eclogs and
other Poetical Miscellanies (1633) when he declares that "He that would learn
Theologie, must first studie Autologie. The way to God is by our selves: It is a blinde and
dirty way; it hath many windings, and is easie to be lost."46
The dedicatory poem in Joshua Poole's The English Parnassus (1657)~"To the
hopeful young Gentlemen, his Schollars in that private School, at Hadley, kept in the
house of Mr. Francis Atkinson"--proposes a variant of the religious function of poetry. The
poem urges the development of an educational environment in which the "first milk," so to
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speak, of a child's learning would be "the sacred dew of Helicon." Nurtured on poetry and
taught to think in verse, this training would reap a harvest of poets whose outpourings
would insure that
sacred verse may be
No longer call'd the thred-bare mystery;
Let the world see, what yet it scarce before
Hath known, there are good Poets, yet not poore,
Whose inspirations, and rich phancies be
More than a Taverns frothy tympany,
That conjure not up wit with spirits of wine,
Nor make the bay, supported by the vine.47
John Norris advances a similar complaint about the degeneration of poetry's high
purpose: whereas the poet in ancient times "had then his Temples surrounded with a
Divine glory, spoke like the Oracle of the God ofWisdom," and poetry esteemed the
"Mistress of all the Arts in the Circle, that which held the Rains of the world in her hand,
and which gave the first, and . . . perhaps the best Institutes for the moralizing and
governing the Passions of mankind," few serious men now looked upon poetry either as
divine or as capable of teaching important truths. Instead of boasting a poetry inspired by
high or noble thoughts, England possessed something which had "dwindled down to light,
frothy stuff, consisting either of mad extravagant Rants, or slight Witticisms, and little
amorous Conceits, fit only for a Tavern entertainment." Norris therefore declares the time
ripe to "restore the declining genius of Poetry to its Primitive and genuin greatness," a feat
which could only be accomplished by tuning "the strings of the Muses Lyre."48 The type of
morally uplifting lyre which he intends to tune is the Pindaric.49
In practice, however, attempts to narrow the lyric's subject range, to prescribe
permissible topics which excluded the native lyric's focus on love and other "vulgar"
issues, did not meet with resounding success. Clearly, not every writer at this time read
and valued ancient poetry for the same qualities or drew the same lessons about the
nature and purpose of ancient lyrics. Not every writer concluded that ancient lyrics only
praised noble deeds and the gods. Thomas Campion, seeking justification for the brand of
lyric poetry employed in his A Booke of Ayres (1601), draws two conclusions from his
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reading of the ancients. The first, a formal point, that "The Lyrick Poets among the
Greekes and Latines were first inventers ofAyres, tying themselves strictly to the
number, and value of their sillables"-, the second concerned the content: "The subject of
them is for the most part, amorous, and why not amorous songs, as well as amorous
attires? Or why not new Ayres, as well as new fascions?"50 Since the ancient lyric
included amorous subjects, he sees no reason why he should restrict his freedom to treat
of a diverse range of topics.
Michael Drayton takes a similar position to Campion, using his sense of the
classical model to support his approach. He tells his reader that
Odes / have called these my few Poems; which how happie soever they prove, yet
Chriticisme it self cannot say, that the Name is wrongfully usurped: For (not to begin
with Definitions against the Rule of Oratorie, nor ab ovo, against the prescript Rule
of Poeticall Argument, but somewhat only to season thy Pallat with a slight
description) an Ode is knowne to have been properly a Song, modulated to the
ancient Harpe, and neither too short-breathed, or hasting to the end, nor Composed
of the longer verses, as unfit for the sudden Turnes and loftie Tricks with which
Apollo used to manage it. They are (as the Learned say) divers: Some
transcendently loftie, and force more high than the Epick (commonly called the
Heroique Poeme) witnesse those of the inimitable Pindarus, consecrated to the
glohe and renowne of such as returned in thumph from Olympus.51
Since his reading of the ancients authorizes his choice of form, he can modulate his voice
and approach to writing. He makes, for instance, the following boast in his Idea. In Sixtie
Three Sonnets:
My verse is the true image ofmy mind,
Ever in motion, still desiring change;
And as thus to varietie inclin'd,
So in all Humors sportively I range.52
In keeping with this independent attitude, he similarly boasts that his "Muse is rightly of
the English straine"; in his Odes. With other Lyrick Poesies (1619), moreover, he
contends that the emotive power of English poetry derives from its native lyric tradition:
Th'old British Bards, upon their Harpes,
For falling Flatts, and rising Sharpes,
That curiously were strung;
To stirre their youth to Warlike Rage,
Or their wyld Furie to assuage,
In these loose Numbers [I] sung.53
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Drayton's arguments here obviously contain a measure of nationalism, but that he chose
to make his stand on the ground of native lyric poetry, that he saw it as the most
appropriate form in which to establish the autonomy of his personal voice (in preparation,
perhaps, for longer poetic efforts), in opposition to the refinements and values of classical
poetry, does not seem entirely insignificant. His (and perhaps Campion's) stance may
derive, in part, from the way in which the ethos of the new science fostered new ideas
and attitudes about writing in general, and to the past in particularly, and this culture of
independence may have infiltrated attitudes to the writing of poetry. Writers simply felt
freer to take individualistic positions on a range of issue, the impulse to reject canonical
authority which so marked the initial steps towards new-science hegemony spilling over
into poetical and critical debates, notably as a desire for a measure of creative and
evaluative independence from classical strictures. Whether Drayton (or any poets at this
particular period) knowingly looked to the new science as support for his position must of
course remain speculative, especially as its main ideals were, as noted earlier, largely
unsystematized, but I detect some coalescing of shared outlooks and attitudes, and this
grows more evident as the seventeenth century progresses.
Poole provides an interesting and instructive case of how classical values could
merge with the ethos of the new science. Even as classical literary values increased in
currency, evident especially in declarations about the poet's social and sacred identity, the
ideals of the new science were gathering force and would, as the "Apology for Poetry"
testified, soon affect vindications of the poet's special nature. In The English Parnassus,
Poole takes the common view that harmony in speech provides a marker for the level of
civilization reached by a culture. To attain harmony, whether in prose or poetry, required
"an exact placing of the accent, and an accurate disposition of the words," two features
which were necessary for reaching and sustaining cultural superiority because, in
"delighting the ear," harmony "doth in a manner captivate the passions and the
understanding."54 Poetry, of course, supplements the charms of harmony with measure,
Chapter Three, p. 153
proportion, and rhyme, great poetry providing another criterion of a nation's cultural
advance.
Moreover, just as the early scientists expressed a willingness to build upon the real
achievements of ancient writers, Poole accepts that because English poetry "admits of
the same division into species, as the Greek and Latine, we must, being obliged to them
for their Termes, submit to their Method" (EP, sig. A3V-A4). By method he means writing
about the same subject-matter as they did in the appropriate genre, and following the
same principles of composition for the disposition of words. Yet Poole would not expect
an English poet to neglect the potentialities of his native language; after all, the history of
poetry proves that "there are in every language certain heights proportionate to their
Idiome, as may very much advance Poetry" (EP, sig. A3). In any case, comparing the
poetic language of the modern to that of the ancient and judging the former "as savage
and barbarous" made little sense since the modern language, greatly improved by recent
additions in learning, was now "much the more excellent." Besides which, says Poole, the
use of rhyme, which every judicious critic acknowledged as one of the greatest beauties
of verse, makes English poetry "the most susceptible of Poesie" of all the languages,
ancient or modern.55
At this phase in his argument Poole manifests even more plainly that he shares the
temper of the times. While rules and the judgments of authority must play a part in
educating the faculty of taste, in the final analysis the poet (and the reader) must rely
upon his own senses, particularly the sense of sound. When the poet undertakes to write
verse he must, of course, dispose the words harmoniously and as much as possible
according to the principles of classical composition. Errors and "violence," however, are
"soon discovered by the ear," the highest court of appeal in such a matter.56 When it
comes to the sense or expression of ideas, Poole looks askance at long or wordy
descriptions of things or events. A poet should "avoid as much as may be long
Parentheses, which are a certain torture to the Reader, forcing him to alter his tone till he
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come to the close of the Parenthesis, and causing in the hearer a distraction and
suspence." Noting that "Some late writers have endeavoured to avoid them even in
Prose," Poole agrees that this type of brevity of statement "ought to be cherished and
seconded, nor indeed is it very difficult" (EP, sig. A6). He argues, finally, that while English
poets should study and learn from the ancient genres, they should not tie themselves
down to a strict imitation of these forms because "the English Language ariving daily to
greater perfection and purity, Poesie must needs accordingly extend to all subjects and
occasions, incident to humane life" (EP, sig. A3). In other words, just as the new
scientists felt constrained by authority and tradition, Poole urges poets present and future
not to remain rooted in modes and forms of expression which not only belonged to a
wholly different time but which, aimed at different type of audience, might prove
inadequate to the needs of contemporary expression.
The stout rejection of authority propounded by the new scientists spawned a
comprehensive array of correspondent attitudes-freedom to experiment, think, judge,
choose, and express. This ethos of freedom, which in many ways symbolizes the special
nature of new-science hegemony, invites new estimates of the poetic value of the lyric
genre. In a culture which was beginning to idealise independence of mind, belief, and
expression, the lyric possessed a generic pedigree wholly appropriate to expressing these
attitudes. We saw Drayton's and Campion's reasons for choosing lyric forms, and in his
prefatory remarks to the reader Thomas Flatman outlines his reasons for choosing the
lyric genre. He begins with the observation that, "instead of an elaborate Harangue in
Commendation of Art in general, or what, and what Qualifications go to the making of a
Poet," he wants his reader to know that "in [his] poor Opinion Poetry has a very near
Resemblance to the modern Experiment of the Ambling-Saddle; It's a good Invention for
smoothing the Trott of Prose; That's the Mechanical use of it." In the same fanciful vein,
Flatman explains his fondness for writing Pindaric odes. First, this type of lyric gave him
"a liberty now and then to correct the saucy forwardness of a Rhime, and to lay it aside till
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I had a mind to admit it." And in the second place, the eccentric stanzaic forms allowable
in Pindarics meant that he could freely adapt form to content or vice versa. Thus, when
Flatman found that he could not fill up a stanza, he "had then opportunity to fill it up with a
Metaphor little to the purpose, and (upon occasion) to run the Metaphor stark mad into an
Allegory, a practice very frequent and of admirable use amongst the Moderns."57 In terms
of its formal potentialities, then, Flatman selects the lyric precisely because it permitted
him the freedom to experiment and to adapt his ideas to different expressive needs and
different expressive moods. He was not bound to produce exact imitations of his
precursors in this generic tradition but could employ the form according to his creative
urges. No doubt, Flatman would have agreed with Drayton's remark that a poet "must
have the Trick / Of Ryming, with Invention quick, / That should doe Lyricks well."58
Flatman, however whimsical he sounds at times, does in fact make some serious
remarks about why he opted for Pindarics; and, while his account covers some familiar
territory, it also offers interesting testimony of how, under the hegemony of science, the
lyric's peculiar generic identity began to undergo evolution. Besides its ability to smooth
the "Trott of Prose," poetry in general served deeper purposes. For Flatman, poetry could
touch him "Physically," that is, it could induce "present Ease to the Pains of the Mind,
contracted by violent Surfeit of either good or bad usage in the World." Poetry functioned
like one of his senses, capable of impressing upon his mind experiences or ideas from
written sources with forceful immediacy. On the other side of the coin, moreover, while
writing poetry seemed to many observers to serve as nothing more than "an Innocent
Help to Sham a Man's time when it lies on his hands and his Fancy can relish nothing
else," Flatman asserts that only the medium of poetry can express certain emotional or
mental states such as anger, indignation, pleasure, and the like: in these states he
eschewed the help of writing "in downright Prose" because he found such moods more
"seasonable for Rhyming." Again, poetry provided an immediate outlet for expression and
no one, moreover, could disprove this to him since he "speak[s] but [his] own
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Experience."59 Of course, he finds lyric forms-songs, Pindarics, Horatian odes-a suitable
vehicle for expressing the urgency of his experiences, to "run stark mad."
Samuel Wesley's An Epistle to a Friend Concerning Poetry (1700) provides
another excellent and intriguing example of the ways in which the ethos of the new
science infiltrated attitudes and thinking processes. Not surprisingly, Wesley does not fit
into my argument as easily as most of the other writers examined thus far because he
worries about the damaging effect of certain trends of the new science on religion, as his
Preface to the Epistle makes clear. To Wesley, many of the new ideas propounded by
the experimenters and the naturalists-particularly those free-thinkers whose ideas were
moving towards a concept of natural as opposed to revealed religion-were sounding the
trumpet of atheism. They were atheists because they "impudently defend and propagate
that ridiculous Opinion of the Eternity of the World, and a fatal invincible Chain of
Things."60 These two notions destroyed common faith and, in denying "any sort of
Freedom in Humane Actions," they reduced "Mankind beneath the Brute-Creation" (ECP,
n. pag.). Indeed, in images which would have done a Romantic proud, Wesley sums up
God's place in the new universe as "only a State Engin to keep the World in Order" {ECP,
n. pag.). In the Epistle Wesley offers more extensive elaboration of his reservations about
the drift of contemporary thinking. The passage bristles with satiric anger:
There are who can whate'er they will believe,
That B[ayle's] too hard for B[entley], Three are Five:
That Nature, Justice, Reason, Truth must fall,
With Clear Idea's they'll confound 'em all:
That Parallels may travel till they meet,
Faith they can find in L[ocke], no Sense in Stillingfleet.
Disturb 'em not, but let 'em still enjoy
Th' unenvy'd Charms of their Eternal Moi.
{ECP, II. 240-247)
It would seem, then, that Wesley did not share the same admiration for the achievements
or the methods of the new science as did so many of his contemporaries, but his
championing of Bentley over Bayle should alert us to avoid making a hasty judgment
about his attitudes to the new science.
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Indeed, a rather more complex picture of Wesley's intellectual temper emerges
when he turns to discuss issues related to art and poetry. For example, he counsels
anyone wanting to become a poet to ignore the wealthy, fashionable, or shallow members
of society who might offer themselves as patrons. Rather than wait for some patron to
give direction and support, the poet should compare himself to Columbus and, taking
courage from his example, set out to explore his own poetic oceans. Since no one
"shew'd Columbus where the Indies lay" (ECP, I. 234), the poet should likewise simply
"charge through, and force to Fame the way!" (ECP, I. 235). Once he gained the
confidence to forge ahead on his own, he could be his "own Patron" (ECP, I. 230) and
would not have to show obeisance to some cultural dictator in the hopes of winning some
financial advantage from him. However, confidence alone cannot guarantee success in
the poetic art, and as he outlines the various qualities required in a poet his arguments
show similarities and a degree of confluence with those of his contemporaries.
Wesley, in common with many other poet/critics in the latter stages of the
seventeenth century, thought about the nature and the function of poetry largely under the
influence of classical ideals, though these ideas were generally made to fit within the older
boundaries of Christian hegemony. Relying upon both biblical and classical analogues to
determine the nature of the poet's vocation, Wesley thereby doubly reinforces the poet's
link to his poetic tradition and to his sacred lineage, equating the writing of poetry with
divinely-inspired acts of praise. Yet as Wesley delves deeper into the "mysteries" of the
art, he finds himself needing to "fit" this classically-derived view of the poet into an image
of how the mind works, and his account of mental operations follows in most essentials a
Baconian or Lockean construction of mind. Wesley's analysis of this "process" makes for
an eccentric but instructive account.
Since Wesley held to the classical view that poets belonged to a sacred or near-
divine lineage, he necessarily envisages the poet's vocation as a serious and difficult one.
The poet's mind, unlike a mere mortal's, engages the world on a different and much
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higher level of apprehension; accordingly, the individual blessed with a poetic talent must
strive to fulfil his potential in ways specific to the fabric of a true poet's mind:
First poize your Genius, nor presume to write
If Phebus smile not, or some Muse invite:
Nature refuses Force, you strive in vain,
She will not drag, but struggling breaks the Chain.
How bright a Spark of Heaven'ly Fire must warm!
What Blessings must a Poet's Mind to form!
How oft must he for those Life-Touches sit,
Genius, Invention, Memory, Judgement, Wit?
There's here no Middle-State, you must excel;
Wit has no Half-way House 'twixt Heaven and Hell.
(iECP, II. 16-25)
Clearly, given the elements in this schema, unless the poet attains an accurate estimate
of the nature and function of each faculty-genius, invention, memory, judgment, wit-he
will never excel. Wesley therefore takes the time to provide a definition and explanation of
each faculty.
Wesley describes genius as "the full Power and Energy of Mind" (ECP, I. 32), and
without it no poet could hope to reach those divine heights which separate good from
great poetry. A true genius displays "A Reach of Thought that skims all Nature o'er, /
Exhausts the narrow World, and asks for more," that is, since neither space nor time can
confine it, the faculty of genius "Can frame a New Creation of its own" (ECP, II. 33-36).
However, Wesley does not cling to a Platonic yearning to negate the material world:
genius does not despise the natural world but uses it as a springboard, so to speak, to
articulate a visionary universe which illuminates heavenly and earthly connections. In
Wesley's scheme, the role that genius assumes in the creative act parallels that of
imagination: as a creative force, genius constitutes a greater power than mere fancy.
Closely allied to genius are invention and memory, which Wesley calls "Nymphs" (ECP, I.
61). Although Wesley becomes somewhat vague here, it would seem that memory
records sense-perceptions, while invention tries to keep the fancy aligned with sense.
Wesley may be influenced by Sidney here, who termed invention "Nature's child."61 In any
case, together these nymphs "guide" genius through "all the Realms of Sense and Fancy"
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(ECP, I. 62). Equally important, they provide a "wondrous Storehouse" (ECP, I. 82) of the
poet's day-to-day experiences; out of this storehouse the poet's genius gathers together
the materials which will go into making new artistic creations. In short, while a poet may
feel the force of inspiration as a discharge from a divine source, Wesley accepts the
empirical evidence that the matter out of which the poet actually fashions his creation
derives from a less exalted origin.
After adding invention and memory to the faculty of genius, the poet must then
apply that of wit, a concept which exercised a large number of writers at this time. Like
inventio and dispositio, the writer makes use of wit in the way that he uses language, but
Wesley's discussion of wit shows that he cannot easily merge it into his explication of the
poetic process. As part of a complex intellectual mechanism, wit's role was difficult to
define and harder to justify. As Maynard Mack points out, the concept of wit underwent
numerous attacks and redefinitions during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
largely as a consequence of the criss-crossing of hegemonic and other factors: a
deepening and more articulate Protestantism; the rise of new and powerful economic
classes; important changes in the publishing business which related to the rise of new
reading groups; and the force of science upon the development of two features of cultural
debate--the value it placed on a certain style of thinking, and its growing capacity to affect
public opinion.62 In terms of the input of science into this overall debate, the most
important element would be the willingness of thinkers imbued with the ethos of
experimental science to delineate its peculiar emotional and intellectual features and to
explore the psychological ramifications of wit on the reader or audience.
Although a full discussion of this debate and its history lies well outside the
boundaries of this study, certain features of the various theories about wit deserve some
discussion, in part because they show how, as they explored the way in which wit
functioned, eighteenth-century critics and writers gained a greater awareness of generic
functionality and generic appropriateness. In their examination of wit such issues as the
place of passion in writing, the role of fancy in creating images, and the value of judgment
Chapter Three, p. 160
in writing all became clearer (and hence more debatable). Moreover, the line of thinking
about wit shows, in a minor way, how the ethos of the new science influenced the
direction of debate.
Hobbes seems the best place to start. In Leviathan Hobbes distinguishes between
two types of wit, the natural and the acquired, both of which he considers intellectual
virtues. Before he defines these two types of wit, he qualifies his meaning of natural: in
particular, he specifies that natural wit does not mean a facility born with one, like the
senses, but an ability which develops simply through experience and use. Acquired wit
occurs through a process of "method, culture, or instruction," and it involves the
application of reason and "the right use of speech, and produceth the sciences."63 The
primary virtues of natural wit Hobbes considers a "celerity of imagining, that is, swift
succession of one thought to another; and steady direction to some approved end."
Those who lack this type of imaginative ability belong to that class of individual commonly
attributed with "DULLNESS, stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signify
slowness of motion," qualities of mind which would later much occupy Dryden, Swift, and
Pope to a large degree.64
Hobbes argues that what constitutes a good wit depends upon the way thoughts
succeed one another in the mind, and whether or not the individual perceives variations,
similarities, and differences in relations between things, ideas, and so forth. When a
person consistently makes striking observations about similarities which escape most
people's notice, then that person's wit means equally "a good fancy." When someone can
do the same consistently with dissimilar things and ideas, can make distinctions and
discernments which most people fail to see, then that type of wit constitutes "a good
judgment." Hobbes adds that this type of wit generally shows itself in social affairs, in
business, and in conversation, in which instances it appears as "DISCRETION."65 Both
types of wit, whether natural or acquired in Hobbes's sense, will prove valuable in
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discourse of all kinds so long as some degree of "steadiness" controls the overall aim of
the speech.
The key ingredient, however, which determines the difference between types of wit,
the quality of wit, and the success of language is passion: "The causes of this difference
of wits, are in the passions."66 Hobbes notes that many elements affect the level of
passion in any one person-physical considerations, custom, education-but that only
those with strong passions will possess a great fancy or a good judgment. Strong
passions, he says, lie at the root of all desires for power, whether that power takes the
form of riches, honour, knowledge: to lack this desire for power "is to be dead ... is
dullness."67 In language virtually the same as Hobbes's, Dryden agreed that "Men that are
given over to fancy onely, are little better then Madmen: What people say of Fire . . . may
not unaptly be applyed to Fancy, which when it is too active Rages, but when cooled and
allay'd by the Judgement, produces admirable Effects."68 Thus, for Hobbes and Dryden wit
plays a significant role in the constitution of personality, considering an excessive or
unsteady wit as akin to madness; moreover, he valued fancy, and judgment for the role
that they play in discourse because together they help to produce wit.
Locke, of course, does not say a great deal about wit, generally following Hobbes,
though differing in the weight which he puts on judgment; he accepts, however, the
relationship between fancy and wit, and he makes it clear that in certain types of
discourse-the entertaining, the literary-a degree of laxity does no harm.69 Addison, of
course, popularised Locke's views on wit: Addison calls Locke's account "the best and
most philosophical" and agrees that wit "consists in . . . Resemblance and Congruity of
Ideas"; he then adds that wit requires more than just resemblance and congruity if it would
give "Delight and Surprize to the Reader: These two Properties seem essential to Wit,
more particularly the last of them. In order therefore that the Resemblance in the Ideas be
Wit, it is necessary that the Ideas should not lie too near one another in the Nature of
things; for where the Likeness is obvious, it gives no Surprize."70 In his An Essay Upon
W/'f (1716), Richard Blackmore essentially reiterates Locke's position, attacking what he
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perceives as a general licentiousness of wit in most modern writing, largely because the
people prefer it to serious works. Blackmore contends that wit has
no place in the Works where severe Knowledge and Judgement are chiefly
exercis'd; those superior Productions of the Understanding must be express'd in a
clear and strong manner, without intervening Strains of Wit or facetious Fancies,
which, were they admitted, would appear incongruous and impertinent, and diminish
the Merit of the Writing. Hence Wit has no place in History, Philology, Philosophy, or
in the greater Lyric or Epick Poems; the two last of which containing either the
Praises of Deities or Demi-Gods, or treating of lofty and illustrious Subjects.71
However, Blackmore modifies his strictures on wit and, in distinguishing superficial from
serious applications of wit, his views fall in line with a general development in eighteenth-
century views of wit.
Leonard Welsted, for example, sees wit as the antidote to the too serious moral
flavour demanded of all literature. Shaftesbury, of course, had argued in his "An Essay on
the Freedom of Wit" (1709) that "Pedantry and bigotry are mill-stones able to sink the best
book which carries the least part of their dead weight. The temper of the pedagogue suits
not with the age. And the world, however it may be taught, will not be tutored."72 Yet
Shaftesbury equally censured those writers who would try to introduce wit which fails to
hit its target. Welsted follows suit, asking
Who can endure what is like Wit, in such a Way, as to be worse than the entire
want of it? For my part, I acknowledge, the sprightly Nonsense of some Writers has
far more Charms for me, than the dull Sense of others; there is in Fustian and in
Impertinency, when they are alert, something that awakens one; but this sober,
tastless, I know not what to call it, raises no Passion, nor of Laughter, nor Joy, nor
Admiration.73
However, Welsted's view of the poetic art (as we shall see in the next chapter) walks a
fine line between passion and judgment, and his concern for the reputation of poetry as a
whole means that he will brook no excessive display of wit; indeed, he considers such
excessiveness largely responsible for the decline of poetry: "It is the Plenty of
Composition of this Strain, which has brought Poetry itself into disgrace with the Ignorant,
and even made some Persons, that do not want Shrewdness in other respects, treat it as
a Trifle, and at the best but a plausible Folly."74
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Thus, while critics like Blackmore and Welsted condemned the licentious use of wit,
they still somehow needed to mesh the element of wit with their conviction that the poet's
and the priest's roles dovetailed: both were "engag'd, as indeed they ought to be, in the
same good Designs, Interests, and Pursuits."75 In other words, Blackmore sees that wit
pertains to the dual function of writing as defined by Sidney and later reiterated by
Addison: "The End and Usefulness of this ingenious Qualification," Addison says, "is to
delight and instruct."76 Thus Blackmore finds himself arguing that, while certain low forms
of wit only please the senses, the success of more serious and profound works will
necessarily require some degree of higher wit, and particularly if the writer aims at "The
Strength and Dignity of the Sublime Stile."77 By introducing the element of the sublime, he
raises a crucial problem for critics and fans of wit, that of the effect of wit on the mind and
the imagination. Clearly, in defining wit most writers either consciously or unconsciously
use language and terms equally applicable to the positive values and dangers of
metaphor and other figurative resources. Just as the experimental scientists wished to
establish acceptable boundaries for the use of ornamental language, so the critics find
themselves trying to delimit the freedom of wit in literary writings, particularly poetry.
Part of the problem lay in definitions of what exactly the beauty or delight of poetry
consisted, especially as this delight or sense of beauty was determined by a structure of
sense impressions and language working upon the mind. As Addison argued, "it is
impossible for any Thought to be beautiful which is not just, and has not its Foundation in
the Nature of things: That the Basis of all Wit is Truth; and that no Thought can be
valuable, of which good Sense is not the Ground-work."78 The focus here on truth as the
basis of wit, however, raises another weighty problem for the writer. Shaftesbury had
stated "that truth is the most powerful thing in the world, since even fiction itself must be
governed by it, and can only please by its resemblance. The appearance of reality is
necessary to make any passion agreeably represented."79 Hobbes, of course, focused the
debate upon the passions, and most commentators agreed that good wit represented a
happy mixture of fancy and judgment given life by passion. Thus Blackmore: wit "strikes
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the Imagination, touches the Passions, and recreates the Intellectual Faculties," largely
because "the Taste of the Soul is more delicate and exquisite than that of the Body."80
Welsted, after arguing that, conceptually, wit like humour is the result of "too vague and
indefinite an Idea, and is of too general a Nature," follows Blackmore and others: "the
Name of Wit... is no other than some uncommon Thought or just Observation, couch'd
in Images or Allusions, which create a sudden Surprize through their Agreeableness, and
the Lustre with which they strike the Imagination; that Agreeableness mostly arises from
the blending together different Ideas, which naturally suit with and illustrate one another;
and when this is done happily, it makes what we call l/V7f."81 A piece in the Gentleman's
Magazine (1732) makes use of a similar definition: "Wit is a Start of Imagination in the
Speaker, that strikes the Imagination of the Hearer with an Idea of Beauty common to
both; and the immediate Result of the Comparison is the Flash of Joy that attends it; it
stands in the same Regard to Sense, or Wisdom, as Lightning to the Sun, suddenly
kindled, and as suddenly gone."82 The main problem with this dynamic feature of wit lay in
the fact that "it as often arises from the Defect of the Mind, as from its Strength and
Capacity . . . Just, solid, and lasting Wit is the Result of fine Imagination, finished Study,
and a happy Temper of Body."83 Most of Blackmore's remarks and those of anonymous in
the Gentleman's Magazine appear in other pieces devoted to the topic as, for example,
the anonymous An Essay On Wit: To Which Is Annexed, A Dissertation on Antient
and Modern History (1748), which goes so far as to separate mere wit from all sublime,
passionate, and beautiful works, though wit is allowed back into the discussion in the form
of humour.84
In short, the concept of wit, a chameleon faculty in many ways, did not lend itself to
an easy merger with any of the hegemonic forces of late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century culture, particularly given the many ways in which wit could be
employed to serve different purposes. As one famous voice lamented, "There is indeed
something very barbarous and inhuman in the ordinary Scribblers of Lampoons. An
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innocent young Lady shall be exposed, for an unhappy Feature. A Father of a Family
turn'd to Ridicule, for some domestick Calamity ... So pernicious a thing is Wit, when it is
not tempered with Virtue and Humanity."85 Corbyn Morris, in language familiar to the
theme, likewise noted that "Wit, in its sudden Flashes, makes no Pretension to
Reasoning-, but is perceived in the pleasant Surprize which it starts, and in the Light
darted upon a Subject, which instantly vanishes again, without abiding a strict
Examination."86 Clearly, in its various guises it could both stabilize and destabilize writing
and thinking; yet even when it was condemned by harsher critics, they often allowed it
back into their considerations because no other concept seemed to link so many aspects
of creative productions. Wit, for all its licentiousness, made language capable of moving
and delighting the reader, and this pertained to sublime and serious works just as much
as to superficial ones. In the final analysis, most critics saw it as one of the greatest
dangers for a writer, but all they could counsel was for the writer to walk a fine line in
using his wit. Dryden's famous definition of wit, for example, states simply that "Wit (which
has been so often attempted, and ever unsuccessfully by many poets) is only this: that it
is a propriety of thoughts and words; or, in other terms, thoughts and words elegantly
adapted to the subject."87
To return, then, to Wesley. He invokes a fairly conventional definition of wit.
Following Dryden, he defines it as "The Beauty and the Harmony of Mind" (ECP, I. 44),
operating somewhere between, and yet in tandem with, both memory and invention. He
accepts that wit alone makes an old language into a new, and that it turns hard and
disagreeable ideas into agreeable and pleasurable ones; in a great genius it transforms
sublime images and profound feelings into words and figures that move the reader to
similar states of mind. Yet wit, like genius, does not by itself create works of poetry: it
adds an important facet to the language of poetry, somehow linking poet and reader in a
sympathetic union, but it cannot form the basis of great poetry. Wesley would have
agreed with the anonymous author of the 1748 An Essay On l/V/'t that almost all the
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sallies of wit are "quite vague and superficial; they don't enter, but only play upon the
Surface of the Soul."88
The final factor in the creative act--the judgment-shows clearly Wesley's attempts
to effect a compromise between his classical views of the poet's identity and his
acceptance of the epistemological convictions of the new scientists. The poet, no matter
how great his genius or how ready his wit, will not attain the reputation of a great poet
unless he joins all to a correct judgment: "these alone, tho much they can, suffice, /
Judgement must join, or never hope the Prize" (ECP, II. 51-52). He then outlines the
judgment's role:
Judgements the Act of Reason; that which brings
Fit Thoughts to Thoughts, and argues Things from Things,
True, Decent, Just, are in its Balance try'd,
And thence we learn to Range, Compound, Divide.
(ECP, II. 57-60)
Although not as eloquent as Fulke Greville's definition of reason as "the fire wherein
men's thoughts be prov'd," in Wesley's formulation we see him making judgment a
consequence or reason's self-discipline.89 That conception of reason, of course, was
traditional, but Wesley makes it clear that judgment succeeds in its task when it works
over its materials according to a set methodology. We may question whether Wesley
consciously wanted to define a pattern of mental discipline which sounded similar to that
of the experimental scientists, but he does emphasize that his poet carefully establishes
the relations between things and ideas, laying a solid basis upon which to build higher and
more significant knowledge before he puts pen to paper.
In fact, Wesley's struggle to define the ambiguous roles of poetic judgment,
invention, wit, and so forth differs from the type of defence mounted by Sidney, and given
the time in which Wesley writers this change in emphasis hardly seems surprising since
the poet must compete with other mediators between man and nature. As Dryden had
noted, writers now lived "in an age so sceptical, that as it determines little, so it takes
nothing from antiquity on trust; and I profess to have no other ambition . . . than that
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poetry may not go backward, when all other arts and sciences are advancing."90 Almost
stridently, Wesley envisions poets as "Uncommon Souls, who nearest Heav'n ascend /
Far more, at once, than others comprehend" (ECP, II. 89-90), pointedly drawing an
ascending arc to the poet's career. At the turn of the eighteenth century, of course, a
figure like Newton appeared more likely to ascend towards the heavens than any poet.
Thus, it might be argued, the subtext of the poem suggests that unless the poet
approached the study of nature and acquired knowledge in much the same manner as the
experimental scientist, he would fail to fulfil his sacred task: certainly, as we will see later,
poets writing after Wesley put this argument in unequivocal terms. Wesley, we might
note, does exhort poets to study nature in all its aspects: natural history, psychology,
astronomy, morality. The true poet
The Rules of Life, and Manners knows and Men
And by what Balance Just and Right are try'd:
How Kindred-Things with Things are closely join'd;
How Bodies act, and by what Laws confin'd,
Supported, mov'd and rul'd by th'Universal Mind.
He knows those Sthngs to touch with artful Hand
Which rule Mankind, and all the World command:
What moves the Soul, and every secret Cell.
Where Pity, Love, and all the Passions dwell.
The Music of his Verse can Anger raise,
Which with a softer Stroak he smooths and lays:
Can Emulation, Terror, all excite,
Compress the Soul with Grief, or swell with vast Delight.
(ECP, II. 101-105; 110-117)
A writer thus faces a simple choice: unless he willingly pursues this rather onerous and
immense task, he must simply remain "content to Rime" (ECP, I. 121) and "a Poet n'er
expect to be" (ECP, I. 120).
Two significant consequences result from Wesley's determination to force the poet
to the top of the intellectual heap. One relates to the way that a writer confronts the poetic
tradition; the other to his choice of genre. Plainly, since Wesley uses the poet's ancient
lineage as proof of the poet's enduring cultural value, he cannot ignore the weight of
tradition and authority, particularly that of the ancients. They, after all, invented and
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"perfected" most of the poetry known to man, or so Wesley and his contemporaries largely
understood that tradition. To achieve their greatness would require close imitation of their
poetic models, as well as pursuing the same aim, to teach and delight. To follow the
ancients, however, puts the poet on the horns of a dilemma. The course of learning which
he sets the modern poet would place a heavy load on even the most exalted intellect, as
he confesses:
To such Impracticable Heights I strain
A Poet's Notion, that if This be He,
There n'er was one, n'er is like to be.
(ECP, II. 123-125)
Now, if my suspicions about the subtext of the poem are plausible, and we saw earlier
that Wesley at least shared his epoch's rejection of authority, then we might expect him to
recognise that simply imitating the ancients will not challenge the growing power and
intellectual influence of the new scientist, that resolving this dilemma in favour of the poet
will require careful reflection. He resolves this problem by taking two different
perspectives on it.
First, Wesley accepts that no poet can ever write without incurring some degree of
imitation, that earlier models will always impinge upon the imagination, and that the poet
partly aims to copy as best he can the perfect original. However, rather than accept that
the ancients discovered the original genres, Wesley simply goes farther back in time,
claiming that all inspiration to write comes from God; poetic inspiration involves a call to
represent God's will and design as closely as possible, even though no writer could ever
hope to achieve a perfect copy of this will and design:
may we not copy well
Tho far th'Original, our Art excel?
Divine Perfection we our Pattern make
Th'Idea thence of Goodness justly take;
But they who Copy nearest, still must fall
Immensely short of their Original.
{ECP, II. 126-131)
Although doomed to imitate or copy perfection (an argument which thus opens the way for
creative adoption of ancient genres), Wesley does not equate imperfection with failure.
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Indeed, once the poet no longer needs to exercise himself overly much about
following the ancients, he can aim at a new standard, that of representing God's will and
design, the source of which lies, of course, in the study of nature. To reach "the craggy
Top of Fame" (ECP, I. 248) now requires supreme artistry in language (wit and judgment)
and a willingness to experiment with new forms: Wesley asks why poets should "be lazily
»
content / With threadbare Schemes, and nothing new invent?" {ECP, II. 260-261). In
short, the poet should study nature and then write, and while the products of the
imagination should be tendered to friends or other judges to consider, in the final analysis
the poet must believe that
Your Friend's a Mortal, and like you, may err.
Upon the last Appeal let Reason sit,
And here, let all Authority submit.
{ECP, II. 126-131)
These declarations of freedom would have sounded familiar to his contemporaries.
Typically, Wesley's explication of poetry leads him to consider the various kinds of
poetry and to pass judgment on their generic history. As we should expect from a writer of
this period, he gives the bulk of his attention to the recognised higher forms-epic and
tragedy-and to satire (his preferred form at this period). When he comes to discuss the
lyric (he focuses upon the ode), he rehearses a by now conventional statement of their
divine origins (Moses and David were lyricists) and of their primacy as the first type of
poetic utterance-the "first great Mother she of all the rest" {ECP, I. 1019). He notes,
moreover, that of all the poetic kinds the lyric particularly requires "Sparks of heav'nly Fire"
{ECP, I. 1022). Just as Flatman found, Wesley finds that the lyric sanctions a freer, more
independent attitude towards authority and the critical rules, especially as the poet's
sacred task demands that he rove unconstrained through nature's wonders. Thus, Wesley
can state confidently that by trying to adhere to the "tedious Rules" which every writer
invariably transgresses, "We make the Trouble more who strive to make it less" {ECP, II.
214-215). Nothing proves this more than the lyric mode.
Chapter Four - Eighteenth-Century Lyric
Section 1 - Scientific Hegemony and Changing Attitudes to Genre
The function of the two prior chapters was principally to demonstrate my contention that
poetry and science do converge radically, organically, intertextually, more so than any
parade of poetic images drawn from science could ever suggest. Additionally, the
argument as formulated intended to show that selective culling of expressions of unease
at the "new" universe revealed by science simply distorts the dynamic character of the
relationship between science and literature and deters exploration of their deeper
connections. Another function was to illustrate the process by which critics and poets,
even as they proclaimed and promulgated principles of composition derived from classical
or biblical models, found intellectual justification for their defence of poetry in the evolving
ideals of the new science. After delineating those distinctive scientific ideals which
emerged during the seventeenth century it was possible to undertake a comparative
analysis of the different ways in which the experimental method directly and indirectly
stimulated new critical perspectives about poetry. While classical hegemony clearly
influenced thinking about issues such as the "origins" of poetry and its function as one of
the sciences, the nature of the poet's vocation, and so forth, and while the Christian
temper of the times combined (or was made to combine) with classicism to defend the
reputation of poetry and poets, many writers adopted and adapted the experimental,
empirical scientists' verdicts on matters such as epistemology, authority, the structure of
language, and the benefits of methodology to writing, which in turn modified those
classical dicta just noted. The flexuose intellectual contortions which Wesley performed
as he tried to assimilate and to harmonize religious beliefs with classical and scientific
values into an intelligible theory of poetic creation provided an instructive case of how an
individual could adapt to various hegemonic forces. Indeed, as he accommodated his
religious anxieties to empirical epistemological assumptions about how the mind
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functioned, Wesley confirmed a central component of Williams's theory of hegemony: that
resistance to particular elements of an hegemony does not lessen its capacity to act as a
constitutive factor in intellectual processes. Berkeley, of course, provides another
interesting example of a devout, traditional mind coming to terms with the various
demands of his evolving culture. He shows an amazing capacity to adopt and reformulate
new scientific theory and concepts to his intellectual bent. In Guardian No. 49, for
instance, he takes up a newly emerging sense of instinct and makes it do duty as part of a
moral hierarchy, and in No. 117 he explains Newton's laws of attraction and then argues,
from analogy, that the same principles hold true in "the Moral World"; men, he says, "are
drawn together into Communities, Clubs, Families, Friendships, and all the various
Species of Society . . . linked by an imperceptible Chain to every Individual of the Human
Race."1 In summary, both chapters showed how the experimental ethos stimulated and
focused debate about such disparate matters as how the mind produced signs and
acquired language, how words functioned in the act of invention, how poetic metres
affected harmony, how different kinds of language imitated nature, how poetry
disseminated knowledge; both accentuated my argument that the most serious
intellectual affiliations and conflations of poetry and science occurred at the level of genre.
In particular, during the seventeenth century poets and critics more and more focused
ideas about the poetic process and the nature of poetry on the lyric genre.
Duplicating a similar chain of analysis and illustration in order to verify the place of
science in the eighteenth century would now serve little purpose. The sheer range of
eighteenth-century science and the multifarious forms in which it received articulation and
support should obviate the need for marshalling detailed evidence about its presence in
the eighteenth century. After all, an optimistic (most would say nai've) belief in the value of
scientific progress remains one of the more conspicuous (and for many embarrassing)
features of eighteenth-century thought, labels such as the Age of Reason and the Age of
Enlightenment broadcasting the fact that literary history has leaned heavily upon the new
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science in the formulation of its dominant interpretive paradigms. Peter Gay, for instance,
complains that historians have tried to define the Enlightenment "as a compact body of
doctrine, an Age of Reason" which has "served them for so long and so badly" because it
necessitates excluding "the vitalism of Diderot, the passion of Rousseau, or the
scepticism of Hume, as foreign bodies, harbingers of Romanticism." He calls this
"definition by larceny; it is to strip the Enlightenment of its wealth and then to complain
about its poverty."2 Does this mean, therefore, that modern criticism has mapped and
thoroughly gauged the reach of science into eighteenth-century culture, and that
eighteenth-century science no longer rates serious critical attention? No, in fact: as
Rousseau cautioned, modern scholars consistently misconstrue the extent and the nature
of eighteenth-century confidence in science, the wisdom of modernity largely disregarding
science's role as a shaping intellectual force, except perhaps as a sinister ancestor in the
romantic genealogy.
Indeed, many literary critics tend to trivialize that eighteenth-century confidence,
seeing it as an immature enthusiasm which would eventually wane or as an insignificant
force in literary developments compared to other influences in the configuration of literary
tastes. Yet as Roy Porter reminds us, interest in science ran deeply through eighteenth-
century culture, in part at least because the scientists and pseudo-scientists actively took
the message to the people. Porter states:
Scientific lectures burst on the scene as the Enlightenment's answer to the itinerant
preacher, trading on the new prestige of the Newtonian science and the magic of
experiments and dazzling apparatus. ... By the end of the century most towns of
any size had been milked by science lectures offering courses of six or a dozen
lectures, selling books and instruments.3
Evidence from the wealth of letters and the often extensive book reviews in the
magazines and newspapers testifies further to the popular interest in science; respect for
it did not lessen as the century neared its close but, as Hans Eichner shows, actually
grew apace.4 In April of 1789, The Universal Magazine and Review published An Essay
on the present State of Society in all civilized Nations, but particularly in France and
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England. In this essay the writer notes that "The spirit of experimental philosophy has of
late been rapidly increased and extended. If this spirit, in the sixteenth century, be
reckoned at the number one, and in the seventeenth at two, and in the first fifty years of
the eighteenth century at four, it may, for the last forty, be computed at eight." The reason
for this extensive spirit can be attributed to the great successes in "mechanical invention"
(which Bacon knew it would do), invention which "abridges the labours, and multiplies the
comforts of mankind. In England, the country that gave it birth, it is intimately connected
with the prosperity and grandeur of the nation."5 That the method would prove beneficial if
applied in all manner of endeavour, including intellectual pursuits, seemed obvious to the
essayist. The reader needed only to consider the great advances in natural philosophy for
sufficient proof of this claim, and the essayist goes on to make the typical statement that
modern natural philosophy "excels that of the ancients, because it is experimental."6
In short, it does not seem over-judgmental to contend that modern critical
presumptuousness (another holdover of nineteenth-century highhandedness?) about the
role of eighteenth-century science generally fails to appreciate how thoroughly that
confidence was predicated on the steady accrual of evidence which proved the value of
the experimental methodology, not only in natural history but when applied in other fields
of knowledge. That, perhaps more than any other feature, stands out largely and
distinctively in the intellectual landscape of the eighteenth century. In fact, the diversity,
the contradictoriness, and the startling intellectual inventiveness which so stamp
eighteenth-century writings-and which so frustrate the critic's desire for a settled
interpretive paradigm-probably resulted from the willingness of eighteenth-century writers
to experiment with the experimental method and to start investigations based on empirical
and personal experience. For example, in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals (1751) Hume explains that after appraising systematic, abstract philosophy and
the experimental method in order to select the one which promised the greater success
for discovering "the true origin of morals," he opted for the experimental. In part he did so
because the desires and activities of humankind constituted "a question of fact, not of
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abstract science" and in any attempt to resolve a question of fact, according to Hume, "we
can only expect success, by following the experimental method, and deducing general
maxims from a comparison of particular instances." The phenomenal field at issue-the
manifold activities of humankind-would not yield much insight to abstract philosophy
because such a mode of inquiry-its method~"suits less the imperfection of human nature,
and is a common source of illusion and mistake in this as well as in other subjects." In
addition, Hume confesses that he chose the experimental method because "Men are now
cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken
to no arguments but those which are derived from experience."7 The writer of An Essay
on the present State of Society in all civilized Nations, but particularly in France and
England agrees with Hume: "The spirit of experiment has extended from natural to moral
philosophy. The operations of the mind, the rise and progress of the passions, are
watched with care, and made the subject of observations intended as a basis for
pneumatics."8 Berkeley would probably have accepted these reasons for applying the
experimental method to other disciplines.
Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke, Pope's close friend, similarly shared Hume's
views about the limited prospects of gaining certain knowledge about human matters,
defining "the condition of humanity" as "an intellectual twilight, where we discover but few
things clearly, and none entirely, and yet see just enough to tempt us with the hope of
making better and more discoveries."9 Typically, he refuses to consider metaphysics or
ontology as proper forms of first philosophy but sees these rather as types of learning
"spun into an immense web out of scholastic brains" which served solely "to propagate an
unintelligible jargon"; such jargon, rather than providing a tool for enlightenment, was
employed primarily "to control the particular and most evident truths of experimental
knowledge."10 In the sciences as a whole Bolingbroke places natural philosophy at the
head ("the mother of them all"), the science which alone can establish first principles, and
he distinguishes between real and fictitious science on the degree or ratio of sense
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experience incorporated into the formulation of theory: "all science, if it be real, must rise
from below, and from our own level. It cannot descend from above, nor from superior
systems of being and knowledge."11 Bolingbroke reiterates the Baconian conviction that
steady and controlled study of particulars, of causes and effects, tested through
experiments, leads to as much certain knowledge as the human mind ever appears
capable of attaining; and as long as the processes of thought remained in contact with the
evidence of the senses, real and positive knowledge would follow. For Bolingbroke, then,
"Experiment is the pillar of fire, which can alone conduct us to the promised land: and they
who lose sight of it, lose themselves in the dark wilds of imagination."12 Like the many
expositors of experimental science before him, however, Bolingbroke modifies his
bluntness with positive observations about the role of eloquence in argument and the
value of making preliminary hypotheses.13
Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful (1757), of course, takes a determined and radical empiricism to
his analysis of aesthetic experiences. In his Preface to the second edition, he defends his
method on familiar grounds, noting that while his inquiry will not lead to a perfect
knowledge of the subject the process will prove a beneficial personal discipline. Indeed,
Burke emphasizes that to pursue knowledge along the same empirical lines as the new
scientist may, though "carefully conducted . . . fail at the last of discovering the truth," but
that may be considered of less importance than the possibility that "it may answer an end
perhaps as useful in discovering to us the weakness of our own understanding. If it does
not make us knowing, it may make us modest."14 The method induces a positive sense of
the inquirer's place in the overall scheme of knowledge, and it initiates a positive concept
of identity and self-achievement. Burke counsels that "Whatever turns the soul inward on
itself, tends to concenter its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science.
By looking into physical causes our minds are opened and enlarged; and in this pursuit
whether we take or whether we lose our game, the chace is certainly of service."15
Furthermore, he sees a need to undertake a study of the imagination because, in
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investigating the nature of the passions which govern our sense of taste, it will give "the
taste a sort of philosophical solidity," and that will aid the acts of judgment and
discrimination; this, in turn, "may reflect back on the severer sciences some of the graces
and elegancies of taste, without which the greatest proficiency in those sciences will
always have the appearance of something illiberal."16 In other words, by giving the taste
some philosophical grounding, it would improve the aesthetic sense of the scientist,
making his use of language more conducive to all readers.
Near the end of the century, a figure who possessed a rather different temperament
to either that of Bolingbroke's or Burke's shows himself equally concerned to establish the
validity and credibility of new-science principles and procedures in the struggles of daily
life. In his essays collected under the title of The Enquirer (1798), William Godwin
organizes his inquiry according to an axiom which he considers a basic truth of all human
endeavour:
The intellectual eye of man, perhaps, is formed rather for the inspection of minute
and near, than of immense and distant objects. We proceed most safely, when we
enter upon each portion of our process, as it were, de novo; and there is danger, if
we are too exclusively anxious about consistency of system, that we may forget the
perpetual attention we owe to experience, the pole-star of truth.17
Based largely upon this conviction, Godwin rehearses a theory of intellectual development
from childhood to maturity which relies heavily upon Locke's ideas about children and the
acquisition of knowledge; he argues that, insofar as higher levels of intellectual activity
were improved and strengthened through experience and education, even genius could
benefit from a suitable programme of instruction. A carefully designed educational regime
which took account of how the mind actually responded to phenomena could extend and
refine the force of genius. However, he also accepts the validity of Hume's insights into
the role which habit and custom play in determining the usual processes of thought.
Godwin, in fact, sees in these two standard features of mental development a principle
which underlies "the entire basis of human knowledge": drawing the obvious conclusion
that our sense of uniformity and predictability rely upon a matrix of habit and custom, he
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concludes that these actually instill a propensity in the mind to discover order and system
in the external world of nature.
The great danger of this self-educative process, of course, lies in its capacity to
make reason stubborn about the relationships of cause and effect. As Hume argued,
because habitual responses condition our comprehension of the seeming stability of
common everyday reality, we "are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by
the mere operation of our reason, without experience." Hume points out that most of us
do not actually make inquiry into the way things operate one upon the other, taking it upon
trust that we know how the laws of gravity or impulsion work: "We fancy, that were we
brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard-ball
would communicate motion to another upon impulse." The depth of this confidence
derives from the force of custom in all thought, and Hume concludes that where its power
"is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even conceals itself, and seems
not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree."18 Blind to the actual
connection between things and ideas, reason proceeds to formulate comprehensive
statements about the world based upon an at best rudimentary grasp of the phenomena.
Hence, says Godwin, "We perceive the succession of events, but we are never
acquainted with any secret virtue, by means of which two events are bound to each
other"; even so, this basic ignorance of cause and effect does not hinder speculation
about the entire fabric of the universe, Godwin finding that "there is a regularity and
system in the speculations of philosophers, exceeding any that is to be found in the
operations of nature. We are too confident in our own skill, and imagine our science to be
greater than it is."19 Of course, this argument supports further the claim of the new
scientists that our understanding of words relies too much upon an easy acceptance of
the constituents and the relationships of things to sense to signs.
Tamworth Reresby provides a good example of a writer who pursued the type of
reasoning censured by Godwin and Hume. In his A Miscellany of Ingenious Thoughts
and Reflections (1721), Reresby articulates a series of arguments based upon a
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confident sense of cause and effect, asserting principles of knowledge and articles of
belief which rested upon presuppositions about the framework of human intelligence. In
an essay titled "What most conduces to the Improvement of Human Understanding,"
Reresby begins with the belief that "the Perfection of the Mind or Understanding consists
in its Union with GOD, who is its sole and true Good." From this principle it follows that
"Truth could not be any Perfection; of our Understanding, if it were not the same with the
Divine Essence; and since that is the only necessary or Ideal Truth, it follows likewise that
this only is the Objective Perfection of humane Understanding."20 He rejects all studies
which do not lead to this perfection as useless and vain, finding that "true Learning
resides only in the Comprehension of those Sciences whose Foundations are fix'd and
immutable."21 As Hume and Godwin testify, only a method which could inhibit Reresby's
brand of confident philosophizing deserved the respect of serious thinkers, and only by
means of a method which forced reason to focus primarily upon the connections between
real things could a serious education occur.
Such remarks as Hume's, Bolingbroke's, Burke's, and Godwin's underscore the
cardinal worth assigned to the methodology and the ethos of experimental science in the
eighteenth century: its hegemonic potency hinged on its capacity to function as an
intellectual catalyst, to forge bridges amongst differing phenomenal fields. Confirming
what a number of Enlightenment scholars see as an essential element of its temper,
Norman Hampson concludes that, if the label Age ofEnlightenment retains any
descriptive currency at all, it simply "refers to ways of thinking and behaving that
permeated many aspects of life." In other words, the term does not define a limited set of
philosophical, theological, or aesthetic positions but encouraged "an attitude of mind
rather than a course in science and philosophy."22 Ernst Cassirer concurs, stipulating that
Enlightenment "thinking cannot be seen in its purest and clearest form where it is
formulated into particular doctrines, axioms, and theorems; but rather where it is in
process, where it is doubting and seeking, tearing down and building up." The
Chapter Four, p. 179
philosophical ethos of the eighteenth century can therefore neither be abstracted from nor
be reduced to the views of its leading figures because "it consists less in certain individual
doctrines than in the form and manner of intellectual activity in general."23 Hume, again,
embodies this attitude perfectly when he determines to "reject every system of ethics,
however subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation."24 Even
Reresby, however much he yearned for the certitudes of idealistic philosophy, accepted
that only that thinker who possessed "an awaken'd Genius" and who put that genius to
work "furnishing his Mind with the clearest Ideas, in settling the Relations and
Consequences of one to another, and in disposing these after an orderly Method in his
Brains," deserved "a title to true Learning." Learning, says Reresby, should produce an
individual who "not only thinks distinctly, but is able at all times to set his Thoughts in the
best Light, and argue independently, and consequentially."25 The emphasis here on clear
and distinct ideas, of course, echoes a basic epistemological principle of the new
scientists, one which found its most influential statement in Locke's work.
Thus many of the seemingly confused or contradictory utterances about such
matters as the correlation between thing and word, the faculties of mind essential to great
poetry, the primacy of form over content (or the contrary) which litter the literature of the
eighteenth century do begin to make more sense when we unravel the various strands of
their hegemonic "lineage." Reflection upon Addison's remark about Horace—that Horace
"declares that he is not offended with those little Faults in a Poetical Composition, which
may be imputed to Inadvertency or the Imperfection of Human Nature"-for example,
shows Addison finding classical support for a developing critical attitude to writing which
also seems to share the new scientists' sense of the impossibility of achieving perfect or
complete knowledge. Just as the scientists accepted that human frailty and limitation
eventually stymied all attempts to comprehend nature in its full complexity, so Addison
can assert a critical maxim that "The truth of it is, there can be no more a perfect Work in
the World than a perfect Man. To say of a celebrated Piece that there are Faults in it, is in
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effect to say no more, than that the Author of it was a Man."26 The numerous rescriptions
on the same or similar themes (like the debate about the necessity or otherwise of rhyme
in poetry), the poetic value derived from certain features of poetry (such as description or
personification), the various (and often competing) assessments of a particular genre--all
these represent ongoing, transactional discourses which make tangible the shaping
power of scientific hegemony upon eighteenth-century culture.
The persistence of the classical and Christian hegemonies in intellectual life
guaranteed that most of the themes and concerns which exercised seventeenth-century
poets and critics continued to occupy those of the eighteenth: the poet's sacred role both
as the mediator between man and nature; the moral function of poetry; the "proper"
subject-matter allowable in the respective genres; the type of language appropriate to
poetry; the ways in which poetry produced differing degrees of delight. The seemingly
reiterative (and so for many annoying) nature of eighteenth-century critical debate does
not, however, prove that their views about literature created a stultifying, blandly
prescriptive critical environment. The reiteration indicates rather that the old issues and
doctrines were undergoing constant questioning, and the willingness to question and
analyse was motivated partly by the new and powerful intellectual ethos and
epistemological ideals put into practice through the application of experimental science.
Moreover (and this, it needs saying, remains significant), eighteenth-century writers
prosecute more detailed examinations into "approved" theories of the genres as a whole,
and they show a greater willingness to examine the verities of literary doctrine, than did
their precursors. They may persist in their admiration and respect for ancient literature
and ancient poets (particularly Homer, Horace, and Virgil), they may often appeal to
ancient models for guidance or authority, but they almost always retain independence of
mind and the confidence to challenge the dogma of fixed genres.27 A common and
mundane remark like the following, by the anonymous editor of The Beauties of Poetry
Display'd (1757), that "Every Species of Poetry has its Rules, which, being founded on
Nature, must be observed by every one who would excel in this agreeable Art" would
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appear to provide fairly conclusive evidence that the taste of the age accepted that no
poetic rules remained to be discovered.28 Yet the clause, "being founded on Nature,"
points to the basic conviction held throughout the period that experience and "life" lay at
the heart of the poetic genres, and therefore that ultimately the genres were dynamic not
inert forms of expression. In literature, as elsewhere, the eighteenth century prided itself
on the principle that a close study of nature would yield new innovations and new
materials for invention: just as new knowledge in natural history and in many of the other
sciences pushed these to new discoveries and "improvements," so this suggested that
the literary genres were neither static nor perfected. A year after publication of The
Beauties of Poetry Display'd Hume writes that
It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or
can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding, from comparing those
habitudes and relations of ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation
is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing
but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in
all countries and ages.29
Throughout the eighteenth century many other writers, of all ranks and abilities, revert
again and again to personal experiences, to the evidence of their senses, to the "natural"
as justification for their choice of expression and for the strength of their literary
responses. The type of emotion allowable in a certain species, how a particular type of
poem should be structured, the value of rhyme in poetry-personal experience and
personal judgment more and more provided the standards for settling such issues. For
instance, the author of an essay titled "Some Account of Elfrida, a dramatic Poem;
written, on the Model of the ancient Greek Tragedy, by Mr Mason; with Remarks" asserts
that it may once have been appropriate to esteem the ancients during the initial stages of
the Renaissance, but now that "learning has been not only revived but improved, after
genius has again formed the taste, and criticism regulated the judgment, the same
fondness for antiquity is ridiculous; nor is it more absurd to prefer the philosophy of
Aristotle to that of Newton, than to prefer his rudiments to the most perfect plan of the
modern drama."30 Thus many writers, even if they pay a measure of obeisance to the
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ancients, as often as not reject the prescriptions of classical authority when they deem it
contradictory to the veracity of their own perceptions, the spirit of "natural invention"
increasing as the century progresses. A number of illustrations should make the point
sufficiently.
In 1695 Samuel Cobb makes a complaint (which was to become rather familiar in
the eighteenth century) in his Preface to Bersaba: Or, The Love of David about a
disturbing development in the world of letters-that "every paltry Apprentice that has read
a few Plays, sets up for an Author." If such authors could accept their minor successes
(and major failures) with humility, or better yet silence, Cobb could stomach their
effusions; instead, lacking any sense of their own mediocrity as writers, these authors turn
into vicious critics: because "they have no Wit themselves, [and] will not allow any in
others," they attack "like a Pack of Irish Wolves." These newfangled critics never make
just or discerning observations about the merit of any work because they lack a sufficient
knowledge of the ancients and the rules of poetry deduced from classical works. On the
contrary, with such critics "it is grown a modern Vice to amuse the Reader with
Chriticisms upon the Ancients."31 During this phase of his career, Cobb belongs to that set
of neo-classical writers for whom the moderns appeared a mere excited rabble (his
remarks obviously owe much to his class bias); however, twelve years later he strikes a
rather more rebellious, anti-authoritarian tone. In a Letter to (Richard Carter Esq.): late of
the (Middle-Temple) now living in (Barbados) (1707) still registers anger at criticism born
of "the pure Effect of Spleen, Passion, and Self-Conceit," but he now expresses less
willingness to side uncritically with the ancients.32
On the one hand, as a writer born into a culture deeply-rooted in classical literature
and which considered the ancients both a source of sublimity of language and for models
of the best composition, Cobb shows himself responsive to the classically-derived view of
the bard's sacred vocation as the rightful mediator of truth, the arbiter of nature and
morals who can, Cobb writes, "teach more good than Hobbs or Lock can do" (PSO, sig.
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A4V). On the other hand, not only does he belong to a culture which was putting new value
on the rejection of authority and of self-expression but he harbours a poet's typical
ambitions, and in Of Poetry: A Poem he states his desire to write verse which would rival
that of his illustrious precursors:
O cou'd my Muse reach Milton's tow'ring Flight,
Or stretch her Wings to the Maeonian Height!
Thro' Air, and Earth, and Seas, I wou'd dispense
His Fame, and sing it in the loudest Verse.
(PSO, p. 221)
Of course, to reach such glorious heights a poet must stand away from the normal herd of
writers; he must fashion an identity for himself, a poetical ethos, in keeping with the poet's
high calling. Like Wesley some few years before him Cobb sees that, inasmuch as he
entertained serious hopes for poetical success, he must tackle both the problem of
traditional authority (the burden of the past) and formulate an intelligible ideal by which to
govern a writing process which could meet the needs of the present.
Cobb argues that classical writers achieved supremacy precisely because they
would not allow rules to fetter the form or content of their expression. The greatest
geniuses of the past wrote without regard for a set of prescriptive laws, leaving the
dissemination of rules to the grammarians and rhetoricians. Accordingly, if he hopes to
mould and exercise "Reason, with a free, generous and Manly Spirit," like the hero or the
prophet, Cobb proclaims that the poet must snap the chains of custom and education:
Who knows the secret Springs of the Soul, and those sudden Emotions, which
excite illustrious Men, to act and speak out of the Common Road? They seem
irregular to Us by reason of the Fondness and Bigotry we pay to Custom, which is
no Standard to the Brave and Wise. The Rules we receive in our first Education, are
laid down with this Purpose, to restrain the Mind; which by reason of the
Tenderness of our Age, and the ungovernable Disposition of Young Nature, is apt to
start out in Excess and Extravagance. But when Time has ripen'd us, and
Observation has fortify'd the Soul, we ought to lay aside these common Rules with
our Leading-strings . . . Thus a Good Poet should make use of a Discretionary
Command 33 (PSO, p. 223)
Once a poet gains control over his rational and imaginative resources, he will no longer
look upon the ancients as the only writers worthy of imitation, as the only guides to
expression. In the first place, Cobb reasons, the great span of time and the wholly
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different cultural tastes which separated the ancients from the moderns actually
disqualified the ancients as appropriate models for contemporary writers. Their
understanding of nature and their cultural experiences could offer the modern poet but
scanty assistance as he went about trying to achieve mastery of a vocation which, after
all, required the writer to "strictly shew / In Charming Numbers, what is false, what true"
(.PSO, n. pag.).
Furthermore, if an aspiring poet blindly or uncritically followed rules of composition
drawn from the ancients or from other illustrious models, he would inevitably begin to
detest the nature of his task, and eventually his energy and his love of literature would
dissipate. He might imitate well and correctly, but he would take little pride in works which
did not release his imaginative power (a factor which Locke considered a stumbling-block
to every educational endeavour). Cobb puts it in the following terms: "He who creeps by
the Shore, may shelter himself from a Storm, but is likely to make very few Discoveries:
And the cautious Writer, who is timorous of disobliging the captious Reader, may produce
your true Grammar, and unexceptional Prosodia, but most stupid Poetry" (PSO, p. 221).
Hence, the poet must approach the practice of writing with the courage and confidence to
make great attempts, to make mistakes, and to risk failure and even obscurity. Instead of
worrying ceaselessly about committing small errors in taste, expression, or form-errors a
discerning reader would in any case silently pass over-the poet should assume "the
Boldness of an enterprizing Author, whose artful Carelessness is more instructive and
delightful than all the Pains and Sweat of the Poring and Bookish critick." Instead of
burdening the poet with rules which deaden his spirit, Cobb advises that he should allow
himself to "follow the Talents that Nature has furnish'd him with, and his own
Observations has improv'd," and in the course of time the moderns could expect "to see
Inventions in all Arts, which may dispute Superiority with the best Athenian and Roman
Excellencies" (PSO, n. pag.). Bacon could not have stated it any more bluntly or
enthusiastically.
Chapter Four, p. 185
Thomas Parnell, although he considered his age "much beholden to Antiquity for
those excellent Compositions by which Writers at present form their Minds," similarly
qualifies his respect for the ancients, carefully putting forward the suggestion that no poet
should exactly imitate them in every facet of their poetry: "it is not so much requir'd of us
to adhere to their Fables, as to observe theirManner." By manner, Parnell means that
writers should study the way in which the ancients treated their respective subject-matter,
how they shaped and crafted their poems, how they employed certain figures to describe
objects or passions, and so forth, but as for the actual content of the poem, a modern
must rely upon his own stores of knowledge and experience, applying his own talents to
create imaginative forms. Even if the ancients provided a storehouse of excellent models
and apt observations which no serious poet would ignore, Parnell can see that "if we
preclude our own Invention, Poetry will consist only in Expression, or Simile, or the
Application of old Stories; and the utmost Character to which a Genius will arrive, will
depend on Imitation, or a borrowing from others."34 Parnell adds that illustrations drawn
both from the ancients and from illustrious British examples (Milton and Spenser, for
instance) proved not only that "Invention is not bounded by what has been done before"
but that slavish and pedantic imitation would frustrate its main purpose, which was to
"open our Imaginations" to a universe of beauty and truth.35
Parnell's remarks indicate that, as with the concept of wit (and other terms relating
to the literary faculties), the concept of genius underwent re-evaluation and re-definition
during the century. A full study of the concept of genius cannot be undertaken here but,
interestingly, just as wit became linked with imagination and invention, writers began to
see genius as essential to invention; more importantly, they conceived genius in terms
which related it to the ethos of the new science. The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. XXIII,
July 1753, remarks:
Few words have been oftener used, and, perhaps, less understood than the word
genius; it has been applied indiscriminately to denote a superiority of parts and
abilities; but it is misapplied, as often as it means only a larger share of learning, or
profounder capacity than other men possess. Capacity is no genius; it is something
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passive, as the word implies, in which sense it has ever been used by all good
writers and should mean no more than a faculty of apprehending, and a power of
retaining ideas; it has nothing to do with the disposing of them afterwards. It is
invention, and that alone which deserves the name of genius. A tall faculty of the
intellect, (if I may be pardoned the expression) which looks around on every side,
finds out all that has any native relation to the object we contemplate, perceives
relations which are not obvious to others, and from their connexions can infer
certain truths and distant conclusions, (pp. 331-332).
The writer then goes on to instance Bacon, Boyle, Newton, Shakespeare, Milton, and
Dryden as instances of true genius. Towards the end of the century, Francis Webb will put
forward a similar argument about the power and function of genius.36
Many writers, particularly in the earlier decades of the century, endorsed a stricter
view of the value of the classic writers for the moderns. Indeed, the weakness and
decadence of modern verse was often blamed on those writers who showed "a too partial
and unmanly fondness of their own Wit," who ignored the invaluable mine of poetic
expression and of correct literary models found in ancient authors and whose perfection
no modern poet could hope to surpass.37 To achieve even a minor success, or so the
argument went, the poet must diligently study and imitate the ancients, a point trumpeted
by Bezaleel Morrice in his An Essay on the Poets (1721):
Ye Bardsl of shallow Sence, but specious Sound;
Ye Critics too, prepostrously profound;
Hither, with Me, direct your needful Sight,
And much insulted Nature, learn to right:
Nature! whose sacred Laws ye disallow,
And to vain Idols of your Fancy bow:
View each discreet, and glorious antient Bard,
Some Moderns too with proper Care regard;
Thus with submission due, receive your Law:
And Rules to frame your future Conduct, draw.38
Morrice here equates nature with the ancients, an equation often made by other
defenders of tradition. Thus Henry Baker, who pays tribute to modern discoveries in "the
Knowledge of Nature" and the many unmistakeable and important "Improvements in the
Productions of Art," upholds the ancients as "confessedly the Standard of all that regards
the Beauty of Sentiment, or the Delicacy of Expression. ... we are indebted [to them] for
every thing that is great in Design, and agreeable in execution." Baker contends that every
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modern poet who ever produced a work which won universal admiration relied heavily
upon some ancient model, that even the most original moderns "frequently condescend
not only to copy, but translate." He concludes by assuring the modern poet that careful
imitations will not render his art less delightful to his modern reader-indeed, that reader
would enjoy an added pleasure in tracing out "the original Strokes" of the ancient
embedded in the modern copy. Admittedly, this reduces the poet to the role of "a skilful
Architect," but since he cannot hope to attain to greater art than that of the ancients, he
must remain content.39 In brief, as the reviewer of Gilbert Wakefield's edition of Gray
makes clear, there were many readers who praised what they considered good uses of
imitations:
Notwithstanding the late Mr. Gray possessed an inexhaustible fund of invention,
perhaps no celebrated writer, in so small a compass, has so much availed himself
of the thoughts and observations of others. This remark, which might seem, on a
superficial view, to convey a tacit censure of his character as a writer, will, however,
on a nearer inspection, constitute a considerable portion of his praise; for, when we
see with what exquisite taste he has selected, and with what inimitable skill he has
appropriated what he has taken, the most rigid criticism will be constrained to
acknowledge, that he has manifested in this, not only the excellency of his
judgment, but the powers of his genius.40
Ironically, it would appear from this argument that a writer could, like Gray, become
"inimitable" through a genius for imitation, the reason why, perhaps, so many writers
followed the advice of observers like Morrice and Baker.41
In contrast to Baker's rather narrow perspective on the merits of imitation, John
Pinkerton, writing (under the pseudonym of Robert Heron) about fifty years later, strikes a
more combative pose. Although he begins with a statement of high esteem for ancient
writers-he cannot imagine that any sophisticated and sensitive reader would not consider
classical works as the repository of all worth striving for in culture-Pinkerton vigorously
attacks the doctrine of imitation and the rules derived from ancient poetry and criticism.
His views about poetry revolve around a fundamental conviction that
no good poetry can be written by an author who pays the smallest attention to the
arts of poetry. Which arts of poetry are, indeed, ... so many contradictions in
terms; for poetry is a faculty, not an art, an exertion of the mind to be circumscribed
by rules, only when some wonderful inventor shall teach watches to think; there
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being fully as much absurdity in the idea of giving mechanism to thought, as in that
of giving thought to mechanisms.42
Since the ability to write good verse requires a seemingly innate talent for it, Pinkerton
defines imitation as "in fact only a decent and allowed plagiarism. When it appears in a
certain degree, it is pronounced literary theft... in other degrees, and in certain forms
and dresses, it is called honourable: but in fact it only differs in the degree of disrepute"
(LL, p. 356). Echoing Cobb's call for boldness in writing, Pinkerton stipulates that all
young writers should be taught to hold imitation in the highest contempt; indeed, "They
ought even to be told that there is more applause due to a bad original, than to the best of
copies" (LL, p. 363). Once young writers learned that they could write according to their
own inclinations and judgments they would, he declares, "at least endeavour to be
original; and this they cannot accomplish without trying to think for themselves, and to dig
diamonds from the mines of invention of their own labour. A point of the utmost
consequence to every kind of science" (LL, p. 363).43 The final clauses reveal the analogy
which regulates Pinkerton's concepts: the poet should investigate nature, examine his
findings, and express his ideas with the same freedom as the experimental scientist.
Pinkerton, in fact, generally resorts to scientific criteria to evaluate and resolve
questions which arise in all fields of human endeavour. For instance, when a writer takes
up, say, some question of moral philosophy ("The Art of Life," he terms it), the way
forward lies along the path laid out by Hume: "Till authors can be persuaded to drop
generalities, and minutely examine particulars; not upon theoretical, but upon
experimental principles, it is in vain to expect any progress in this great science" (LL, p.
409). Although he advocates originality and novelty in literature, he nonetheless ranks
good sense as a necessary ingredient of all composition-"the salt that preserves the
other qualities from corruption" (LL, p. 57)--a point which the poet must always keep in
mind because his task demands such an extensive knowledge of life and manners. Not
surprisingly, when Pinkerton evaluates the critical works handed down from the ancients
he similarly disdains to follow in their footsteps. Calling Aristotle's Poetics "a crude and
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indigested performance, written by the author in his silly vanity of dictating in every
science then known to man," he finds it "full of gross improprieties and absurdities, that
could only proceed from an author's writing on a subject he knew nothing of' (LL, p. 230).
He later turns on Longinus, a critic in whom he finds (probably following Burke) that "the
Sublime is confounded with the Beautiful and the Tender, qualities of writing directly
opposite" (LL, p. 231); Longinus, Pinkerton concludes, "wrote on the sublime in a total
ignorance of what it was" (LL, p. 511). Hence, since ancient criticism can offer no perfect
system either of the genres or of the psychological effects of poetic language, he
contends that a poet should at all costs avoid chaining himself to a "system: with
attachment to which if a writer is tainted, he can never acquire wide and lasting fame"
(LL, p. 212). Corbyn Morris made a similar claim, claiming that he had endeavoured "to
give Definitions of the Subjects, upon which I have treated; a Plan the most difficult of all
others to be executed by an Author; But such an one, as I apprehend, deserves to be
more generally introduced and established. If once it was expected by the Public, that
Authors should strictly define their Subjects, it would instantly checque an Inundation of
Scribbling." Such a self-discipline would lead to positive progress in the quality of writing
because "The desultory manner of Writing would be absolutely exploded; and Accuracy
and Precision would be necessarily introduced upon every Subject." This determination to
provide accurate definitions of all his critical terms, he says, "is the Method pursued in
Subjects of Philosophy; Without clear and precise Definitions such noble Advances could
never have been made in those Sciences; And it is by the Assistance of these only, that
Subjects of Polite Literature, can ever be enlightened and embellish'd with just
Ornaments." Morris concludes that, "If Definitions had been constantly exacted from
Authors there would not have appeared one hundreth Part of the present Books, and yet
every Subject had been better ascertained."44
These few examples indicate in a limited way how scientific hegemony during the
eighteenth century modified perspectives about the act of writing poetry, about the
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function of invention, about the function of genres, and about the value of the poetic
tradition. Just as the experimental scientist was expected to make new discoveries, so
too the poet was urged to strike out on his own, to study the ancients but not to subject
his reason or his imagination to their authority; and just as Sprat argued that the
phenomena should guide the experimenter-that method did not preclude his freedom to
pursue a line of thought-the poet should not restrict his imagination by rules of
composition based upon works and writers who lived in ages largely disconnected to the
present. By analogy, the writing of poetry appeared to be an activity which could be
modelled on that of experimental science, an investigative and communicative "science"
founded on personal observation and experience. Thus Henry Baker explains, in his
Original Poems: Serious and Humourous (1725), that he "scarce ever. . . intentionally
sat down to write, but only copied the Ideas, / know not how arising, accidentally, in my
own Mind."45 Since these ideas arose naturally, as it were, he saw little reason to follow
the rules of poetry set down by others or to study ideas already expressed by other writers
on similar subjects; his poems, therefore, will exhibit "less of Art, and more of Nature,
than is usually found in Compositions of the like Sort." However, because all poetry "is no
more than a true Representation of Nature," those readers who possessed a "just Taste
of Poetry" would hardly turn away in disgust from Baker's verse.46 Indeed, while readers
would not find old thoughts in a new dress to delight them, in recompense they would
discover many novel thoughts and expressions of infinitely greater value. Significantly,
Baker describes his poems as "a natural History ofmy self, truly pointing out the Turn and
Disposition ofmy Soul at the Time it gave them Birth."47 In other words, the new science
offered Baker a model of self-examination and behaviour. He testifies to the growing
hegemonic influence of the new science: it was working on deeper levels of the poetic
process.
Section 2. Science and the Call for a New Poetic Ethos.
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As Chapter Three showed, the guidelines for scientific writings offered ideals for all types
of writing, including poetry. In their theoretical arguments about the links of words to
things and sounds to signs, the new scientists stimulated critical thinking about how
poetic language mediated between mind and nature, about how the poet's special
faculties enabled him to figure forth the beauty, truth, and distinctness of nature in images
which both moved and instructed the reader-thus fulfilling a fundamental doctrine of neo¬
classical poetics.48 In a limited way, then, the linguistic ethos for scientific writing also
offered the poet a prescriptive model for choosing and evaluating the proper signification
of words. We should not, however, immediately assume that this necessarily led to a
reductive prescriptiveness; it would be more accurate to see this model as an economy of
language which permitted, even encouraged, a highly complex philosophy of nature to
evolve in which the movements of language and thought somehow "mirrored" the
perceiver's experiences of nature. Morris, for instance, argued that accuracy of definition
and careful description did not mean that writing would "be encumbered with Stiffness."
On the contrary, "in illustrating the Truth of Definitions, there is a full Scope of the utmost
Genius, Imagination, and Spirit of a Writer," and he accordingly declares that any work
which followed such a method would be "adorned with the highest Charms appearing with
Propriety, Clearness, and Conviction, as well as Beauty."49 This perspective on poetic
language emerges, not surprisingly, in critical analyses of the nature and function of
descriptive language in achieving the overall aims of poetry and in observations of the
effect or the appropriateness of digressions and transitions (often termed method or
argument by eighteenth-century writers); more surprisingly, debates often focused on the
importance of these two factors in the lyric genre. However, in view of the widely
accepted conviction in the eighteenth century that the lyric genre was the "first" and most
primitive type of poetry, and that the lyric poet thus possessed the original qualities of the
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poetic "personality," it should seem a natural development that the lyric emerges as the
exemplary poetic form for theoretical illustration: just as the new scientists went to the
things themselves, so too did the genre theorists, but in terms of the more generalized
debate about poetry and its continued validity as one of the human sciences writers saw
the scientist's way as a means of rejuvenating popular perceptions of poetry and of poets.
While a figure like Morrice implored writers to conduct themselves according to ancient
rules, other voices advised the poet to behave in a manner more akin to that of the
scientist. This becomes clear when we examine how writers defended poetry. Throughout
the century prefaces, essays, and other forums often rehearsed a lengthy encomium upon
poetry, praising its ancient lineage and emphasizing the benefits bestowed upon society
by the poet's art: a striking number of these defences implore the poet to adopt the ethos
of the experimental scientist as a means for securing poetry's future.
Leonard Welsted provides a good example of this process of argument in his
Preface to Epistles, Odes, &c. Written on Several Subjects (1724). Starting from an
evaluation of the "general Cause and Concerns" of contemporary poets-that is, in view of
their aims and the subjects about which they usually wrote--he finds it difficult to "affirm,
that they prosper exceedingly in this Age."50 There may, of course, be perfectly valid
reasons for this state of affairs: people may receive greater pleasures from other pursuits,
from business or other forms of entertainment, or perhaps the general taste of the
population at the present time serves to make poetry unpopular. In other words, Welsted
sees that changes in the makeup of society, in levels of technological advancement, in
the constitution of the classes, and so forth, can bring about transformations in cultural
values. Whatever the extent or longevity of these changes, he does not expect the poor
reputation of poetry to continue for much longer; while the present appears rather gloomy
for "the Votaries of this Art" (EOSS, p. vi), he looks to the future with some confidence. In
the first place, Welsted takes comfort that for at least the last hundred years or so the arts
had continued to show a steady progression towards greater sophistication and
refinement; next, the English language, through a process of refinement and
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accumulation (brought about through learning, trade, and innovation), required "Little or
nothing ... in respect of Copiousness and Harmony" (EOSS, p. viii).51 Third, and here
Welsted appeals to a common theory of cultural progression, England seemed poised to
benefit from God's providential design which determined that the "Arts and Sciences, with
their Train of Blessings, shall visit, in their Turn, all Parts of the Globe" (EOSS, p. xi). The
glorious time, moreover, seemed near at hand.
To advance successfully "towards ... a Classical Age" (EOSS, p. xiv), however,
would require some effort on the part of England's writers. Although Welsted finds little to
complain of as regards the actual materials to hand, he finds a lack of true genius
amongst the writing crowd. True, the state of the English language appeared "ripe" for the
production of magnificent poetry, but only someone with "a fine Imagination and a skilful
Hand to direct the Pencil" (EOSS, p. xiv) could harvest this to the full. Part of the problem
derives from the complex and difficult art of composition itself, and part from the large-
scale failure of readers or listeners to appreciate true poetry.52 Greater damage to poetry's
reputation came from other quarters, however, Welsted singling out the overly
prescriptive temper of contemporary critics and other readers, a temper which drew upon
a too strict adherence to the classical rules. Welsted comments that all these much
vaunted rules "were primarily form'd upon and design'd to serve only as Comments to the
Works of certain great Authors, who compos'd those Works without them" (EOSS, p. xvii).
Applying these rules strictly and mechanically could not "contribute at all, towards the
raising or finishing a good Genius" for the obvious reason, he argues, that any writer who
busies himself with such rules will simply "play about the Surface of Poetry, but never dive
into its Depths; the Secret, the Soul of good Writing is not to be come at thro' such
mechanic Laws" (EOSS, p. xviii).53 As we shall see, quite a few eighteenth-century critics
adopt this line of thought about the rules of composition.
Welsted distinguishes, therefore, between two different types of poetry; one, which
might be called the mere act of versifying, and the other true poetry. The first relies
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heavily upon the thoughts, images, and forms found in established works: writers of this
sort copy slavishly, and because they serve up the same hackneyed ideas and images
over and over never really understand the nature of their stupidity. Writing of this type may
serve a certain mundane purpose, but its practitioners lacked both taste and spirit.54 On
the other hand, writers of the second type "are born with the Talent of judging," which
Welsted defines as "a new Sense or Faculty superadded to the ordinary ones of the Soul,
the Prerogative of fine Spirits" (EOSS, p. xix). In a typical appeal to the transcendent spirit
which suffuses poetry, Welsted claims that "the main Graces, and the cardinal Beauties
of this charming Art" escape coarser, blunter spirits because they lie deep "within the
Bosom of Nature, and are of too fine and subtle an Essence" (EOSS, p. xviii). Welsted
finds, as a direct consequence of this highly elevated spirituality, that access to the higher
realm of beauty can only be gained through feeling and emotion. Not rules but feeling
permits the writer "to think poetically, or to trace out, among the various Powers of
Thought, that particular Vein or Feature of it, which Poetry loves," and only feeling makes
it possible "to distinguish between the good Sense, which may have its Weight and
Justness in Prose, and that which is of the Nature of Verse" (EOSS, pp. xviii-xix). In short,
Welsted's concept of poetry appears to make the poetic act into a mysterious, divinely
inspired, eruption of passionate expression; at its basis his conception of the poetic act
and the spiritual function of poetry does not lie far off from that of the Romantics.55
Yet Welsted shares the same convictions about the hierarchical constitution of the
mind-how the differing faculties of mind stood in relation to one another in any act of
thought-as did many of his commonsensical, prosy contemporaries.56 If the fire of
imagination was indispensable for igniting the language of poetry, then unless reason
controlled the blaze all would simply disappear in a puff of smoke. As Welsted says, he
would not "throw the Talent of writing in Verse into a lawless Mystery, and make it a wild
ungovern'd Province, where Reason has nothing to do: It is certain, every Thing depends
on Reason" (EOSS, pp. xxi-xxii). Bringing in reason to restrain the lawless imagination at
this point would appear now to identify Welsted with the infamous band of neo-classical
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critics who lacked a true poetic sensitivity; certainly Welsted possessed his quotient of
neo-classical prejudices, but he proves himself a more subtle and discriminating critic
than, say, Morrice, calling for a more sympathetic and comprehensive appraisal of how
the mind in its imaginative fury functioned.
Firstly Welsted argues that every person would agree from experience that reason
operates differently and in varying forms in different sciences, but always in line with the
purpose of reason. All sciences aim at truth, and reason adapts according to its object or
to its special subject matter. In each case, it reveals equally valid truths, even if the writer
of poems goes about proving that truth through a process unlike that of the
mathematician. Welsted declares that "there is in good Poetry as rigid Truth, and as
essential to the Nature of it, as there is in a Question of Algebra" (EOSS, p. xxii). At this
point, interestingly, he turns the argument round to judge the other sciences by the
standard of the imagination, in part (and in common with the unifying, synthetic impulses
of the period) because he wants to keep all of them linked together, an integral whole not
a disjointed hierarchy. Rather than separate imaginative reasoning from that of
mathematical or other types, Welsted suggests that all thinking requires some measure of
imaginative engagement-poetry, naturally enough, relies upon the imagination more than
other sciences, but reasoning in whatever form always makes some use of the
imagination.
Finally, appealing to the classical verities of the time, he reminds critics that since
poetry must not only instruct but please, and since it performed a more difficult intellectual
task than other types of science, it ought not to suffer from judgments which do not take
adequate account of its special nature. As Welsted puts it, the
Imagination is as much a Part of Reason, as is Memory or Judgement, or rather a
more bright Emanation from it, as to paint and throw Light upon Ideas, is a finer Act
of the Understanding, than simply to separate or compare them: The Plays, indeed,
and the Flights of Fancy, do not submit to that sort of Discussion, which moral or
physical Propositions are capable of, but must nevertheless, to please, have
Justness and natural Truth: The Care to be had, in judging of Things of this Nature,
is to try them by those Tests that are proper to themselves, and not by such as are
proper only to other Knowledges. (EOSS, p. xxii)
Chapter Four, p. 196
If the critics of poetry could look with justice on the art, then they might acknowledge that
in the commonwealth of learning poetry deserved the same esteem as any other form of
knowledge, especially as "the Speculative Knowledge of Poetry [is not] less various or
delightful than that of any other Art" (EOSS, p. xliii). Thus, demanding that poetry receive
treatment commensurate with the importance of its function in all acts of the intelligence
astutely draws attention to the links between imagination, reason, and writing already
implicit (and often explicit) in new-science theorizing about how the mind made sense of
reality.57
When Welsted proposes a programme which would help poets to train their minds,
which would nurture their in-born genius, he appeals to the methods of the experimental
scientists. Since he already had condemned the practice of trying to write according to
critical rules as unlikely to nurture genius, this appeal might seem surprising, but Welsted
likewise had rejected the notion that inspiration itself could produce great poetry. Indeed,
when he explains how a poet should go about the business of storing his mind with
materials for poetry, how the poet should discipline himself as he worked over that
material, Welsted provides a blueprint for this aspect of the poetic character which comes
straight out of Bacon or Sprat.58 The one true way for the poet to nurture his genius
involves the familiar pattern of examining "closely and carefully into Men, Manners, human
Nature; by frequently viewing Things, as they are in themselves, and under their natural
Images, and by growing intimate with them; by accustoming his Mind to look deeply into,
and to judge accurately of all Objects" (EOSS, p. xxxi). Yet simply looking closely and
carefully at objects will not suffice: the poet must also adhere to a strict pattern of
interpretation and judgment, disciplining the whole mind (and not just the imagination) in
the production of ideas. Welsted lays down what he calls "the first universal Rule" of all
poetic behaviour-'Wever to give or deny one's Assent to any Thing, till we evidently see
the Truth or Falsehood of it' (EOSS, p. xxxii). After this he provides several general rules
for the conduct of the mind, all of which lean heavily on the behavioural maxims of the
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new science, particularly Locke's: "Never to reason of Things, that we have no clear Ideas
of; to begin by the simplest and easiest Truths; and to dwell long upon them, before we
proceed to those that are more difficult and compounded" (EOSS, p. xxxii). Interestingly,
Welsted feels that the objects of study for both poetry and logic "are infinite; they are not
to be found any where altogether, and in part every where; we must gather 'em . . . out of
all we read, all we see, all we hear, all we think of... we may go on for ever to improve
our Reason." Not surprisingly, he censures the "common School Logic, or Syllogisms,"
which he equates with the rules of poetry: they are "wholly useless; they serve no purpose
but to wrangle and dispute; they rather puzzle and embarrass the Understanding, than
enlighten it" (EOSS, p. xxxii). In any case, Welsted feels that only after a poet stores his
mind with solid materials for his imagination to work upon can he proceed to read the
great poets in a frame of mind capable not only of "tracing their Beauties" but of "striking
out of his own Reflections Improvements upon 'em" (EOSS, p. xxxi). If the poet can
combine all of these qualities and virtues with a severe study of his language, "sifting all
the Turns, Graces, and Refinements, it will admit of' (EOSS, p. xxxi), he may achieve
something of greatness. More importantly, he would help set a better standard of poetic
behaviour.
Section 3. James Thomson and the New Poetics
Welsted's guidelines for disciplining the poet's mind thus provide a fairly clear sign of
where poets could go to find materials for a "new" poetic identity, but on the whole his
advice remains rather vague and abstract, a set of prescriptions about the means which a
poet should adopt to discipline his mind but little in the way of practical illustration of how
to apply the fruits of this discipline in the actual writing of poetry. His poems certainly offer
little indication that he knew how to take his own counsel. In the work of James Thomson,
however, we find a similar argument in favour of adopting the scientific attitude to nature
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but with some important differences, and I want therefore to look at his ideas in some
depth. Like almost every other writer of the first half of the century, he was much
exercised by the problem of the poetic "personality," but unlike so many other writers he
actually formulated a poetics based upon the model of the new science (and in a way as a
response to the new science). Moreover, he put what he learned into practice, as will
become clear when I illustrate the manner in which Thomson revised certain key
passages in The Seasons. Next, however much modern critics may now disregard
Thomson's contribution to eighteenth-century poetry, for some one hundred and fifty or
more years he remained one of the most influential British poets. Highly regarded in his
day, he inspired numerous poets and critics and laid the basis, I believe, of a new
appreciation of the relationship between nature's ability to infuse the imagination and the
function of descriptive writing, and in turn this reoriented perceptions of the lyric genre's
potential for achieving elevated and sublime poetic effects.
In Prophetic Strain, Anne Williams regards Thomson as a poet possessed of a
quintessentially lyric consciousness (which would, I suppose, make The Seasons into a
kind of lyric epic), but it seems quite unnecessary to make such a claim for Thomson.59
Indeed, if his usual poetic sympathies or instincts lay anywhere, they lay with pastoral,
perhaps in some sort of feeling which might go by the name of the pastoral sublime. Of
course pastoral and lyric-especially as the eighteenth century understood these genres-
do overlap, as the myriad of pastoral songs and ballads produced during the century
amply testify. In his Essays on Song-Writing (London: 1772), for example, John Aikin
traces the development of the native ballad tradition, pointing out that during the century
its appeal had grown extensively, partly because "a real or affected taste for beautiful
simplicity has almost universally prevailed," and this new taste for ballad imitation, if
"affected," nonetheless had transformed it into "a serious composition, turned however in
its general subject from the story of martial adventure to the pathetic tale of the peaceful
village. It is a just taste, founded upon real observation of nature, which enjoins simplicity
of expressing in every attempt to engage the sympathetic emotions; we have many
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delightful examples of its success."60 Moreover, one of the main reasons for the pastoral
song's success was its generic demand "to follow nature exactly and with a minute nicety"
and particularly, says Aikin,
in the scenery and description. Natural objects are scarcely ever disgusting, and
there is no country so unblessed as to be unprovided with an ample store of
beauties, which must ever please in an accurate representation, independently of all
fashion or peculiarity of taste. It is unpardonable in a poet to borrow these from any
fountain but nature herself, and hereby he will most certainly avoid the mistakes and
incongruity of imagery, which they are apt to fall into who describe from ideas
gained by reading rather than observation.61
Thomson, of course, would have agreed wholeheartedly with Aikin's views about nature
and poetry. That said, Thomson's value for this study derives from his perception of a
crisis in poetry and the way in which he tried to resolve that crisis. He does so in part
through a poetics which relies heavily upon pastoral conventions, not lyric ones, but in
doing so he helps to illuminate a number of important poetical issues which brought the
lyric genre to centre stage in eighteenth-century poetical debate. This digression into
Thomson's poetry should on the whole prove worthwhile.
Just as many critics see little of poetical value in the eighteenth-century lyric, so
they tend to undervalue the presence of pastoral imagery and conventions in the poetry.62
Indeed, eighteenth-century poets retreat to pastoral groves with such regularity that
modern readers, dulled by repetition, usually dismiss the image of the grove as
conventional and meaningless. The literature of the period abounds with comments like
the one in Spectator 15: "True Happiness is of a retired Nature, and an Enemy to Pomp
and Noise; it arises, in the first place, from the Enjoyment of one's self; and, in the next,
from the Friendship and Conversation of a few select Companions. It loves Shade and
Solitude, and naturally haunts Groves and Fountains, Fields and Meadows."63 It might
seem likely that prosaic, eighteenth-century readers were similarly inured to the ubiquitous
poetical representations of the pastoral grove. We might detect a hint of weariness, for
instance, in Johnson's comment that "When a poetical grove invites us to its covert, we
know that we shall find what we have already seen ... a natural grot shaded with
myrtles." Yet even as Johnson acknowledges the conventionality of the pastoral grove he
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considers pastoral imagery one of enduring sources of pleasure when reading poetry: "yet
who can forbear to enter the pleasing gloom, to enjoy coolness and privacy, and gratify
himself once more by scenes with which nature has formed him to be delighted."64 Since
Johnson knows that this "entering" constitutes an act of imagination, not a real retreat to a
grove, the force of the feeling cannot be underestimated. In fact, the prevalence of groves
and other pastoral conventions in eighteenth-century poetry indicates a widespread
appeal among poets and readers alike: in simple terms the "country" meant nature, a
subject sure to touch a responsive chord. At an obvious level of appeal, the simple, if
idealized pleasures of a pastoral life contrasted sharply with the complexity of a city
existence, offering a welcome curative for the pollution and enervation of body and mind
which accompanied urban living. Pastoral, says Rene Rapin in his influential essay, De
Carmine Pastorali (added to Thomas Creech's 1684 translation of Theocritus's
Idylliums), never fails to move readers because it recalls for them the restorative powers
of nature: "the Country is so ravishing and delightful, that twill raise Wit and Spirit even in
the dullest Clod." Moreover, that poet anxious to meet the demands of his sacred
vocation will find the country, as opposed to the city, peculiarly well-suited for poetic
inspiration: "in truth, amongst so many heats of Lust and Ambition which usually fire our
Citys, I cannot see what comfort is left for a chast and sober Muse."65 In addition Rapin
notes that, unlike the city, the country makes one feel at home in the world, a vibrant and
integral part of a larger, more comprehensible whole: that person lucky enough to escape
the city "is much more happy in a Wood, that at ease contemplates this universe, as his
own, and in it, the Sun and Stars, the pleasing Meadows, shady Groves, green Banks,
stately Trees, flowing Springs, and the wanton windings of a River, fit objects for quiet
innocence."66
Such declarations occur regularly and testify to the appeal of this pastoral "feeling,"
as in John Morfitt's poem Philotoxi Ardenae; The Woodmen of Arden (1788):
Farewell, hoarse Quarrels of the Bar!
The Fraud of Courts, with ever-bending Knee, and all
The dusty Cohort of the Great, farewell!
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Here Quiet reigns; who me, long lost in Grief,
Has to myself restor'd: here reigns secure.
Quiet! Sole Medicine to a Mind Diseas'd.67
Pastoral imagery, even in a poem of such limited merit as Morfitt's, could initiate a chain
of associated ideas and feelings shared by most eighteenth-century readers. Not all
writers, moreover, used pastoral conventions and imagery in jejune, artificial ways, as a
careful analysis of Thomson's revisions to The Seasons indicates. Pastoral focused his
creative energies, and his alterations to certain grove scenes specifically show that
pastoral conventions were indispensable in the evolution of his ideas about nature, man,
and poetry.
Critics from Johnson to his latest editor take note of Thomson's obsession with
revision and accept that some rationale lay behind this obsession. Ralph Cohen, for
example, observes that Thomson's "attitude to language and unity ... is itself
experimental and tentative, and the frequent revisions indicate that in The Seasons he
was dissatisfied with and unable to withdraw from the published work," while James
Sambrook labels him "an inveterate tinkerer."68 Cohen finds that Thomson usually made
the right choice when he altered his poem, that these decisions "had sound sensibility
behind them if one grants the kind of poem he was writing." He remains uncertain,
however, of the poetic principles which guided these choices, concluding that Thomson
altered for "whatever reasons."69 Presumably, Thomson's poetic was neither innate nor
static but evolved under the pressure of various poetic influences, through reading,
thinking, discussing, formed by and in reaction to numerous elements working in his
culture. Admittedly, a lack of sufficiently detailed information about Thomson's critical
ideals effectively limits speculation, yet it is possible to extract from the extant materials a
set of principles which do guide his "sound sensibility."
That Thomson viewed a great deal of contemporary poetry with contempt seems
clear from his Letters and the Preface to Winter: poets he could see needed to adopt
new methods, new attitudes, to writing. His own early experimentation, however, met with
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adverse criticism. Writing to Mallet (in August 1725), he refers to William Aikman's
comments on his diction and asserts that "His Reflections on my Writings are very good;
but He does not, in Them, regard the Turn of my Genius enough. Should I alter my Way, I
would write poorly. I must chuse, what appears to me the most significant Epithet or I
cannot, with any Heart, proceed."70 Thomson, to his credit, continued to forge his own
way, his stubbornness vindicating his intuitions. As a writer noted in the London Journal,
4 June 1726, Thomson's Winter displayed a "new and peculiar manner" of writing worthy
of endorsement; he further assured readers that "the new and masterly manner in which
[Thomson] has introduced his Reflections, and made them to succeed his several
Descriptions throughout the whole Performance" would provide "a most entertaining,
rational, instructive Delight and Satisfaction, to every one whose Mind is capable of
receiving it."71 This, certainly, offered better encouragement, but after the initial success of
Winter Thomson clearly began to reflect more seriously upon his ideas about poetry. A
Preface appeared with the second edition of Winter (June 1726) but never appeared after
publication of the full Seasons of 1730. Spring, published in 1728, included Proposals
for An Essay on Descriptive Poetry, which suggests that Thomson's reflections were
concentrating on the role of description in contemporary poetry: unfortunately, he never
published that essay. Interestingly, these Proposals emerged after publication of A Poem
Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton (May 1727). Thomson included Newton in
most of the full editions of The Seasons published during his lifetime, and it seems
plausible to conclude therefore that in Newton he first conceptualized the basic elements
for a new poetic, and later decided that the essay on description was unnecessary.721
point out the number of these various printings to suggest their importance to Thomson's
thinking, and to emphasize that the matter of his thinking, and the poetics which he
develops, would have reached (and perhaps influenced) a fairly wide audience. The
revisions to The Seasons do suggest that he found a way to select that "most significant
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Epithet" and, as we will see, his difficulty provides a key to understanding the rise of the
lyric.
Thomson, in common with many eighteenth-century writers, looked gloomily on
poetry's future as one of the revered sciences. As early as 1725 he complains that "As for
Poetry, she is now a very Strumpet and so has lost all her life, and Spirit, or rather a
common Strumpet, passes herself upon the world for the chast, Heaven-born Virgin."73
Ten years later he identifies the popular press as a major factor leading to poetry's
decline. The press unleashes a "Torrent of Barbarism," and he expects "to see all Poetry
reduced to Magazine-Miscellanies, all Plays to Mummery Entertainments, and, in short, all
Learning absorb'd into the Sink of hireling scurrulous News-Papers."74 The Preface to
Winter makes a spirited defence of poetry, echoing Sidney of course, and also bearing a
strong resemblance to Joseph Trapp's 1718 Preface to The Aeneis of Virgil. Trapp says:
"However Poetry may have been dishonoured by the Follies of Some, and the Vices of
Others; the Abuse, or Corruption of the best Things being always the worst: It will,
notwithstanding, be ever regarded, as it ever has been, by the wisest, and the most
judicious of Men, as the very Flower of human Thinking, the most exquisite Spiht that can
be extracted from the Wit, and Learning of Mankind."75 While Thomson admits that "there
may seem to be some Appearance of Reason for the present Contempt of [poetry], as
managed by the most part of our modern Writers," he hopes that readers with real
learning and taste will recognize the injustice of such contempt: after all, "It is affronting
the universal Taste of Mankind, and declaring against what has charmed the listening
World from Moses down to Milton."76 Discerning readers should distinguish good from bad
poetry: good poetry "seems to be the peculiar Language of Heaven" (p. 303) and displays
"the finer, and more amusing Scene of Things" (p. 304); bad poetry exhibits "forced,
unaffecting, Fancies; little glittering Prettinesses; mixed Turns of Wit, and Expression" (p.
303). Bad poetry appeals to "weak-sighted Gentlemen" who "cannot bear the strong Light
of Poetry" (p. 304), whereas good poetry contains "the very Soul of all Learning, and
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Politeness" (p. 303). Poetry, he affirms, stands between civilized society and the Winter
which always surrounds and threatens it with, in Pope's terms, a "Universal Darkness"
which "buries All" beneath it.77
Thomson, as we might expect, abides by Sidney's definition of the poet as a semi-
divine figure essential for expressing spiritual and civilized values, who expounds either
old or new knowledge to bridge the gulf between nature, thinker, and society: an
intellectual leader. As Thomson sees it, however, most modern poets ignored the
seriousness of their social role, using poetry to escape that responsibility, not fulfil it, and
unless they gained some new sense of their poetic destiny, the danger existed that
society could slide back into barbarity. Part of the solution to this dilemma would involve
poetry's return "to her antient Truth, and Purity," a movement which would make it
possible once more for poetry to "be inspired from Heaven" (p. 304). With such divine
inspiration, poetry could then "exchange Her low, venal, trifling, Subjects for such as are
fair, useful, and magnificent; and let Her execute these so as, at once, to please, instruct,
surprize, and astonish: and then, of Necessity, the most inveterate Ignorance, and
Prejudice, shall be struck Dumb; and Poets, yet, become the Delight and Wonder, of
Mankind" (p. 304). To reassert poetry's importance in cultural life Thomson argues that
poets must once more choose "great, and serious, Subjects; such as, at once, amuse the
Fancy, enlighten the Head, and warm the Heart" (p. 304).78 Not surprisingly, he finds "no
Subject more elevating, more amusing; more ready to awake the poetical Enthusiasm, the
philosophical Reflection, and the moral Sentiment, than the Works of Nature" (p. 305). In
order to express this subject, however, he needed a form suitable to the purpose.
Pastoral, naturally enough, readily suited Thomson's needs. In an early letter he
writes: "Happy he! who can comfort himself amidst the general night, and in some rural
retirement, by his own intellectual fire and candle as well as natural, may cultivate the
muses, inlarge his internal views, harmonize his passions, and let his heart hear the voice
of peace and nature."79 Loudly echoing Rapin, he notes that all the great poets devoted
themselves to "Retirement, and Solitude. The wild romantic Country was their Delight.
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And they seem never to have been more happy, than when lost in unfrequented Fields,
far from the little, busy, World, they were at Leisure, to meditate, and sing the Works of
Nature" (p. 305). The problem, of course, was that every poet could (and usually did)
claim that his poetry sang nature's works. Thomson cannot reform poetry, therefore,
simply by reproaching his fellow poets: he needs to show not tell.80 He needed a great
and serious subject, an event to concentrate his mind, so to speak, wonderfully.
On 20 March 1727, Sir Isaac Newton died. Thomson's A Poem Sacred to the
Memory of Sir Isaac Newton appeared on 8 May 1727.81 The elegy presents a panegyric
which, in A. D. McKillop's words, "still convey[s] a fresh and authentic response to
Newtonian science."82 Douglas Grant claims that Thomson's "harmonious marriage of
scientific accuracy and poetic imagination make the poem a remarkable achievement,"
which he rates "among the finest of its kind in our language."83 Certainly the eighteenth-
century reading public found it superior to other tributes: the poem went through four
printings in one year.84 Although good, even "a remarkable achievement," critics generally
consider Newton of limited value: covering familiar ground, it does not appear significant
to the evolution of The Seasons.85
In fact, the poem marks an important epoch in Thomson's poetic development.
Ostensibly, it both praises Newton's greatness and laments his loss--a model elegy-but
the formal conventions helped to clarify his understanding of the relations between nature
and poet, poet and society, science and poetry. The poetical ideology which he
announces in Newton provides a spur to his later writing and regulates the scores of
revisions which he made to The Seasons over some twenty or more years. After he
completes the work of writing Newton, Thomson understood better the grammar of
nature, mind, and poetry than before it; after Newton, he knew how to wrest back poetry
from the dilettantes, or at the least he could show an alternative poetry.
A warning to poets underlies the poem's obvious subject matter, Thomson seeing
that when poets ignore scientific advances they leave the door open for the scientist to
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subsume their traditional role as the mediating voice in man's relations with nature and
God.86 In so doing Newton provides, perhaps inadvertently, an epicedium for the Muses.
Confronted by the fact of Newton's death, Thomson asks:
Shall the great soul of Newton quit this earth,
To mingle with his stars; and every Muse,
Astonish'd into silence, shun the weight
Of honours due to his illustrious name?87
Surely an event as notable as Newton's death should call forth inspired and passionate
verse from Britain's poets, yet the Muses find themselves "Astonish'd into silence." In fact,
that Thomson begins by questioning the Muses here alerts the reader to the underlying
critical function of the poem; instead of a conventional invocation, he will address a series
of questions about Newton's career and achievements which will raise key issues about
the poet's role in Newton's age: how and why, that is, could and should a poet write in
such an age, especially since the poet must intend to "please, instruct, surprize, and
astonish." In other words, he will need to try and appreciate a mind such as Newton's.88
Thus, in the context of the poem's larger argument the invocation initiates an offensive in
the struggle to defend poetry against the real enemies to poetry's good name: the
dilettantes. When, therefore, Thomson innocently seems to ask the angelic "sons of light"
(I. 5) if they had "listen'd while [Newton] bound the Suns, / And Planets to their spheres!"
(II. 17-18), he may also be asking those other "sons of light"--the poets--if instead of
chasing the rewards of vanity they had studied Newton's laws of universal motion.
Thomson does not need to look far for a good reason why the poet should study the
new science: the laws which Newton discovered made redundant the intricate systems
taught in the schools. Unlike the "hopeless gloomy-minded tribe" (I. 162) of Scholastic
philosophers and rhetoricians, Newton "sat not down and dream'd / Romantic schemes"
which he then defended "by the din / Of specious words, and tyranny of names" (II. 23-
25). On the contrary, he
bidding his amazing mind attend,
And with heroic patience years on years
Deep searching, saw at last the System dawn,
And shine, of all his race, on him alone.
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(II. 26-29)
Before Newton, understanding planetary motion remained "th'unequal task / Of
humankind" (II. 18-19); as the planets mysteriously "roll'd / O'er erring man the year," the
secrets of their motions "disgrac'd / The pride of schools" (II. 19-21). Newton's scientific
method of inquiry, not the systemizing of the schools, proved "the secret hand of
Providence, / Wide-working thro' this universal frame" (II. 15-18), and only his corrected
the errors of past philosophies, including those of the ancient world: "And what the
triumphs of old Greece and Rome," writes Thomson, "but the pride of boys / In some
small fray victorious!" (II. 31-33). In short, Newton's reliance on observation and
experiment revealed a realm of knowledge which left "The schools astonish'd"; indeed,
they "found it vain / To keep at odds with demonstration" (II. 85-86), the echoing of
"astonish'd" reminding readers of the Muses' fate. Poets, the message rings clear, would
suffer the same ignominious fate as the much ridiculed scholastics unless they changed
their attitude to science.
Indeed, Thomson groups poets together with those thinkers who refused to accept
the new scientific order, who "unawaken'd, dream beneath the blaze / Of truth" (II. 87-88).
Unwilling or unable to catch the fire of inspiration from this truth, the poet effectually gives
up the right to sing nature's praises. As Thomson enjoys a sunset from Greenwich's
"lovely heights," the scene impresses on him "how beauteous the Refractive Law" (II.
122-124), but he doubts that any poet could "image aught so fair, / Dreaming in
whispering groves, by the hoarse brook" (119-120). The poet who allows his Fancy free
play in a vague dream-world state differs markedly from a Newton directing an "All
intellectual eye" (I. 39) upon nature, an eye "well-purg'd" and hence "penetrative" (I. 73).
Thomson knows, too, that historically poets availed themselves of whatever the science
of the day held true about the nature of the world: poet and scientist spoke differently, but
they still spoke about the same world. Thomson thus fears a chasm opening up between
new scientific conceptualizations of nature and poetic descriptions which ignore the new
truths. If poets failed to create descriptions based upon a solid and accurate knowledge of
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nature, then they could not properly convey the Newtonian universe: "in Fancy's lighter
thought, / How shall the Muse then grasp the mighty theme?" (II. 135-136). Shamefully,
that task will fall to those "Of the deep-studying race" who "can stretch their minds / To
what he knew" (II. 133-135), that is, to experimental scientists, to prose writers.89
Yet Thomson did study Newton's works (he even taught them) and, reflecting upon
those amazing accomplishments, he sees the "new way" for poetry; rather than dream
"Romantic schemes" and pursue idle fancies, the poet must adopt the same type of
discipline demanded by the scientific method. A new poetic ethos might then arise to
counter the "Torrent of Barbarism" and bring about a "Revival of Poetry" which the
Preface despaired was "not to be expected" (p. 304).90 Precisely because the new
science challenges modern poetic practice, Thomson sees that it can provide the strength
of mind necessary to inspire those "fair, useful, and magnificent" (p. 306) works which
might counter the trivial productions of his "tasteless Age." Therefore, he begs Newton to
look with pity down
On humankind, a frail erroneous race!
Exalt the spirit of a downward world!
O'er thy dejected country chief preside,
And be her Genius call'd! her studies raise,
Correct her manners, and inspire her youth.
(II. 198-203)
The choice of the phrase, "And be her Genius call'd," makes it doubly clear that Thomson
sees the scientific method as the only way for poets to regain the inspirational initiative.
These lines, by the way, echo an original passage in Winter in which Thomson writes
that, despite the confusions inherent in mortal life,
Providence, that ever-waking Eye
Looks down, with Pity, on the fruitless Toil
Of Mortals, lost to Hope, and lights them safe,
Thro' all this dreary Labyrinth of Fate.91
Significantly, in 1744 Thomson altered "fruitless" to "feeble," a change emphasizing that
knowledge of the world comes slowly and not through blinding flashes of revelation or in
flights of fancy. Such a revision draws upon Christian orthodoxy-in a Christian cosmos
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toil cannot be fruitless-and it also suggests the new-science perspective that knowledge
could only be gained through slow, painful, limited, and humble steps.
With the publication of Newton completed, Thomson returned to work on The
Seasons, publishing all four in 1730: many editions, many alterations followed. An
examination of several grove passages in the poem shows convincingly how the scientific
ethos as defined in Newton guided revisions of epithets, images, ideas. Generally, these
alterations entailed an intense and sensitive focus upon the Fancy's role in poetic
representation, its relationship to the senses, to inspiration, and to the poet's identity.
Analysis of these passages will, in particular, help to illuminate later discussion of the
development of critical thinking about description and digression. These two areas of
concern proved the value of the lyric genre and showed that it could produce the highest
poetical effects.
In the first version of Winter (April 1726), a five line passage presented a common
image of escape from the city to a quiet rural grove:
Oh! bear me then to high, embowering, Shades;
To twilight Groves, and visionary Vales;
To weeping Grottos, and to hoary Caves;
Where Angel-Forms are seen, and Voices heard,
Sigh'd in low Whispers, that abstract the Soul,
From outward Sense, far into Worlds remote.
(Wi.26f\\. 74-79)
Even at this early stage in the poem's development, Thomson sensed that the image
required the proper context in which to work both poetically and rhetorically. Before
introducing this passage, he describes himself walking the countryside just before winter's
stormy arrival. The scene induces a state in which
Soft, o'er the secret Soul, in gentle Gales,
A Philosophic Melancholly breathes,
And bears the swelling Thought aloft to Heaven.
Then forming Fancy rouses to conceive,
What never mingled with the Vulgar's Dream:
Then wake the tender Pang, the pitying Tear,
The Sigh for suffering Worth, the Wish prefer'd
For Humankind, the Joy to see them bless'd,
And all the Social Off-spring of the heart!
{Wi.26f II. 65-73)
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The sequence of mental and emotional states presented here indicates the causal chain
which Thomson believed necessary to bring about the final moral vision: nature first
inspires "Philosophic Melancholly" to swell "Thought aloft to Heaven," and then "forming
Fancy" awakens sympathy from "all the Social Off-spring of the heart." Line eighty returns
to a description of Winter's progress over the landscape.
Yet (and despite praise of the poem's order by the reviewer in the London Journal)
the transitions from scene to scene do lack integrity, the passage as a whole begging
direction; the original five lines in particular present an indistinct, conventional image of
dubious poetical or intellectual merit. Thomson saw the root of the problem in a clearer
light after the experience of writing his elegy, deleting lines forty to seventy-nine from the
1730 version. He transferred the passage to Autumn 30q, starting at line 963 and greatly
expanded. Numerous changes in diction radically alter the rhetorical force of the imagery:
Oh bear me then to vast embowering Shades!
To twilight Groves, and visionary Vales!
To weeping Grottoes, and prophetic Glooms!
Where Angel-Forms athwart the solemn Dusk,
Tremendous sweep, or seem to sweep along;
And Voices more than human, thro' the Void
Deep-sounding, seize th'enthusiastic Ear.
(Au.30q II. 1030-1036)
Thomson actually transforms the familiar pastoral grove into a site of sublimity, and his
characterization of what occurs there reveals a notable shift in outlook since 1726.
Originally he described the "Angel-Forms" as definite objects of sense, while the
whispering voices abstracted him "From outward Sense, far into Worlds remote." The
passivity of the senses—indeed the lack of connection (or response) between imagination,
body, and the external world-minimalised the human dimension of the experience,
emptying it of any reality which it might feasibly convey. The revision presents an entirely
different conception: the Angel-Forms now only "seem to sweep along," occurring
because the influence of the "solemn Dusk" (external nature), sparked his imagination.
The voices become "Deep-sounding" and, instead of abstracting him, "seize
th'enthusiastic Ear." The whole experience impresses upon him the immensity of the
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universal scheme. In short, rather than fancying himself removed beyond the world of
sense "far into Worlds remote," the universe surrounds him, to use Rapin's words, "as his
own."92
In 1730, a passage similar to Wi.26f quoted earlier follows and again the transition
appears weak. The 1744 revision, however, interjects some forty-five lines after line 1036
which Thomson addresses to Pitt as they wander the gardens of Stowe, a landscape
which "Genius tam'd / By cool judicious Art" (Au. II. 1045-1046). Thomson exhorts Pitt to
support policies which promote civilized values, drawing an analogy between Stowe, a
"regulated Wild" (Au. I. 1055), and man's position between rough and civilized nature to
remind Pitt that his political responsibilities encompass society as a whole. In a complex
allusion to ancient Greece, Thomson urges Pitt to consider that politicians, like poets,
must control their Fancy when they address the public. In order to learn the virtues that
made Greece great, Pitt must exercise "gay Fancy" and "tread in Thought the Groves of
Attic Land" (Au. II. 1055-1056). As an orator, however, he must control his Fancy because
it can either promote a rhetoric of "purest Truth" (Au. I 1057) or carry the day through
linguistic subterfuge. A true patriot appeals to
What every decent Character requires,
And every Passion speaks: O thro' [Fancy's] Strain
Breathe thy pathetic Eloquence! that moulds
Th'attentive Senate, charms, persuades, exalts,
Of honest Zeal th'indignant Lightning throws,
And shakes Corruption on her venal Throne.
(Au. II. 1062-1069)
Thomson's exhortation to Pitt indicates that his vision of nature, man, and society evolved
over the period from 1726 to 1744 not just from generalized considerations of nature but
from particular and immediate social and political experiences as well. Interestingly, the
anxiety which he expresses here as a dissident Whig shares similarities to those Tory
poets who worried that by adopting Whig methods to gain power and wealth their side
was deserting moral positions long and passionately argued.93
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In any case, the transitions from passage to passage now make better sense:
Thomson describes a natural setting which leads to powerful feelings, philosophical
reverie, and retreat to a grove; in the grove he disciplines his Fancy in order to describe
his experience faithfully; then he switches to a scene more suitable for moral exhortation
(usually structured like a dialogue, though only the poet speaks), after which he returns
once again to the landscape and to descriptive matter. The relevant lines of Autumn now
fulfil related philosophic, poetic, and rhetorical functions, a pattern which occurs
repeatedly in The Seasons.94 Analysis of revisions to other grove passages reveals
similar shifts in emphasis and argument.
A passage in Summer, for example, describes Thomson retreating in "haste into
the mid-wood Shade, / Where scarce a Sun-beam wanders thro' the Gloom" (Su. II. 9-10).
Once there he will sit "on the dark-green Grass" (Su. I. 11) and "sing the Glories of the
circling Year" (Su. I. 14). The passage remains virtually untouched between 1727 and
1746, but lines fifteen to twenty undergo important alterations. Although in Newton he
berated poets for "dreaming in whispering groves," Thomson never dismissed the grove
as the site where poet and muse meet. Originally he called to Inspiration and politely
asked: "may I presume / From thy fix'd, serious Muse" (II. 16-17).95 In 1730 the question
becomes "may Fancy dare," and in 1744 "Muse" becomes "Eye." The final version reads:
Come, Inspiration! from thy Hermit-Seat,
By Mortal seldom found: may Fancy dare,
From thy fix'd serious Eye, and raptur'd Glance,
Shot on surrounding Heaven, to steal one Look
Creative of the Poet, every Power
Exalting to an Ecstasy of Soul.
(Su. II. 15-20)
In terms of the poetic outlined in Newton, replacing "Fancy" for "I" in line sixteen and "Eye"
for "Muse" in line seventeen becomes, as it were, necessary: the changes fall into line
with Thomson's arguments about how the poet should approach the writing of poetry. The
language and imagery not only become concrete, directed, dramatic, but causal
relationships become clearer and the conventions serve specific artistic purposes. The
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poet, for instance, first seeks Inspiration in the grove because it, not Fancy, shows him
those "great, and serious, Subjects" which animate true poetry. Inspiration's eye, though
"raptur'd," remains a "fix'd serious" one, an image which recalls Newton's "All
intellectual," "well-purg'd," and "penetrative" eye. Again, Fancy forms but a small part of
the "Power" necessary for writing inspired and relevant poetry; a controlled Fancy only
dares "to steal one Look," a theft which the true poet fashions into instructive and
delightful poetry.96 In this revision, as in the one discussed earlier, Thomson shifts the
emphasis, qualifying Fancy's role in the poetic process by distinguishing the play of
nature, mind, and creativity. In 1730 he added a passage addressed to Dodington, again
introducing the themes of social harmony and public zeal.
A similar transformation occurs to another grove scene in Summer. The changes
affect seven lines deleted from Su.27 and several alterations in diction. In Su.27, a man
suffering the "Prevailing Heat" (II. 331) ("All-Conquering Heat," Su. I. 451) searches
wildly for relief from "The too resplendent Scene" which "Already darkens on the dizzy
Eye" (Su.27 II. 338-339). The heat induces a chaotic state in which "double Objects
dance; unreal Sounds / Sing round the Ears" (Su.27 II. 340-341). Significantly, as his
perceptions become disordered he feels alienated, the world fearful: as "a Weight of sultry
Dew / Hangs, deathful, on the Limbs," it "shiverfs] the Nerves" and makes the "Sinews
sink; and on the Heart, / Misgiving, Horror lays his heavy Hand" (Su.27 II. 341-344). Thus
enervated the man can neither judge accurately nor act morally. Thomson removed these
lines and the passage now reads:
Night is far off; and hotter Hours approach.
[seven lines omitted]
Thrice happy he! who on the sunless Side
Of a romantic Mountain, forest-crown'd,
Beneath the whole collected Shade reclines:
Or in the gelid Caverns, woodbine-wrought,
And fresh bedew'd with ever-sprouting Streams,
Sits coolly calm; while all the World without,
Unsatisfy'd, and sick, tosses in Noon.
Emblem instructive of the virtuous Man,
Who keeps his temper'd Mind serene, and pure,
And every Passion aptly harmoniz'd,
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Amid a jarring World with Vice inflam'd.
(Su. II. 457-568)
At first glance the omission seems an error. However, the dramatic effectiveness of the
original lines overshadowed the moral force of the "virtuous Man" who, avoiding the
danger, "Sits coolly calm." The passage which follows it, moreover, merges the literal and
imagistic into a striking poetic argument about why the poet should take the grove
seriously:
Cool, thro' the Nerves, your pleasing Comfort glides;
The Heart beats glad; the fresh-expanded Eye
And Ear resume their Watch; the Sinews knit,
And Life shoots swift thro' all the lighten'd Limbs.
(Su. II. 476-479)
The picture of the poet with senses alert and a heart that "beats glad" contrasts nicely
with a world "Unsatisfy'd, and sick," a reasonable substitute for the "sultry Dew" hanging
"deathful." The correlation of alienated, directionless passion with physical, mental, and
moral laxity strengthens Thomson's argument about the benefits of a "temper'd Mind
serene."97
Thomson's revisions emphasize that a pastoral grove, either literally or figuratively
experienced, remained a primary site of inspiration, though "By Mortal seldom found," and
in the care which Thomson took over the descriptive details of external and internal
worlds he provides a model of poetic practice. Further, he shows that the manner in which
a poet approaches his use of conventions will determine whether or not he makes a true
poet or a poor versifier. In other words, the experience of the grove teaches the poet how
to pursue his high vocation, how to discipline his fancy. At the end of Autumn, Thomson
explains this ethical command in an intricate and forceful way. Significantly, his choice of
imagery mirrors the conventional out-of-body lyric vision, but he modifies and "corrects"
that vision.
First Thomson calls upon Nature to "Light [his] blind Way" (Au. I. 1359) and "open to
[his] ravish'd Eye / A Search, the Flight of Time can n'er exhaust" (Au. II. 1365-1366). The
desire to write about such an experience he calls "That best Ambition" (Au. II. 1369);
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skilfully re-working of a passage from Virgil's Georgics, he establishes the appropriate
model of behaviour for the serious poet. He accepts that he could prove "unequal" to the
visionary experience, that "the Blood, / In sluggish Streams about my Heart" (Au. II. 1367-
1368) could repress the inspirational juices. In that case, he wants Nature to lay him
"under closing Shades, / Inglorious ... by the lowly Brook, / And whisper to my Dreams"
(Au. II. 1367-1371). The analysis of scenes discussed earlier helps to illuminate the
nuances of this passage. Unlike a poet who sits in a grove and spins fanciful dreams and
who unthinkingly imitates poetic conventions, Thomson wants Nature's "whisper" to "Inrich
[him] with the Knowledge of [its] Works" (Au. I. 1353). The conventional out-of-body
voyage to some "World beyond World" (Au. I. 1355) (that is, a flight of fancy) which he
describes shortly thereafter expresses his desire to see into the heavens and to
understand, like Newton, "their Motions, Periods, and their Laws" (Au. I. 1357). The
request parallels his earlier hope that Newton's works would "guide," "exalt," "correct," and
"inspire" Britain's youth. Yet, realistically, Thomson knows that few ever achieve a
Newton's greatness--his talents could prove "unequal" to the task of singing Nature's
glory. From the grove scenes in Summer discussed earlier, we know why the opposition
of blood flowing "swift" or "sluggish" can determine success or failure of "That best
Ambition."
After 1730, Thomson omits a grove passage from Winter--it would hardly suit a
winter environment-but he employs a complementary scene which parallels as it were the
grove scenes elsewhere in the poem. It might seem, because Thomson concludes The
Seasons during winter, that he intends a final pessimistic vision similar to the apocalyptic
final lines of Pope's Dunciad. On the contrary, Winter directs the reader to contemplate
the purpose and value of natural and moral knowledge, which for Thomson means
comprehending the hierarchical structure of a universe divinely created. By adhering to
this hierarchy, he skirts a number of pitfalls, most notably that he worships a de-deified
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Nature on which man, a social animal, solely depends.98 Winter, in fact, asserts a
realistic, optimistic vision of mortal life and fills out Thomson's vision of the poet's identity.
During winter Thomson finds a rural retreat "Where ruddy Fire and beaming Tapers
join, / To chear the Gloom" (Wi. II. 430-431), an image which suggests that during winter
the poet needs society (just as society needs the poet at this time), not the solitude of a
grove: winter teaches him the essential value of human closeness and the necessity of
social structures which promote such closeness. Hence, as he sits "studious" (Wi. I. 431)
by the fire discussing the rise of arts, arms, empires, and the fall of all these, his
imagination rises above the natural to look into "the moral World' (Wi. I. 583), a difficult
but more important order to comprehend:
Which, tho' to us it seems embroil'd, moves on
In higher Order; fitted, and impell'd,
By Wisdom's finest Hand, and issuing all
In general Good.
(Wi. II. 584-587)
Reflection on this higher moral world teaches Thomson that society flourishes when
patriots (like Pitt and Dodington) act according to "that Ray / Of purest Heaven, which
lights the public Soul" (Wi. II. 595-596). Again, just as few will attain Newton's fame, few
possess the stuff of true patriots, a commonplace argument, but Thomson's real point is
that even one "doom'd, / In powerless humble Fortune" (Wi. II. 597-598) should "learn the
private Virtues" (Wi. I. 601) that promote the "general Good." Surrounded by darkness and
overcome by these social feelings, Thomson enthuses that the poet must lead others
"where the Mind, / In endless Growth and infinite Ascent / Rises from State to State, and
World to World" (Wi. II. 606-608).
Thomson, true to his philosophical and religious convictions, modifies this outburst,
refusing to claim that man (or science) or poetical creation could ever transcend the
boundaries placed between man, nature, and God, and repeatedly reminding his reader
that behind nature lies "Th'All-Perfect Hand, / That pois'd, impels, and rules the steady
Whole" (Su. II. 41-42).99 Indeed, the more Thomson contemplates nature's grandeur, the
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more he realizes that "This Infancy of Being, cannot prove / The final Issue of the Works
of God" (Su. II. 1802-1803) which "ever rising with the rising Mind" (Su. I. 1805) declare a
universe "By boundless Love and perfect Wisdom form'd" {Su. I. 1804), a point which
Bacon argued so strenuously in The Advancement of Learning. As Thomson sits by the
fire he wonders about "those veering Thoughts, / Lost between Good and III, that shar'd
thy Life" {Wi. II. 1037-1038). If death means that all ideas "now are vanish'd," that genius
does not guarantee immortality, then only "Virtue sole survives" {Wi. I. 1039).
Winter, like the other Seasons, applies the poetic standards which Thomson called
for in the Preface and adumbrated in Newton. In order to forge a new poetic way he
looked to experimental science as a means for clarifying experience, for disciplining his
Fancy, for choosing "the most significant Epithet." By using pastoral conventions with a
sensitivity to their expressive potential-conventions "with which nature has formed [man]
to be delighted," as Johnson's Adventurer 108 said-Thomson gained a fair degree of
flexibility: they permitted, without stretching his reader's credulity, discussions about the
Fancy, poetic method, science, morality, and the divine plan. The careful revisions,
especially those concerning how the senses and the imagination relate and combine in
the poetic process, were rooted in Thomson's sense of scientific accuracy and poetry's
representational virtues. Thus, while acknowledging philosophy's place as the "Effusive
Source of Evidence, and Truth" {Su. I. 1732), he can still argue that poetry performs a
more important task. Poetry, to be sure, needs to be "Tutor'd" {Su. I. 1753) by
philosophy, but in return poetry "exalts / [philosophy's] Voice to Ages" {Su. II. 1753-1754).
Although science discovers and confirms the divine laws, by itself it cannot dispel the
winter or give the universe a human aspect: it remains the poet's task to communicate
"Whate'erthe humanizing Muses teach" {Su. I. 876). As Thomson said in Newton, the
poet, not the scientist, appears "to guide" the man "wilder'd on his darksome way"
{Newton, II. 130-131).
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Before ending this section, a few words about assessing the impact of Thomson's
"new" approach to descriptive poetry: it remains, of course, a difficult proposition. In the
first place, we cannot tell if a poet working in the same vein as Thomson would have
produced worse poetry without Thomson's example and, second, whether a poet really
grasped the fundamental seriousness of Thomson's writing or the complexity of his
descriptive procedures. Finally, we cannot judge with any accuracy whether or not a
poet's specific aims in any poem were meant to duplicate or parallel Thomson's--after all,
The Seasons stands rather apart from the hundreds (perhaps thousands) of poems which
utilize the convention of the pastoral grove and include references to science. For
example, in "The RETREAT, or Contemplative Solitude. Inscribed to the Right Honourable
the Countess of HERTFORD," Samuel Bowden not surprisingly evokes the pastoral grove
and treats it in a way similar to Thomson. Though not particularly exciting poetry, some of
Bowden's verse merits citing:
Welcome, blest Grove! and no less sacred Shade,
By Silence hallow'd, and for Sages made.
Welcome, blest Freedom! here the Goddess dwells,
With simple Majesty, in peaceful Cells.
Oft banish'd from the Plains by barbarous Sports,
And tir'd with tinsel Pomp, and guilty Courts,
Affrighted, here she quietly resorts.100
The scene seems set for a revelatory experience. The poem then goes on to provide a
conventional paean to rustic simplicity, focusing on ancient examples, and so forth,
ending with a statement of nature's superiority over art. However, the use of rhyme tends
to conventionalize the poem, while Bowden's descriptions lack Thomson's subtlety. The
title of Bowden's work, moreover, suggests that he meant the poems as vehicles to
function primarily as vehicles for a certain type of instruction. Two of his poems, however,
follow Thomson in taking the same view of the benefits of experimental science, opposing
science to the undisciplined use of the imagination. "On the New Method of treating
Physic, inscribed to Dr. Morgan, on his Philosophical Principles ofMedicine" observes
that
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Sages now trust to Fairy Scenes no more,
Nor venture farther, than they see the Shore:
They build on Sense, then reason from th' Effect,
On well establish'd Truths their Schemes erect;
By these some new Phaenomena explain;
And Light divine in ev'ry Process gain.
Similarly, "A POEM Sacred to the Memory of Sir ISAAC NEWTON" gives a resounding
affirmation of the new science. Bowden calls out to "blest Experiment, whose grateful
Light, / Dispels the Gloom of Sophistry and Night," and accompanying Experiment he
finds that "Discov'ry sits, close waiting, at thy side, / And Paths of Evidence thy Foot-steps
guide." Discovery and invention, of course, were concerns of poets as well as scientists.
Best of all, the power of experiment lies in its ability to produce solid knowledge: "Error
from thee, as from the Morning, flies, / And Bigots half awake, see Light, and close their
eyes."101
Section 4. Description and the Recognition of Lyric Values
Thomson's poetics, as the previous section makes clear, developed out of his concern to
rehabilitate the reputation of contemporary poetry. Whereas most writers simply
complained about the sorry state of affairs, Thomson actually tried to confront the
dilemma head-on, believing that poetry's prestige as one of the human sciences would
continue to decline unless poets carried out a comprehensive evaluation of all the
elements of their vocation: they needed to reassess the fundamental principles of poetic
identity and to reorient their treatment of poetry's subject matter. To make poetry coequal
with, if not superior to, the other sciences, Thomson begins to establish a new ethos of
writing which consciously exploits poetry's exceptional ability to represent (or imitate)
nature in a way that met the changing epistemological temper of the times. The revisions
to The Seasons show that description formed the basis of Thomson's poetics—his
proposed essay on description suggests the increasing importance of description in
critical thinking-and they indicate that he wanted to make description the poetic vehicle
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for transporting the listener to emotional heights which forged a bond between God and
the votaries of nature. Not surprisingly, the issue of the role of description in poetry
occupied many writers both before and after Thomson published his landmark poem, and
it seems plausible that this specific focus upon the appeal of poetic description--an appeal
which critics invariably connected with the basic role that sense impressions play in the
formation of imagery-as well as the determination to distinguish the mental pathways
which produced vital, living description, derived in part from a general sense of what
constituted appropriate representational criteria. Addison, of course, provides perhaps the
most famous instance of a critic who focused on the role of the senses in the power of the
imagination to produce vivid descriptions, his papers on the pleasures of the imagination
constantly drawing upon the new science, but a few of Thomas Gray's criticisms of
William Mason's odes seem particularly instructive in this regard. Gray shows a critical
sense of the way in which illogical terms, trite diction, and poorly observed description
marred a lyric. Writing to Mason he censures many of Mason's attempts to describe
various natural phenomena: "A rill has no tide of waters to 'tumble down amain'"; "I like
the opening as it was originally better than I do now, though I never thoroughly understood
'how blank he frowns'"; "And as to 'black stream', it gives me the idea of a river of mud";
"You have introduced no new image in your new beginning but one, 'utters deep wailings',
which is very well: but as to a 'trickling runlet', I never heard of such a thing, unless it were
a runlet of brandy."102 Gray reminds Mason that "Extreme conciseness of expression, yet
pure, perspicuous, and musical, is one of the grand beauties of lyric poetry."103 Mason did
not always appreciate Gray's advice, nor did he want to apply the discipline that Gray felt
the ode required. Indeed, Mason would appear to be exactly the type of lyric writer who so
worried poets like Young and Coward. Mason states: "I do wish that these Odes were all
of them finished; and yet, by what you talk of 'measure, and rhythm, and expression', I
think I shall never be able to finish them,-never certainly at all if I am not to throw out my
ideas at large; so, whether I am right or wrong, I must have my way in that: therefore talk
no more about it."104
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Gray, of course, took a more serious view of the problems of poetic language, and it
seems worth noting that his interest in natural philosophy and science was wide-ranging
and keen. Given the steadfast conviction of the new scientists about the primacy of sense
impressions in all facets of intellection, given their belief that careful observations were
necessary for building up a body of solid knowledge, and given their suspicions about
using words without thinking about their proper significations, it only seems logical that
poets (or at least serious poets) writing at this time would subject representational
doctrines and conventional ideas about how to depict higher states of mind to some re-
analysis. As Thomson's careful alterations to his grove scenes show, to create a scene
which could elicit ecstatic responses from his readers required strict control over the
language of the poem, descriptions of events, mental processes, and emotional states
never deviating from plausible experiences, never abandoning a poetic rooted in the
conscious knowledge of causes and effects.105 Such representational criteria, as I have
argued, took shape and drew their authority from the principles of the new science.106
Of course, from the perspective of the modern literary historian or critic working
within one of the normative eighteenth-century critical paradigms these debates have
amounted to a field of scattered, blurred, and inconsistent statements lacking any clear
organizing or evaluative principles: side issues seemingly disconnected from the concerns
of the major writers, the nature or reason for which remained obscure and unimportant. In
fact, many of these controversies involved critical problems of fundamental interest to the
period, and they provided an important vehicle for establishing cultural priorities, cultural
standards of taste. Obviously, confusions must arise for any scholar trying to interpret
data from a period undergoing a particularly dynamic and fertile conflation of varying
hegemonic doctrines, some of which concerned the relationship of the sense impression
to the linguistic sign; some the opposition between classical and Christian concepts of the
social value of the artist; and some the demands of a swelling, loosely connected literary
community paying less deference to ancient authority and more to contemporary tastes.
Yet, as we have seen in numerous examples, when eighteenth-century writers
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approached critical issues they typically carried with them a set of assumptions about the
appropriate way to examine and evaluate phenomena, be it natural or psychic: even if
they did not explicitly state their methods or their standards of judgment, they everywhere
confess their implicit acceptance of the new science. In short, in the critical treatment of
poetic description we can see how the rise of new science generated a new seriousness
and complexity towards the art of poetry; further, we can see how, as poets became more
conscious of the need to create images which would achieve powerful emotional
experiences, the lyric genre could satisfy this demand.107
A number of these points are touched on in an issue of The Lay-Monastery for
1714, a magazine edited by Richard Blackmore. The essay notes that "There are no
Parts in a Poem which strike the Generality of Readers with so much Pleasure as
Descriptions." The author does not go looking for esoteric reasons for this preference but
simply relies upon his culture's epistemological convictions: "Descriptions make livelier
Impressions on common Readers than any other Parts of a Poem . . . because they are
form'd of Ideas drawn from the Senses, which is sometime too call'd Imaging, and are
thus, in a manner, like Pictures, made Objects of the Sight." The writer contrasts this type
of immediate and powerful reflex with that of more serious ideas and concepts, like moral
or abstract thoughts which, because removed somewhat from the immediate sense
perception (already, as Hobbes said, in decay), "operate slower, and with less Vivacity."108
The writer clearly feels that a great poet will somehow solve the dilemma of how to
present moral or abstract ideas in poetic form, but in a way this task remains a separate
issue, and he emphasizes that before a poet tackles such problems he must lay down a
foundation of good descriptions. Poor, weak, or inaccurate descriptions will subvert a
potentially good work: "A judicious Description is like a Face which is beautiful without Art;
an injudicious one is like a painted Complexion, which often discovers it self, by affecting
more Gayety of Colour than is natural." Yet any mere catalogue of prescriptions or rules
for writing descriptions cannot easily resolve a writer's immediate problems. In the first
place, every one equally shares in the process which forms impressions and experiences
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into words, and recovering them from memory and turning them into poetry presents the
poet with a monumental difficulty. Indeed, Hume would argue that even if our "faculties
may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses," in the final analysis it must be admitted
that "they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment... All
the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner
as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still
inferior to the dullest sensation." Whatever poets may claim about their ability to imitate,
to be philosophically accurate, says Hume, the most we can admit, "even when they
operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that
we could almost say we feel or see it."109 A writer like John Gilbert Cooper would disagree
with Hume, declaring that the great advantage that poetry retained over all the other arts
stemmed from its ability to describe objects: an object "transferred by the irresistible
Magic of Poetry, to the before lifeless Objects of the Creation, animates the whole Scene,
and conveys an instantaneous Idea to the Imagination."110 William Jackson, however,
reiterates Hume's point, arguing that all attempts to describe a visible object must "come
so short of a representation, and are so imperfect, that if ten painters were to read Mr.
Kalm's account of this amazing fall [Niagara Falls], and to draw it from his description, we
should have as many different draughts as painters."111 Neither Hume nor Jackson, we
note, declares that poets should not make the attempt to imitate or represent objects or
experiences; rather, they want to remind writers of the great difficulties they face, and to
point out the physical limitations of the medium. Both writers appear to enjoy
representations when they are carried out in a certain fashion.
Francis Webb, in the Preface to his Poems (1790), offers a more complex view.
Working towards a modified idealism, he contends that the mind "first considers the
whole, then the Genus and Species, descending from these to lowest and minutest parts,
or first principles of things."112 The mind then reasons upwards, putting all of its
impressions, sensations, and ideas back together again through the power of genius,
"forming an ideal whole of concentrated Excellencies, superior to what exists in any
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Individual, Class, or Species." Genius accomplishes this task, says Webb, through a
progressive and complex string of analogies which bring unity to apparent disparity.
However, genius also discovers differences in familiar resemblances, which leads to the
creation of new and striking metaphors. Thus artistic genius functions to combine the
"distinct separate excellence" of individual objects and idea into "a beautiful whole." This
produces "forms of ideal excellence," but Webb hastens to add that these "forms or ideas
were first obtain'd by attentive observation, and discovery of those scatter'd beauties and
excellences which Nature hath dispers'd through the mighty whole"113
In other words, the writer needs some special talent to turn these words into moving
pictures, a point in which Jackson and Webb agree: "draughts made without genius, or by
genius without practice, can never give such resemblances as to convey a proper idea of
objects."114 Genius appears indispensable at this level of the poetic performance because
both writer and reader rely upon their senses-or more accurately upon their storehouse of
memories-to recognise and appreciate poetic descriptions, which on the one hand
means that "the Likeness or Unlikeness of them are easily perceiv'd," and on the other
that "there is a general Similitude in all true Descriptions of the same Object drawn by
several Hands, like that in a Picture of the same Person done by several Artists."115
Hence, of the many potentially disastrous pitfalls set before a poet "there are none in
which Poets of an ordinary Rank are more frequently betray'd into Faults" than that of
description.116 Webb sees a similar problem, and his explanation of it indicates the way in
which hegemonic influences forced upon critics new formulations of the forces at work in
the writing process. In the following observations, Webb works with a number of
recognisable critical commonplaces, all in order to give validity to the poetic power of
description. He begins with a typical appeal to universal experience:
On the attentive perusal of the works of the Wise Men in all Ages of the World, we
shall evidently perceive, that on all great and interesting subjects, their opinions and
sentiments have been nearly the same: and also, that sublime subjects have
begotten sublime speculations and descriptions. And as the Supream Being, and
Divine Wisdom, are the most sublime objects of Contemplation, on these exalted
subjects have the most exalted and sublime things been said.117
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In other words, "the sublimest Description may consist of the greatest sublimity" may
attain the highest poetical affects.118 Obviously, then, a poet who wished to achieve truly
vivid and powerful representations would need to chose a genre which encouraged or
even demanded immediate or spontaneous impressions or experiences of nature. The
genre itself would need to encompass both the descriptive ideals of the new science and
the higher ideals of poetry set by the hegemonies of Christian and classical poetics.
Webb's three poems in his collection are, not surprisingly, all odes.
William Coward's Licentia Poetica Discuss'd: Or, the True Test of Poetry (1709)
approaches the issue of description in a rather oblique fashion and, instructively, he uses
the lyric to exemplify his arguments. Coward begins with the point that criticism may
abound with "many Artes Poeticae, wrote by much better hands" than his, but most of
these works did not treat English poetry in particular but poetry in general.119 Worse, since
the rules and the prescriptions were predicated on ancient models, Coward reiterates
Cobb's arguments that the modern English poet could benefit little from such critical
counsels. In the first place, the English poet usually worked in rhyme, whereas the
ancients organized their verse according to other principles. In trying to adhere to the
prescribed guidelines, therefore, the modern must write poorly: not only did these rules
exhort writers to "add new Trimming to an old Garment," a frustrating, hackneyed
procedure, but this could hardly help a modern burdened by the need to make his poetry
"suitable to the present Age" (LPD, sig. A2V).120 Accordingly, Coward resolves to make a
thorough search of both English poetry and the English language for whatever special
qualities these might possess, and which might regularly "make [English poetry] please"
{LPD, sig. A3).
The first problem, as always, is where to begin. Since Coward noted earlier that
most critics designated rhyme as the natural organizational principle of all English verse,
and because he wants to base his prescriptions on those qualities which English readers
habitually enjoy, he logically wants to illuminate that poetry "in relation to its Rhyme ... its
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Expressions after the English Mode, its regulahty, or irregularity of Feet' (LPD, sig. A3).
Moreover, if a study such as his cannot ignore the historical evolution of English poetry,
then it must also pay some regard to examples drawn from actual poetic practice.
Appropriately, Coward intends his analysis to overlap with various disciplines, drawing
upon and synthesizing historical, critical, and linguistic materials: he will look, he declares,
"into the Original of Poetry, and the Poetic License assum'd by Ancient and Modern
Poets, and, as well as we can, to state the Difference between that of other Languages,
and our own, in order to find out the Defects, if any such be, in either" {LPD, sig. A3).
Once these relationships are revealed in their proper lights, the modern could set about
applying this knowledge to his own practice, using Coward's insights into poetry and
language to achieve new levels of poetic beauty of a distinctly English kind.
Coward's views about the origins of poetry take a familiar form. Songs and lyrics
were the original mould for all later types of poetry, the Bible providing sufficient evidence
for this conclusion.121 Significantly, by appealing to the lyric's ancient and sacred
genealogy, Coward infers that reviving the language of English poetry will demand that
poets take the writing of lyrics seriously: the genre deserved better treatment than the
usual hackneyed panegyric or loosely-developed, conventional depictions of unhappy
love. A first step towards understanding the genre's capacity for serious subjects would
involve careful study of the basic elements of lyric verse, a point with which Isaac Watts
was in complete agreement. In the Preface to his Horae Lyricae (1706), after
complaining that too few writers treated religious subjects in a manner even remotely
similar to that evinced by the poets of the Bible, opting for dry and prudent expressions
when emotional and sublime language would better move listeners, Watts contends that
"If shorter Sonnets were composed on sublime Subjects, such as the Psalms of David,
and the holy Transports interspersed in the other Sacred Writings, or such as the moral
Odes of Horace, and the ancient Lyricks\ I persuade myself, that the Christian Preacher
would find abundant Aid from the Poet, in his Design to diffuse Virtue, and allure Souls to
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GOD." After equating preacher and poet, he adds that in those poems which intend to lift
the reader to some high level of religious fervour, "the free and unconfined Numbers of
Pindar, or the noble Measures of Milton without Rhime, would best maintain the Dignity
of the Theme, as well as give a Loose to the devout Soul, nor check the Raptures of her
Faith and Love," Watts confessing that in the past his use of rhyme both "fettered" his
ideas and "contracted and cramped the Sense."122 Coward, with reservations about
measure similar to Watts's, therefore carries out a long argument about the many
different measures found in ancient lyric poetry, evaluating each to see which might prove
acceptable in the English language. He puts his findings in rather picturesque terms:
Now when words either Originally English, or Angliciz'd, are requisite to be inserted
in Verse, Our own National Use, by long Custom, give us Power to cover our Feet
with Leather, more pliable to Service, than wear Wooden-shoes according to the
stated Customs of Foreign Nations. I mean, we may be justly said to Imitate Them
in the General Modes, tho' not in the particularMeasures of Verses.
(,LPD, sig. B5V).
Here Coward clearly feels that practical considerations must rule the poet's choice of
measure; indeed, since the ancients (both Greek and Latin) made use of so many
different metrical feet in their verse, choosing on the basis of such factors as the
particular subject matter of a poem, the occasion, the specific kind or mode, and the like,
Coward concludes that contemporary lyric poets could make use of whatever measure
they liked.
Of course, Coward knows that to advance such a doctrine of freedom could open
the door wide to exactly the sort of abuses of language and form about which the sterner
neo-classicists fretted so noisily.123 He protects himself from any such charges-the
narrow focus on measure was merely a vehicle for tackling a more complex topic.
Coward's analysis grants the poet greater freedom to structure the verse line and to
choose a word according to English usage, which gives the poet an opportunity to
impress his style (or wit) upon a work; however, the work as a whole involves the writer in
a complex series of other choices. The poet must not only constantly keep in mind the
poem's overall thematic aims but its aesthetic impact as well, Coward taking a
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conventional line about this issue. If the verse measure helps to maintain the rhythm or
smooth out the sound, or if a poet can employ it to imitate certain types of emotion, all
well and good, yet the language of the entire poem must aim at a higher and more
intellectual (or, we might say, imaginative) perception of beauty. While wanting to free the
English poet from useless prescriptions about measure, he still remains convinced that
the poet must choose words and images which convey a just and natural sense of beauty.
As with the writer in The Lay-Monastery, Coward feels that decisions which affect the
descriptive ingredients of a poem will make or break it:
Among the Graces, which the Muses boast,
And without which, Poetic Beauty's lost,
Is choice of proper Epithets, t'express
The Poet's Mind in Ornamental Dress;
Such as, if possible, in one sole Word,
May the full Sense of a whole Line afford.
(ILPD, p. 32)
Here he follows the new scientist's linguistic code in demanding that a word should
express a thing or feeling as closely as possible. Coward of course translates this
linguistic code into the conventional language of criticism, noting that "The Beauty of a
Poem being good Descriptions, and fine Similes, particular Regard ought to be had of
them; but so that a Decorum must be observed in both" (LPD, p. 31 ).124 Later he claims
that a poet must put as much of his imaginative effort into making "Descriptions exact,
and Naturally correspondent to the Thing" as into any other element of the poem, a type
of linguistic decorum which, if followed, leads to "the greatest Grace and perfection in
Poetry" (LPD, p. 60).125
Coward's stipulation that a poet should use words which are "Naturally
correspondent to the Thing" not only parallels the new scientist's demands for greater
accuracy in the use of words but it fits into a wider debate about the aesthetic potential of
words, particularly their ability to forge a meaningful bond between the perceiver, the
perceived object, and the creator of that object. Hume and Jackson, of course, doubted
that words could actually represent reality truthfully, but John Gilbert Cooper, in his
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Letters Concerning Taste (1757), sets out to prove "that Truth and Beauty are
coincident" (LCT, p. 3), with the additional claim that the ability to recognise this
coincidence marks off the man of taste from lesser beings. Much of what he says echoes
or develops Shaftesbury's arguments in Section III of his "An Essay on the Freedom of
Wit and Humour" but not entirely, and Cooper, in common with many of his
contemporaries, begins his proof, so to speak, at ground level and works upwards, his
investigation taking in the role of the senses in the production of pleasure and leading him
to a revelation of God's universal plan126. The process, while predictable, shows how the
train of reasoning by which nature, as the visible form of God, and thus the perception of
its materials or objects, could come to be equated with both truth and beauty, and how
the emphasis of the new scientists on correct and accurate perceptions of things set a
standard for determining beauty. Cooper observes that
There is no Study so improving and entertaining to the Human Mind, as an Enquiry
into the final Cause of all rational Pleasure; to trace to its Source the Reason why
Matter acts in such various Ways thro' the Inlets of the Senses upon the
Understanding, and affords such infinite Delight to the intermediate Powers of
Imagination. By reasoning thus from the Effect to the Efficient, we naturally become
acquainted with the Conceptions of the great Author of all Things; we transfer as it
were the Excellence of his Works into our Manners, and grow imperceptibly Good
and Vertuous (which is moral Comeliness) by being familiarized to the Beauty of
external Objects. Nature, the substitute of Heaven, agreeable to the divine
Attributes, has calculated all Things for universal Convenience.127
(LCT, pp. 160-161)
In this schema it follows that in any investigation into the correlation between truth and
beauty "Nature . . . must be the Criterion to go by" {LCT, p. 161); since this point seems
irrefutable, it means that standards forjudging representations of nature (or objects) in the
imitative arts must be predicated on the relationship between these arts and their subject
matter.
Cooper argues, therefore, that beauty in painting or sculpture does not reside in the
production but in the object represented by the work of art: "a Statue or Picture has no
intrinsic Beauty in itself, but is relative to another Object, the Similitude to which is made
the Venus of the Art; the Thing therefore represented regulates our Esteem" {LCT, p.
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161). However, Cooper does not believe that any individual object in itself possesses that
excellence which draws from us a sense of esteem: an object strikes us with its beauty
because it belongs to a mass of objects, a connected series of objects which make up a
whole. The whole-which is nature-- possesses intrinsic excellence. Moreover, once we
see that beauty resides in a finely-tuned system, we come to appreciate that truth and
beauty are the same. Cooper states:
Every Object round has a Share, and it is more or less Good and Beautiful, as it
corresponds to them, and they to others to Infinity. Whatever then is proportionable
and harmonious, is good; every thing that is so, is natural; we judge of Beauty by
Nature, consequently Good and Beauty are the same. Thus we form our Opinion of
an Image. Every Limb and Feature ought to agree with the whole in Size, Age, Sex,
&c. and this is called Symmetry, this Symmetry is most perfect when made for the
Use and Strength of the Species, and that Use produces Beauty.
(.LCT, pp. 161-162)
Predictably, Cooper cannot offer terrestrial reasons why objects affect the mind in this
way, so he appeals to celestial factors: God "has in this, as well as in all his other Works,
out of his abundant Goodness and Love to his Creatures, so attuned our Minds to Truth,
that all Beauty from without should make a responsive Harmony vibrate within" (LCT, p.
6). Since God is truth, and since God created nature, which is beautiful, then truth and
beauty must be the same. Keats, of course, put the matter much more hauntingly.
Cooper's cerebral account would strike many as a rather plodding method for
appreciating beauty, giving the whole process over to the control of reason. Indeed, it
seems to grant research into natural philosophy a certain aesthetic credit, a point which
most eighteenth-century writers would find acceptable, but Cooper actually wants to keep
the scientist's mode of perception apart from that of the man of taste. Therefore, he
refuses reason complete domination and outlines the way that taste responds to natural
and to imitated objects. The man of taste possesses a truly elevated soul which perceives
nature with finer and more spontaneous faculties than those of other people: he gains an
immediate sense of pleasure at sight of natural objects (wholly, of course, because it
grasps the object's relation to the whole creation). Thus, an educated taste passes
judgment before reason "can descend from the Throne of the Mind to ratify it's
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Approbation" (LCT, p. 3). When this elevated soul observes an imitation--a painting or
sculpture, for example-Cooper claims that an "internal Sense we call Taste" (LCT, p. 6)
virtually supersedes both the normal operations of sense and reason, which now simply
act "in Conjunction [to] prove this Beauty by collating the Imitations with their Originals"
(LCT, p. 7). The same process occurs with words. In short, then, Cooper's analysis of
how taste functions leans on the same desire of the new scientists to capture as quickly
as possible the full panoply of perception, though he grants a higher status to the more
feeling man of taste.
Coward finds himself facing a similar problem. As he pushes into other areas of
concern, he begins to suggest ways that a poet (and in this case that means a lyric poet)
should discipline his use of language, revealing at each step both his reliance upon the
linguistic ethos of the new science and his appreciation of the demands of poetry. He
argues, for instance, that '"Tis a certain Rule in Imitation, that those who would do it well,
must endeavour to make the Passion, he designs to Imitate, his Own; Like the
Philosopher, who said no Man could better describe a Storm, than he that had been in it"
(LPD, p. 60). The same principle of selection should apply, of course, to any other object
of imitation, but choosing the correct epithet while keeping in mind the need to create
poetic beauty leads him into a quandary about the accurateness or propriety of image,
thing, or event:
But, as fit Epithets you should select,
Drawn from the Genuine Cause, or near Effect.
They must be as compatibly apply'd,
As without Fault, the Subject will abide.
The Stones Inanimate must not declaim,
Nor Trees th'inconstant Amaryllis blame.
Unless some list'ning Eccho's feign'd to make
Those Trees, and hollow Caves, and Mountains speak.
Because from them reverberates a Noise,
That seems articulate, like human Voice.
(LPD, p. 34)
Some twenty or more years before Thomson put his poetics into practice, Coward hit
upon a similar resolution to the problem of using "fanciful" imagery. In other words, for all
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forms of imitation to possess spirit and force the writer must employ a figurative language
which knowingly distinguishes fact from fiction. Coward warns against using metaphors
and images "o'er-charg'd with Copiousness of Wit' (LPD, p. 27), that is, producing images
which distort natural relationships or contradict the evidence of the senses.
Nevertheless, the poet must be wary of trying to write a type of poetry in which "the
Subject should be naked stript, / And with no beauteous Ornaments equipt" (LPD, p.
31).128 Indeed, Coward doubts whether a group of verses "without Similes compos'd, /
And without Painting, in plain Forms, enclos'd" (LPD, p. 29) deserved the name of poetry.
On the one hand, serious readers will read poems lacking such graces "without Relish,"
while on the other such poems simply "an insipid Taste the Fancy feed" (LPD, p. 29). A
poet shines at his best, therefore, when he uses language and creates images and
figures with tact, art, and good sense, when his wit works to adorn and grace both things
and thoughts.
When Coward turns to discuss issues relating to choice of form-to those structures
into which the poet puts his choice epithets—he applies the same standards as those
which he employed in his analysis of language. Form and content "should be weigh'd by
AN" and "Each kind of Verse pois'd in the proper Scale" (LPD, p. 64), an evaluative
process which would allow the poet to impress upon the ancient form his particular
English stamp. Coward argues that constraining English poets to imitate classical forms
usually resulted in basic confusions about the nature of the genre, which in turn led to
terrible stylistic errors: this commonly produced further misunderstanding about the choice
of verse line and metre. As proof Coward points to contemporary lyrics, where he finds
misapplications of the genre by poets transfixed by ancient rules responsible for the
genre's secondary status.129
In the first place, poets who think that they can reach lyric heights simply by trying to
imitate ancient measures invariably produce hotch-potch poems of little value and less
beauty. With one eye fixed on the past and the other half-blind to the poetical tastes of the
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present, their misuse of ancient verse measures militates against any expression of the
beautiful. Cowards states:
Most English Lyrics incompleatly write,
As their wild Fancy springs with different Flight,
Here Anapests with odd Iambics join,
And there Anacreontics crowd the Line.
Then Saphhics mix'd the Composition fill,
To make a Medly eminently ill',
Yet these pretend a Right to claim the Bays,
Altho' elaborately Dull in Lays.
Seek for their Muse a Tutelary Guard,
Under some Grecian, or a Latin Bard.
But to what end? Their Umbrage can't excuse,
Nor yet support an English Lyric Muse.
(LPD, p. 80)
In the second place, confusion about the purpose and the function of the many different
types of lyric leads to a discordant clash of subjects and styles, and it leaves many writers
free to produce works which lack formal unity and a sense of purpose. Echoing Sidney,
Coward complains that
Lyric with us is nothing but a Song,
Wrote with what Numbers we imagine fit,
With the Tune only makes ingrate, or sweet.
(LPD, p. 80)
Moreover, like Sidney, he looks to the classical tradition for a means of strengthening the
English lyric at the level of language and at that of content.130
As with Hawkins before him, Coward argues that in order to determine the proper
subject matter of a lyric the modern poet should simply compare contemporary attempts
with Horace's. This comparison would reveal not only that Horace covered a wide range
of material but that he treated his various subjects in poetry equal to that of his more
famous works. In short, because Horace paid close attention to both matter and style he
achieved a "Majesty of Style /. . . Worthy the Praises of the Delian God" (LPD, p. 81).
After taking stock of the sublimity and beauty of Horace's lyric poetry, the English would
be unable to "presume to call our Common Songs, Lyric Poetry, as some do, when as
many times, poor, low and mean Expressions, are cloath'd in the Garb of a Good Tune, to
make 'em tolerably pass the Reader's Approbation" (LPD, p. 81).
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This conflict between content and style appears no where more obvious than in the
modern poet's attempts to imitate Pindar's various odes, attempts which Congreve called
"a Bundle of rambling incoherent Thoughts, express'd in a like parcel of irregular Stanza's,
which also consist of such another Complication of disproportion'd, uncertain and
perplex'd Verses and Rhimes."131 Coward agrees, modern poets consistently mistaking
the difference between the heroic and the noble styles. To imitate Pindar's style, he points
out, a poet cannot simply try to copy the measure or use artificially abrupt breaks in the
development of an idea:
'Tis not uneven Lines Pindarics make,
Where Rhymes with frequent Interruptions break.
But 'tis the Noble Style which Pindar wrote,
Expressive of as excellent a Thought
That makes Him justly valu'd and admir'd,
In Imitators th' Only Thing Desir'd.132
(iLPD, p. 64)
Of course, the noble style arose out of the nature of the subject under discussion, and the
poet needed to undergo an experience which would inspire noble thoughts. Samuel
Bowden was on the right track when he wrote that his feelings while roving the
countryside reached a high pitch of intensity:
Sometimes, more studious, with attentive Ears,
I catch the tuneful Rhetoric of the Spheres,
Which, o'er the still Expanse, incessant speaks,
And from the vocal Hills Pindahc breaks.133
Considering that most poets failed, like Bowden, to achieve a noble style, Coward seems
on solid enough ground when he declares that "it is strange to me, That the Notion
amongst some should run so high as to commend Lyrics above all other Poetry. The
Great Scaliger is said to be so enamour'd with the 9th Ode of Horace . . . That He is
reported to have wish'd Himself the Author of it, rather than be made a Prince, or to that
Effect" (LPD, p. 80).134 In other words, the modern lyric for Coward still needed
development before he would consider it a major genre, its primary weakness or inferiority
stemming from the fact that English poets paid too little attention to fitting subject matter
to measure and diction. Although Horace and Pindar offered models of how to accomplish
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the job, and he wishes to "see some bold Imitator endeavour the like in English," he
believes that even if a bold writer attempted this feat and wrote without regard for "the
Ornament of Rhyme," he would encounter difficulty in convincing "the World that Any such
composition will be a True Lyric Poem, or indeed deserve to be call'd Verse" (LPD, p.
81).135
Like so many eighteenth-century critical essays, the preface to A Miscellany of
Poems by Several Hands (1731) by the publisher John Husbands begins with a familiar
complaint about the poor reception received by poetry amongst the general population of
readers. He highlights two reasons for this state of affairs. First, unlike writers in the other
arts and sciences who "are not asham'd to confess their Ignorance" and willingly follow
the guidance of experts in the field, "every Blockhead, that can read his Primmer, sets up
for a Judge in Poetry, and the Poor Author's Genius often is condemn'd, for Want of Taste
or Understanding in the Reader."136 Second, and more importantly, there persisted
amongst the "Beaux Esphts," the makers of modern fashion, a marked distaste for moral
and religious ideas in poetry. With them, every serious writer deserved the satiric lash,
and their continuous attacks upon all that was good and great built "the Foundation of Wit
upon the Ruins of good Manners and Decency" (PSH, sig. A4V). Of course, such
irreverent attitudes to poetry scorned a venerable tradition spanning both classical and
Christian literatures which laid down the rightful purpose of all poetic thought—to praise
divinity. Husbands offers a panegyric on the Bible as source of sublime imagery, and he
outlines a typical history of poetic development, from a primitive, natural type of
expressive urge to that of a more sophisticated but artificial, rule-bound poetry. Again, just
as the new scientists availed themselves of a theory of an originally primal or primitive
experience of nature, when the senses gave an immediate impression of things, resulting
in words capable of expressing solid knowledge, Husbands declares that "the Writers of
the first Ages had no other Guide than Nature" (PSH, sig. C2V).
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This equation, that a primitive, unsophisticated mode of existence generated a
passionate, powerfully descriptive poetry, appealed to many eighteenth-century critics; its
general acceptance as a principle of poetic maturation cannot be underestimated
because it accounted for differences in genre and for differences in individual styles.
Pinkerton, working with this principle of intellectual development, argues that
in youth most people have felt an inclination to write verses, tho in a more mature
age they have lost that desire; so it is in the youth of society . . . that poetry has
most flourished. Now this youth of society is commonly, like that of man, lost in
tempestuous passions, which call forth extraordinary exertions of mind. Such
exertions form the very life and soul of poetry . . . Violent actions, and sudden
calamities of all kinds, are the certain concomitants of uncivilized life: to these we
owe a poetry warm, rapid, and impetuous, that. . . carries the reader along in the
barge of fancy, now by vales fragrant with wild flowers, now thro woods resounding
with untaught melody, but most generally thro deserts replete with romantic and
dreadful prospects. (LL, p. 4)
John Dart, writing about the type of language permitted in elegy, makes a similar point.
Because the elegiast must write about affairs of the heart, disappointments and
successes, Dart cannot "suppose these Poets sate down to study fine Things, like our
Cowley, but that they writ from the Heart, and if so, their Pens must be under the
Guidance of their Passions, not of their Wit."137 These same concepts underlie Sir William
Jones's defence of Arabic poetry in his famous translations.138 In short, a poet would
naturally express certain states of mind and emotion if unconstrained by a false or
misleading doctrine of imitation.
Husbands draws the obvious conclusion: "The Essence of Poetry consists in a just
and natural Imitation and Illustration of Things byWords" (PSH, sig. C2V). Because these
poets enjoyed such an immediate experience of the world, they produced "a lively and
affecting Manner of Writing, adorn'd with Figures, varying according to the Greatness,
Nature, and Quality of the Subject." (PSH, sig. C2V). In this way, primitive poetry naturally
fulfilled Sidney's dictum that all writing should instruct and delight, and such powerful and
instructive poetry abounds in the scriptures, Husbands says, because sacred writers
"imitated Nature without Art, and without Study describ'd agreeably Things, Sentiments,
and Affections" (PSH, sig. C2V-C3). Furthermore, rather than devoting themselves to the
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superficial and the artificial, the biblical writers wrote about subjects and issues in which
they were emotionally involved, with the wholly expected result that their poetry
possessed great spirit and sublimity: "For the Strength and Energy of the Figures, and the
true Sublimity of Style, are a natural Effect of the passions. No wonder therefore that their
Diction is something more flourish'd and ornamental, more vigourous and elevated, more
proper to paint and set Things before our Eyes, than plain and ordinary Recitals" (PSH,
sig. C2V-C3). Significantly, given the degree of attention which it receives later in the
century, Husbands judges that "Pindar perhaps, in his Enthusiastick Manner, comes as
near as any to the Spirit of the Scriptures" (PSH, sig. F1). The linkage of Pindaric and
other types of lyric with scriptural sublimity proved a common critical strategy throughout
the eighteenth century.139
Husbands would appear to yearn for that primitivistic type of poetry often noted by
those critics looking for a sure sign of nascent romanticism, but this interpretation would
misread his philosophical or critical or even religious intentions. He wants the poet to look
upon nature as the original and pure source, the never uncorrupted source of poetic
language. In other words, he inherits the same anxieties as the seventeenth-century
scientists who worried about the ease with which the immediacy of experience faded; like
Locke, Husbands appeals to the incorruptibility of nature as the only means for renewing
the sources of language. The following long quotation exhibits this desire in expressive
fashion:
Wherever We turn our Eyes so many Arguments of the Goodness of the Deity offer
themselves to our View, as are sufficient to make the most Insensible break forth
into Poetry. What reasonable Creature can forbear thinking of him? And who can
think of him without Gratitude? Who can speak of him without Transport? The pious
and contemplative Man meets him in his morning Walk, and converses with him in
his evening Meditation. He makes his Closet God's Altar, and his Breast his
Temple. Every Leaf and Herb, the Birds of the Air, the Flowers of the Field, and
even the Clods of the Valley, bring his Creator to his Remembrance. His Heart
over-flows with Love towards the Author of his Being and Happiness, and he feels a
kind of Inspiration, which tunes his Soul for Harmony and Thanksgiving. One
Advantage He is sure of, that He has a Subject infinitely superior to all others; a
Subject that can never satiate, that can never be exhausted; a Subject which is
worthy to employ the Thoughts of all created Beings to Eternity. Nor need He be
asham'd to own, that He falls greatly below the Dignity and Majesty of his Theme.
(PSH, sig. B1)
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Thus, in a process which we saw occurring in Wesley, Husbands' conception of poetry
brings together classical doctrine with his Christianity, and both merge into the scientific
assumptions of his culture.
The full coherence of this merger of hegemonic precepts becomes clearer when
Husbands discusses the different epistemological values of fiction and truth. Like Coward,
he identifies beauty as one of the chief means by which poetry achieves its complex aims.
He says that "the Foundation of all Beauty in Composition is Truth" (PSH, sig. G1), and
this applies equally in theology, philosophy, or poetry. Truth, then, suffuses all writing, or
should, but an area of difficulty lies in the nature of human desire and human intellectual
capabilities. The mind, he says, "naturally delights in what is great and unbounded," but
when it looks beyond the narrow range of its perceptions to try and comprehend the
divinity the "Imagination is forc'd to put itself on the Stretch to comprehend him who fills
Infinitude; in vain! It soon arrives at the utmost Limits of its Apprehensions" (PSH, sig.
B2). When the mind can go no farther, it usually resorts to such linguistic strategies as
fable and allegory; however, by availing himself of these two fictionalizing modes of
language, the poet can fall into a common error.140 Seduced by the delights of the
imagination, by a fairy-world inhabited by delightful figures, the poet can quickly lose sight
of the true aim of poetry, opting for the fantastic over the real: "the nearer Fable
approaches to Truth, the more beautiful it is," says Husbands, but at all times the poet
must remember that "an Appearance of Reality is necessary even in Fiction itself. In a
Word, the Use of Fiction is to serve as a Veil to Instruction; to animate the Thoughts and
Affections, and to make them (as it were) breathe and live; to engage the Attention, and
amuse the Mind of the Reader in order to improve it" (PSH, sig. G1). Husbands then
observes the many instances where writers made use of allegory, simile, and metaphor,
concluding from their prevalence in all forms of writing that there "seems to be a
Proneness in the Mind to compare the several Objects that occur to its notice, and the
Resemblance, either real, or imaginary, which one Thing bears to another" (PSH, sig.
Chapter Four, p. 239
G1). Somehow this ability of the mind to abstract experience and then figure it forth in
language, an ability which Locke so forcefully analysed as the distinguishing feature of the
human mind, means that poetic language fulfils an important function of learning, that
"one Thing is represented, and another understood" (PSH, sig. G1), and it does so in an
agreeable manner.
Robert Potter, in his An Inquiry into some Passages in Dr. Johnson's Lives of
the Poets: Particularly his Observations on Lyric Poetry, and the Odes of Gray
(London: 1783), pp. 13-14, makes the same point. The desire by some critics to see the
lyric genre as a product of more refined and civilized social structures indicates, in a minor
way, that the lyric genre had reached major genre status. Husbands here broaches the
same issue of the fictionalizing urge of poetic language taken up by Thomson and
Coward, an issue which came to exercise numerous writers throughout the eighteenth
century, Richard Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance (1762) probably being the
most famous remarks.141 Clearly, this problem required a satisfactory resolution, and an
instructive case of how poets worked to integrate the poetic resources of language with
the descriptive ideals of the new science occurs in Robert Andrews's analysis and
clarification of the function of description in his Preface to Eidyllia: Or, Miscellaneous
Poems (1757). Andrews shows a nice ability to make clear critical distinctions and
classifications, arguing that poetic language can involve the use of three separate types
of description. The first kind of description simply involves "objects as they appear to exist
in fact." The second, a more complicated type, describes those "objects that were never
known to exist, but similar to those that we see do exist." Andrews defines this second
type as "imaginary description." While he considers these imaginary things permissible in
poetry, in the final analysis any judgment of their poetic value, their "excellence" as he
calls it, must rest upon an "appeal ... to nature, experience, fact, and the common
notions of consistency, propriety, truth," that is, upon the first type.142 The second
descriptive type obviously refers to "things" like unicorns or other such fabulous beasts-
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composite images based on a knowledge of actual creatures. Of course, in making this
special distinction Andrews simply appealed to conventional wisdom about the
permissibility of such imagery in poetry. Dryden, in his The Author's Apology for Heroic
Poetry and Poetic Licence, argued convincingly that all such fictions were allowable: both
the Christian and the classical traditions abounded with legendary creatures,
personifications, abstractions, and the like. Furthermore, the popular imagination took
great delight in them, and they thus provided an important tool for teaching society's less
educated members moral truths.143 Logically, Dryden noted, as an art of imitation poetry
legitimately covered all facets of human existence, so to use such fictions merely
amounted to an imitation of another aspect of life, "though of other men's fancies."144
The third type of description Andrews defines as those objects "that never at all
exist but in the poet's imagination, as Homer's Gods and Goddesses, the Muses, Fairies,
Genii of places, the Virtues and Vices personified, and all the other branches of the
poetical machinery" (EMP, p. 3). He would call these images the product of "creative
description," noting that "If a poet chooses to adopt a machinery already established, it
stands in the place of nature; and to it the appeal lies for the justness of his descriptions"
{EMP, p. 3). Just as the most primitive poets peopled their environment, so too would a
modern writer who experienced the same immediacy of nature. Thomson, we recall, felt
that such imagery "personized" the relationship of human to landscape. Andrews
contends that description of this last sort always occurs under the influence of the various
actions of the heart. And while the perceiver may know that no such creatures "ever fall
under human observation," yet because they seem to "bear a near analogy to human
things" we suspend a certain portion of our disbelief and "never cease to admire" {EMP, p.
4) and take delight in them. They convey the essential majesty and the power of nature
and divinity.
After Andrews has defined his three types of description, he undergoes a change of
heart: methodologically, this conversion does not lack significance. Since all descriptions
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must at some level rely upon human perceptions, whether those derive from some
immediate, sensual perception or from mental and emotional conceptions-that is, from
ideas in the mind-he surmises that the distinction between imaginary and creative
description does not hold. Instead of complicating the whole business with a series of
needless classifications, he thinks that it makes sense to rank all descriptions as
imaginary. As Locke pointed out, all word-use relies upon the ability of the mind to
imagine, abstract, and synthesize experience and ideas into words, and Andrews astutely
follows Locke's lead here: since words signify our grasp of objective and subjective reality,
all writing amounts to some form of description.
This verdict leads Andrews to articulate a basic principle of poetic descriptions. If all
description falls into the class of the imaginary, he argues, then it follows that imagery or
description does not, as he earlier suggested, simply supplement or ornament poetry but
forms "its essence, its soul and body: so that the more or less any composition has of it, it
has the more or less of poetry" (EMP, p. 4). Thus, depending upon the type and the
purposes to which a poet puts it, description determines the real (and lasting) excellency
of the poem. Inasmuch as Andrews believes that description or "Imagery be both the soul
and body of Poetry," he nevertheless hesitates to claim that by itself it can make sublime
poetry. Description must assist the "sense and spirit" of the poem, by which he means
that it must express "the divine and proper sentiments of Poetry" (EMP, p. 8).
In short, only a writer with genius, wit, judgment, and the like could turn experience
and learning into great poetry. In the first place (and in line with what most eighteenth-
century readers thought about the poetic function of harmony and measure), Andrews
observes that measure must supplement description; following Coward, he stresses that
without measure "Poetry generally loses the very name" (EMP, p. 5). Whereas Andrews
permitted a degree of latitude to the imagination or fancy in the creation of descriptions,
he attributes to measure an aspect of poetry which "is founded upon this certain principle
of human nature, the sense of harmony" (EMP, p. 5), an ornament of poetry susceptible to
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some degree of objective or rational control. He seems to conceive of measure as a sort
of limiting or controlling force, as if the judgment working through measure effectively
stabilizes an all-too-human proclivity for descriptive extravagance. Indeed, as Andrews
explains it, this particular imitative facet of poetry leads to better imitations because it
relates directly to the impression of sound: "the tone of the voice being expressive of the
passions, or correspondent to the velocity, slowness, delicacy, &c. of the things
described" (EMP, p. 5), it follows that the faculty of judgment must come into force to
make the job a success. For Andrews, the cooperation of these elements usually satisfies
his expressive demands: "If this correspondence and expression be preserved, together
with that harmony, which gives a certain freedom, agility, and voluntary motion to the
thoughts, whatever the language be, my fancy is fully satisfied" (EMP, pp. 5-6).
Accordingly, and like Coward, Andrews does not want to restrict a writer's choice of
measure, doubting that any composition absolutely requires the same measure
throughout. Since it imitates speech, he distinguishes between two different types of
pleasure which measure might convey: "the abstract uniformity and variety of sounds," in
which "only the ear is tickled," and that which is independent of sound, "the sense and
spirit" of a poem which touches "the imagination" and "the heart" (EMP, p. 7).145 A
principal business of the poet, then, consists of choosing words which both produce
harmony and correspond to the poem's sense and spirit. For these reasons, Andrews
remains sceptical that harmony necessarily requires the use of rhyme. The only criterion
which should govern the adoption of a formal, abstract ornament like rhyme should relate
to whether or not it added to the poems's sense and spirit—if not, a poet ought to apply
some other organizing principle.
Andrews concludes his Preface to the Eidyllia in the spirit of one living in the
ascendency of new-science hegemony. He says that British poets--and any youth wishing
to follow that career-should learn to "practice [sic] temperance and due industry," a
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conventional enough demand, but this discipline would require them to attain not only "a
brave indifference to the world" but
an honest self-dependence: and, far from affecting popularity, be fired into a nobler
ambition by studying day and night the best transcripts of Nature ancient and
modern, but especially their common Model herself, whose scenes are infinitely
various, and can never be exhausted by the human pencil. So may they, (for thus
only can they,) arrive to that full perception of Truth and Beauty, which is necessary
to those, who would excel in any of the ingenious arts. (EMP, p. 19)
The poet who undertakes to study the "transcripts" of nature need only follow the model
provided by the new science, and in his poem, "Philocles: A Monody," Andrews gives
energetic expression to his conviction that only the emergence of a "better science and
free thought" which had been for so long "unknown"--and for its discovery he says, "God
be thank'd"—was able to break through a superstitious and ignorant view of nature to
reveal the "sure attendant Gospel-Light / Unclouded" (EMP, p. 30). The lessons of that
past seem obvious to Andrews, and he pleads with his contemporaries to
be ever learning, tho' employ'd
In busy scenes to study less benign!
For Science, like the Soul, is ever free,
Not bound by charters, nor to place confin'd.
(EMP, p. 33)
Science here means knowledge in a general sense, of course, but In these last two lines
Andrews gives an indication about the direction in which thinking about the lyric genre
would go; throughout his Eidyllia, he uses lyric kinds because they allowed him to
express the sense of intellectual freedom inherent in the practice of the new science, a
freedom he considered essential to the health of poetry. Others would declare similar
things about the lyric, and they would especially see its facility in description as key to its
poetic power.
Husbands, even if he did not push the debate about allegorical and fictional figures
as far as Andrews, still contributed some valuable observations to the debate. More
pertinent to our concerns, he argues that if poets hoped to sing God's and nature's
praises they must find for themselves a spirited and vital poetic language which rang with
truth and sincerity. Echoing Blackmore's The Lay-Monastery, Husbands asserts that
Chapter Four, p. 244
effective poetic imagery always derives from the senses, while images copied from books
soon reveal their author's lack of experience: "The more sensible any Impression is, the
more strongly it affects Us. The Sagest Writers therefore often make their Address to the
Senses, and describe the Majesty of God in all the Pomp and Magnificence of Language"
(PSH, sig. N1-NT0. Thus, the novice (or even the experienced) poet must learn from
other writers and from his precursors that nature provides the only real and perfect source
of beauty; keeping the subjects which occupied the beaux esprits in mind, Husbands (like
Thomson) points to nature as the only truly sublime subject matter for poetry. Unlike the
petty satires which relate the vanities of the town, nature provides "a more spacious Field
for a true Poet to exercise his Talent in," as well as impressing upon the mind the need for
continual "Contemplation of Him, from whom proceeds every Thing that is excellent,
perfect, and harmonious" (PSH, sig. P3-P4). In light of the basic principles of Husbands'
poetic, it seems quite natural for him to conclude that "No part of Poetry is more pleasing
than the Descriptive, no Descriptions charm more than those taken from rural Life" (PSH,
sig. L2V). A conventional point, no doubt, but illuminating when put into its cultural context,
especially as the demand for a more accurate and philosophic (as in natural philosophy)
poetic language grows stronger as the century progresses.
That same demand finds clear and logical articulation in John Aikin's An Essay on
the Application of Natural History to Poetry (1778). Clearly possessing a knowledge of
the relevant issues, Aikin situates his Essay at the centre of debate about the decline of
poetry. He expresses his weariness with familiar complaints which heap together and
condemn the "insipidity of Modern Poetry" when any truly educated observer would
acknowledge the intellectual superiority of poetry.146 Aikin notes that explanations for this
"insipidity" usually point to "a real deficiency of poetical genius in the present age," adding
that "such causes are assigned for it as leave us little room to hope for any favourable
change" (EANHP, p. 2). Moreover, this explanation does not take into account many of
the finer performances of the time, nor does it really fit in with the general improvement in
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all "the elegant arts, which must be allowed to characterise our own times" (EANHP, p. 2),
nor does it make sense given the appetite for poetry exhibited by the reading public. The
real problem with modern poetry, says Aikin, is that "It comes down to us, worn down,
enfeebled, and fettered" (EANHP, p. 3), that is, through a long process of servile imitation
and senseless copying of imagery and figures the language of poetry no longer
possesses any life of its own.
Novelty, decides Aikin, provides the only antidote to such enfeebled, decaying
language since only novelty can introduce new materials into the stock of poetry; indeed,
given the sorry state of poetic language, he considers novelty even more important than
genius. Genius will usually make language suit its needs and capacities, will usually vivify
tradition and convention through an almost alchemical process of transformation, but
genius often cannot offer much to other writers precisely because it transcends the
normal run: to try and follow genius is to fall into the same old trap of imitation. Aikin
therefore argues that writers must resist the urge to copy the language of the truly sublime
poets, Rather, they must "enquire what source is capable of affording" (EANHP, p. 4)
novelty. Like Thomson and the other writers who we have discussed, he looks to nature
as the most obvious source for new ideas and images, to "the grand and beautiful objects
which nature every where profusely throws around us" (EANHP, p. 4). The immensity and
the complexity of nature should provide an endless source of new and intriguing ideas,
but Aikin remarks that "it is the store which of all others [the poet] has most sparingly
touched," a claim which admittedly sounds "extraordinary" (EANHP, p. 4) but evidence for
it lays open to anyone who pays the merest attention to the modern poet's use of
descriptive poetry.
Aikin, in fact, feels "certain that supineness and servile imitation have prevailed to a
greater degree in the description of nature, than in any other part of poetry" because he
finds that descriptive poetry "has degenerated into a kind of phraseology, consisting of
combinations of words which have so long been coupled together, that. . . they are
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become inseparable companions" (EANHP, p. 5).147 Clearly, this hackneyed use of
descriptive language would persist as long as the modern poet continued to ignore
nature, continued to draw upon other writers for his material instead of upon his own
impressions.148 However, while servile imitation leads to a lack of various and dynamic
imagery, modern writers fall into other habits of mind which detract from the force of
description. Even when modern poets introduce natural objects into their poetry, "It is no
less common to find their descriptions faint, ill characterized; the properties of things
mistaken, and incongruous parts employed in the composition of the same picture. This is
owing to a too cursory and general survey of objects, without exploring their minuter
distinctions and mutual relations" (EANHP, pp. 9-10). If a writer fails to "habituate himself
to view the several objects of nature minutely," to search for similarities, differences,
uniqueness, then he will fail to produce description and imagery which possess both
vividness and accuracy, the lack of which "constantly attend every writer of inferior rank"
(EANHP, p. 11). Just as the artist must study anatomy and proportion to "produce a just
and harmonious representation of the human frame," so too must the descriptive poet first
"habituate himself to view the several objects of nature minutely, and in comparison with
each other"; otherwise, he "must ever fail in giving his pictures the congruity and
animation of real life" (EANHP, pp. 10-11). Aikin not surprisingly can see no other way of
rectifying weak descriptions and improving the overall vitality of poetry than for poets to
undertake "accurate and attentive observation, conducted upon somewhat of a scientific
plan" (EANHP, p. 10).149
How, though, would this scientific plan of study lead to inspired poetry, or to lyric
poetry? The suppression of emotion which such a method entails would seem quite
inimical to the pursuit of poetry. Eighteenth-century writers were, however, capable of
making the necessary synthesis-at least in their prefatory arguments and in their poetical
statements regarding the process of inspiration. Husbands includes in his Miscellany a
long poem with the simple title of "The Country." The poem, in almost all respects entirely
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conventional, expatiates at large on the joys of country life, on the moral purity of heart
generally found among the inhabitants of the country, and on the freedom to meditate
when nurtured by the peaceful surroundings, as compared to the city where "Scenes of
Pageantry / Deceive" and "cringing Parasites salute / The Thresholds of the falsely Great"
(PSH, p. 198). Whereas the city constantly tempts us with its bustle and business and
superficial pleasures, all of which deadens our passions and our intellects, in the country
"We talk / With Nature, and her wondrous Footsteps trace / Thro' all Creation," a freedom
which opens up the mind to grasp "the bounteous Source of All" (PSH, p. 205). The writer
begins his poem with an apostrophe to Urania, the Muse of Astronomy, calling her to
carry him to her "sacred Haunts," in which, "smit with the love immense / Of Song
celestial," he can "indulge the Vision of the sacred Maid" (PSH, p. 197). Once the mind
achieves openness and visionary power, a mysterious state of excitement follows: the
writer feels as if "ev'ry Sense / Is sweetly snatch'd away, transported, lost," that is, this
experience takes him into a realm wherein he feels "sacred Extasies" (PSH, p. 205).150
The poet should, moreover, consider this his penultimate happiness. The highest
happiness is reserved for him who learns
From an attentive View of Nature's works
Their bounteous, great, and wise Original!
Who soars, upon Devotion's wings up-born,
To Heav'n.
(PSH, p. 205)
Interestingly, at least in light of the earlier discussion about the fictionalizing urge of
poetry, the anonymous author of "The Country" claims that in this heightened state the
perceiver easily imagines the countryside populated by "Seraphs, Genii, all th'immortal
Sons / Of Heav'n" (PSH, p. 206).
This whole transformative experience occurs precisely because the country frees
the mind and imagination: the poet "enjoys the sacred Muse" (PSH, p. 205), an enjoyment
which erupts in praise of God, in the desire to sing "thy Praise . . . / Great Being" (PSH, p.
206). Importantly, while the opening apostrophe suggests a conventional epic movement,
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the writer steers away from an epic sensibility into a lyric one: the poem details the
writer's experience of feelings produced from solitary experience of a natural setting.
Clearly, as the feelings expressed here suggest, and as do, say, Bowden's claim noted
earlier that a "Pindaric breaks" from him when he contemplates nature, the observation of
natural objects initiated a movement in the poet's imagination which parallels that which
takes place, or was thought to take place, in a typical lyric experience. In other words, we
can discern in the various and varying debates about description, rhyme, measure, and so
forth, steady progress towards an eighteenth-century lyric ethos.
Although Edward Young's two companion odes, "To the King" and "Ocean. An
Ode," published in 1728, offer little more than nationalistic panegyrics on Britain's status
as a sea-power ("A iru\y-British Theme I sing") and familiar didactic exhortation ("The
publick scene / Of harden'd men / Teach me, O teach me to despise!"), his accompanying
Discourse on Ode makes a number of observations about the poetic ethos of the lyric
writer which deserve notice.151 Like Congreve and others, Young noticed that a large,
eclectic tribe of writers were penning lyric poems, and he worries about their lackadaisical
attitude to the form. Of this kind of poetry Young would not think himself "Poet enough
intirely to rely on Inspiration for [his] Success in it" (OO, p. 14), but far too many writers
misjudged the nature of the form, deluded into thinking that inspiration unfettered could
somehow generate a sublime ode. On the contrary, the poet must pay careful attention to
the type of poem meant to provide the vehicle for his inspired state; doing justice to the
uniqueness of his heightened impressions means scrupulously weighing up the many
factors which constitute perfection in his choice of poetic kind. On this rests any hope of
success: "He that has an Idea of Perfection in the Work he undertakes may fail in it," says
Young, but "he that has not, must' (OO, p. 15). Inspiration, then, may power a poem, but
writing it demands method and discipline, Young regarding a general disregard for
method as a primary reason why poetry's reputation as both an art of language and as
one of the human sciences continued to deteriorate. What too many modern writers
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lacked was an ethos, a vocational ideal which would regulate and discipline their poetic
behaviour: lack of vision about their visionary vocation lay at the heart of the
contemporary ridicule of poetry. Without a sense of generic perfection a vain poet will
continue to pride himself on trivial effusions when, in fact, he evoked nothing but scorn
and laughter from proper judges of the poetic art. Accordingly, Young resolves to set
down rules of conduct for any writer so bold as to undertake an ode. His guidelines share
the behavioural ethos which Bacon, Sprat, Locke, and others prescribed as the norm for
an experimental scientist, and which writers like Welsted, Thomson, Husbands, Aikin, and
others all saw as necessary for the health of poetry.
Whereas the ancient poet enjoyed (supposedly) a high reputation within his society
because he performed a valuable social role and wrote poems which respected the
integrity of the genres, Young claims that the modern poet remained in woeful ignorance
of his social responsibility and lacked any appreciation of the forms in which he chose to
write. This not only makes "the Poetick Clan . . . more obnoxious to vanity than Others"
(OO, p. 16), but it nurtured a personality which could not accept criticism, could not learn
from its errors or improve on its weaknesses:
from Vanity consequentially flows that great sensibility of disrespect, that quick
resentment, that tinder of the Mind that kindles at every spark, and justly marks
them out for the Genus Irntabile among mankind. And from this combustible
temper, this serious anger for no very serious Things, Things look'd on by most as
foreign to the Important Points of Life, as consequentially flows that Inheritance of
Ridicule, which devolves on them, from Generation to Generation. (OO, p. 16)
To speak plainly, people do not treat poets with disdain because they do not fully
comprehend their vital contributions to culture, but the poets themselves who do not
understand their responsibility to society: scribbling away in vain ignorance, they reap the
predictable rewards of self-delusion. Gaining a proper perspective of their vocation,
therefore, would go some way towards recovering their rightful reputation. The first step,
naturally, involves a serious study and contemplation of the poetic genres, for "To our
having, or not having this Idea of Perfection in the Poem we undertake, is chiefly owing
the Merit, or Demerit of our Performances" (OO, p. 14). When a poet fully comprehends
Chapter Four, p. 250
the formal attributes of a poem--and can thereby appreciate its full imaginative potential-
he will simultaneously obtain a correct judgment of his language rooted in the soil of
sense, which sounds like a contradiction in terms. However, as with most eighteenth-
century commentators on the lyric Young begins from a definition which relies upon the
lyric's ancient heritage and takes seriously the neo-classical conviction about literature's
aims. As an ancient type of poetry-if not the original genre itself-which arose during a
period when language necessarily lacked complex and abstract terms, the lyric utilized a
type of primitive but spontaneously vital and pure form of representational speech.
Because Young accepts that antiquity of the lyric, he believes that
so is it more Spiritous, and more remote from Prose than any other, in Sense,
Sound, Expression, and Conduct. It's thought should be uncommon, sublime, and
moral; Its numbers full, easy, and most harmonious; Its expression pure, strong,
delicate, yet unaffected; and a curious felicity beyond other Poems; Its conduct
should be rapturous, somewhat abrupt, and immethodical to a vulgar Eye. That
apparent order, and connection, which gives form and life to some compositions,
takes away the very Soul of this. Fire, elevation, and select thought, are
indispensible; an humble, tame, and vulgar Ode is the most pityful error a pen can
commit. (OO, pp. 18-19)
By counterpoising lyric expression ("pure, strong, delicate, yet unaffected") to that of
prose, Young implicitly accepts that the clear, concise, and simple prose style of the new
scientists effectively set the agenda for all representations of natural phenomena.
Moreover, he appears to recognise that this style presented the poet with a competing
style of representation which threatened to efface the poet's historical role as mediator
between scientist, society, and nature which Sidney stressed, putting his function as the
praiser of nature in danger. Young carefully scouts a way out of this morass, holding firm
to the view that the lyric style of language could both satisfy new-science demands about
language and representation and complement it: lyric language could-just as Sidney said
it should-move those who might resist the language of science. The underlying aim of the
lyric's expressive ardour, he explains, was first and foremost to "a little startle some
apprehensions" by showing "objects in their natural lustre"; whatever else one might think
about the lyric, this capacity to reveal objects constituted "the genuine character, and true
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merit of the Ode" (OO, pp. 19-20). The real value of the ode-its ability to break through
the encrusted shell of custom to awaken the deadened senses-lies in its ability to disturb
those "Men of cold Complections" whose eyes can no longer bear the sight of nature's
brightness. Thus the dual process of startling the mind and raising emotions to a sublime
level helps to fulfil the main purpose of all poetry-to instruct and delight.
However, it would be wrong to assume that inspired expression alone will
necessarily produce a great or sublime ode. As in other types of poetry, where judgment
must hold the reins of the imagination, so too in the ode; since all "the fairest Offspring of
the human mind" (OO, p. 21) share this tutelage, so with the ode. Nevertheless, Young
feels that lyric poetry differs from other types of composition, and in this difference lies its
superiority as a poetic genre: in the ode "the Imagination, like a very beautiful Mistress, is
indulged in the appearance of domineering; tho the Judgment, like an Artful Lover, in
reality, carries its point; and the less it is suspected of it, It shews the more masterly
conduct, and deserves the greater commendation" (OO, p. 21). To support this view, he
affirms that Pindar displayed "as much Logick at the bottom, as Aristotle, or Euclid' (OO,
p. 20). Of course, Young does not mean to suggest here that the lyric would benefit from
a too logical use of language, especially as most commentators stressed that the delight
afforded by the lyric lay in its peculiar use of a wild figurative language. He therefore
enumerates the various types of diction which the lyric accommodated: pure, sweet, solid,
graceful, natural, and so forth. Equally important, its images were bold, sublime, shocking,
striking, and the like; its subjects manifold, involving a full range of emotions and moods.
This range and combination of elements made the lyric superbly suited to meet the
expressive tastes of eighteenth-century readers.
Indeed, like Coward and other lyric analysts, Young emphasizes that the "Spiritous"
and emotional features of lyric language permitted a wide variety of measures, a freedom
which opened up great possibilities for the poet to shape his diction to his thoughts.
Although accepting, like Sheffield, that neither ancient nor modern practice made rhyme a
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necessary feature of a poem, Young saw no reason to exclude rhyme from lyric poetry.
The poet must choose what best fits the subject of the poem and treat it accordingly,
always making "Rhyme consistent with as perfect Sense, and Expression, as could be
expected" (OO, p. 26). The aim, above all, was to write a poem which achieved an overall
affect of harmony but "without the least sacrifice of expression, or of sense" (OO, p. 26).
In other words, Young wants to define carefully the nature and purpose of lyric freedom,
bringing under control the instinct for poetic excess in order that writers served their
vocation with appropriate seriousness. Young's programme suggests a parallel with the
new scientists' doctrine of intellectual freedom: just as they constrained their freedom with
specific intellectual, linguistic, and behavioural ideals which directed research to higher
social purposes, so Young (along with most other lyric theorists) effectively delimits the
lyric poet's freedom.
In fact, just as Sprat warned scientists to regulate their research by the limitations of
the phenomena, generating conclusions based solely on testable experiments, Young
asserts that poets who understood the lyric genre would see that their subject matter
should govern any and all tendencies to excessive imagery, diction, conceptualization,
and so forth. In keeping with a man who would later write an essay on original
composition, he sees that in order to discover the limits of the genre the poet should
strive after "somewhat of an Original Spirit" (OO, p. 27), even if true originality might prove
impossible. If, unlike a bookish imitation, a work of original poetry would exude an aura of
"true Life" (OO, p. 27), it would, after all, need to draw upon the writer's real experiences
and feelings. As with other contemporary theorists, Young accents the poet's need to
reflect carefully upon the type and extent of imitation required in the lyric: while other
species of poetry might dictate an exact imitation of ancient models to meet with success,
the case with the lyric was otherwise. The lyric poet, says Young, must regard imitation of
the ancients in light of a simple but by no means easy rule. He must "imitate their example
in the general motives, and fundamental methods of their working," but he must not follow
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them "in their works themselves" (OO, p. 27). In other words, the modern lyric poet should
attempt similar subject matter in his poems, he should study the formal organizational
principles of ancient lyrics, but he should invent his own images, use his own language,
and express his own thoughts and feelings. The ancient models might show how to
organize certain kinds of emotional experience, they might suggest the types of figures
which were most effective in certain moods, and they might even indicate how to catch
the lyric fire, but they did not dictate the poet's imaginative engagement with the subject of
his poetry. To exercise lyric freedom and perhaps win success in this form, Young argues,
needed "a due deference for the great Standards of Antiquity" (OO, p. 27) but not
subjection to their achievements. Doubtless, Bacon and all the experimental scientists
who followed in his steps would have agreed with Young.
The observations of Coward, Andrews, and Young indicate an important element in
early eighteenth-century theorizing about the lyric genre. Its rootedness in the experience
of nature, its use of a simple, yet dignified and elevated (even sublime) language, its
descriptive and imagistic licence, and its capacity to function as a vehicle for religious
praise-these aspects proved valuable for conflating the hegemonic ideals of the new
science with the lyric genre's expressive potential, and without undermining either the
classical or Christian hegemonies. In the face of competition from science poets could
use the lyric genre to satisfy the representational demands of science and still make use
of the poetic resources of language; moreover, decorum could be maintained because the
classical heritage of the lyric sanctioned bold imagery, nervous metaphors, abrupt
transitions, and so forth. If, for instance, the descriptions or images built logically towards
it, that is, they were appropriate to the spirit or sense of the poem, the poet could pursue
a sequence of imaginative visions based upon the experience of nature and invoke the
use of non-human forms: genii, seraphs, and so forth. Likewise, the rapturous episode
could induce a state of mind in which allegorical figures would appear: nature, beauty,
pity, fear, and so forth. The allegory or personification would then convey the moral or
didactic meaning of the experience. The ancients, however, furnished no examples of
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how to write a poem such as a descriptive and allegorical ode, and this raised important
generic issues which needed resolving, particularly for those poets who took seriously the
command that imitation of the ancients constituted their primary poetic task.
Richard Shepherd provides a good example of a poet who sees when and how the
past can offer help, but also when it cannot, especially when it seems clear that the old
form is being made to carry the freight of a new mode of experience. Just as Campion
went back to ancient writers to sanction his choice of subject matter in his Ayres, so too
does Shepherd. His Preface to Odes, Descriptive and Allegorical (1761) points out that
Horace's Art of Poetry stipulated that "The proper Subjects of Lyrick Poetry are ... the
Exploits and Thumphs of Heroes, Love's Cares, and the free Joys of Wine,"152 Yet this
narrowly prescribed range of subject matter conflicted with Horace's actual practice in his
poems, which often treated moral and sentimental issues (as did other classical authors),
and Shepherd takes this as sufficient authority for the range and content of his poems.
However, the discovery that Horace's practice differed from his critical decrees
could permit the modern poet some leeway in treating various types of subject matter
does not by itself solve all Shepherd's problems. When he turns from Horace to Pindar's
example Shepherd finds that, unlike the Pindaric ode which "has its foundation in Fact
and Reality, that Fact worked up and heightened by a studied Pomp and Grandeur of
Expression," a descriptive and allegorical lyric "is built intirely upon Fancy" (ODA, p. iv).
Whereas a Pindaric ode would employ some historical or ritual event as a focal point,
Shepherd correctly sees that the type of ode emerging in the eighteenth century put a
high premium on the poet's visionary experience of nature. Yet by taking the advice of
critical wisdom to lean upon ancient models, the modern subjected himself to a labyrinth
of constraints: not only can the poem at hand differ in many ways from the ancient model,
but ancient and modern worldviews-their respective imaginative tempers, one might say-
were premised upon radically contrasting experiences of nature, on a differing set of
epistemological assumptions. Thus, if the type of subject-matter which informs Pindaric
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poetry "not only admits of, but requires bold digressions, abrupt and hasty Transitions"
(ODA, p. iii), that of the newly-emerging descriptive and allegorical ode did not necessarily
rely upon them to the same extent, and certainly not for the same reasons. True, the
modern poet's vision supposedly resulted from the powerful and sublime force of nature-
and it might therefore be expected to employ similar heightened language and abrupt
transitions as the Pindaric--but Shepherd finds it difficult to smooth over the contradictions
between ancient and modern views about poetry and language: notably, the modern
demand that language correspond to or imitate the subject-matter of a poem. On the one
hand, because the modern lyric focuses on natural imagery, "Ease and Simplicity of
Diction are its peculiar Characteristics" (ODA, p. iv). On the other hand, eighteenth-
century theory valued the capacity of a lyric fancy to create allegorical creatures (so
important for instructing and delighting). How, then, could the poet maintain a language
rooted in the experience of nature? How could the language of the descriptive and
allegorical ode, however fanciful, attain sublimity and still make sense? Shepherd offers
no answers.
The problem does not disappear; rather, it becomes both more confused and more
sharply delineated. Shepherd's dilemma draws attention to a growing awareness of the
demands which the linguistic code of the new science made upon representational
values, and many writers opted for a rigorous application of this code to poetic language.
Their reasons for doing so remain complex and often obscure, though in most cases a
desire to rehabilitate the language of poetry lies at the heart of their rigour. Where a cold,
straitlaced temper (a proof of prosiness some might say) seems to condition a critic's
observations about allegories, fictions, and so forth, a closer look reveals a deep concern
to rescue poetry from the scribblers and return it to the serious votaries of poetry.
Both John Scott and John Aikin, for instance, take a hard line on the use of
allegorical or mythical figures, especially when used without clear thought or careful
development. Scott censures both Denham and Pope for their use of pagan deities, or as
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he calls it, for making any "Comparison with a non-entity."153 To introduce such deities by
way of comparison, he argues, "surely cannot elevate a real object," and in true patriot
fashion adding that "The mythological fables of Atlas, and the towery crown of Cybele,
bear no relation, and add no dignity, to an English hill or palace" (CESP, p. 12). Indeed,
Scott upbraids Denham especially for presenting "a tedious enumeration of supposed
qualities, illustrated by a string of far fetched and unnatural comparisons" which in no way
come "as nearly as possible" (CESP, p. 19) to an accurate description of Cooper's Hill.
Such literalness doubtless sounds rather too obtuse, too unpoetic, missing the spirit
and aim of poetic representation, and committing all the worst errors of a Lockean-
inspired evaluation of poetic language, but Scott's indignation deserves more of a
hearing. When he turns to Pope's Windsor Forest, Scott lays his cards out on the table
and they amount to more than mere bluff. He notes that for a poet "To describe
graphically and poetically the discriminating peculiarities of any particular situation,
requires superior abilities" (CESP, p. 72), and he willingly allows Pope a huge fund of
such ability. However, when he analyses the literal purpose of Pope's description, its
logical and strictly communicative role, he finds that it fails to achieve these ends: "To
compare it [Windsor] to a number of other places, of different character, is certainly no
very difficult business. Windsor was before compared to Eden, it is now compared to
Olympus; but the man who has never seen Windsor, can receive no idea of its
appearance from these comparisons" (CESP, p. 72). For Scott, in other words, the
apparent poetical beauty of Pope's substitutions cannot overrule his demand that poetry
fulfil certain basic criteria of sense, and he not insensibly sees these criteria as ones set
by poetry itself. In the same vein, he criticizes the use of similes and metaphors. Similes
"are sometimes employed to great advantage" (CESP, p. 282) but not always, especially
when writers draw too many easy and inconsistent resemblances between things;
metaphors add much beauty to poetry but he regards metaphor as "an ignis fatuus, that
leads many a poet into the bog of nonsense" (CESP, p. 284). Similarly, Scott accepts that
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"The prosopopoeia is a figure less liable to abuse than the metaphor, but it is frequently
abused" (CESP, p. 355). Examples of good usage Scott finds in Gray, Collins, and
Thomson: these writers show great skill and acuity in the ways that they forge sense and
poetic language. They rarely make the mistake of being "defective in correctness" (CESP,
p. 356). Again, Scott's demand for correctness does not mean that he could not read
sensitively or with imagination. Praising Gray's Elegy, for instance, he finds "Poetical
boldness, carried to its utmost classical limit. . . Some of the images are so uncertainly
marked, that we scarcely know whether they were intended for natural objects or
allegorical personages" (CESP, p. 216), a feat of representational writing which he
considers of the highest merit.
Aikin, a writer who wanted the poet to undertake scientific training as a means of
rescuing descriptive poetry from its boring sameness, shares Scott's anxieties about the
excessive and unthinking use of allegory, mythic figures, and compound images. Aikin
accepts that "fictions of some kind have been justly accounted the very soul of poetry, and
cannot be rejected without depriving it of its choicest ornaments" (EANHP, p. 31), but he
also feels that the rationale for this type of poetic language requires clarification at the bar
of criticism. He asks, therefore, what gives rise to this type of imagery and what could be
done to ensure that it does not subvert the high expressive aims of poetry.
Drawing (it would seem) upon Sir William Jones's ideas about the nature of Arabian
and Indian poetry, Aikin puts forward the argument that "The genius of eastern poets,
bold, ardent, and precipitate, was peculiarly averse to precision and accuracy" (EANHP,
p. 11). Motivated by a strong emotional response to some sublime natural object, these
poets "often seem entirely to lose sight of the train of thought which the proposed subject
would seem naturally to suggest" (EANHP, p. 12). Like Scott, Aikin sees that emotional
outpourings such as those exhibited in these poets shares directly in the poetical spirit,
"an exuberance of that fire which constitutes the very essence of poetry" (EANHP, p. 16).
Indeed, says Aikin, when we understand how the fictions and the beautiful images of
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poetry take life and force from the real objects of nature, how the language of poetry itself
depends upon the fictionalizing and imaging of nature, then it seems only reasonable that
we should indulge and venerate them. Thus, the poet should remain free to nurture his
emotions and present them in a language which truly represents their full power.
A lack of emotional restraint, however, does not constitute a problem for modern
poets, Aikin finds, but rather a "Want of knowledge, attention, or discernment" (EANHP, p.
16). Modern poets do not suffer from any lack of emotional motivation in their poetry:
rather, they require greater rigour and a more disciplined application to principles of
composition. Worse, as long as poets continued to imitate or copy fictions and allegorical
figures from outmoded systems of mythology and so on, trading on the inventions of
others, they would fail to win renown or respect for their poetry. Thus, while Aikin can
appreciate that careful and tasteful imitation forms an important, even elegant, element of
the poet's art, he refuses to countenance that poetical beauty in itself can derive from any
source other than nature; until poets governed their use of fictions and imagery by
principles of truth, there remained little hope that poetry could take its rightful place
amongst the other sciences. If, says Aikin, writers could adopt "this unquestionable
principle, that nothing can be really beautiful which has not truth for its basis" (EANHP,
pp. 24-25), if they could rely on nature for their images and ideas, and if they could
reflect on the danger of suffering falsehood and error habitually to intrude even in
matters of the slightest importance; we shall scarcely give our assent to a licence,
as unnecessary as it is hazardous. A modern writer can lose nothing by this rigour;
for since both true and false wit have so long been employed upon these topics,
every thing brilliant or ingenious which they can suggest, must have long since been
exhausted; and the revival of them at present is as much a proof of barren invention
as of false taste. (EANHP, p. 25)
In keeping with this principle of truth and beauty in composition (a principle which, given
Aikin's thorough grounding in experimental science, likely owes something to the new
science), Aikin would compel the modern writer to pay greater attention to the actual aim
of a particular poem. An awareness of precisely what any particular part of a poem should
accomplish would go far to bringing a justness and accuracy to imagery. Thus, "Where
the professed intention of the poet is the description of natural objects, it cannot be
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doubted that every fabulous idea should be religiously avoided" (EANHP, p. 26),
especially since "it is the business of every figure of comparison either to illustrate or to
enforce the simple idea, it is certainly requisite that they should be founded upon
circumstances to which the mind of the reader can assent; otherwise it can produce little
effect" (EANHP, p. 28). Indeed, Aikin feels so strongly about the need for poets to show
greater accuracy in the description of natural objects that he suggests that "Perhaps, in a
modern writer we should require an adherence to truth, even in the representation of
those higher and less obvious parts of the economy of nature which come under the
survey of philosophy" (EANHP, p. 29). After all, he adds, because "The Copernican theory
of the solar system has been now long enough established to take place of the Ptolemaic
even in poetical allusion," it does not seem too much to ask that "the sun, tranquilly
seated in the centre of its vast dependencies, cheering, invigorating, and animating the
whole, may on every occasion of sublime imagery, supercede the chariot of Phoebus, for
ever painfully dragged round the globe we inhabit" (EANHP, pp. 29-30). Not every poet, of
course, would care to follow Aikin's advice. Christopher Smart, for example, refused to
take new scientific discoveries into account if they disagreed with his religious beliefs.
Karina Williamson points out that an acquaintance with empirical science and its
achievements did not guarantee acceptance of it as a mode of truth-finding: "Smart's
habit of mind, in fact, was fundamentally unscientific. In so far as scientific evidence
supported his metaphysical preconceptions he was happy to accept it; where evidence
conflicted with his preconceptions he dismissed it with cavalier disdain."154 In any case, no
number of writers who shared Smart's position should obscure Aikin's basic concerns,
which remain firmly on the side of a more vital poetry-Aikin wants the poet to convince
and to move his reader, wants the poet to integrate emotion, mind, and imagination into a
language capable of achieving the greatest possible effects. As Aikin says elsewhere, "It
is not enough that poetry does not disgust, it ought to give raptures,"155
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Indeed, some six years prior to the publication of his An Essay on the Application
ofNatural History to Poetry Aikin published Essays on Song-Writing (1772), a work
which probably motivated the sentiments of the later essay. The analysis which Aikin
carries out in his Essays on Song-Writing indicate that he considered the lyric a major
genre with wide appeal, and four more editions of the work provide more confirmation of
the growing interest in the form. Aikin observes that because the song itself belongs to a
minor mode a great deal of confusion surrounded its nature as a composition, obscuring
the functions of its various generic elements and hindering a full appreciation of its
poetical potential. Like many other writers, he hopes to gain his bearings by looking at the
roots of poetry, at its bare elements in their most primitive states. Not surprisingly, then,
he notes that "The original poetry of all nations must have been very much confined to the
description of external objects, and the narration of events. This is a necessary
consequence of the barrenness of infant language with regard to abstract ideas, and is
confirmed by the remains of antiquity which have reached us" (ESS, pp. 3-4). Unlike the
many critics who wanted to define the lyric as the original of all poetry, however, he does
not want to ascribe to the song a lineage more ancient than that of epic or drama: he
simply makes use of this point to establish the descriptive bedrock of all poetry.
Aikin contends that the really best examples of epic and drama, as well as pastoral,
"have been the spontaneous growth of a rude and uncultivated soil," whereas the various
modes of lyric "have never flourished without the acquired richness in the soil and the
fostering hand of art" (ESS, pp. 1-2).156 Such poetry concerns heroic events, pastoral
matters, or the effects of passion in human acts, and it focuses on descriptions and
beautiful images. As far as Aikin can tell, in such a plain and linguistically barren state "all
is simple and natural, and poetry so far from being the art of fiction, is the faithful copyist
of external objects and real emotions" (ESS, p. 6). In short, since almost every critic
persistently accepted that the lyric genre evolved to fulfil the highest moral and intellectual
purposes-to sing the praises of nature and God-Aikin merely makes the theory more
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conducive to his sense of the natural growth of the mind and of civilization. Indeed, in
pushing the accepted theory of the lyric genre in this direction he manages to show that
precisely those imaginative parts of poetry which many saw as its soul-fictions and
figures—evolved as part of the lyric response to nature.
Aikin makes a distinction, therefore, between a type of poetry like epic or pastoral
which more or less faithfully represent objects and events, and that of the lyric, a type of
poetry which makes greater use of the imagination. This more imaginative application of
the mind he considers entirely natural and necessary, a factor in the development of
higher states of intellection:
the mind of man cannot long be confined within prescribed limits; there is an
internal eye constantly stretching its view beyond the bounds of natural vision, and
something new, something greater, more beautiful, more excellent, is required to
gratify its noble longing. This eye of the mind is the imagination-it peoples the world
with new beings, it embodies abstract ideas, it suggests unexpected resemblances,
it creates first, and then presides over its creation with absolute sway.
(ESS, pp. 6-7)
This distinction, that the lyric impulse introduces the use of fiction into poetry, paves the
way for Aikin to make a further and more striking partition of the poetic processes.
Aikin notes that the two different forms of representation, the natural and the
fictional, will determine the type of effects which a poem or a part of a poem can produce,
and this applicability extends to the two primary aims of poetry, to instruct and to delight.
He conceives of these two terms in a specific way, ascribing elements to both which
relate to the general matter of the genre and to the more specific function of the poem's
language. For Aikin, instruction always includes the notion of moving the reader to some
practical end, while delight always includes the concepts of beauty and surprise, of raising
the reader to a higher intellectual state of apprehension. Thus, says Aikin, when a poet
works in, say, epic or drama, both forms in which education constitutes the primary aim of
the matter, "whatever is designed to move the passions cannot be too natural and
simple," and similarly, "when the professed design of the poet is to paint the beauties of
nature and the rural landscape of pastoral life, he must give as great an air of reality as
possible to his piece, since an ill imitation necessarily produces disgust" (ESS, pp. 7-8).
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Thus, in compositions where fidelity to experience and to history automatically set
representational standards, and whenever a form guides the listener to a specific type of
pleasure, the poet cannot make much use of the full poetic resources of language, of
elevated figures, metaphors, allegories.
When, however, the poet wants to elicit a response to nature that raises the
thoughts of the listener to a transcendental realm beyond immediate sense, then must he
exploit poetic language to the full. As Aikin puts it, "when the aim is to elevate and
surprise, to gratify a love of novelty and the pleasing luxury of indulging the fancy, all the
powers of fiction must be set at work, and the imagination employed without controul to
create new images and discover uncommon resemblances and connexions" (ESS, p. 8).
This process of poetic creation, activated by the specific aims of the poem, constitutes
the lyric's claim to major genre status. Strongly rooted in the soil of sense, sharing the
descriptive virtues of a primitive expressionism, and permitted the freedom to expatiate on
the sublime and transcendent relationships of human, nature, and God, the lyric required
a high degree of both art and imagination. Thus, the writer who wishes
rather to please and surprise than to move, will ransack heaven and earth for
objects of brilliant and unusual comparison with every circumstance relating to the
passion itself or its object. He will not value sentiment as the real offspring of an
emotion, but as susceptible of ingenious turns, striking contrasts and pleasing
allusions. He will not compose from the heart but the head, and will consult his
imagination rather than his sensations. This quality is peculiarly termed wit, and a
just taste for it is never acquired without a considerable degree of national
refinement. (ESS, pp. 8-9)
In this one dense statement Aikin brings together various threads of critical thinking about
the relationships between sense experience, imagination, and wit (judgment), and he
rounds it off with a quite typical expression of pro-modernism. Later in his Essays Aikin
makes the observation cited in the first chapter of this study that "The graver and sublimer
strains of the Lyric muse are exemplified in the modern ode," and he supplements this
remark by noting that modern poets had developed "a species of composition which
admits of the boldest flights of poetical enthusiasm, and the wildest creations of the
imagination, and requires the assistance of every figure that can adorn language, and
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raise it above its ordinary pitch" (ESS, p. 20). When Aikin several years later publishes his
An Essay on the Application ofNatural History to Poetry, he had already developed
his ideas about what constituted the basic elements of good poetry, and what of great,
and the lyric comprised all of them.
Like Aikin, John Pinkerton finds the lyric genre a model genre, and what he says
about it makes some significant modifications to eighteenth-century lyric theory. What he
succeeds in doing merits some praise since he formulates one of the better arguments in
favour of careful study of the ancient forms, showing that many of the confusions about
what elements belong in a lyric arise because theorists fail to distinguish the different
gradations of lyric experience. Pinkerton, moreover, clearly considers the lyric a major
genre. Of all the contemporary literary subjects deserving of critical attention, he feels that
surely an inquiry into the lyric ranked uppermost. Criticism needed to establish just what
exactly constituted "the spirit of lyric poetry," and when it managed to do that it could more
rationally determine "its discriminations from other kinds of poetry" (LL, p. 33). The need
for this analysis strikes him as absolutely vital because of the importance of this type of
poetry and because "Those who have even pretended to write in this style have often
betrayed perfect ignorance of the very principles of so exquisite a mode of composition"
(LL, p. 33). He goes on to define two distinct types of lyric.
The ancient Greek lyric provides the only source for reflection upon the genre, so
far as Pinkerton can see, since they "alone . . . are the masters, and their works the
models of this kind of poetry" (LL, p. 33). Looking carefully at the structure and content of
the ancient Greek lyric, Pinkerton notes that it "divides itself, in resemblance to nature,
into two kinds, the sublime, and the beautiful" (LL, p. 33); each of these two kinds makes
particular demands upon language; and each allows the poet to organize that language in
a peculiar fashion, which then constitutes its fundamental appeal.157 The subject matter of
the sublime lyric, for instance, permits "sudden transitions, bold and abrupt metaphors, a
regular cadence, and a warm impetuous glow of thoughts and language" (LL, p. 34), and
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much of the poem's sublimity derived from the movement of emotion and thought as
mirrored in its transitions. Coward certainly reacted strongly to such transitions, stating
that of all the rules which he knew that cultivated better poetry "I do affirm among the rest,
Digressions, to be the Life and greatest Beauty of Poetry" (LPD, p. 49). In the type of lyric
which he terms the beautiful, Pinkerton finds that "Harmony of cadence, and beauty and
warmth of expression, seem the principal. Above all, uncommon elegance in terms of
language, and in transition, are so vital to this kind of lyric poetry . . . that I will venture to
say they constitute its very soul" (LL, pp. 34-35). Philip Francis, in his A Poetical
Translation of the Works of Horace (1753), offers similar arguments as Pinkerton.
Francis observes that the lyric permits "a pleasing Variety, to which no other Poetry can
pretend," and it ranges over "a Variety of Subjects" in which "is agreeably maintained a
Variety of Numbers, and they have both contributed to that free, unbounded Spirit, which
forms the peculiar Character of Lyric Poetry." For Francis, the lyric's peculiar generic
heritage sanctions its "Freedom of Spirit [which] disdains to mark the Transitions."158
Andrews, we recall, likewise focused on harmony as a particular beauty of lyric poetry.
With some justification, then, Pinkerton can assert that before Gray no other English poet
paid any attention to either of these aspects of the genre; in fact, in Pinkerton's eyes no
poet before Gray, ancient or modern, English or otherwise, managed to surpass or even
match Pindar.
Pinkerton seems almost at times to conceive and define poetry in terms of lyric
poetry, although it would be risky to say anything determinate about his views--his Letters
on Literature bristle with contradictions and eccentric proclamations. Certainly he agreed
with Gray's feeling that "The true lyric style, with all its flights of fancy, ornaments, and
heightening of expression, and harmony of sound, is in its nature superior to every other
style."159 Gray likewise stressed the natural felicity of lyric descriptions and the peculiar
beauty of the genre's varying structures, defining expression not as "the mere choice of
words, but the whole dress, fashion, and arrangement of the thought" and noting that "it is
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the brokenness, the ungrammatical position, the total subversion of the period, that
charms me . . . for this is pure poetry, as it ought to be, forming the proper transition, and
leading on the mind."160 Typically, Gray employs a perspective analogy to illustrate that the
lyric's form aptly suits its range of content, and particularly its usually short length. The
lyric poem can lift the writer to such heights that extended productions become
impossible--just as the eye cannot "bear to see all this scene that we constantly gaze
upon,-the verdure of the fields and woods, the azure of the sea and skies, turned into
one dazzling expanse of gems."161 For a critic of Pinkerton's complexion, the subject
matter of the lyric sanctions a "want of connection" in its development and, indeed, he
feels that much of the beauty of the lyric resides in its generic warrant to make
connections where none appear to exist. Unfortunately, other than a few positive remarks
about the quality of much contemporary lyric poetry, Pinkerton says little more of a critical
nature on the topic.
Gilbert West takes up the issue of regularity and the use of transitions in the
Pindaric ode in his translation of the Odes of Pindar (1749). Following Congreve, he sets
out to counter the view that Pindar wrote in irregular numbers and paid little or no
attention to the connections between stanzas. Those poets pretending to write a Pindaric
imitation actually produced something quite different, or at least a poem which, says
West, might at best be termed a "Can'cafura."162 The problem according to West goes
back to Cowley, whose translations of Pindar, though demonstrating both "Wit and Fire"
and written by a man whose "Genius, perhaps . . . was not inferior to that of Pindar
himself," did not give a true representation of Pindar's poetry; further, all those who
proclaimed obedience to the Pindaric muse did not imitate Pindar but simply "mimick'd"
(OP, sig. A3V) Cowley, and they did that poorly. Francis follows West's lead. Cowley's "too
great Success," he says, "first gave Pindar's Name to a wild irregular Kind of Versification,
of which there is not one Instance in Pindar. All his Numbers are exact, and all his
Strophes regular." However, whenever some poet manages to pull off a success, others
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quickly run down the same path, trying to imitate the same form and manner but a weak
writer: "hath not Strength or Industry sufficient to confine his Rhimes and Numbers to
some constant Form, (which alone can give them real Harmony) makes an Art of
wandering, and then calls his Work a Pindaric Ode; in which, by the same Justness of
Criticism, his Imagination is as wild and licentious, as his Numbers are loose and
irregular."163 West and Francis may have had Sheffield in mind. He describes the ode in
terms of abandon and imaginative freedom:
A higher Flight, and of a happier Force
Are Odes, the Muses most unruly Horse;
That bounds so fierce, the Rider has no rest,
But foams at the Mouth, and moves like one possest.
The Poet here must be indeed inspired,
With Fury too, as well as Fancy fired.164
If, therefore, either a reader or a writer of Pindaric wanted to catch its original flame, they
needed to treasure the logical beauty of its structural movement, that form into which the
beautiful words went; they ought to study the original and derive their understanding from
thence, putting little (or no faith) in the authority of those who lacked any knowledge of
Greek history or literature. West, for his part, confesses that he sought information about
Pindar and about the nature of Greek poetry from "a learned and ingenious Friend" (OP,
sig. A4V). This learned, historically-grounded account stressed the ordered, ritual function
of the ancient ode, defining it as a performance art which involved both singing and
dancing: however transcendental the lyric, its basis lay in powerful physical actions.
Drawing upon his friend's historical information West highlights the ancient ode's
structural organization: two major stanzas--the strophe and the antistrophe--and a lesser
stanza, the epode. Clearly, then, each stanza performed a specific function and each
symbolised some aspect of the ancient cosmology. Lyric performance involved singing
the strophe at the altars of the gods according to a certain dance step; the antistrophe
inverted the dance; the epode was sung standing still. Spectators were expected to
equate the strophe with the motions of the higher spheres, the antistrophe with that of the
planets, while the epode signified the "fixed Station and Repose of the Earth" (OP, sig.
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A4V). West reasons that since dancing and singing accompanied both the strophe and the
antistrophe, these stanzas probably resembled church recitative; therefore, both probably
involved parallel or counterbalanced structures and verse lines of equal measure. The
epode could then be compared to a complete air (a conclusion which supports Campion's
views about the ancient lyric). In any case, both the first and second stanzas of the
strophe and antistrophe "contained always the same Number and the same kind of
Verses. The Epode was of a different Length and Measure" (OP, sig. B2). Obviously,
different occasions would call for odes of differing length, in which case says West the
ode "was always divided into Triplets or Stanzas, the two first being constantly of the
same Length and Measure, and all the Epodes in like manner corresponding exactly with
each other" (OP, sig. B2). In short, the structure of a Pindaric ode should follow a regular
and consistent design; even those few which do not employ an epode, or contain just a
strophe, use different measures, and run to varying lengths display a high degree of
control and regularity.165
If the original ode maintained such structural regularity in so many areas, West
thinks it unlikely-popular notions to the contrary-that Pindarics employed transitions
illogically, a practice which supposedly resulted from the "Wildness of [Pindar's]
Imagination" (OP, sig. B2V). While West does not dispute that Pindar often uses abrupt
transitions, he sees them as formal features dictated by the subject matter of the odes.
On the one hand, many of the odes celebrate Olympic heroes, conquerors, or warriors:
logically, a poet would rarely possess a complete knowledge about the lives of these
individuals. He would therefore fill out his poem with other matter related to the
subject-family history, the hero's country of birth, a story about the games in which the
winning athlete emerged victorious. None of this would appear wild or extravagant either
to the subject of the poem or to Pindar's listeners: they would follow the movement of the
ode without feeling that Pindar had transgressed the bounds of logic or narrative
decorum. Furthermore, whenever the subject dictated a style of expression more elevated
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in nature than a run-of-the-mill ode-praise of the gods, for instance-rapid, abrupt
transitions would correlate with the movements of passion described in the poem-the
natural and deep passions of praise and admiration, of love and devotion—and this would
burst forth in a declamatory, elated manner. In either instance, whether as a celebratory
ode or as an ode of praise, and whether the lyric utterance conveyed immediate
responses and deep emotions extempore, the form followed highly conventionalized and
structurally sophisticated patterns. As West puts it:
whoever will consider the Odes of Pindar with regard to the Manners and Customs
of the Age in which they were written, the Occasions which gave Birth to them, and
the Places in which they were intended to be recited, will find little Reason to
censure Pindar for want of Order and Regularity in the Plans of his Compositions.
On the contrary, he will perhaps be inclined to admire him for raising so many
Beauties from such trivial Hints, and for kindling, as he sometimes does, so great a
Flame from a single Spark, and with so little Fuel. (OP, sig. B3-B3V)
Properly understood, then, Pindar's poetry exemplified a controlled, methodical technique
of composition: its effects unfolded from both experience and art, to which Pindar added
"a great deal of Good-sense, many wise Reflections, and many moral Sentences,
together with a due Regard to Religion" (OP, sig. C). West pointedly remarks that
inasmuch as Pindar's character could be drawn from his poetry, it was hardly one that a
lazy contemporary poet would wish to emulate.166
West's analysis of the ode's formal conventions and its elevated language belongs
to a long line of argumentation which, as we have seen, both sanctions the lyric genre as
a form which permits latitude and scope for the poet's imaginative rendering of experience
but compelled a hard discipline upon that freedom.167 The critics of the genre were
groping towards an awareness of the way that a primitive form rooted in immediate
experience could also fulfil the highest claims of poetry and thereby compete seriously as
an explainer of science with that contemporary upstart, modern science. In particular, the
sense of religious awe excited by nature, the revelation of God's great love and care for
humankind as displayed through the workings of nature, demanded a form that licenced a
certain type of ecstatic praise. The form needed to follow the contours of an emotional
response to an awe-inspiring nature newly revealed by the eye of the new science.168
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Obviously, this asked poets to walk a critical or theoretical tightrope which balanced both
emotion and judgment. Significantly, the poet could walk this tightrope only if the subject
or content of the poem represented or imitated real experiences, not just book-learning or
copying of the ancients.
The anonymous Preface to Smollett's Ode to Independence (1773), for example,
focuses on the lyric genre's ability to imitate states of mind and body rather than on its
use as a form for explaining philosophical doctrines, although ultimately poetic
representation of heightened states of being were expected to point the reader towards
some higher moral revelation. In any case, the doctrine of dynamic imitation which we see
emerging in the eighteenth century demanded that all poetry have a basis in real
experience. The anonymous preface-writer, however, restricts the focus of the lyric more
than most of his contemporaries, seeing its main poetic virtue as a vehicle for imitating
"violent and ardent passions."169 Since this aim constituted the special quality of this type
of poetry, it followed that each of its major generic elements developed in order to
accommodate this ardency. Insofar as it imitated violent passions, poets needed to
employ a "bold, various, and impetuous" language, a lyric poem always succeeding best
when it displayed "animated sentiments, glowing images, and forms of speech often
unusual, but commonly expressive." Thus, if readers found the structure of the lyric
somewhat perplexing-it might "appear disordered, and the transitions sudden and
obscure"-they should simply accept these as formal features integral to the experience of
the genre: if the transitions seemed to lack connection, in reality they were "always
natural" because they were always "governed by the movements and variations of the
imitated passions." To an audience familiar with Locke's ideas about associationism such
an argument would seem neither illogical nor sophistical.
Indeed, the preface-writer pushes this point even farther. The poet who sets about
his business by first "preparing the mind by a cool artificial introduction," employing logical
arguments or statements of moral principles as a prelude to a more passionate
expression, obviously differed noticeably from the lyric writer. Eschewing this practice, the
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lyric poet makes his appeal directly through the medium of imagery. Images, metaphors,
and associated figures of speech "assail the imagination by an abrupt and sudden
impulse; they vibrate through the soul, and fire us instantaneously." In other words, the
lyric poet relies upon well-drawn descriptions, and he blends these with finely perceived
delineations of the emotional responses which these descriptions excite. Moreover, he
does not need to use many of these images because they are "in themselves great and
magnificent." Although the writer says little else about the lyric, he emphasises those
features which would appeal to his readers: poetry imitates real experience; nature
provides the poet with the greatest of all sources of imaginative experience; poetry
therefore derives its power from a close, lively, and accurate imitation of real things. Such
imitation raises in the reader a strong and pleasurable feeling of the beauty and sublimity
of existence, and it thus teaches him to revere the God of all creation.
A final example of an eighteenth-century critic's (and a working lyric poet's)
evaluation of the lyric should sufficiently supplement the arguments put forward in this
chapter about the lyric's rise to major genre status as part of the hegemonic ascendency
of the new science. John Ogilvie's astute analysis in "An Essay on the Lyric Poetry of the
Ancients" (1762) merits reflection not so much for any clear statements which he makes
about the relationship between the various ideals of experimental science and the lyric but
for the virtually seamless way in which he assimilates into his discussion the
epistemological assumptions and standards of his culture. Indeed, he falls into line with
the many other critics of the eighteenth century who wanted, first, "to rescue Lyric Poetry
from the contempt in which it has been unjustly held by Authors of unquestioned
penetration" and, second, who wanted to prove that the genre "is naturally susceptible of
the highest poetic Beauty; and that, under proper regulations, it may be made subservient
to purposes as beneficial as any other branch of the Art."170
Ogilvie's rescue plan begins with an assertion which immediately brings the lyric
genre into the fold of the greater genres. Neither form nor specific content give rise to
great poetry but the operation of genius, that power which "is the offspring of Reason and
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Imagination, properly moderated, and co-operating with united influence, to promote the
discovery or the illustration of truth" (PSS, p. xxi). What therefore governs a poem's
ultimate claim to greatness depends upon the alignment of all these faculties within an
individual mind; while they constitute separate and particular forces at work, in the act of
creation "it often becomes a matter of the greatest difficulty to prevent them from making
mutual encroachments, and from leading to extremes, which are the more dangerous,
because they are brought on by an imperceptible progression" (PSS, pp. xxi-xxii). Initially,
Ogilvie takes care not to overrate any of these powers of mind or to make a blanket
judgment about which should lead, which follow. Instead, he notes that different literary
forms and different purposes will regulate the structure and the language of a poem.
However, the poet's attitude towards these faculties can affect whether or not a poem
attains greatness. A poem in which the author allows reason to predominate will exhibit
certain features: "sentiments will follow each other in connected succession; the
arguments employed to prove any point will be just and forcible; the stability of a work will
be principally considered, and little regard will be paid to its exterior ornament" (PSS, p.
xxii). Certain readers will rank the poem a fine performance based on its orderliness. Yet,
says Ogilvie, few will value it beyond that: such a work will not fulfil the great aims of
literature because it will "never be productive of general improvement, as attention can
only be fixed by entertainment, and entertainment is incompatible with unvaried
uniformity" (PSS, p. xxii). So, like Aikin and other critics, Ogilvie accepts that a writer must
strive for some degree of novelty in language, imagery, and so forth, in those aspects of
writing which rely upon the imagination. Yet if a poet wantonly applies imagination to
"bestow the graces of ornament indiscriminately, we either find in the general that
sentiments are superficial, and thinly scattered through a work, or we are obliged to
search for them beneath a load of superfluous colouring" (PSS, p. xxii). Somehow, the
poet must find a way between the extremes.
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Working from a psychological insight into the operations of the mind, Ogilvie argues
that most of us come into the world with a strong inclination to one or other tendency,
either to favour reason or imagination, and that many writers, fearful of committing the
vice of either of these excesses, often end up embracing the other side. Predictably, most
writers fail to reach "that perfect poise, which is necessary to constitute consummate
excellence" (PSS, p. xxiv). That failure, however, does not inhibit writers from claiming
that their approach alone satisfies the demands of great poetry. No writer can really claim
the accolades of correct taste, though Ogilvie observes that the poet "who attempts to
combine distant ideas, to catch remote allusions, to form vivid and agreeable pictures, is
more apt, from the very nature of his profession, to set up a false Standard of Excellence,
than the cool and dispassionate Philosopher" (PSS, p. xxiv). At least the philosopher "who
proceeds deliberately from position to argument, and who employs Imagination only as
the Handmaid of a superior faculty" (PSS, pp. xxiv-xxv) will produce a composition which
avoids a false taste. Poets can, of course, avoid falling into similar difficulties, but of all
the different types of poet, says Ogilvie, "the Lyric Poet is exposed to this hazard more
nearly than any other; and that to prevent him from falling into the extreme . . . will require
the exercise of the closest attention" (PSS, p. xxv).
In order to offer a programme which would help the lyric poet avoid the type of
overly excessive imaginative language and imagery which leads to false taste, Ogilvie
thinks it necessary "to enquire into the end which Lyric Poetry proposeth to obtain, and to
examine the original standards, from which the rules of this art are deduced" (PSS, p.
xxv)--in other words, he intends to study the classical forms. First, however, he looks to
classical criticism to determine what the ancients considered the basic elements of
poetry. Following Aristotle, Ogilvie accepts that poetry originates in the combination of
"Imitation and Harmony; both of which are natural to the human mind" (PSS, p. xxv).
Seemingly innate or "originally stamped on the mind" (PSS, p. xxvi), both of these give
pleasure: this combination of active (imitation) and passive (harmony) governs all poetic
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relations. Ogilvie cites Aristotle's definitions of imitation and harmony, and his point of
reference here seems significant. He highlights Aristotle's argument that poetic imitation
was meant '"to represent any subject in a natural manner, whether it hath a real or
imaginary existence"' (PSS, p. xxv). The phrase, "in a natural manner," lays down a
primary standard for all forms of imitation. Equally important, Ogilvie focuses on Aristotle's
distinction that harmony does not only involve metre and rhythm but embraces "that music
of language, which, when it is justly adapted to variety of sentiment or description,
contributes most effectually to unite the pleasing with the instructive" (PSS, p. xxvi). Any
poetics worth its name, then, must attribute to all the various parts of the poetic act a
pragmatic end, as well as showing how imitation and harmony contributed to the enduring
appeal of poetic language. For the eighteenth century, this matrix was comprehensible in
terms of an anthropological analogy.
The conventional anthropology of the time theorized that poetry arose earlier than
philosophy based on the analogy of the child of passion and the adult of reason. It was
easy enough to conceive of the growth of society by analogy with the growth of each
individual of the species; equally convincing, the mind should grow like the body. In the
earliest stages of human development, poetry arrives at a degree of perfection as a
species before philosophy emerges to bring order, accuracy, and sophistication to
expression. Like Cobb before him, Ogilvie remarks that "Experience informs us on every
occasion, that Imagination shoots forward to its full growth, and even becomes wild and
luxuriant, when the reasoning Faculty is only beginning to open, and is wholly unfit to
connect the series of accurate deduction" (PSS, p. xxvii). Ogilvie does not condemn this
imaginative excess altogether nor its basis in a more primitive response to nature than
that of the reasoning mind. He says:
The information of the senses (from which Fancy generally borrows her images)
always obtain the earliest credit, and makes for that reason the most lasting
impressions. The sallies of this irregular Faculty are likewise abrupt and
instantaneous, as they are generally the effects of sudden impulse, which reason is
not permitted to restrain. (PSS, p. xxvii; my emphasis).
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This immediacy of response Ogilvie links to our natural, spontaneous love of imitation,
and in keeping with the common anthropological theories of the time he concludes that,
since imitation constituted an innate quality of the mind, "and as the first inhabitants of the
world were employed in the culture of the field, and in surveying the scenery of external
Nature, it is probable, that the first rude draughts of Poetry were extemporary effusions,
either descriptive of the scenes of pastoral life, or extolling the attributes of the Supreme
Being" {PSS, p. xxvii). Ogilvie here connects desire and action to show how they form the
two poles as it were of the poetic impulse: when experience (sense impressions) excite
the fancy, it immediately transforms these into natural description or into praise of the
divinity. Accordingly, Ogilvie draws the conclusion that in terms of the development of the
respective poetic genres, pastoral largely served as a vehicle for description, lyric for
praise of the deity. Thus, as we saw with Thomson, the anthropological theory which
Ogilvie follows means that pastoral experience gives way to the lyric desire to praise.
Ogilvie, however, finds it necessary to offer a further explanation for the distinctive
evolution of pastoral and lyric. He argues that before the rise of philosophy or science,
pastoral reached a state of perfection which science could not improve upon. Because
pastoral mainly served to exhibit "simple and lively pictures of common objects and
common characters" (PSS, p. xxxi), it did not require the services of science to help refine
its concepts or images. Not so with the lyric. While the primitive, pre-scientific period of
development nurtured the emotional basis of the lyric, its expressive aims were always
more abstract than those of pastoral: "The Poet in this branch of his Art proposed as his
principal aim to excite Admiration; and his mind, without the assistance of critical skill,
was left to the unequal task of presenting succeeding ages with the rudiments of Science"
(PSS, p. xxxi). Science here means, of course, natural, moral, and metaphysical
knowledge and not experimental science--and herein lies the significance of Ogilvie's
point. Sidney had argued that the poet needed knowledge of all the sciences: his vocation
demanded it. Yet, while the lyric poet in this early stage allowed his fancy to range without
restraint throughout both the material and immaterial dimensions, his mind "proceeded
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without a guide; and his imagination, like the fiery courser with loose reins, was left to
pursue that path into which it deviated by accident, or was enticed by temptation" (PSS, p.
xxxi). In other words, the lawlessness of lyric praised by so many writers perpetrated a
false standard of excellence. The lyric, because it pursued a higher, more complex artistic
end--to excite admiration for the deity-required the rein of reason, required a form of
discipline. As evidence for this claim, Ogilvie draws upon the classical myth of Orpheus,
the poet/philosopher "who taught the knowledge of God, and laid down the rudiments of
Science" (PSS, p. xxxvi). The poetic powers controlled by Orpheus, says Ogilvie, "leads
us naturally to suppose, that his own mind must have not only received from Nature an
higher share of intellectual qualities than others, but that these must likewise have been
improved by experience and study" (PSS, p. xxxvii).
For Ogilvie, Orpheus offers a handy classical paradigm of the first true lyric poet.
The figure of Orpheus embodies those qualities of mind and spirit which Sidney
considered singularly unique to the poet, and which were essential for him to fulfil his
primary task, to teach and delight:
When the Reformer of mankind turned his Lyre, and raised the mind to the
contemplation of these sublime objects; accompanying the researches of
Philosophy with the irresistible charms of melodious versification; his hearers grew
insensibly mild as they listened; their thoughts were exalted by the greatness of his
subjects; their ferocity subdued by the sweetness and harmony of his numbers.
(PSS, p. xxxix)
Yet after he establishes this classical precedence for the poet's role as the mediator
between man, nature, science, and God, the force behind the growth of civilization,
Ogilvie performs a typical eighteenth-century critical manoeuvre, making the classical
tradition subservient to the Christian.
Ogilvie argues that Orpheus actually learned his lyric art from the Jewish lyricists,
Ogilvie instancing the sublime and inspired poetry of the Old Testament as evidence for
his claim. While allowing that the Greek writers produced some striking lyrics, he declares
that the bible contains songs of praise which outstrip any classical lyrics. The older
historical records of the Jewish people, he notes, indicates that they had brought the song
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of praise to a degree of perfection which the Greek simply copied; the Jewish lyricists not
only produced lyrics which praised their creator, but they developed the literary form in the
direction to which it attained most value. Under their influence the lyric functioned as a
means for teaching about God; Ogilvie in fact considers this teaching to constitute the
basis of science--the biblical lyrics were "a vehicle to convey the principles of Science"
(PSS, p. xlvi), that is, they conveyed the principles of order and causation in the universe
to a culture in clear and vivid language. As we have seen with other critics in this chapter,
the lyric's ability to transform the truths of science into praise of God was one of its prime
excellencies, and lyric poets would, we might suppose, be expected to do the same for
their contemporary culture.
A catalogue of ancient lyric poets with accompanying illustration helps Ogilvie to
distinguish the different forms and uses of language which mark the various lyric types. In
the course of a lengthy discussion of these matters, he emphasizes over and over that
the emotional basis of the lyric sanctions the use of abrupt transitions, bold digressions,
and nervous and sublime descriptions: passion and description go hand in hand.
However, the poet should always remember the basic and highest purpose of the lyric—to
raise admiration in the listener and lead him to praise the deity. Attending to this purpose
required a judicious application of reason. As with so many other eighteenth-century
writers, it would be wrong to assume that Ogilvie's conception of reason was simplistic or
that he saw its application as always and everywhere the same, an undeviatingly
systematic approach to all issues.
After carrying out his historical assessment of the lyric in which he revealed the
abuses of ancient poets, Ogilvie turns to the matter of how modern writers should
proceed if they hoped to achieve success in this genre. He sets about advising writers
about how they could improve their attempts to render lyric experience. In other words, in
keeping with the critical predilections of his times, he feels it a necessary part of his job as
a critic to offer a few prescriptive remarks. He does not, however, want his reader to think
that he wishes to stifle the imagination through rules, and he prefaces his examination of
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the possible rules of lyric poetry with the remark that he would not want it thought that he
"would wholly repress the excursions of this noble Faculty, or that I would confine its
exercise within narrow limits" (PSS, p. Ixxvi). Indeed, to any one who feels that he does
not have a proper grasp of the true nature of the poetic art, Ogilvie adds the rejoinder that
"It must be obvious to every person who reflects on this subject, that Imagination presides
over every branch of the Poetic Art, and that a certain infusion of her peculiar beauties is
necessary to constitute its real and essential character" {PSS, p. Ixxvi). In light of the
primary importance of the imagination in all artistic acts, he goes on to delineate clearly
the way that reason functions when the mind is engaged in creating poetry, arguing that
whatever
degree of superiority the reasoning Faculty ought ultimately to possess in the
sphere of Composition, we are not to consider this power as acting the same part in
the work of a Poet, which it should always act in that of a Philosopher. In the
performance of the latter, an appeal to reason is formally stated, and is carried on
by the process of connected argumentation; whereas, in that of the former, the
Judgment is principally employed in the disposition of materials. Thus the
Philosopher and the Poet are equally entitled to the character of judicious, when the
arguments of the one are just and conclusive, and when the images of the other are
apposite and natural. {PSS, pp. Ixvii-lxviii)
In the case of the lyric-always keeping in mind its primary end, to excite admiration--
Ogilvie accepts that the imagination or fancy must predominate. Since the lyric poet's
subject demands the most exalted feelings and ideas, and since he must try to describe
sublime and beautiful objects, "it is the business of Fancy to enliven the whole piece with
those natural and animating graces which lead us to survey it with admiration" {PSS, p.
Ixxxviii). Thus, rather than a prescriptive catalogue of rules, Ogilvie finds himself offering
advice about language and imagery appropriate to lyric poetry.
The lyric poet needs to possess a genius which can create an extensive variety of
images and bold transitions which display a "picturesque vivacity" {PSS, p. Ixxxix). Ogilvie
argues that in every case the poet needs to restrain the urge to excessive and illogical
usage: he persistently pulls the poet back to what would be accurate, natural, and
comprehensible to the reader:
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It is therefore the business of the Lyric Poet, who would avoid the censure of
composing with inequality, to consider the colouring of which particular ideas are
naturally susceptible, and to discriminate properly betwixt sentiments, whose native
sublimity requires but little assistance from the pencil of art, and a train of thought,
which (that it may correspond to the former) demands the heightening of poetic
painting. (PSS, p. xcii)
The great danger lies in losing sight of the aim of the poem and taking pleasure in the
flight of fancy excited by the poem's object. What the lyric poet needs to avoid at all costs
is a forced, derivative, uncontrolled use of language: the expression should need "but little
assistance from the pencil of art," a sentiment which the new scientists reiterated time
after time. Of course, where the scientist wanted to persuade with clear, naked language,
the poet aimed at a different kind of persuasion, though still a version of truth. The
scientist and lyric poet shared the same dilemma-how to avoid using the ornaments of
language inappropriately. Thus, says Ogilvie, when "a metaphor is hunted down . . . and a
description overwrought, its force and energy are gradually lessened, the object which
was originally new becomes familiar, and the mind is satiated, instead of being inflamed"
(PSS, p. xciii). Both scientist and lyricist needed constantly to make language new.
Ogilvie's views about how to sustain a fresh, vibrant, and accurate lyric language, a
language initiated by real impressions and responses to nature, views which he held in
common with almost all the other writers discussed in this chapter, can be helpfully
understood in terms of the linguistic and epistemological ideals of the new science. Much
of what critics and other readers saw as valuable and exciting in the lyric genre-aspects
such as its capacity for free thought and expression united to discipline and order, its
function as a medium of immediately lived experience, its use of both concrete and
figurative language to evoke accurate descriptions of natural imagery, its ability to lead the
reader to praise of nature and of God, and its function as a vehicle for teaching truth and
beauty-the ideals of the new science, now an important force in their culture, would
already have predisposed them to value and expect. While other forces working
themselves out in eighteenth-century culture effected attitudes to the lyric, we might not
be too off-key to say that, thanks to Bacon, Sidney's hopes for the English lyric were
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realized-at least, eighteenth-century writers and readers testify that the lyric had come of
age.
Chapter Five - Concluding Remarks
The various critical positions explored in the previous chapter illustrated a variety of ways
in which the epistemological and linguistic ideals and values of new-science hegemony
might have helped to initiate a new awareness and appreciation of the lyric's expressive
potential. Whether they were trying to settle such issues as the appropriate structure of
the ode, the types of imagery and figures of speech most natural to lyric experience, the
effect of nature on the poet, or the typical pattern of lyric inspiration, most eighteenth-
century writers (such as Welsted and Aikin) either appealed directly to the standards of
the new science to justify their critical reasoning, or they coded their arguments in terms
which made it plausible to argue that their evaluative perspective was informed by the
ethos of the new science (Ogilvie and Husbands, for instance). The interpretive and
critical benefits of situating the development of the lyric genre in an eighteenth-century
culture which valued highly the ideals of the new science would thus appear obvious
enough; it may still remain somewhat arguable that the hegemony of science effectively
helped to transform attitudes to the lyric genre's potential, lifting it from a minor to a major
genre. It did so because the relationship between the new science and lyric experience
conflated on yet another plane from those explored earlier: when they figured the
scientist's experience of nature, eighteenth-century writers commonly used the same
imagery as that for lyric experience. At a primary, formative stage of mental development-
-that of inspiration-the poet's and the scientist's experience of nature were
undifferentiated, taking the same emotional and spatial pattern. This identification of the
scientist and the lyric poet may still strike the reader as incongruous-after all, one
supposedly aims for objective knowledge, the other for imaginative vision-but it fits easily
into an eighteenth-century sensibility which appreciated the pursuit of science as
intrinsically aesthetic and implicitly religious. In the final analysis, as I confessed in
Chapter Two, it would be impossible to prove absolutely that the new science influenced
attitudes to the lyric genre, but there seem to me sufficient similarities in many aspects of
Chapter Five, p. 280
Chapter Five, p. 281
the ways in which eighteenth-century writers viewed the experience of science and that of
lyric to suggest a plausible relationship.
Henry Pemberton's 1728 work, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy,
published shortly after Newton's death and including "A Poem on Sir Isaac Newton" by the
sixteen-year- old Richard Glover, provides a perfect illustration of this sensibility. The
volume attracted an extensive subscription list which included many poets, among them
Pope, Watts, and Young, many women, and a great number of clergy. In his introductory
remarks to this audience, Pemberton observes that
It is a just remark, which has been made upon the human mind, that nothing is
more suitable to it, than the contemplation of truth; and that all men are moved with
a strong desire after knowledge; esteeming it honourable to excel therein; and
holding it, on the contrary, disgraceful to err, or be in any way deceived. And this
sentiment is by nothing more fully illustrated, than by the inclination of men to gain
an acquaintance with the operations of nature; which disposition to enquire after the
causes of things is so general, that all men of letters . . . find themselves influenced
by it.1
Pemberton's point about the mind's natural bent for rational inquiry and the high social
value put upon the results of its discoveries sounds much like the rationalist cant which
supposedly defines the attitude of all eighteenth-century writers. However, he goes on to
offer a view which should, I believe, be considered typical of the whole period, a view
which commonly integrates the mind's function with a variety of human values which rely
upon a right relation to knowledge. Critically, Pemberton attributes the mind's unceasing
interest in the workings of nature--"our desire after knowledge"--as "an effect of that taste
for the sublime and the beautiful in things, which chiefly constitutes the difference
between the human life, and the life of brutes."2 In other words, the search for and
accumulation of knowledge, however rational, builds towards an aesthetic (and, equally,
religious) appreciation of the world, nature, life, God.
Indeed, Pemberton goes on to argue that the reason why the human mind achieved
superiority over that of a brute's resided not so much in our rational abilities as in the
mind's capacity for "receiving various degrees of delight, where the creatures below us
perceive no difference. Hence arises that pursuit of grace and elegance in our thoughts
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and actions, and in all things belonging to us, which principally creates imployment for the
active mind of man."3 Significantly, in the same type of argument about human nature
which the Romantic writers would use as justification for their artistic distinction from their
precursors, Pemberton invokes an image of human uniqueness which emphasizes the
mind's or soul's desire for beauty and truth:
The thoughts of the human mind are too extensive to be confined only to the
providing and enjoying of what is necessary for the support of our being. It is this
taste, which has given rise to poetry, oratory, and every branch of literature and
science. From hence we feel great pleasure in conceiving strongly, and in
apprehending clearly, even where the passions are concerned. Perspicuous
reasoning appears not only beautiful; but, when set forth in its full strength and
dignity, it partakes of the sublime, and not only pleases, but warms and elevates the
soul.4
This view of the elevating process of mental activity has strong echoes of Thomson's
defence of poetry, and the similarity of Pemberton's aesthetic theory of the mind with
Thomson's emerges even more clearly in Pemberton's observation that "the same taste
for the sublime and the beautiful directs us to chuse particularly the productions of nature
for the subject of our contemplation: our creator having so adapted our minds to the
condition, wherein he has placed us, that all his visible works, before we inquire into their
make, strike us with the most lively ideas of beauty and magnificence."51 emphasise the
phrase, "before we inquire into their make," because it demonstrates Pemberton's
recognition that the search for scientific knowledge, like that for poetic knowledge,
amounts to an attempt to recapture through language impressions and emotions
generated through a complex interrelationship of body, mind, soul, nature, and God's
eternal providence. This process, which "warms and elevates," is initiated and driven by
passion, pleasure, and the desire to praise-before speech, then, the scientist and the
lyric poet meet.
Eighteenth-century writers understood and articulated this inspirational process in
spatial terms. Soame Jenyns explains in "The Art of Dancing," for example, that
Each cautious bard, ere he attempts to sing,
First gently flutt'ring tries his tender wing,
And if he finds that with uncommon fire
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The Muses all his raptur'd soul inspire,
At once to heav'n he soars in lofty odes,
And sings alone of heroes and of gods.6 (my emphasis)
Jenyns' description focuses on the initiatory emotional experience which inspires the
"raptur'd soul" to fly up to heaven where it can then find expression in a lyric poem.
Michael Wodhull relates the same generative pattern of poetical development in his A
Poetical Epistle to [John Cleaver], M. A. (1762), but he provides a more detailed history
of the experience. After relating how as a child he often strayed along the banks of the
river Ouse, and how this filled his memory with a "bright ideal Train," Wodhull says that
here "Full to my View . . . / Coy Science thence disclos'd her kindling Beams."7 Science
here means the knowledge acquired through his first impressions, that knowledge
revealed to his mind through his senses, and this process of impression and memory
generated "a Heat unfelt before" and which, subsequently, "In wild Career spontaneous
Numbers flow'd" (p. 6). As a novice poet writing with unchecked fervour, Wodhull "Struck
the harsh Lyre, and tun'd th'unmeaning String," that is, he wrote without skill, his
"flattering Landschape" growing "Ere Judgment check's the Strokes which Fancy drew" (p.
6). If he would translate these emotions into true lyric poetry, then he needed to begin the
"steep Ascent which Scales the Hill of Truth, / With Learning pure Morality impart,"
combining his love of nature and his impulse to write so that he can perform the poet's
real task, to "Strengthen the Head, and humanize the Heart" (p. 5). Thomas Mercer's "Of
Poetry: An Epistolary Essay" works over similar materials to those of Wodhull and in much
the same temper of mind, and he concludes that he would only give the name of poet to
that writer
to whom Invention brings
The unessential, fleeting forms of things;
And Judgement comes, of piercing look, his guide;
And Taste, coy maiden, blushing at his side;
While kindling Genius, eager for the sky,
His flaming pinions spreads, in act to fly;
To whose audacious flight alone 'tis given
To snatch, Prometheus-like, the fire from heav'n.
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Here genius puts all the powers, qualities, and functions of the other faculties to work by
launching an almost guerilla-like raid on the heavens to bring back truth and knowledge
and a vision of God's providence.
This spatial pattern for figuring inspiration was conventional enough, but it could, as
we saw in Thomson's A Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton, apply to the
scientist's mental processes just as much as to that of the poet's. Isaac Watts, in "To
John Locke, Esq; Retir'd from Business," makes use of the pattern to praise Locke, noting
that
Angels are made of Heavenly Things,
And Light and Love our Souls compose,
Their Bliss within their Bosom springs,
Within their Bosom flows.8
This angelic composition of the soul means that each, despite the limitations of a fleshly
existence, possesses the capacity to ponder the mysteries of being, can "leave the
Cottage or the Throne, / May quit the Globe," that is, each can "dwell alone / With his
spacious Mind." Such a man was Locke, who "hath a Soul wide as the Sea, / Calm as the
Night, bright as the Day." Because Locke's capacious mind gives "his vast Ideas play," he
never "feel[s] a Thought confin'd."9 Watts repeats this image of the free mind and its
impulse to inspired thoughts beyond the bounds of earth in his poem, "To the much
Honour'd Mr. Thomas Rowe, The Director of my Youthful Studies. Free Philosophy."
Arguing that "Knowledge invites us each alone" to pursue the mysteries of the universe,
Watts declares that
Thoughts should be free as Fire or Wind;
The Pinions of a single Mind
Will thro' all Nature fly:
A Genius which no Chain controuls
Roves with Delight.10
Here, as with Pemberton, Watts stresses the experience of pleasure which accompanies
the thinker's search for knowledge.
Examples of this eighteenth-century aesthetic sensibility could be adduced again
and again from a wide variety of discourses, but particularly when we find writers
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embarking on a discussion of the role of science in the pursuit of truth. These examples,
moreover, could be drawn from works published at the beginning or end of the century.
Alexander Campbell's "Ode XII," for instance, published in 1796, begins with the
conventional apostrophe to
Awake, my lyre, awake, my song!
My soul, enraptur'd with the lofty theme
Through space, darts as the morning's beam.--
I'll tell the countless orbs that roll along,
The glories of this nether sphere.--
While soaring in the vast career.11
The rest of the poem provides an enthusiastic account of the new universe revealed by
Newton's laws, while "Ode XIV. To Chemistry" offers up similar imagery. Equally, both
poems offer enthusiastic praise to the creator who fashioned the miraculous universe
revealed by science.
The eighteenth-century lyric, especially as it develops after mid century, can rightly
take its place alongside those other great literary achievements of the period--the novel,
the long poem, the satires, the translations. The critical explorations into its expressive
potentialities and into the nature of its structure paved the way for the poets who followed
after-most of the Romantics poets, after all, began their careers by first working in lyric
forms, drawn to poetry as Coleridge recalled by a language "so natural and real, and yet
so dignified, and harmonious." As Thomas McFarland argues, whatever the Romantics'
yearning to write in longer forms, whatever the cultural gestalt which prompted them to
attempt longer works, in point of fact the form in which they achieved most success-he
calls it their favourite form-was the ode; arguably, most lay readers and general students
remember most and remain most familiar with the great odes.12 Despite the oft-noted and
oft-praised Romantic reaction to science, it is the hegemony of science, modifying and
qualifying the classical impulse, which opens up and releases critical and imaginative
energies throughout the century. The on-going debates over fancy, imagination,
judgment, wit, the role of emotion, the discussions of rhyme and harmony, the stress on
the lyric's expressive function-all these topics and issues received critical attention during
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a period of history in which most areas of thought were affected by the methods and
temper of the new science. In Blake's Songs of Innocence and Experience, and
throughout his work, Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, in his critical formula
to speak the language of men, in Coleridge's stress on Bowles' natural way of speaking,
moreover, the ideals and values of the new science played a positive part.13 Most
obviously, the image of the scientist and that of the poet as similarly inspired seekers after
truth initiated a tension, a fruitful tension-intellectual war, even-which released further
imaginative energies.
Many issues, of course, remain unresolved or not explored in sufficient detail: that
is as is should be. A great deal of work remains to be done towards situating the lyric
genre in its eighteenth-century context. The persistence, for instance, of adamic
philosophies of language in eighteenth-century debate, and the problem of the role of wit
in the creation of poetic language; the values of description and the poetic devices and
figures of speech as employed to articulate lyric experience likewise deserve close
examination; the impact of the image of the lyric poet on society as a whole might also
prove an interesting window on eighteenth-century cultural ideals. Doubtless, other paths
could be followed which would open up new and valuable vistas on the relations between
science and poetry. Such investigations would require, of course, a persistent refusal to
take critical paradigms as forms of gospel, especially as regards mid- and late-eighteenth
century literature, and a willingness to withhold the evaluative impulse, perhaps forever,
when we read and think about these writings, these records of human minds trying to
imagine their place in a changing and complicated "universal scheme."
Notes, p. 287
Notes





















Journal of English and Germanic Philology




Publications of the Modern Language Association of America
Philological Quarterly
The Review of Engish Studies
Studies in English Literature
Studies in Romanticism
Preamble
1 The Gentleman's Magazine (London), 1786, Vol. LVI, September, p. 757.
2 Coleridge, The Collected Works, eds. James Engell and Walter Jackson Bate
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 7:1, p. 17.
3 Coleridge, The Collected Works, 7:1, p. 15.
4 See Bowles's account of his poems in his Poetical Works, ed. George Gilfillan
(Edinburgh: 1855), I, pp. 1-3. Years later Coleridge rationalized the strength of his
reaction to a poet of such transitory reputation as Bowles: "it is peculiar to original genius
to become less and less striking, in proportion to its success in improving the taste and
judgement of its contemporaries" (The Collected Works, 7:1, p. 24). His rationalization,
we note in passing, serves well to explain the Romantic's unresponsiveness to the poetry
of Pope and his peers.
5 Aikin, Essays on Song-Writing: With a Collection of such English Songs as are
most eminent for Poetical Merit. To which are added Some Original Pieces (London:
1772), pp. 20-21.
6 Potter, An Inquiry Into Some Passages in Dr. Johnson's Lives of the Poets:
Particularly His Observations on Lyric Poetry, and the Odes of Gray (London: 1783), p.
15.
7 Cooper, Letters Concerning Taste (London: 1757), p. 47.
8 The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. LV, p. 839; Pinkerton, Letters on Literature
(London: 1785), p. 131. Pinkerton's Letters instigated a series of arguments and counter¬
arguments in The Gentleman's Magazine (see, for example, Vol LVI, March, 1786, p.
252; April, p. 280, 284; July, p. 588): a review in Vol. LV, July, 1785, notes Pinkerton's
remarks about Gray and, although it does not reiterate his enthusiasm, does not dispute
his evaluation. The representation of Collins as a profoundly sensitive, divinely-inspired
poet was well established in the latter decades of the century. See, for instance, Robert
Notes, p. 288
Merry, Diversity. A Poem (London: 1788), who in a roll-call of British poets notes that
"sainted Collins came in meekness due" (p. 21); and, for a similar catalogue of British
poetical greatness, Anonymous, The Grove of Fancy. A Poem (London: 1789): "Hark!
Collins strikes the potent shell; / The Passions throng the magick cell! / And, as
Madness rul'd the hour, / On the strings their soul they pour. /. . . Ah! see, the glorious
Maniack dies! / Each heav'nly Muse, affrigthed, flies!" (p. 37).
9 Aikin, Essays on Song-Writing, p. 20.
10 Sidney, Selected Writings, ed. Richard Dutton (Manchester: Carcanet Press,
1987), p. 143.
11 Maclean, "Theory of Lyric Poetry in England from the Renaissance to
Coleridge," Ph. D. Diss. Univ. of Chicago, 1940, p. 35. Also, p. 36.
12 Dryden, An Essay of Dramatick Poesie, in The Works, eds. Samuel Holt Monk
et al (London: Univ. of California Press, 1971), Vol XVII, pp. 13-14.
13 Norris, A Collection of Miscellanies: Consisting of Poems, Essays,
Discourses, and Letters, Occasionally Written (Oxford: 1687). In their prefatory
remarks on seventeenth-century poetry, Alexander M. Witherspoon and Frank J. Warnke
observe that, while the poetry of the period encompasses a variety of kinds, "The
dominant genre of the entire period ... is certainly the personal lyric, either amorous or
devotional." Seventeenth-Century Prose and Poetry, 2nd ed., eds. Witherspoon and
Warnke (1929; rpt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 710. Maclean feels that
critics came to see the English lyric as a major type sometime in the late seventeenth or
possibly early in the eighteenth century ("Theory of Lyric Poetry in England from the
Renaissance to Coleridge," p. 44). Obviously, although the lyric was rapidly approaching
major genre status, I disagree with Maclean. My reasons for dissenting will become clear
as my argument progresses. Simply put, it is not until after the middle of the eighteenth
century that many writers, critics, and readers clearly share a similar experience and view
of the lyric genre's function and expressive potential; as late as the last decade of the
seventeenth century, most observers still equated lyric kinds with lowly subject matter.
Timothy J. Reiss, in Tragedy and Truth (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press,
1980), argues that "By the late seventeenth century tragedy has become the ideal ordered
and instructive model, the highest of the literary genres" (p. 9).
14 Prior, "A Simile," in The Literary Works, 2nd ed., ed. H. Bunker Wright and
Monroe K. Spears (1959; Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), I, p. 245.
15 Johnson's careful evaluation in his Lives of the English Poets of the positive
influence of writers like Cowley and Waller on English poetry offers an instructive instance
of the eighteenth-century reader's ability to appreciate the way in which his poetic tradition
evolved.
16 Congreve, A Pindarique Ode, Humbly Offer'dto the Queen (London: 1706),
sig. A.
17 Prior, The Literary Works, I, p. 232.
18 Boswell's father, for example, "collated manuscripts and different editions of
Anacreon, and others of the Greek lyrick poets, with great care," work which, fortunately,
provided Johnson and him with "much matter for conversation, without touching on the
fatal topicks of difference." Boswell also relates Johnson's joy at finding William Baxter's
edition of Anacreon in the elder Boswell's library. Boswell and Johnson considered
Notes, p. 289
reprinting the edition. Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL.D,
eds. Frederick A. Pottle and Charles H. Bennett (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1963),
pp. 370-371.
19 The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for
the Year 1788, 2nd ed. (London: 1790) contains at least thirteen lyrics out of twenty-six
poems. The Poetical Preceptor; Or, A Collection of Select Pieces of Poetry;
Extracted from the Works of the most eminent English Poets (London: 1777) includes
numerous lyrics, as does Poetical Beauties, 2nd ed., comp. by S. J. (London: 1803).
See, also, Charles Ryskamp, "Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads in Their Time," in From
Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Frederick A. Pottle, eds. Frederick
W. Hilles and Harold Bloom (New York: OUP, 1965), pp. 357-372, for an account of the
popularity and influence of ballads and songs on Wordsworth and Coleridge.
20 The Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, with Letters to
the Rev. James Brown, D.D., 2nd ed., ed. John Mitford (London: 1855), p. 125.
21 Doughty, Forgotten Lyrics of the Eighteenth Century (1924; rpt. n. p.: Folcroft
Library Editions, 1972), p. 9; Grierson, Lyrical Poetry from Blake to Hardy (London:
Hogarth Press, 1928), p. 19; Davie, Introduction, Augustan Lyric (London: Heinemann,
1974), p. 5; Rogers, "Introduction: the Writer and Society," in The Eighteenth Century,
ed. Rogers (London: Methuen, 1978), p. 59.
22 Hutchings, "To Tempt Creative Praise: New Styles in Eighteenth-Century
Poetry," CQ, 27, No. 3 (1985), p. 73. Ryskamp shows that Wordsworth's choice of title
would not have appeared surprising or radical to contemporary readers, who would have
commonly made lyric forms a part of their poetry reading. See "Wordsworth's Lyrical
Ballads in Their Time," pp. 357-359.
23 Coleridge, The Collected Works, 7:1, p. 19.
24 Poole, The English Parnassus: Or, A Helpe to English Poesie (London:
1657), sig. A4. Edward Bysshe offered a similar catalogue in The Art of Poetry, (London:
1725), I, p. 38: "This sort of Poetry is employ'd in all Manner of Subjects; in Pleasant, in
Grave, in Amorous, in Heroick, in Philosophical, in Moral, and in Divine."
25 See, for instance, Trifler No. XI (1786): "Satire seems to be now considerably
on her decline. She has long since passed her zenith, and the few votaries that remain of
her are only the outcasts and reptiles of genius. The popularity of writings of this nature,
and the repute they are held in, make us lament that they should be so much neglected."
Reprinted in The Gentleman's Magazine, LVI (1786), p. 960. William Coombes, in the
Preface to The Justification: A Poem (London: 1777), argues that "There is no species
of Writing which Mankind abuse with so much virulence in the world, and so eagerly
attend to in the closet, as that of Satire. The Author who possesses a genius for this
species of composition is certain of success; and while almost every one discovers an
outward displeasure at his Works, a rapid and extensive sale generally marks the real
opinion of the World concerning them" (p. i). Collins, we might note, employed lyric forms
as a means of imagining the "higher" form of tragic experience.
26 Maclean, "Personification But Not Poetry," ELH, Vol. 23 (1956), p. 163.
27 See Williams, Keywords (1976; rpt. London: Fontana, 1984), pp. 313-315.
Notes, p. 290
28 Christie and Shuttleworth, "Introduction: Between Literature and Science," in
Nature Transfigured, eds. Christie and Shuttleworth (Manchester and New York:
Manchester Univ. Press, 1989), p. 4.
291 will define more precisely my use of the term "hegemonic" and its applicability
to understanding the development of experimental science in Chapter Three.
30 For a discussion of the various historical meanings and ways in which the term
empirical was understood, see Williams, Keywords, pp. 115-117. Many discussions of
the meanings of science and empiricism in the period could be cited; readers might
usefully consult James Sambrook, The Eighteenth Century (London and New York:
Longman, 1986), p. 1; for an excellent treatment of how eighteenth-century thinkers
generally understood the relations between observations, theories, hypothesis, and
scientific knowledge, see, T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science ofMorals (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 25-45; and Thomas L. Hankins, Science and the
Enlightenment (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), pp. 1-16, gives a good account of the problems
of assigning twentieth-century categories of science to the understanding of scientific
categories in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
31 Jordanova, "Introduction," Languages of Nature, ed. Jordanova (London: Free
Association Books, 1986), p. 15.
32 Eco, The Open Work, trans. Anna Cancogni and introd. David Robey (London:
Hutchinson Radius, 1989), p. 132.
33 Charles Gildon and John Brightland, A Grammar of the English Tongue, with
Notes, Giving the Grounds and Reasons of Grammar in General, 2nd ed. (London:
1712), p. 145.
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2 Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980) p.
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(1931-32), p. 281. See, also, Gay, The Enlightenment, I, p. x: "the men of the
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37 Spate, "The Muse of Mercantilism: Jago, Grainger, and Dyer," in Studies in the
Eighteenth Century, ed. Brissenden, I, p. 120. See, also, Charles Peake, "Poetry 1700-
Notes, p. 295
1740," in Dryden to Johnson, ed. Roger Lonsdale (London: Sphere Books, 1971), p.
165, who notes that, while the "desire for stability was a factor in most of the activities of
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39 John Sitter notes that "Most commentary on eighteenth-century English
literature and most teaching of it splits the century into an 'Age of Pope and Swift' and an
'Age of Johnson', the first ending about 1740, the second beginning in earnest
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is part of scientific discourse" (p. xi). To try and integrate their work into this particular
study would, I believe, lead to less not greater illumination of the issues.
Notes, p. 315
45 For a stimulating account of the way in which competing ideas continue to
condition and modify attitudes and behaviour, see Edward Craig, The Mind of God and
the Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 13-68, and especially pp. 37-38.
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founder of the new experimental philosophy" (p. 32).
91 Cowley, The Essays and Other Prose Writings, ed. Alfred B. Gough (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1915), pp. 26, 27, and 26 respectively.
92 Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, Together with
some reflections upon the New Philosophy, ARS, No. 100 (1963), p. 19.
93 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 101.
94 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 85.
95 Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking: Containing (Besides the Common Rules)
Many New Observations, That are of great Use in forming an Exactness of
Judgment, translated by John Ozell (London: 1717), pp. 1-2. Clearly, the anti-scholastic
mood was still prevalent in the early part of the eighteenth century: Ozell notes that "The
Book I present you with is so full of fine Reflections for the Common Use of Life, and so
differently handled from the Scholastical Manner, that it has been every where well
received, and translated into all Languages" (sig. A3).
96 Ozell, Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking, p. 30.
97 Ozell, Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking, p. 28. The authors add: "This is the Rule
we have followed in speaking of the Opinion of Philosophers, both ancient and modern.
We have both looked only for the Truth, without espousing the Sentiments of either in
general, and without declaring ourselves an Enemy to one more than to another" (p. 29).
98 Ozell, Logic; Or, The Art of Thinking, pp. 28-29.
99 Birrell, Introd., A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, Together
with some reflection upon the New Philosophy, by Simon Patrick, ARS, No. 100
(1963), p. iv.
100 A discussion of the religious influence on the development of the new science
lies outside the boundaries of this work-such an exploration would lead into matters
which, however interesting, do not bear directly enough on the main aims of my
argument. For a stimulating discussion of the competing views about which form of
Protestantism proved most conducive to the new science-puritanism, Anglicanism, or
Latitudinarianism-see John Henry, "The Scientific Revolution in England," in The
Scientific Revolution in National Context, pp. 178-209. My discussion of Patrick's
arguments would support Henry's suggestion that Latitudinarian principles dovetailed with
those of the experimental scientists. Henry does not mention Patrick. See also Perry
Miller, "The Plain Style," in Seventeenth-Century Prose, pp. 147-186. This article was
excerpted from Miller's The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 331-361.
101 Patrick, A Brief Account of the New Sect of Latitude-Men, p. 10. Further
references to this edition are given after quotations in the text and abbreviated as BA.
Patrick's account of reason concurs with Hobbes's: see Leviathan, pp. 81-82.
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102 As Henry points out, this argument about the consanguinity of natural
philosophy and theology went back to at least the thirteenth century: see "The Scientific
Revolution in England," p. 194.
103 The geographical analogy goes back to Bacon: "And this proficience in
navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further proficience and
augmentation of all sciences; because it may seem that they are ordained by God to be
coevals, that is, to meet in one age. ... as if the openness and through-passage of the
world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages" (AL, p. 78).
Also, see Boas, The Scientific Renaissance 1450 -1630, pp. 30-39, for a brief
discussion of the popular excitement generated by geographical discoveries; and Daniel
J. Boorstein, The Discoverers (1983; rpt. New York: Vintage Books, 1985), especially
Book II: "The Earth and the Skies," pp. 256-289.
104 The importance of external factors in the development of science cannot be
underestimated, and I have no wish to do so. In a different context, I would in fact wish to
give greater space to this issue. Theorists and historians of science are now taking the
connections between science and its cultural contexts more seriously. See, for instance,
Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, eds. and introduction, The Scientific Revolution in
National Context (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), pp. 1-10; Peter W. G. Wright, "On the
Boundaries of Science in Seventeenth-Century England," in Sciences and Cultures, eds.
Everett Mendelshon and Yehuda Elkana (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Pub., 1981), pp.
82-100; and James J. Bono, "Science, Discourse, and Literature: Role/Rule of Metaphor
in Science," in Literature and Science, pp. 59-89. Bono's analysis yields suggestive
reflections on the issue of scientific language and its supposed attempt to effect a
separation from other forms of discourse. I feel, however, that he paints a picture too
coloured with the language of subterfuge: Sprat, after all, makes no bones about the
historical and social pressures which bore on the minds of the first members of the Royal
Society and that their project took force as a reaction to that history.
105 Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, For the Improving of
Natural Knowledge, eds. Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones (1958; rpt.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 53. All further references to this edition are
given after quotations in the text as HRS. Sprat reiterates this point elsewhere, linking the
early success of the new science to the political and religious controversies of the mid
century: "For such a candid, and unpassionate company, as that was, and for such a
gloomy season, what could have been a fitter Subject to pitch upon, then Natural
Philosophy? To have been always tossing about some Theological question, would have
been, to have made that their private diversion, the excess of which they themselves
dislik'd in publick: To have been eternally musing on Civil business, and the distresses of
the Country, was too melancholy a reflexion: It was Nature alone, which could pleasantly
entertain them, in that estate. The contemplation of that, draws our minds off from past,
or present misfortunes, and makes them conquerors over things" (HRS, pp. 54-56).
106 Sprat, HRS, n. pag. The first page of the History, by the way, gives an
additional title: The History of the Institution, Design, and Progress, of the Royal
Society of London. For the Advancement of Experimental Philosophy.
107 Hobbes comes to similar conclusions in Leviathan, pp. 66-68
108 Cowley, The Essays and Other Prose Writings, p. 38. Incidentally, Sprat's
contention that a training in experimental science taught one to avoid enthusiasm and
heated debate parallels the anti-authoritarianism of the Port-Royal logicians. Logic, they
say, "is so much the more necessary, as it is exceeding rare to meet with one endued
with an Exactness of Judgment. The World is throng'd with false Thinkers, who are
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uncapable of discerning Truth; who take every Thing by the wrong Handle; who acquiesce
to the most insufficient Arguments, and wou'd impose the same upon others; who are
carried away with the slightest Appearances; who are always in Excess and in
Extremities; who have no Hold-fast to keep themselves firm to the Truths they do know,
because they at first embraced them rather by Chance than by clear Conviction; or who,
on the contrary, adhere to their Opinions with so much Obstinacy, that they will not so
much as give ear to the Reasons which might undeceive them; who boldly give their
Decisions upon Things in which they are utterly ignorant, and which, perhaps, neither they
nor any Body else ever understood; who make no Difference between Discourse and
Discourse, or who judge of the Truth of what is said by the Tone of Voice it is said in: He
who speaks with Ease and Gravity is in the right; he who explains himself less readily, or
seems to be in a Heat, is in the wrong. These are all the rules they judge by" (Ozell,
Logic, p. 3).
109 Biagioli makes the cogent point that the social and class appeal of the Royal
Society was not conditional upon royal or aristocratic patronage but on a sense of
gentlemanly pursuit: "the need of major leaps in social status in order to overcome
received disciplinary hierarchies was not felt as acutely in England as elsewhere on the
continent. Moreover, the king was not the crucial source of legitimation as he was in the
rest of Europe. Although the monarch played an important role in legitimizing the Royal
Society by granting it a royal charter, his financial support and input into the Society's
programme was minimal [unlike the situation on the continent, where monarchs
determined the course of research]. The status and image of the gentleman rather than
the absolute monarch was the source of socio-cognitive legitimation sought by the
practitioners of the Royal Society." In "Scientific Revolution, Social Bricolage, and
Etiquette," p. 33.
110 Cowley's Proposition explains that at his college his professor of experimental
philosophy does not, on Sundays, "trouble himself and his Auditors with the Controversies
of Divinity, but only teach God in his just Commandments, and in his wonderful Works."
Essays and Other Prose Writings, p. 38.
111 Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London: 1675), p.
5; Boyle, The Sceptical Chemist (1661), Introd. M. M Pattison Muir (London: J. M. Dent;
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., nd), pp. 3-4.
112 Cowley, Essays and Other Prose Writings, p. 34. This curiosity about natural
phenomena combined with the demand for accurate observations of natural phenomena
becomes an important element of the eighteenth-century intellectual character. For
example, in a letter to George Staunton, a man sailing to Guadaloupe, Johnson notes that
in "America there is little to be observed except natural curiosities. The new world must
have many vegetables and animals with which philosophers are but little acquainted. I
hope you will furnish yourself with some books of natural history, and some glasses and
other instruments of observation. Trust as little as you can to report; examine all you can
by your own senses. I do not doubt but you will be able to add much to knowledge." In
Letters, pp. 136-137. In The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. XX (November, 1750), p. 493,
a letter signed A.B.C.D. states: "Having a little taste for natural history, I am particularly
entertained by those books of travels or geography, which are large and accurate in their
accounts of the natural history of the places and countries they describe. Under the term
Natural History, I include a history of the seasons, as well as a detail of the animal,
vegetable and mineral productions of countries, and descriptions of their face." Remarks
extolling the pleasure and benefit received from reading natural history form a fairly
regular submission to The Gentleman's Magazine, as well as other eighteenth-century
magazines.
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113 Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, p. 11.
114 Like Johnson after him, Cowley makes a similar point in the Proposition,
arguing that, as a methodology, experimental science does not "check or enterfere with
any parties in State or Religion, but is indifferently to be embraced by all Differences in
opinion, and can hardly be conceived capable (as many good Institutions have done)
even of Degeneration into any thing harmful" (Essays and other Writings, p. 43).
115 Wotton, Reflections Upon Ancient and Modern Learning, 2nd ed., With a
Dissertation Upon the Epistles of Phalaris, Themistocles, Socrates, Euripides', &c. by
Dr. Bentley (London: 1697), p. 365. Wotton provides a succinct review of the basic
principles of the experimental scientists: see pp. 364-365. Likewise Boyle in The
Sceptical Chymist, p. 5, takes it as axiomatic that constant questioning and doubt forms
an integral part of the process of experiments.
116 Cowley, Essays and Other Writings, p. 39.
117 As I noted in my section on Bacon, we must take care when we define the
nature of the new scientists' attitude to language. Bacon wanted writers to make use of
eloquence, just as Sprat here reiterates, seeing it as essential to the fulfilment of the
scientific project. I cannot agree, then, with Richard Foster Jones' condemnation of the
effect of the linguistic ideals of the new science on the development of language in his
"Science and English Prose Style in the Third Quarter of the Seventeenth Century,"
PMLA, XLV (1930), pp. 977-1009, and "Science and Language in England of the Mid-
Seventeenth Century," JEGP, Vol. 31 (1932), p. 315-331, nor do I accept Christie and
Shuttleworth's claim that as "a writing practice, science would now forego the whole realm
of rhetorical persuasion and of figuration" (Introduction, Nature Transfigured, p. 2).
Similarly, Bono's facile gloss on the attitude of language of such figures as Hobbes,
Locke, and Sprat indicates a blindness to these writers' stated positions: see his
"Science, Discourse, and Literature: Role/Rule of Metaphor in Science," p. 62. Ronald. S.
Crane's review of Jones's position strikes me as cogent and valid: see, "English
Literature, 1660-1800: A Current Bibliography," PQ, X (April 1930), pp. 185-186, where he
argues that the prescriptive views of the Royal Society about figurative language did not
extend to other literature; in the same article, see Morris W. Croll's objections to Jones'
interpretation, pp. 184-185. Croll's remarks on this issue at the end of his "The Baroque
Style in Prose," in Seventeenth-Century Prose, ed Stanley E. Fish (New York: OUP,
1971), are also cogent.
118 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 84-85.
119 Dryden, Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco, in The Works,
eds. Samuel Holt Monk et al (London: Univ. of California Press, 1971), XVII, p. 183.
120 Dryden, Notes and Observations, in The Works, Vol XVII, p. 182. Dryden, of
course, was a member of the Royal Society in 1644 and remained one, though not a paid
up member, for a little over three years. During this time he was a member of a committee
for collecting and registering phenomena and experiments, as well as serving on the
committee to improve the language. See, Claude Lloyd, "John Dryden and the Royal
Society," PMLA, XLV (1930), pp. 967-976. Lloyd doubts that Dryden remained committed
to the Society's doctrines, though it seems unlikely that he would not have followed
developments or felt its influence.
121 Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, p. 7.
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122 Wilkins, An Essay Towards a Philosophical Grammar, Real Character, and
a Philosophical Language (London: 1668), p. 20. Further references to this edition are
given after quotations in the text and abbreviated as ETRC. For a fascinating account of
the tradition in which Wilkins's text took shape, see James Knowlson, Universal
Language Schemes in England and France, 1600-1800 (Toronto and Buffalo: Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1975. Equally interesting is M. M. Slaughter's Universal Languages and
Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1982). Both of
these works show just how central to thinking about language were the linguistic ideals of
the new science. For a brief but illustrative account of Wilkins's career and some of the
political and religious background to his work, see Hans Aarsleff, "John Wilkins," in From
Locke to Saussure (London: Athlone, 1982), pp. 239-277.
123 Richard F. Jones makes the point that "The vividness with which material
reality was conceived filled the scientists with alarm lest that reality should be lost through
a faulty medium of communication and lest the manner of expression should usurp an
importance belonging to the thing described. The result was a linguistic ideal which
reduced language to its simplest terms, a single word, being exactly equivalent to a single
thing." In "Science and Language in England of the Mid-Seventeenth Century," JEGP,
Vol. 31 (1932), p. 321.
124 Anonymous. The work was appended to The History of Hai Ebn Yockdan, an
Indian Prince; or, the Self-Taught Philosopher... Set Forth not long ago in the
Original Arabick, with the Latin Version, by Edward Pocock (London: 1686). In ARS,
No. 56 (1956), pp. 199, 207, 197, and 213 respectively.
125 For a consideration of the religious motivation behind the Royal Society's and
Wilkins's view of language usage, see Francis Christensen, "John Wilkins and the Royal
Society's Reform of Prose Style," MLQ, 7 (1946), pp. 179-187, 279-290. Christensen
notes that Wilkins's thoughts about language develop from a desire "to clarify his own
mind about his duty as a preacher. The motive springs from the same apprehension of
the danger of extravagance of speech, and the remedy for correcting it is the same" (p.
289). For a similar argument, see Richard F. Jones, "The Attack on Pulpit Eloquence in
the Restoration: An Episode in the Development of the Neo-Classical Standard for Prose,"
JEGP, 30 (1931), pp. 188-217. Readers should also consult William H. Youngren's fine
article, "Generality, Science and Poetic Language in the Restoration," ELH, Vol. 35
(1968), pp. 158-187. Youngren argues, as I do, that the desire to purify scientific language
did not extend to that of poetic discourse.
126 Dryden, Poems 1681-1684, in The Works, eds. H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., and
Vinton A. Dearing (Los Angeles and London: Univ. of California Press, 1972), II, p. 122, II.
446-450.
127 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch
(1975; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), p. 6. All further references to this edition are given
after quotations in the text as ECHU. For Locke, "'tis Ambition enough to be employed as
an Under-Labourer in clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies
in the way of Knowledge" (ECHU, p. 10).
128 For an account of Locke's theory of language which looks carefully at the way
in which Locke's ideas belong to a tradition of language debate, see Land, The
Philosophy of Language in Britain, pp. 31-77.
129 Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure, p. 57. Aarsleff's chapter on the dispute
between Leibniz and Locke on the purpose and function of words provides a succinct and
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stimulating analysis of the conflicting nature of philosophical thinking at this time. The
nature and reason for the controversies and disputes, as Craig reminds us in his The
Mind of God and the Works ofMan, make sense when we see them as the inevitable
consequence of hegemonic conflict and conflation.
130 Reresby, A Miscellany of Ingenious Thoughts and Reflections (London:
1721), pp. 3-4. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 73-74.
131 Locke reiterates this same idea at various times in the Essay, pushing home
the argument that "the Foundation of all our Knowledge of corporeal Things, lies in our
Senses. . . . The whole extent of our Knowledge, or Imagination, reaches not beyond our
own Ideas, limited to our ways of Perception" (p. 520). See, also, The Correspondence
of John Locke and Edward Clarke, ed. Benjamin Rand (1927; rpt. New York: Books for
Libraries Press, 1975), p. 147.
132 For an interesting and suggestive discussion of the metaphysical importance of
names and arbitrary words during the Renaissance, see Anne Barton, The Names of
Comedy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 3-15.
133 Locke repeats this point on various occasions: however much speakers may
agree arbitrarily to annex or attach sounds to ideas, in the final analysis only the individual
mind can perceive, comprehend, formulate, and determine meaning: "Words in their
primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that
uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelesly those Ideas are collected from the
Things, which they are supposed to represent"; "common Use, being but a very uncertain
Rule, which reduces it self at last to the Ideas of particular Men, proves often but a very
variable Standard" (ECHU, pp. 405, 522). Land's discussion of this issue in his The
Philosophy of Language in Britain, pp. 40-42, does not to me seem to take into account
the way in which Locke tries to solve the dilemma. Land offers a reasonably sound
analysis and critique of Locke's difficulties, but I feel that my approach and discussion of
the problem shows that Locke does offer a valid and credible way out of the dilemma.
134 Elsewhere Locke states: "The knowing precisely what our Words stand for,
would, I imagine . . . quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they
come to examine them, find their simple Ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse
with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different Names. I imagine,
that Men who abstract their Thoughts, and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds,
cannot much differ in thinking-, however, they may perplex themselves with words,
according to the way of speaking of the several Schools, or Sects, they have been bred
up in: Though amongst unthinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their
own Ideas, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but confound them with
words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon" (ECHU, p. 180).
135 In his letters to Clarke about how Clarke might educate his son, Locke
consistently stipulates the need to teach the child according to the child's experiences. In
particular, Locke considered the usual method of teaching the child to read and write in
Latin at a young age to be quite wrong, largely because the child was given exercises
from works which lay well beyond his ability to conceptualize-a method which gives the
child "scraps of authors got by heart; which when a man's head is stuffed with he has got
the just furniture of a pedant." See The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward
Clarke, pp. 148-151.
136 Hobbes and Locke take similar views about language, but they differ in one
important respect. Although Hobbes does emphasize the role of experience in
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determining the truth of a fact, when it comes to examining whether or not an argument
holds water he does not refer back to the things themselves, or at least not directly, but to
the definitions of the words, which should be "rightly joined together into syllogisms."
Leviathan, p. 98 (see pp. 71, 77, and 85). Locke saw little value in using a syllogism to
determine the truth of a word or a proposition, and in formulating his ideas about
education he saw that "the abstract notions of logic and metaphysics ... are fitter to
amaze than inform the understanding, in its first setting out towards knowledge." The best
way to teach a child how to reason was to teach him the relationship between sense
experience and words. See, The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke,
pp. 146-148. For a discussion of Hobbes's view of language, see John Watkins,
Hobbes's System of Ideas (1965; rpt. Aldershot, England: Gower Publishing, 1989), pp.
99-118.
137 Of course, Locke's views on education, developed during much the same
period in which he was working on the Essay, stipulate that the amount of effort required
to fulfil a learning task can reach a point of diminishing return, after which further
application simply works against success. Children, he argued, would only apply
themselves as long as they continued to enjoy the task or subject at hand.
138 Of course, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries various
individuals and groups expended a great deal of energy on just the sort of works Locke
wanted: Boyle's Philosophical Transactions, Chambers's Cyclopaedia, Buffon's
Histoire Naturelle, and Voltaire's Dictionnaire Philosophique, to name a few. Wilkins's
attempt to establish a philosophical character and grammar clearly shares the same
desire.
139 Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke, p. 156. Locke argues
that children rarely receive any benefit from learning the rules and laws of rhetoric and
logic: see, pp. 155-156.
140 Locke's analysis of the abuse of philosophical language echoes Sprat's
demand that scientists should try to speak in plain, everyday language, avoiding obscure
or specialist terms: "In the Names of Substances, for a right use of them, something more
is required than barely determined Ideas: In these the Names must also be conformable
to Things, as they exist. . . This exactness is absolutely necessary in Enquiries after
philosophical Knowledge, and in Controversies about Truth. And though it would be well
too, if it extended it self to common Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I
think, that is scarce to be expected" (ECHU, pp. 513- 514).
141 Elsewhere Locke opines about "how little the preservation and improvement of
Truth and Knowledge, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; since the Arts of Fallacy are
endow'd and preferred. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive, and be deceived,
since Rhetorick, that powerful instrument of Error and Deceit, has its established
Professors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation" (ECHU, p.
508).
142 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 74.
143 Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke, p. 148.
144 Defoe, An Essay Upon Projects (London: 1697), p. 229. All further references
to this edition will appear in the text after the quotation as EUP.
145 Norris, A Collection ofMiscellanies, pp. 146, 147, 148-149.
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146 Rymer, An Essay, Concerning Critical and Curious Learning: in which are
contained Some Short Reflections on the Controversie betwixt Sir William Temple
and Mr. Wotton; and that betwixt Dr. Bentley and Mr. Boyle (London: 1698), pp. 3, 8,
and 9 respectively. All further references to this edition will appear in the text after the
quotation as ECCL. By the way, as if to provide ample evidence of the justness of
Rymer's criticism of modern dilettantism, the anonymous author of An Answer to a Late
Pamphlet, called An Essay Concerning Critical and Curious Learning (London: 1698)
attacks Rymer, not so much for what Rymer says about the ancients or moderns dispute
or much else of import that Rymer discusses but for some disparaging remarks dropped
about Christ-Church College. Rymer's fame, or infamy, rests of course on his apparently
wrong-headed defence of ancient authority in the drama over the modern; as Curt A.
Zimansky points out, Rymer's was not an anti-rationalist spirit at odds with his times,
though most modern critics still consider Rymer a perfect case of the rule-bound pedant.
Zimansky does not believe that Rymer wrote the Essay, though he can offer no evidence
against ascribing it to Rymer. Moreover, he feels that the Essay's "importance ... in the
history of criticism is slight, though it is an interesting commentary on the battle of the
books." The Critical Works of Thomas Rymer, ed. and introd. by Zimansky (1956; rpt.
Wesport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 284; for his remarks on Rymer's
rationalism, see pp. xx-xxxiii. As will become clear through my discussion, I feel that this
appraisal requires some radical modifications: Rymer's views and understanding of
literature and the writing process deserve greater attention. As Earl Miner points out in
"Mr. Dryden and Mr. Rymer," PQ, 54 (1975), Rymer belonged to the venerable tradition of
Renaissance humanism; he knew that Europe's "progress" for several hundred years
rested on discovery of ancient writers, and he accordingly felt that "the ancients must be
imitated, followed, because (and this is the essential thing) such emulation will produce a
revival of learning, a rebirth or reformation of literature" (p. 148). For Rymer, whose
primary concern was for the health of his culture, achieving the purity and fire of literature
meant going "back to primitive truth, for by doing so reform and human progress are
possible" (p. 148).
147 Wotton makes virtually the same points in favour of experimental science as
Rymer in his Reflections Upon Ancient and Modern Learning, p. 169. He says, for
instance, that a fair judgment of a modern writer's accomplishments compared to an
ancient's does not involve arguing about "Whether they were Great Men," since that
stands beside the point, but "Whether the Moderns have said anything upon these
Matters, without Copying out of other Men's Writings." The answer--"unless we will do
them Wrong"--seems beyond debate.
148 Rymer, it must be said, also derided those scientists who speculated about
visits to the moon, building planes, submarines, and other mechanical contraptions,
considering such ideas absurdities. He viewed these as "Contradictions to Nature," but he
adds that "These, I must confess, are Projections that turn upon too subtle and deep
Reasons for my comprehension" (p. 11). Rymer, of course, was not alone in taking issue
with such manner of speculation. See, Thomas Baker, Reflections Upon Learning, 5th
ed. (London: 1714). It ought to be noted, however, why these two writers took issue:
Baker, for instance, distinguishes between "The Genuine Members" of the Royal Society
from those who "over-rate their own Performances" and "who have been so Planet-struck,
as to dream of the Possibility of a Voyage to the Moon, and talk of making Wings to fly
thither," and "nothing," he says, "has done them more injury" (p. 99) than such rash
speculations.
149 Rymer distinguishes between etymological criticism and textual criticism; he
sees the latter as vital to the progress of learning: "had not the Criticks of latter Ages,
when Learning after a long and dark Interval began to dawn and revive again in Europe,
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been very industrious in Publishing correct Editions of antient Books, and putting Modern
Authors upon great Care and exactness in their Writings, that they might at last restore
Letters to the World, we had not at this day seen Learning in so flourishing a Condition,
nor so many Academies, and places of Polite Literature, where Men are wholly set apart
for the cultivation of Knowledge" (pp. 4-5). Given the stress that Rymer puts on the
recovery of correct texts-that textual criticism constituted the most important labours of a
critic-it is hardly surprising to see eighteenth-century writers making the same point. In
Poems On Several Occasions (London: 1727), for example, William Broome offers "a
few things upon Criticism in general, a Study very necessary, but fal'n into contempt
through the abuse of it. At the restoration of Learning, it was particularly necessary;
Authors had been long buried in obscurity, and consequently had contracted some rust
through the Ignorance and Barbarism of preceding Ages; it was therefore very requisite
that they should be polish'd by a Critical Hand, and restor'd to their original Purity: In this
consists the Office of Critics; but instead of making Copies agreeable to the Manuscripts,
they have long inserted their own conjectures; and from this licence arise most of the
various readings, the burthens of modern Editions" (pp. 3-4). Books, he says, "are like
Pictures, they may be new varnish'd, but not a feature is to be alter'd, and every Stroke
that is thus added, destroys in some degree the resemblance . . . Whoever deviates from
this Rule, does not correct, but corrupt his Author" (pp. 4-5). Broome concludes that "it is
ridiculous to make it the supreme business of Life to repair the ruins of a decay'd Word, to
trouble the World with vain niceties about a Letter, or a Syllable, or the transposition of a
Phrase, when the present reading is sufficiently intelligible" (p. 5).
150 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 64. Hobbes equates imagination and memory,
considering them one and the same aspect of mind.
151 In part, Rymer's meditation about memory and invention seems to draw upon
Sidney's argument in The Defence of Poesy that "memory being the only treasurer of
knowledge, those words which are fittest for memory are likewise most convenient for
knowledge." Sidney then goes on to demonstrate that poetry and its ornaments provide
the best tools for improving and exercising the memory. See, Selected Writings, pp. 128-
129.
152 Baker, Reflections Upon Learning, 5th ed. (London: 1714), sig. A3. All further
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ed. Richard Blackmore (London: 1714), a writer defines the ideal critic, and he clearly
shares that tolerance which marked the new scientist's attitude to the past and to new
ideas: "his peculiar Ornament" is that "he is deliver'd from the Ostentation, Malevolence
and supercilious Temper, that so often blemish Men of that Character. His Remarks result
from the Nature and Reason of Things, and are form'd by a Judgment free, and unbias'd
by the Authority of those who have lazily followed each other in the same beaten Track of
Thinking, and are arriv'd only at the Reputation of acute Grammarians and
Commentators; Men, who have been copying one another many Hundred years, without
any Improvement; or, if they have ventur'd farther, have only apply'd in a mechanical
Manner the Rules of ancient Criticks to modern Writings, and with great Labour discover'd
nothing, but their own Want of Judgment and Capacity." The true critic, however,
"penetrates to the Bottom of his Subject, by which Means his Observations are solid and
natural, as well as delicate, so his Design is always to bring to Light something useful and
ornamental" (pp. 8-9).
36 Webb, Preface, Poems (Salisbury: 1790), pp. 39-43.
37 Morrice, An Essay on the Poets (London: 1721), sig. A3.
38 Morrice, An Essay on the Poets, pp. 7-8. He opines that"/ cannot but conceive
Poetry to be at present (and ever to have been as yet) under to many disadvantages
amongst us, to arrive at any very considerable Compleatness; to be even capable of
gaining that noble Simplicity so eminently remarkable in the most celebrated of the
Antients; the graceful, neat, and most admirably seeming Negligence, where the finest Art
is conceall'd under the Resemblance of a familiar Ease, and in reality is the highest pitch
of Human Skilf' (sig. A3-A3V).
39 Baker, Medulla Poetarum Romanorum: or, the Most Beautiful and
Instructive Passages of the Roman Poets (London: 1737), n. pag.
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40 The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol. LVI (July 1786), p. 591.
41 Mark Akenside, for instance, defends his performances in his Odes on Several
Subjects (London: 1745) with the remark that he "pretends chiefly to the merit of
endeavouring to be correct, and of carefully attending to the best models" (p. 2).
Interestingly, in "Ode X. On Lyric Poetry," after a long paean to the ancient lyric, Akenside
concludes with a statement of the emotional basis of the lyric impulse which requires no
models: "But when from envy and from death to claim / A hero bleeding for his native
land; / Or when to nourish freedom's vestal flame, /1 hear my Genius utter his command,
/ Nor Theban voice, nor Lesbian lyre / From thee, O Muse, do I require, / While my
prophetic mind, / Conscious of pow'rs she never knew, / Astonish'd grasps at things
beyond her view, / Nor by another's fire hath felt her own confin'd" (p. 54).
42 Pinkerton, Letters on Literature (London: 1785), p. 211. All further references
are to this edition and appear in the text as LL.
43 In "Of the Standard of Taste," Hume puts forward a similar argument about the
danger of trying to force a young writer to follow strictly any set rules of composition,
especially since "Many of the beauties of poetry and even of eloquence are founded on
falsehood and fiction, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuse or perversion of terms
from their natural meaning. To check the sallies of the imagination, and to reduce every
expression to geometrical truth and exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of
criticism; because it would produce a work, which, by universal experience, has been
found the most insipid and disagreeable" (p. 231). Even so, Hume hardly thinks it
advisable to dispense with the rules altogether: "but though poetry can never submit to
exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or
observation"; typically, he enters the caveat that "though all the general rules of art are
founded only on experience and on the observation of the common sentiments of human
nature, we must not imagine, that, on every occasion, the feelings of men will be
conformable to these rules. Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and
delicate nature" (pp. 231-232).
44 Morris, An Essay Towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour,
Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule (London: 1744), p. xxvi.
45 Baker, Original Poems: Serious and Humourous (London: 1725), pp. viii-ix.
46 Baker, Original Poems, p. ix.
47 Baker, Original Poems, p. viii. A poet with the surname Wicksted offers similar
justification for his efforts in his An Ode for the Year MDCCXVII. To the King (1717), sig.
A2. Also, James Ogden confesses that when he sat down to write his An Epistle on
Poetical Composition (London: 1762), he did so "endeavouring to forget whatever had
been wrote on the subject"; he adds that he took up the subject "having observed the
poverty of thought, so frequently complained of (owing, perhaps, to laziness, but more
immediately to a servile imitation of the Antients) I ventured to speak my sentiments with
the freedom of an Englishman, and a warmth which may be pardonable, if we consider in
how many discoveries and improvements we excel the Antients, and how little interesting
their Fables are to the Trade, Commerce, and Connections of Britain" (pp. 5-6).
48 S. K. Heninger, Jr. points out that, in direct response to the steadily emerging
empiricist ethos, a move to make poetry more depictive was occurring at the end of
sixteenth century. The authority to define poetry as an art capable of creating "speaking
pictures" was found in ancient poetry and criticism. See, "Speaking Pictures: Sidney's
Rapprochement Between Poetry and Painting," in Sir Philip Sidney and the
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Interpretation of Renaissance Culture, eds. Gary F. Waller and Michael D. Moore
(London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 3-16.
49 Morris, An Essay Towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour,
Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule, p. xxvi.
50 Welsted, Epistles, Odes, &c. Written on Several Subjects (London: 1724), p.
vi. All further references are to this edition and appear in the text as EOSS. Welsted,
another of those many poets whose fame lives on only in Pope's Dunciad, enjoyed some
favour throughout the eighteenth century, as a letter to The Gentleman's Magazine, Vol.
LVI (November 1786), signed by J. N. makes clear. The writer, interestingly, puts the
decline in Welsted's reputation down to Pope's poem: "That this ingenious Bard, who in
his day was considered as a rival to Pope himself, is unjustly consigned to oblivion; and
that his character and his verses are with equal injustice and malevolence attacked in the
notes on the Dunciad; I doubt not of being able to demonstrate" (p. 940).
51 Of course, the issue of whether or not the English language had reached a state
of perfection or near-perfection or was perfectible ran throughout the eighteenth century.
The contributions to this debate are so various that it would be impossible to draw any
satisfactory conclusions about any general consensus.
52 Welsted argues that "a judicious Writer may find an opportunity of throwing a
Jewel into our Language, a Word or Expression of more Sweetness and Significancy,
than it had before; but all Men have not the Talent of doing this with Judgment, as all do
not distinguish between hard and elegant Words, or see how Poetry and Eloquence differ
from Pedantry" (EOSS, pp. viii-ix).
53 Like many other writers of the time, Welsted makes a plea for better criticism:
"True Criticism is the truest Friend of Poetry; and all good Poets must naturally wish, that
the Knowledge of it was as extensive and universal, as the Exercise is unlimited, and that
there were as many just Critics or Judges in Poetry, as there are in any other Art" (EOSS,
p. xxxv). Pinkerton doubts that criticism could ever be reduced to laws or rules: "In
speaking of criticism I have avoided treating of systematic, because the ancients knew no
such thing; it was left for the folly of the moderns to frame elements of universal criticism.
An attempt than which nothing can be more absurd; for if no critic hath yet arisen able
fully to discuss one particular branch of this science, what shall we say of him who boldly
undertakes to examine and illustrate the whole?" (LL, p. 514).
54 Welsted, in common with many writers of the time who worried about poetic
decline, puts the blame for this decline on the burden of the past, but not in the same
terms offered by modern critics-the problem lies in trying to imitate or copy the past, not
that the present could not achieve works of equal or greater sublimity. The problem,
moreover, persists throughout time: "If one considers the Herd of Writers, in the past and
present Times, they have, great Part of them, been servile Copiers after others, and this
perhaps is one Cause that the English Genius has not gone greater Lengths. Imitation is
the Bane of Writing, nor ever was a good Author, that entirely form'd himself on the Model
of another" (EOSS, p. xxxvii).
55 For Welsted, "that which truly and lastingly pleases in Writing, is always the
Result of a Man's own Force, and of that first Cast of Soul, which gives him a Promptitude
to excel" (EOSS, p. xxxviii).
56 Clearly, and as Welsted so aptly shows, in order to account for the change in
style and idiom from early eighteenth-century diction to that of the Romantics we cannot
rely solely upon critical or aesthetic declarations about the emotional, imaginative,
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century. As G. S. Rousseau argued so forcefully in his essay, "On Reading Pope," all the
same writerly and "life" virtues which supposedly animated and distinguished the
Romantics from the Augustans are articulated in eighteenth-century writings. I would
suspect that part of the answer lies in the gradual adjustment of the rhetorical principles
of the new science with literary values, coupled with the emergence of writers whose style
provided exempla of the new idiom. Coleridge, we might recall, considered Bowles the
most natural writer he knew, while an essay in The Monthly Miscellany, or Gentleman
and Ladys Complete Magazine (London: 1744) entitled "The Humble PETITION of
EPITHETS, to the Editors of the MAGAZINES," points to the prose styles of "the chaste
Melmonth, the elegant Dr. Robertson, the sententious Hume, the nervous Ferguson, the
judicious Dean Tucker, and the argumentative Beattie" (p. 19) as the reason for the
decline in excessive use of epithets.
57 John Gilbert Cooper, in his Letters Concerning Taste (London: 1757), shows
the same synthesizing urge as Welsted. He defines taste as the "Correspondence betwixt
the Senses, Imagination, and Understanding of the same person" (p. 13), noting that
"Taste does not wholly depend upon the natural Strength and acquired Improvement of
the Intellectual Powers; nor wholly upon a fine Construction of the Organs of the Body;
nor wholly upon the intermediate Powers of the Imagination; but upon a Union of them all
happily blended, without a too great Prevalency in either" (p. 27).
58 Welsted instances Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke as three exemplary men who
worked with their own apprehensions of things and "who thereby have struck out their
Discoveries by the mere Strength of a great Genius, without treading the Steps of any
who went before 'em, and without being much oblig'd to the Assistance of Learning"
(EOSS, p. xxxviii).
59 For Williams's remarks on Thomson, see Prophetic Strain (Chicago and
London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 70-76. Although much of her analysis of
eighteenth-century lyric rarely strikes one as accurate or convincing, Williams does on
occasion break out of her Wordsworthian teleology to make insightful remarks into the
development of the lyric. In general, her approach suffers from a too-trusting reliance
upon secondary sources and not enough research into primary evidence.
60 Aikin, Essays on Song-Writing (London: 1772), p. 29.
61 Aikin, Essays on Song-Writing, pp. 34-35.
62 Maynard Mack stands out as a notable exception to the general tendency to
ignore pastoral conventions. In arguments too numerous to detail here, Mack shows in his
biography of Pope just how significant and integral pastoral was to Pope's development
as a poet. In light of this disregard, John Sitter's point that "historical criticism ought to
regard some of the too-familiar characteristics of eighteenth-century poetry, especially
invocations, apostrophes and personifications, not as 'mere' conventions but as of
poetically deep significance precisely because they are shared and frequent" could well
be extended to include the whole pastoral genre. "Mother, Memory, Muse and Poetry after
Pope," ELH, 44 (1977), p. 312. See, also, Jeffrey L. Duncan's "The Rural Ideal in
Eighteenth-Century Fiction," Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, Vol. Ill, 1968, pp.
517-535.
63 The Spectator, No. 15, 1711, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965), I, pp. 67-68. No. 120, 1711, reiterates a similar point, as do many of the other
numbers, whether by Addison or other contributors to the work.
Notes, p. 343
64 Johnson, The Adventurer 108, in The Works, eds. W. J. Bate et al (New
Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), II, p. 447. Although Johnson tended to make
disparaging observations about pastoral, his reflections on it were by no means
consistently negative: see, for instance, The Rambler, Nos. 36, and 37, in The Works,
eds. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press,
1969), III, pp. 195-205.
65 The Idylliums of Theocritus, with Rapin's Discourse of Pastorals done into
English (London: 1684), p. 4.
66 Creech, Idylliums, p. 4.
67 Morfitt, Philotoxi Ardenae; The Woodmen of Arden, A Latin Poem. With a
Translation in Blank Verse; Another in Rhyme &c. (Birmingham: 1788), p. 5. For similar
comments see the following: The Guardian, ed. John Calhoun Stephens (Lexington:
Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1982), Nos. 22 and 23; Joseph Trapp, Lectures on Poetry
(1742), ed. Malcolm Kelsall (Menston: The Scholar Press, 1973), pp. 33-34; Joseph
Warton, A Dissertation Upon Pastoral Poetry, in The Works of Virgil (London: 1743),
Vol. I, pp. 37-43. Anonymous, The Grove of Fancy: A Poem (London: 1789), pp. 9-11.
68 Cohen, The Art of Discrimination (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), p.
22; James Thomson, The Seasons, edited and introduction by James Sambrook (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981), p. xciv. Readers should consult Cohen's Discrimination and his
The Unfolding of The Seasons (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), and
Sambrook's introduction to The Seasons for publication histories, and appraisals, of
Thomson's writing practices.
69 Cohen, Discrimination, pp. 72, 23 respectively. See, also, Sambrook, Seasons,
p. Ixviii. Besides their works, see also Alan D. McKillop, The Background to The
Seasons (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1942; London: OUP, 1942); Patricia
Meyer Spacks, The Varied God (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959); Otto Zippel,
editor, Thomson's Seasons, A Critical Edition, (1908; rpt. n. p.: Folcroft Library Edition,
1970), pp. xxxii-xl; John Chalker, The English Georgic (London: Routledge, Kegan &
Paul, 1969), pp. 100-134. All argue that The Seasons employs a complex, allusive
structure.
70 Letters and Documents 1700 - 1748, ed. Alan D. McKillop (Lawrence: Univ. of
Kansas Press, 1958), p. 46. Hereafter cited as Letters.
71 Johnson, never slow to criticize, called Thomson "a man of genius" who, if "not
very skilful in the art of composition . . . much will be forgiven as an original, that will not
be forgiven to an imitator, or a successor." Letters, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1952), I, p. 100.
72 See Thomson, Liberty, The Castle of Indolence and other Poems, ed. James
Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 1-5 for the publishing history of Newton.
Sambrook points out that the four "editions" of Winter probably were made up from one
initial press-run; likewise with the four "editions" of Newton.
73 Letters p. 13.
74 Letters, p. 98. This view surfaces throughout the century and is too extensive to
document here. See for example Pope's The Dunciad, Bk I, II. 9-16; Bk IV, II. 627-656, in
Poems, ed. John Butt (1965; rpt. Methuen & Co., 1985); Richard Blackmore, editor, The
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75 Trapp, Preface, The Works of Virgil (London: 1731), I, p. xv. See, also, the
Dedication to Charles Gildon's Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, On Several Subjects
(London: 1694), sig. A3-A8V.
76 Thomson, The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981), p. 303. All further references to the Preface are from this edition and appear in the
text.
77 Pope, The Dunciad, Bk IV, I. 656, in Poems.
78 Pope strikes a similar chord in An Essay On Man, Epistle IV, II. 391-393. In
Poems.
79 Letters p. 76.
80 Thomas Rundle saw Thomson's efforts in this light: "now the muses are grown
coquettes; and boys and rakes have been their only minions. The wise who valued
reputation, have been ashamed to assist them; and it was almost proof that a man
wanted virtue, to say he had often been in their company. ... If [Thomson] reforms these
amiable dames, and gives them once more a taste above delighting in trifles, and
persuades them no longer to be dishonourable handmaids of dissoluteness, he will
deserve our esteem." Letters, pp. 62-63.
81 Thomson's response to Newton hardly needs repeating, nor does the
eighteenth-century's admiration for Newton require documenting here. Helpful works
include Thomson, The Castle of Indolence and Other Poems, ed. Alan D. McKillop
(Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1961), p. 128 especially; Marjorie Hope Nicolson,
Newton Demands The Muse (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1945); E. W. Strong,
"Newtonian Explications of Natural Philosophy," JHI, 18 (1957), pp. 49-83; and Herbert
Drennan, "James Thomson's Contact with Newtonianism," PMLA, 49 (1934), pp. 71-80,
"Scientific Rationalism and James Thomson's Poetic Art," Studies In Philology, 31
(1934), pp. 453-471, and "Newtonianism in James Thomson's Poetry," Englische
Studien, 70 (1936), pp. 358-372.
82 Thomson, Indolence, p. 132. McKillop sums up most evaluations of Newton,
but see also Rundle's remarks, Letters p. 62; G. C. Macaulay, James Thomson (London:
MacMillan, 1908), p. 189; Douglas Grant, James Thomson, Poet of the Seasons
(London: Cresset Press, 1951), p. 109. Regardless of the Romantic depreciation of
Newtonian science, a view too readily disseminated by modern critics, Newtonian science
played an extensive role in the eighteenth-century imagination. W. Powell Jones shows,
for example, that the many biblical paraphrases which utilize Newton's discoveries
"furnish a good example of how poetic imagination can be so enlarged by scientific
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in the reading and daily life of the English people." "Science in Biblical Paraphrase in
Eighteenth-Century England," PMLA, 74 (1959), p. 44. Thomson employs Newtonian
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83 Grant, Thomson, p. 71.
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Thomson's development. An exception is Michael G. Ketcham's "Scientific and Poetic
Imagination in James Thomson's 'Poem Sacred to the Memory of Sir Isaac Newton'," PQ,
61, No. 1 (1982), pp. 33-50. He sees the poem as a "vehicle for an eighteenth-century
mythology of science, a mythology which reflects less the empirical methods of science
itself than an imagery of light derived from the neoplatonic and Christian traditions of
wisdom" (p. 33). Thus, "The elegy for Newton comes near the end of a long tradition of
imagery combining light, intuitive knowledge, and immediate vision" (p. 41). I differ:
Thomson makes it clear that Newton does not belong to any tradition—his works stand
apart from those of the past, his light and motion are new, as I show, Thomson
recommends the scientific method as the necessary way for disciplining the poetic
imagination.
86 For a discussion of the ways in which Thomson confronts the dilemma of the
growing authority of the scientist, see Mark L. Greenberg, "Eighteenth-Century Poetry
Represents Moments of Scientific Discovery: Appropriation and Generic Transformation,"
in Literature and Science, ed. Stuart Peterfreund (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press,
1990), pp. 115-137. Although I read Greenberg's essay quite some time after formulating
my thoughts about Thomson's poem on Newton, certain facets of his argument share
similarities with my reading; however, his concern lies primarily with the way in which the
young Thomson tropes himself into a poet of authority, while my reading focuses more on
the analysis and criticism of contemporary poetry undertaken by Thomson in his poem.
87 Thomson, Liberty, The Castle of Indolence and Other Poems, ed. Sambrook,
p. 6, II. 1-4. All future references to Newton are to this edition and appear in the text.
88 Thomson probably owes the idea to John Dennis who, in 1720, said that
Newton's "Merit is above what the Muses themselves can commend" because he "oblig'd
and astonish'd the Learned World by his Immortal and unparallel'd Treatises; Those
Treatises that have made him an Honour to his Country, an Advancer of the noblest
Learning, and an Enlarger of the Empire of the Mind." In Critical Works, ed. E. N. Hooker
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1943), II, p. 208.
89 Shortly after Newton's death, Henry Pemberton published A View of Sir Isaac
Newton's Philosophy (1728), a popular, comprehensible prose exposition of Newton's
works.
90 Many writers took a similar view about the benefits of science to poetry. See for
example Trapp, The Works of Virgil, I, p. v; John Aikin An Essay on the Application of
Natural History to Poetry (Warrington: 1778), pp. 3-4; John Scott, Critical Essays on
Some of the Poems of Several English Poets (1785; rpt. Farnborough: Gregg
International Pub., 1969), p. 59.
91 Thomson, The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981), II. 355-358. All further references are from this edition and appear in the text. For
the most part I employ Sambrook's abbreviations for the various editions, drawing
attention to particular editions as required.
92 Thomson describes an experience of significance to many eighteenth-century
readers which should not be underestimated. Even Johnson valued such experiences:
during the tour of Wales he wrote that his host's property "sits very pleasantly by the side
of a small river, of which the bank rises high on the other side shaded by gradual rows of
trees. The gloom, the stream, and the silence generate thoughtfulness." Diaries, Prayers,
and Annals, in The Works, eds. E. L. McAdam, Jr., and Donald and Mary Hyde (New
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The Works, eds. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss (New Haven and London: Yale Univ.
Press, 1969), III, pp. 35-40.
93 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of Tory political satire in the face of
an ever more homogeneous political ethos, see Vincent Caretta, The Snarling Muse
(Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), chapters V and VI especially.
94 The pattern which Thomson follows belongs, in fact, to a long rhetorical
tradition, as in a way does his use of the grove as a scene of inspiration. I would contend,
however, that Thomson exploits these conventions in a thoroughly personal way, dwelling
on specific issues only in the grove as a means of concentrating the reader's imagination
on the philosophical and moral concerns of the poem. For a succinct discussion of the
tradition of the grove, see Karina Williamson, "Wild Woods and Sacred Groves," RES,
New Series, Vol. 34, No. 136 (1983) pp. 464-470. For an excellent discussion of the
rhetorical tradition which utilized patterns of blame and praise for the purpose of
educating the politician in the ethics of social duty, see Brian Vickers, In Defence of
Rhetoric (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), ch. 1, "An Outline of Classical Rhetoric," pp.
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95 Thomson owes the personification of Inspiration to a suggestion by Mallet: "I
thank you heartily for your Hint about personizing of Inspiration. It strikes me." Letters p.
45.
96 Thomson's formulation fits into a familiar tradition. In Guardian 34, for example,
Steele remarks that "the great Poet animates all the difficult Parts of Learning by the
Force of his Genius, and irradiates all the Compass of his Knowledge by the Lustre and
Brightness of his Imagination" (pp. 143-44).
97 In Guardian 15 Steele argues that "Deep Reflections are made by a Head
undisturbed; and Points of Wit and Fancy are the Work of an Heart at Ease" (p. 85).
98 For a more detailed account, see Patricia Meyer Spacks, The Varied God
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1959), pp. 133, 143. See also Letters pp. 170, 172.
99 Many of the best passages in The Seasons discuss these relations, as Spacks
notes in The Varied God. "The most effective poetic fusion of aesthetic, emotional, and
moral outlook takes place in The Seasons when nature is conceived as a vast pattern of
order including man, and it is this concept which seems most essentially important to the
poet" (p. 6). For a suggestive analysis of Thomson's appreciation of the importance of
nature to our moral concepts, see Ralph Cohen, "Thomson's Poetry of Space and Time,"
in Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics, 1600-1800, eds. Howard Anderson and John S.
Shea (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1967): Thomson's personifications, for
instance, "suggest human attitudes-ease, authority, disregard-implying that nature has a
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Augustan Mode in English Poetry," in Studies in the Eighteenth Century, ed.
Brissenden, pp. 171-192.
100 Bowden, Poetical Essays on Several Occasions, 2 Vols. (London: 1733,
1735), I, p. 4.
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104 The Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, p. 131.
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106 See, for instance, Chester F. Chapin, Personification in Eighteenth-Century
English Poetry (New York: King's Crown Press, 1955): he shows that a new interest in
allegory and personification occurs under the influence of empirical theories of mind. The
persistent demand that ideas derive from actual sense impressions led to a revaluation of
various poetic figure of speech, and allegory and personification proved their worth
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8).
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(Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1986; London and Toronto: Associated Univ. Presses,
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Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (1975; rpt.
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Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 17.
110 Cooper, Letters Concerning Taste (London: 1757), p. 44. All further
references are to this edition and appear in the text as LCT. Cooper accepts, however,
that a simple or conventional description rarely moves the judgment and "never sinks
deep into the Heart" (p. 44). Cooper's argument derives from Addison, The Spectator,
No. 416, 1712, III, pp. 558-561.
111 Jackson, Thirty Letters on Various Subjects, 3rd ed. (London: 1795), p. 109.
112 Webb, Poems (Salisbury: 1790), p. 41.
113 Webb, Poems, p. 42.
114 Jackson, Thirty Letters on Various Subjects, p. 109.
115 Anonymous, The Lay-Monastery, p. 228. The Adventurer, Vol. I, No. 63,
likewise draws attention to the difficulty of creating truly original or novel descriptions, and
finds that part of the problem derives from a too slavish attention to the past, and part lies
in the objects of sense and in mechanisms by which sense impressions become words:
"The number of original writers, of writers who discover any traces of original thought, or
veins of new expression, is found to be extremely small, in every branch of literature. Few
possess ability or courage to think for themselves, to trust to their own powers, to rely on
their own stock; and, therefore, the generality creeps tamely and cautiously in the track of
their predecessors. . . .It happens unfortunately in poetry, which principally claims the
merit of novelty and invention, that this want of originality arises frequently, not from a
barrenness and timidity of genius, but from invincible necessity and the nature of things.
The works of those who profess an art whose essence is imitation, must needs be
stamped with a close resemblance to each other; since the objects material or animate,
extraneous or internal, which they all imitate, lie equally open to the observation of all, and
are perfectly similar. Descriptions, therefore, that are faithful and just, must be uniform
and alike; the first copier may be, perhaps, entitled to the praise of priority; but a
succeeding one ought certainly not to be condemned for plagiarism" (p. 373-374).
116 Anonymous, The Lay-Monastery, p. 223. The writer feels compelled to make a
typical statement about the quality of English poetry: "I shall conclude this Paper with a
Remark, which I believe will be allow'd by all impartial Criticks, That whoever will take the
Pains to look into the several Descriptions of this Kind, which may be found in the Works
of ancient and modern Writers, will find that the English Poets have describ'd the Morning
with at least as much Elegance of Fancy as any others have done, and with more Variety"
(p. 233).
117 Webb, Poems, p. v.
118 Webb, Poems, p. vi.
119 Coward, Licentia Poetica Discuss'd: Or, the True Test ofPoetry (London:
1709), sig. A2. All further references are to this edition and appear in the text as LPD.
120 Coward's view that poor poetry must result from the many and various
misguided prescriptions offered to the eighteenth-century poet throws another log on the
burden of the past fire; and his point deserves a hearing, it seems to me, if for no other
reason than that it does surface in so many discussions on the state of English poetry,
whether these take place at the beginning, middle, or end of the century. A large body of
opinion during the century felt that, while studying ancient models could provide
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invaluable hints about how to structure a work, the distance in time and the differences in
language, customs, and daily concerns of the respective ages meant that the modern
needed to establish his own content and linguistic style. Spectator 29, for instance,
contends that "Musick, Architecture, and Painting, as well as Poetry and Oratory, are to
deduce their Laws and Rules from the general Sense and Taste of Mankind, and not from
the Principles of those Arts themselves; or in other words, the Taste is not to conform to
the Art, but the Art to the Taste. Musick is not design'd to please only Chromatick Ears,
but all that are capable of distinguishing harsh from disagreeable Notes." Thus, English
music could benefit greatly from Italian opera, as long as "the Subject Matter of it be
English." The Spectator, I, p. 123.
121 See, for instance, "An Apology for Poetry, in an Essay directed to Walter Moil
Esq," in Charles Gildon's Miscellaneous Letters and Essays, on Several Subjects
(London: 1694), p. 16, and Isaac Watts, Horae Lyricae. Poems, Chiefly of the Lyric
Kind, 8th ed. (London: 1743), pp. iii, viii, xxi.
122 Watts, Horae Lyricae, 8th ed. (London: 1743), pp. xxi and xxii.
123 Wicksted, in An Ode for the Year MDCCXVII. To the King (London: 1717),
apologizes in the Preface for "giving so lofty a Title to a Number of Verses, which have
nothing of the divine Fury of a Poet to recommend them: A Composition, where Fiction as
well as the Embellishments of Description and Similitude is entirely wanting." However
lacking in descriptive accurateness or appropriate poetical adornment, Wicksted defends
his poem with the observation that "upon the Subject of all others the most Universally
Entertaining, they have succeeded the Best, who wrote from their Hearts; I was so secure
of this, which I thought the Grand Qualification, that I never examin'd my self about any
other" (sig. A2).
124 The Guardian reiterates Coward's point, and it does so in a language which
both reveals and obscures its participation in the linguistic ethos of the new science:
Number 13 declares that "clear Conception will produce clear Expression, and clear
Expression proper Action," while Number 15 lays down the critical axiom that "every
Thought which is agreeable to Nature, and expressed in a Language suitable to it, is
written with Ease" (pp. 80 and 84 respectively).
125 Coward typically declares that when it comes to comparing the descriptive
poetry of ancients and moderns he wagers that "We are not inferior to Them in the least"
(,LPD, p. 60).
126 See Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc., 2
Vols., ed. John M. Robertson (London: Grant Richards, 1900), pp. 94-97.
127 Cooper echoes here Addison in The Spectator, No. 413, 1712, III, pp. 545-546.
128 Besides warning against using a too luxuriant or witty language, Coward takes
issue with too much repetition of both argument ("which will scarce bear a second
Reading") and "insipid tedious long Descriptions" (LPD, p. 30) in a poem.
129 Contemporary debates about factors such as metre, transitions, language, and
control bear out Coward's sense of a decided lack of consensus about the basic structural
and linguistic conventions of the lyric genre. See, for instance, Congreve's A Pindarique
Ode, Humbly Offer'd to the Queen ... To which is prefix'd, A Discourse on the
Pindarique Ode (London: 1706), sig. A-A3V, Prior's "An Ode, Humbly Inscrib'd to the
Queen. On the Glorious Success of Her Majesty's Arms" (1706), in The Literary Works,
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2nd ed. Eds. H. Bunker Wright and Monroe K. Spears (1959; Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), I,
pp. 230-232, and Samuel Cobb's two poems, Bersaba: Or, The Love of David (London:
1695), sig. A2-Bv; The Female Reign: An Ode, Alluding to Horace, B.4 Od. 14 ... With
a Letter to a Gentleman in the University (London: 1709), pp. 3-4.
130 In a similar frame of mind to Coward, John Dart notes in his Preface to his
translation of The Works of Tibullus (London: 1720) that English elegy writers laboured
under a severe shortcoming. He laments that records from the ancients do not provide an
account of the "first Inventor" (p. iii) of this type of poetry, and as a consequence elegy,
"as practis'd with us, is improperly so call'd, since it is bound to our Heroick Measure, yet
the nature of it is the same" (p. x). While Dart accepts that several modern critics—he
notes the Duke of Buckingham-have established "rules for an English Elegy . . . founded
on a just Judgment, and an exquisite Discernment of what an English Genius can bear"
(p. xii), he nonetheless wishes "that we had an exact Model for Elegy" derived from
ancient practice since "No Moderns have better succeeded than those who have been
observers of the Rules and Writings of the Ancients" (p. xxiii). Interestingly, while Dart
looks to the ancients for a proper model, when it comes to translating the sexually explicit
passages in ancient elegy he argues that "an English Translator is by no means
excusable to transplant the Crimes of other Countries into his own, when the soil is of its
own accord too productive of that growth" (p. xxxviii).
131 Congreve, A Pindarique Ode, Humbly Offer'd to the Queen, sig. A.
132 Dart, translator, The Works of Tibullus, makes a similar point about the use of
transitions in the elegy. While he accepts that an elegiast should make use of frequent
transitions because the subject matter of this type of poem permits such a style of writing,
he nevertheless censures poets who fail to understand the difference between a natural
transition and an artificial one: the style of an elegy "ought to be suitable to the Subject,
soft, smooth, fluent, easie, and harmonious, of sweet and solemn Voice, not swelling,
sounding, nor harsh, not too many Exclamations, nor too frequent Repetitions, Practices,
frequently common among some late Writers, to supply the Defect of natural passionate
Thoughts, and hide the Want of Numbers, loose and unerv'd Writings" (pp. xxiv-xxv).
133 Bowden, "The RETREAT: or Contemplative Solitude. Inscribed to the Right
Honourable the Countess of HERTFORD," in Poetical Essays on Several Occasions
(London: 1733), I, p. 4.
134 Of course, Coward's own sense of what constituted a great English lyric hardly
provides evidence of his critical acumen. He felt that "if any where Great Pindar Lives, /
And in our English Verse again survives, / By Transmigration in Another Shape, / Sprat's
Plague of Athens seems His Soul t'enwrap" (LPD, p. 64).
135 Coward's pessimism about the demand for rhyme was not, of course, ill-placed.
In his An Essay on Poetry (London: 1709), John Sheffield observes that "Number, and
Rhime, and the harmonious sound, / Which never does the Ear with Harshness wound, /
Are necessary" (p. 4) in all lyric poems, but like Coward he defines number and rhyme as
"yet but vulgar Arts" and "superficial parts" which "all in vain ... I Contribute to the
Structure of the whole / Without a Genius too, for that's the Souf' (p. 4).
136 Husbands, publisher, A Miscellany of Poems by Several Hands (Oxford:
1731), sig. A2. All further quotations are to this edition and appear in the text as PSH.
13/ Dart, translator, The Works of Tibullus, p. v.
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138 Jones writes: "It seems probable then that poetry was originally no more than a
strong, and animated expression of the human passions, of joy, and grief, love, and hate,
admiration, and anger, sometimes pure and unmixed, sometimes variously modified and
combined: for, if we observe the voice and accents of a person affected by any of the
violent passions, we shall perceive something in them very nearly approaching to
cadence and measure; which is remarkably the case in the language of the vehement
Orator" (p. 193). Jones, in fact, contends that the genres arose from real experiences,
that initially poetry did not imitate but expressed an actual state-refinements, polishing,
and art followed later. As Jones argues, "A man, who is really joyful or afflicted, cannot be
said to imitate joy or affliction" (pp. 201-202). Accordingly, he says that "we may define
original and native poetry to be the language of the violent passions, expressed in exact
measure, with strong accents and significant words; and true musick to be no more than
poetry, delivered in a succession of harmonious sounds, so disposed as to please the
ear" (p. 200). Poems, Consisting Chiefly of Translations from the Asiatick Language,
2nd ed. (London: 1777).
139 The anonymous author of An Hymn to God (London: 1746), for example,
makes this precise link between Pindaric and scriptural sublimity: see pp. viii-ix.
140 Thomas Parnell, in An Essay on the Different Stiles of Poetry (London:
1713), contends that allegory "is not only engaging to the Fancy whenever it is well
perform'd, but it has been thought also one of the first [ways of writing] that the Poets
made use of' (sig. A3V). He sees allegory as a particularly useful poetic device for
teaching truth in a pleasing way, and he considers that "there seems to be no likelier way
by which a Poetical Genius may yet appear as an Original, than that he should proceed
with a full compass of Thought and Knowledge, either to design his Plan, or to beautify
the Parts of it, in an Allegorical manner" (sig. A3V-A4). We may suppose that Parnell's
observations about allegory go some way towards explaining the popularity of
personifications and allegorical figures in eighteenth-century poetry: not only were they
considered to bring the poet close to the sources of poetry (to nature) but they offered a
means of expressing original thoughts. A poet like Collins exploited this view of allegory in
quite obvious ways.
141 While Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance (London: 1762) constitute the
best-known analysis of the positive strengths of allegorical figures and the use of
imaginary beings in poetry, what he called "a world of fine fabling; the illusion of which is
so grateful to the charmed Spirit' (p. 120), his arguments about this issue do not differ
markedly or radically from writers whom I discuss in this chapter. Hurd, of course, usually
makes it into the ranks of the pre-romantics based on his attacks on "the philosophic
moderns" who Hurd declared "have gone too far, in their perpetual ridicule and contempt"
(p. 4) of poetry. However, a close reading of Hurd's Letters shows that, while he censures
reason for demanding that fancy accept its reins, his targets were really those neo¬
classical critics who misapplied generic rules based on ancient models (a point made by
quite a few eighteenth-century critics), who judged Gothic art by Grecian standards (pp.
55-60); and, he says, a type of reason assisted "by party, and religious prejudices" (p.
119). This brand of critic "would endure these lying wonders, neither in their own proper
shape, or as masked in figures" and so they "drove them off the scene" (p. 119). Typically,
Hurd declares that the only way to rectify this type of bad criticism is by proceeding in a
properly philosophic manner: "The only criticism, indeed, that is worth regarding is, the
philosophical, but there is a sort which looks like philosophy, but is not" (p. 88).
142 Andrews, Eidyllia: Or, Miscellaneous Poems (Edinburgh: 1757), p. 3. All
further quotations are from this edition and appear in the text as EMP.
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143 Hurd, Letters on Chivalry and Romance, develops a similar argument as
Dryden. See, pp. 89-93.
144 Dryden, Essays, ed. W. P. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900), p. 187.
145 Similarly, Sheffield, in his An Essay on Poetry, declares that, unless a poem
exudes some "Spirit which inspires the Work throughout," no degree of ornamentation will
save it from the fate of mediocrity. Just as the spirit or force "of Nature moves the World
about," so too does the poetical spirit provide "A Heat which glows in every word that's
writ, / Tis something of Divine, and more than Wit' (p. 4).
146 Aikin, An Essay on the Application ofNatural History to Poetry (Warrington:
1778), p. 1. All further references are to this edition and are included in the text as
EANHP
147 For a revealing discussion of the way in which eighteenth-century writers
appropriated the language of science, and their attitude to the value of scientific terms in
producing accurate descriptions, see John Arthos, The Language ofNatural Description
in Eighteenth-Century Poetry (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1949). See,
especially, his remark that critics often fail to appreciate the language of eighteenth-
century poetry because we take for granted that the scientific "terms meant what they
seemed to mean, and nothing else," when in fact "In the eighteenth century, their
associations were taken for granted, and so there was no need for comment" (p. 27).
148 Aikin does not reject imitation or copying out of hand-he provides a number of
examples from Shakespeare, Milton, Collins, and Gray which show how a poet could
borrow an image and adapt it with accuracy and elegancy. See, p. 9.
149 For a brief but illuminating discussion of Aikin's Essay, see Jeffrey Plank, "John
Aikin on Science and Poetry," Studies in Burke and His Time, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1977), pp.
167-178. Plank rightly points out that Aikin, "A contemporary of Johnson, Wordsworth,
and Coleridge and one of the most important dissenting critics at the turn of the
nineteenth century . . . has not been given much attention in our time. He is known as a
perceptive critic of Thomson and as an innovative thinker in medical theory, science,
politics, and economics, but his application of scientific methodology to literary studies
has been ignored" (p. 167). (Of course, as Plank's notes indicate, Aikin has not been
completely ignored.) As Plank argues, "Aikin's literary criticism has its conceptual
underpinnings in his medical studies and the reality basis of their value; his systematic
thinking about scientific problems allows him to recognize traditional critical positions as
problems and to suggest how conceptions of experience derived from empirical
disciplines alter thinking about poetry" (p. 167). See, also, William Powell Jones, "John
Aikin on the Use of Natural History in Poetry," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
Vol. 21 (1963), pp. 439-443. Jones argues that Aikin's critical articulation of the
relationship between natural history and descriptive poetry "was new to criticism when he
wrote An Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry in 1777" (p. 440).
Jones also points out that, while the tradition of physico-theologicai poetry made use of
plants and animals to prove the wisdom of God, using discoveries made with the
microscope to discuss marvels, the common objects of natural history do not become
common discussion points until after mid century. Only after Linnaeus' system of
classification did plants and animals become popular, particularly with amateurs, and
Aikin's observations about the necessity to pay close attention to natural history thus fell
upon receptive ears. Interestingly, in my copy of Aikin's Essay a somewhat cryptic, hand¬
written note on an inner leaf reads: "ever since I read your Aiken on the practical use of
Natural History, a favourite study of mine, the characters of the Vegetable & the manners
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of the Animal Kingdoms." The note is signed Bums to Dugald Stewart, July 30, 1790.
150 Soame Jenyns, in "An EPISTLE, Written in the COUNTRY, to the Rt. Hon. the
Lord Lovlace," articulates similar ideas, though with a more satirical object in mind. In
Miscellaneous Pieces (London: 1761), I, pp. 42-43.
151 Young, Ocean. An Ode.... To which is prefix'd, An Ode to the King: And a
Discourse on Ode (London: 1728), p. 3 and p. 25 respectively. All further references are
to this edition and appear in the text as OO.
152 Shepherd, Odes, Descriptive and Allegorical, 2nd ed. (London: 1761), p. iii.
All further references are from this edition and appear in the text as ODA.
153 Scott, Critical Essays on Some of the Poems of Several English Poets
(1785; rpt. Gregg International Pub., 1969), p. 12. All further references are to this edition
and appear in the text as CESP.
154 Williamson, "Smart's Principia: Science and Anti-Science in Jubilate Agno,"
RES, Second Series, Vol. 30, No. 120 (1979), p. 411. Thus, when it came to a clash
between biblical doctrine or fable and new scientific discoveries "Smart is clearly not
interested in the scientific arguments. The authority of the word of God sweeps away all
empirical objections" (p. 411).
155 Aikin, Essays on Song-Writing: With a Collection of such English songs as
are most eminent for Poetical Merit. To which are added Some Original Pieces
(London: 1772), p. viii. All further references are to this edition and appear in the text as
ESS.
156 Robert Potter, in his An Inquiry into some Passages in Dr. Johnson's Lives
of the Poets: Particularly his Observations on Lyric Poetry, and the Odes of Gray
(London: 1783), pp. 13-14, makes the same point. The desire by some critics to see the
lyric genre as a product of more refined and civilized social structures indicates, in a minor
way, that the lyric genre had reached major genre status.
157 Pinkerton's division of the lyric into the sublime and beautiful indicates clearly
that his categories derive from Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin
of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757). Since my intent in this work is not
to trace specific critical and aesthetic influences between major and minor writers, as I
mentioned in the introduction, a detailed account of Burke's ideas has not been
undertaken. However, the thorough-going empiricism of Burke's study further supports my
argument that the ideals of the new science influenced debate about poetry.
158 Francis, A Poetical Translation of the Works of Horace (London: 1753), I, p.
xi.
159 The Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, with Letters to
the Rev. James Brown, D. D., pp. 71-72.
160 The Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, with Letters to
the Rev. James Brown, D. D., p. 108.
161 The Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, with Letters to
the Rev. James Brown, D. D., p. 72.
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162 West, trans, Odes of Pindar (London: 1749), sig. A3. All further references are
to this edition and appear in the text as OP. This debate about the structure of the ode
carries on throughout the century. See, for instance, William Preston, "Thoughts on Lyric
Poetry," in The Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy (Dublin: 1787), pp. 57-73.
163 Francis, A Poetical Translation of the Works of Horace, p. xii.
164 Sheffield, An Essay on Poetry, p. 7.
165 Francis, A Poetical Translation of the Works of Horace, I, pp. ix-xiii, once
again agrees with West, but he argues as well that he studied a number of English stanza
forms which seemed to suit Horace's subject matter and therefore adopted them instead
of trying to match English measure to Horace's forms.
166 Preston accepts most of West's arguments (though he comes to the debate
through Mason's remarks on one of Gray's odes), but he does not think that the strophe,
antistrophe, or epode are necessary in English, or that a regular ode makes it more
difficult to write lyric poetry than an irregular ode. See, "Thoughts on Lyric Poetry," pp. 61-
62.
167 Preston, for instance, argues that the irregular ode requires a high degree of
skill and talent for any hope of success: see, "Thoughts on Lyric Poetry," pp. 69-73. For a
brief but instructive discussion of the terms of this debate, see Roger Lonsdale, ed., The
Poems of Gray, Collins and Goldsmith (1969; rpt. New York: Longman Group Ltd,
1980), pp. 158-160.
168 Thomas Gray, for example, makes a distinction between a nature which
displayed God's power and could therefore move the imagination and that lesser, more
habitual nature familiar to the urban dweller. He writes: "I am returned from Scotland
charmed with my expedition; it is of the Highlands I speak; the Lowlands are worth seeing
once, but the mountains are ecstatic, and ought to be visited in pilgrimage once a year.
None but those monstrous creatures of God know how to join so much beauty with so
much horror. A fig for your poets, painters, gardeners, and clergymen, that have not been
among them; their imagination can be made up of nothing but bowling-greens, flowering
shrubs, horse-ponds, Fleet-ditches, shell-grottoes, and Chinese rails." The
Correspondence of Thomas Gray and William Mason, with Letters to the Rev. James
Brown, D. D., p. 349.
169 Smollett, Ode to Independence (Glasgow: 1773), p. 9.
170 Ogilvie, Poems on Several Subjects (Dublin: 1769), I, p. cxxiii. All further
references are to this edition and volume and appear in the text as PSS.
Chapter Five - Concluding Remarks
1 Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy (London: 1728), pp. 2-3.
2 Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, p. 3.
3 Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, p. 3.
4 Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, p. 3.
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5 Pemberton, A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy, pp. 3-4.
6 Jenyns, Miscellaneous Pieces (London: 1761), I, p. 20.
7 Wodhuli, A Poetical Epistle to [John Cleaver], M.A., 2nd ed. (London: 1762),
pp. 5-6. Alt further references are to this edition and appear in the text.
8 Watts, Horae Lyricae. Poems, Chiefly of the Lyric Kind, 8th ed. (London:
1743), p. 147.
9 Watts, Horae Lyricae, p. 148.
10 Watts, Horae Lyricae, pp. 171-172.
11 Campbell, Odes and Miscellaneous Poems. By a Student ofMedicine in The
University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: 1796), p. 18. See, also, Anonymous, A Poem
Sacred to the Memory of John Gregory, M. D. (Edinburgh: 1773), for similar imagery
and sentiments about a man of science.
12 McFarland, Romanticism and the Ruins of Form (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1981), p. 54; see also pp. 3-55 on the importance of fragmentation and of
fragmented works as critical registers of cultural stability, and pp. 216-254 for the problem
of evaluating the longer, fragmented, incomplete works.
13 To enter into the debate about the Romantics and science would, of course,
entail a lengthy disquisition. That they were informed and influenced by science in a
positive way seems beyond doubt, even when we take note of their negative
protestations. See, for instance, Trevor H. Levere, "The Lovely Shapes and Sounds
Intelligible': Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Humphry Davy, Science and Poetry," in Nature
Transfigured, eds. John Christie an Sally Shuttleworth (Manchester and New York:
Manchester Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 85-101; Donald Ault, Visionary Physics (1974; rpt.
Chicago and London: Univ. Of Chicago Press, 1975).
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